Honble PRASAD, J. – The present writ petition has been filed by petitioner-Union representing workers working with respondent- Rajasthan State Mines & Minerals Ltd. Petitioner is a registered Trade Union. There is another Union functioning, known as Rock Phosphate Mazdoor Sangh (INTUC), which is the respondent in the present petition. Petitioner contends that a long term settlement was entered in between the parties which purported to be for the period commencing from 1.10.1992 to 13.9.1997. This settlement was arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings. Petitioner has produced a copy of settlement as Annex.2 to the writ petition. It has been urged on behalf of petitioner that in the settlement, in paragraph 35, rights of the Union have been recognised. Union had a right to deal with the Company on various counts where right of the workers were to be protected. (2). Union has very valuable function to discharge and in view thereof, recognition by respondent-Company assumes importance for the enforcement of Annex.2. Petitioner-Union and the respondent- Union submitted to the respondent-Company that a joint meeting should be held to implement the long term Settlement (Annex.5). Negotiations were undertaken by the parties. It was agreed as per Annex.3 that till the question of recognition is solved, both the Unions will carry on neglitations with the Management jointly, in respect of all the terms of general nature. A joint meeting between the Management, representatives of the petitioner-Union and respondent-Union, was held on 21st November, 1996 and an agreement was arrived at in between the parties. In this agreement (Annex.4) question regarding the recognition of the Union was also discussed and following decision in this regard was taken: ``On the contention of RSMM Karamchari Sangh (PMS) to know the decision about the period of recognition by the management, the managements representatives submitted that they will give recognition to the majority Union for 5 years. This is in view of the FCI Case, where the Honble SC has laid down the procedure for conducting the election through secret ballot or assessing the representatives character of the Trade Unions. (3). Yet another meeting of the Management and representatives of petitioner-Union and the respondent-Union was also held on 21st December, 1996. In this meeting, question of recognition was once again considered vide Annex. 5 to the writ petition and agreement was drawn. (3). Yet another meeting of the Management and representatives of petitioner-Union and the respondent-Union was also held on 21st December, 1996. In this meeting, question of recognition was once again considered vide Annex. 5 to the writ petition and agreement was drawn. Following decision was taken in regard to the recognition :- ``This point was referred to the Chief Labour Commissioner (C) New Delhi and it is clarified by the office of CLC(C) New Delhi that verification of the membership of Unions under the code of discipline is undertaken for grant of recognition for 2 years only. So far the recognition period of 5 years in respect of FCI is concerned, that was done as per direction of the Honble SC. This direction was applicable to FCI exclusively. This is informed to both the Unions and the management during the meeting. (4). The case of petitioner-Union is that parties had agreed that recognition will be granted to the Union after the polls. The pools will be held in terms of Annex. 4 and Annex.5. Recognition so granted will be for two years. This agreement in between the parties has given out an assurance to the workers at large that whatever proceedings take place, will be valid for two years. The term of recognition would be for two years. The assurance contained in Annex.5 operates as estopple against the respondents. After expiry of term of two years, they are required to re-determine the right of recognition of the Union. (5). Petitioner has further emphasized that having agreed to keep the recognition valid for two years, the respondent-Company is estopped by the principle of promissory estopple. It cannot turn around and deny the petitioner Union, an opportunity to seek recognition for representation of the workers. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the observations of their Lordships of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Delhi Cloth & General Mills Ltd. vs. Union of India (1), wherein in para 27 it has been observed as under :- ``The last and final aspect of the matter to which attention should be drawn is that for the purpose of finding whether an estopple arises in favour of the person acting on the representations, it is necessary to look into the whole of the representation made. It is also necessary to state that the representation must be clear and unambiguous and not tentative or uncertain. (6). It has been stressed on behalf of learned counsel for the petitioner that in Annex.5, a clear and unambiguous statement is contained that recognition would be only for two years. Respondents are now not proceeding to undertake an exercise which would give an opportunity to the petitioner-Union to seek recognition. What the respondent-Company could not do directly i.e. give recognition for more than two years to the respondent- Union, is being done indirectly by not holding elections to judge the right of Union to seek recognition. (7). It has been further contended on behalf of petitioner that when in Annex.5, two years is prescribed it follows by implication that thereafter fresh exercise would be undertaken to see suitability of Union by judging the majority support. The agreement in Annex.5 clearly meant that after the end of two years, a fresh effort would be made to judge the competence of the Union to represent the workers. This being not done, respondent-Company is acting dishonestly. The dishonest intention of the respondent-Company is writ large in not resorting to a fair exercise of determining the right of recognition of the Union after two years agreed period. (8). It has also been canvassed by learned counsel for the petitioner that petitioner-Union has no other efficacious remedy and therefore, it has chosen to come to this Court because raising an industrial dispute before the Industrial Tribunal would be an exercise wherein respondent-Union will continue to enjoy the recognition. Petitioner has supported his case on the strength of a decision of the Honble Supreme Court rendered in Management of Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation vs. KSRTC Staff & Workerss Federation & Anr. (2). Another case relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner to support his case is rendered in the case of Food Corporation of India Staff Union vs. Food Corporation of India and others (3). (9). Learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that objection of the respondent-Company in their reply that there is no legal right in the petitioner, is misconceived. It is a misconception that a writ can only be issued in the nature of mandamus for enforcing a legal right. (9). Learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that objection of the respondent-Company in their reply that there is no legal right in the petitioner, is misconceived. It is a misconception that a writ can only be issued in the nature of mandamus for enforcing a legal right. Firstly, legal rights emanate in favour of the petitioner from Annex.5 an agreement entered into in between the parties; secondly, from the fact that respondent-Company has undertaken to give recognition for two years and the principles of promissory estopple give rise to a right in favour of the petitioner. To fortify his argument, learned counsel for the petitioner has relied on the observations of the Honble Supreme Court in a decision rendered in Dwarka Nath vs. Income Tax Officer (4) wherein it has observed as under :- ``Article 226 is couched in comprehensive phraseology and it ex facie confers a wide power on the High Court to reach injustice wherever it is found. A wide language in describing the nature of the power, the purposes for which and the person or authority against whom it can be exercised was designedly used by the Constitution. The High Court can issue writs in the nature of prerogative writs as understood in England; but the scope of those-writs also is widened by the use of the expression ``nature which expression does not equate the writs that can be issued in India with those in England, but only draws an analogy from them. That apart, High Courts can also issue directions, orders or writs other than the prerogative writs. The High Courts are enabled to mould the reliefs to meet the peculiar and complicated requirements of this country. To equate the scope of the power of the High Court under Art. 226 with that of the England Courts to issue prerogative writs is to introduce the unnecessary procedural restrictions grown over the years in a comparatively small country like England with a unitary form of Government to a vast country like India functioning under a federal structure. Such a construction would defeat the purpose of the article itself. But that does not mean that the High Courts can function arbitrarily under this article. There are some limitations implicit in the article and others may be evolved to direct the article through defined channels. (10). Such a construction would defeat the purpose of the article itself. But that does not mean that the High Courts can function arbitrarily under this article. There are some limitations implicit in the article and others may be evolved to direct the article through defined channels. (10). Replying to the arguments of learned counsel for the petitioner, counsel for the respondent-Company has urged that there is no legal right vested in the petitioner Union. It has been contended on behalf of the respondent-Company that pleadings in the writ petition are conspicuously silent about the right of the petitioner. There is no legal right vested in the petitioner to maintain the writ petition. No attempt has been made on the part of the petitioner to show that there is a fundamental right and/ or legal right which is being denied by respondent-Company. It has further been contended that what is sought to be enforced by this writ petition is a relief with regard to recognition of respondent-Union. No such writ can be issued as respondent-Union is not a `State within the meaning Article 12 of the Constitution of India. Learned counsel for the respondent-Company has placed reliance on a Supreme Court decision rendered in the case of the Bihar Eastern Gangetic Fishermen Cooperative Society Ltd. Vs. Sipahi Singh and others (5) wherein it has been held as under :- ``A writ of mandamus can be granted only in a case where there is a statutory duty imposed upon the officer concerned and there is a failure on the part of that officer to discharge the statutory obligation. The chief function of a writ is to compel performance of public duties prescribed by a statute and to keep subordinate tribunals and officers exercising public functions within the limits of their jurisdiction. It follows, therefore, that in order that mandamus may issue to compel the authorities to do something, it must be shown that there is a statute which imposes a legal duty and the aggrieved party has a legal right under the statute to enforce its performance. (11). It follows, therefore, that in order that mandamus may issue to compel the authorities to do something, it must be shown that there is a statute which imposes a legal duty and the aggrieved party has a legal right under the statute to enforce its performance. (11). Learned counsel for the respondent-Company has further relied on the observations of the Honble Supreme Court rendered in the case of Praga Tools Corporation vs. C.V. Imanual and others (6) wherein it has been held as under:- ``In our view the High Court was correct in holding that the writ petition filed under Art. 226 claiming against the company mandamus or an order in the nature of mandamus was misconceived and not maintainable.... ``But it is well understood that a mandamus lies to secure the performance of a public or statutory duty in the performance of which the one who applies for it has a sufficient legal interest. Thus, an application for mandamus will not lie for an order of restatement to an office which is essentially of a private character nor can such an application be maintained to secure performance of obligations owed by a company towards its workmen or to resolve any private dispute... "This Court has never exercised a general Power said Bruce, J. in R. vs. Lewisham Union, 1987-1 QB 498, 501 ``to enforce the performance of their statutory duties by public bodies on the application of anybody who chooses to apply for a mandamus. It has always required that the applicant for a mandamus should have a legal and specific right to enforce the performance of those duties. Therefore, the condition precedent for the issue of mandamus is that there is in one claiming it a legal right to the performance of a legal duty by one against whom it is sought. An order of mandamus is, in form, a comm- and directed to a person corporation or an inferior tribunal requiring him or them to do a particular thing therein specified which appertains to his or their office office and is in the nature of a public duty. (12). Thus, learned counsel for the respondent-Company urges that there being no legal right in petitioner-Union, no relief can be granted and writ petition deserves to be dismissed on the score that petitioner has no enforceable right vested in it. (13). (12). Thus, learned counsel for the respondent-Company urges that there being no legal right in petitioner-Union, no relief can be granted and writ petition deserves to be dismissed on the score that petitioner has no enforceable right vested in it. (13). Learned counsel for respondent-Company has further stressed that much has been stated at bar about the principles of promissory estopple. In the writ petition, there is not a wishper about the point canvassed. A point which has not been raised in the writ petition, cannot be canvassed by the petitioner. One who prosecutes a writ petition has to plead complete facts and support of law. This is done because the matter is decided on affidavits only. In this regard, learned counsel for the respondent-Company has placed reliance on a Supreme Court decision rendered in Bharat Singh and others vs. State of Haryana (7) wherein it has been held as under :- ``When a point which is ostensively a point of law is required to be substantiated by facts, the party raising the point, if he is the writ petitioner, must plead and prove such facts, the party raising the point, if he is the writ petitioner, must plead and prove such facts by evidence which must appear from the writ petition and if he is the respondent, from the counter-affidavit. If the facts are not pleaded or the evidence in support of such facts is not annexed to the writ petition or to the counter affidavit, as the case may be, the court will not entertain the point. There is a distinction between a pleading under the Civil P.C. and a writ petition of a counter affidavit. While in a pleading, that is, a plaint or a written statement, the facts and not evidence are required to be pleaded, in a writ petition or in the counter affidavit not only the facts but also the evidence in proof of such facts have to be pleaded annexed to it. (14). Thus, it has been contended on behalf of learned counsel for respondent-Company that question of promissory estopple cannot be gone into as the same has not been pleaded by the petitioner. (15). Another aspect high lighted by the learned counsel for respondent-Company is in relation to alternative remedy. (14). Thus, it has been contended on behalf of learned counsel for respondent-Company that question of promissory estopple cannot be gone into as the same has not been pleaded by the petitioner. (15). Another aspect high lighted by the learned counsel for respondent-Company is in relation to alternative remedy. Learned counsel for the respondent- Company has submitted that petitioner has represented to hold election and in this connection, Ministry of Labour has issued a written communication to the respondent-Company, produced as Annex. R.1/1.A reading of this shows that steps are being taken to hold the election. A parallel regular remedy to redress the grievance of the petitioner is being continued. In any case, the questions sought to be raised are in the nature of industrial dispute and no writ lies to enforce an industrial dispute in the High Court. Reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the respondent-Company on a decision of this Court in the case of Gopilal Teli Vs. State of Rajasthan and others (8) wherein it has been held as under:- ``The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, which is a special statute has been enacted by the Parliament for setting the industrial disputes through conciliation and if not possible, then by the Tribunals constituted under the Act, and, also to reduce the field of conflict between the employer and the employees in order to increase the industrial growth of the country. (16). Reliance has also been placed on the Honble Supreme Court decision rendered in Scooters India and others Vs. Vijai E.V. Eldred (9) wherein the Honble Supreme Court has held as under:- ``The above facts alone are sufficient to indicate that there was no occasion for the High Court to entertain the writ petition directly for adjudication of an industrial dispute involving the termination of disputed questions of fact for which remedy under the industrial laws was available to the workman. (17). Thus, it has been strenuously contended that remedy available to the petitioner is to approach the Industrial Tribunal. Counsel for the respondent-Union has supported the case of the respondent- Company and has further urged that in the joint meeting, it was agreed that period of recognition be of five years as contained in Annex.4. In addition to this, it was left to the Ministry of Labour, Govt. Counsel for the respondent-Union has supported the case of the respondent- Company and has further urged that in the joint meeting, it was agreed that period of recognition be of five years as contained in Annex.4. In addition to this, it was left to the Ministry of Labour, Govt. of India to decide this question and if contrary was decided about the period of recognition, then the Management had agreed to abide by it. Whatever was considered in the meeting of which minutes are Annex. 5 was not a decision of Union of India but a decision of Chief Labour Commissioner. Decision of the Labour Commissioner cannot be said to be a decision of the Union of India. Both the parties are bound by their agreement vide Annex. 4 and the period of recognition is upto five years. (18). Learned counsel for the respondent-Union has further stressed that code of discipline does not have a statutory force and therefore, cannot be enforced. Whatever has been decided by Annex. 4 and 5 is only minimum period and not maximum period and thus, there is no agreement in between the parties in relation to maximum period. Regarding maximum period, there is no provision either in any of the agreements or the settlements. Since there is no maximum period provided either in law or the agreements, no writ in the shape of present writ petition is maintainable. (19). I have considered the rival submissions and perused the record. (20). Petitioner claims that it has a right to enforce the valuable right of the workers contained in Annexure 2 in paragraph 35. Petitioner has further contended that this settlement was operative from 1.10.1992 to 13.9.1997. The period of settlement is over, according to the pleading of the petitioner itself. May be that to recognise the right of the petitioner, another settlement is required. As on today on the strength of Annex.2 it cannot be said that there is any legal right. Petitioners argument that it has enforceable rights in Annex.2, therefore, appears to be out of place. (21). Learned counsel for the respondents had raised an objection that there is no legal right vested in the petitioner, to maintain the present writ petition. In the petition, there are no pleadings to claims the right of equitable estopple. Petitioners argument that it has enforceable rights in Annex.2, therefore, appears to be out of place. (21). Learned counsel for the respondents had raised an objection that there is no legal right vested in the petitioner, to maintain the present writ petition. In the petition, there are no pleadings to claims the right of equitable estopple. In its pleading and ground no.1, the basis has been made on long term settlement (Annexure 2) and the subsequent agreements (Annexures 4 and 5) wherein the period of recognition has been limited to two years. Its enforcement has been sought under Sec. 18 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The content of Annex.4 and 5 falls short of being a legal settlement between the parties, because it was not in the course of any conciliation proceedings. It can at best be said to be an agreement in between the parties. This agreement as sought to be enforced by this writ petition is not sound enough to be recognised as a legal right, which can be enforced through a writ petition, as has been held by the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Praga Tools Corporation (supra). (22). Regarding the argument of learned counsel for the petitioner that powers of the High Court under Article 226 are vide enough as has been held in the case of Dwarka Nath (supra), suffice it to say that when inter party rights are to be enforced, it has to be seen whether such rights are comprehensive. Annex.5 speaks of two years recognition but does not say anything what will happen in future. Annex. R/1 shows that Ministry of Labour, Govt. of India has already undertaken the exercise of holding election and therefore, a process has been initiated. It would not be proper for this Court to issue any mandamus in this regard. (23). The pleadings of the petitioner being not sufficiently modulated to establish a case of promissory estopple, on this count, nothing turns out in favour of the petitioner. Petitioner was required in terms of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Bharat Singh (supra) to plead the complete facts. Only at the stage of arguments, when this question has been raised by the petitioner, this Court finds it difficult to adjudicate this aspect of the matter. (24). Petitioner was required in terms of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Bharat Singh (supra) to plead the complete facts. Only at the stage of arguments, when this question has been raised by the petitioner, this Court finds it difficult to adjudicate this aspect of the matter. (24). The writ petition further suffers from another infirmity of not being a proper prosecution on behalf of the petitioner. Petitioner is an industrial Union and for such matters, the forum of Industrial Tribunal is a proper forum. When the facts alleged by the petitioner have been disputed by the respondents, this Court would be slow in interfering in writ petition in view of the decision of the Honble Supreme Court rendered in Basant Kumar Sarkar and others vs. Eagle Rolling Mills Ltd. and others (10) and therefore, this Court is of the considered opinion that no interference is called for in the writ jurisdiction. The petitioner has to seek his remedy before the Industrial Tribunal. In this back ground, no relief can be granted to the petitioner in the present writ petition. The writ petition having no force is dismissed.