DEEPAK MISRA, J. ( 1 ) FEELING aggrieved by the order dated 22-7-99 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge/special Judge, Sidhi in Special Case No. 55/96 the applicant has invoked the revisional jurisdiction of this Court for quashment of the same. ( 2 ) THE facts as have been uncurtained are that the Economic Offence Wing, Rewa filed a charge-sheet against the applicant under S. 13 (1) (e) read with S. 13 (1) (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 on 2-6-92 on the ground that he had disproportionate assets and could not account for Rs. 56,864/ -. It was also alleged that the applicant had misused his post as a public servant by taking recourse to corrupt practice. At the time of framing of charge the applicant prayed for his discharge on two counts, namely, certain agricultural income has not been taken into consideration by the investigating, agency and if the same would have been taken into consideration the charge-sheet could not have been submitted against him and that as per the Rule 9 (3) read with sub-rule 6 (b) of the Central Civil Services Pension Rules "no judicial proceedings" can be instituted against the government servant whether he is in service or a retired personnel or under re-employment in resepect of a cause of action which arose, or, in resepect of an event which took place more than 4 years before such institution and as the said Rule applies in full force to the present case the order of framing charge is liable to be quashed. ( 3 ) IT is to be noted here that at an earlier stage by order dated 24-12-92 the learned Special Judge had discharged the applicant. The said order was assailed by the prosecution before this Court in Cr. Rev. No. 215/93. This Court vide order 13-6-96 set aside the order and remanded the matter to the trial Court for hearing on the question of framing of charge. ( 4 ) THE learned Special Judge while dealing with the contention of the applicant at the time of rehearing of framing of charge opined that the points raised by the applicant relying on the pension rule was not available in view of the fact that the issue relating to grant of sanction has already been put to rest. ( 4 ) THE learned Special Judge while dealing with the contention of the applicant at the time of rehearing of framing of charge opined that the points raised by the applicant relying on the pension rule was not available in view of the fact that the issue relating to grant of sanction has already been put to rest. As far as the contention regarding inclusion of income obtained from the agricultural source is concerned the learned Special Judge did not find any merit in the same. ( 5 ) ASSAILING the aforesaid order it is contended by Mr. S. L. Kochar, that the learned trial Judge has not properly appreciated the contentions raised before him and hence, the order passed by him is vulnerable. He has reiterated the submissions which were canvassed before the Court below and has placed reliance on the decision rendered in the case of Amrit Rao Mukutrao Survey v. State of M. P. , 1999 (1) MPLJ 595 : (1999 Lab IC 2158 ). Mr. Ahaluwalia, learned Govt. Adv. , per contra, submitted that the submissions are devoid of merit as the provisions in the Pension Rules cannot control the penal action. ( 6 ) TO appreciate the rival submissions raised at the Bar, I have perused the impugned order of rejection I am of the considered view that the contention relating to non-inclusion of agricultural income has to be dealt with during the trial. Hence, I am not inclined to accept the aforesaid submission of Mr. S. L. Kochar. ( 7 ) THE second limb of argument of Mr. Kochar is that the learned Special Judge has fallen into an error by opining that this Court had put to rest the issue with regard to the limitation on institution of criminal proceedings in relation to a government servant as stipulated in the aforesaid rule. It is his submission that this Court had dealt with regard to the propriety of sanction and when it was putforth before this Court that the decision of the Division Bench passed in the case of Baman Prasad Mishra v. State of M. P. ( 1994 MPLJ 977 ) : (1995 AIHC 2215) has overruled the decision rendered in M. Cr. C. No. 1366/91 (Hariram Patel v. State of M. P.), this Court set aside the order discharging the applicant and directed for rehearing of the matter by the concerned Special Judge. In view of this, the learned trial Judge should have dealt with the matter of limitation and should not have come to the conclusion that the issue relating to grant of sanction has been put to rest by the High Court. Now, the question arises that whether the aforesaid submission of Mr. Kochar with regard to the limitation as provided under rule has any force. To appreciate the said submission it is apposite to refer to the aforesaid rule. Rule 9 (3) which reads as under :-"3. No judicial proceedings, if not instituted while the Government servant was in service, whether before his retirement or during his re-employment, shall be instituted in respect of a cause of action which arose or in respect of an event which took place more than four years before such institution. "mr. Kochar has also placed reliance on the Rule 6 (b) of the Rules which reads as under :- (B) judicial proceedings shall be deemed to be instituted - (I) in the case of criminal proceedings, on the date on which the complaint or report of a police officer, of which the Magistrate takes cognizance, is made, and (II) in the case of civil proceedings on the date the plaint is presented in the Court. " ( 8 ) IT is canvassed by Mr. Kochar that if Rules 3 and 6 (b) are read conjointly it is graphically clear that a period limitation has been provided for institution of judicial proceedings. It is submitted by him that the complaint was made on 28th September 1987 and the petitioner retired on 31-3-1992 and cognizance was taken on 2-6-92, and hence, the proceeding was barred by time. At this juncture, Mr. Ahaluwalia, learned Govt. Adv. for the State, pointed out that the Rule 3 has been deleted on 1-2-92. It is his submission that the applicant cannot take the benefit of limitation, if any, prescribed under the said rule. At this juncture, Mr. Ahaluwalia, learned Govt. Adv. for the State, pointed out that the Rule 3 has been deleted on 1-2-92. It is his submission that the applicant cannot take the benefit of limitation, if any, prescribed under the said rule. Without getting into the effect and impact of the deletion of Rule after passing of order taking cognizance, I may profitably refer to the decision of the Apex Court rendered in the case of State of Punjab v. Kailash Nath, AIR 1989 SC 558 : (1989 Cri LJ 813) wherein their Lordships while considering the effect of Punjab Civil Service Rules, Col. 2, Chap 2, R. 2. 2 (b), Proviso 3 have held as under (at pages 817-818; of Cri LJ) :"article 309 empowers making of rules regulating the recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or any State. On the plain language of Article 309, the proposition that any rule framed under this article has to be confined to recruitment and conditions of service of persons mentioned therein admits of no doubt. In the normal course that falls within the purview of the term "conditions of service may be classified as salary or wages including subsistance allowance during suspension, the periodical increments, pay-scales, leave, provident fund, gratuity, confirmation, promotion, seniority, tenure or termination of service, compulsory or premature retirement,superannuation, pension, changing the age of superannuation, deputation and disciplinary proceedings. Whether or not a Government Servant should be prosecuted for an offence committed by him obviously cannot be treated to be something pertaining to conditions of service. It is not proper to say that an assurance to an employee that he shall not be prosecuted after his retirement, even though guilty of committing a grave misconduct or negligence during the period of his service, after the lapse of a particular time is a condition of service calculated to ensure a person, peace of mind after retirement, and so falls within the purview of "conditions of service" as contemplated by Art. 309. Making a provision that a government servant even if he is guilty of grave misconduct or negligence which constitutes an offence punishable either under the Penal Code or Prevention of Corruption Act or an analogous law should be granted immunity from such prosecution after the lapse of a particular period so as to provide incentive for efficient work would not only be against public policy but would also be counter productive. It is likely to be an incentive not for efficient work but for committing offence including enbezzlement and misappropriation by some of them at the fag end of their tenure of service. Such a situation cannot be created by framing a rule under Art. 309 of the Constitution laying down an embargo on prosecution as a condition of service. More-over, if giving a government servant peace of mind after his retirement in his old age can be a good ground to grant him immunity from prosecution R. 2. 2 granting such immunity only to Govt. servants would on the face of it be discriminatory and thus arbitrary inasmuch as if peace of mind in old age can be a good ground for immunity from prosecution for offences committed by a person, there can be no reason why such immunity may not be available to all old persons and should be confined only to government servants. On the face of it, the government servants cannot constitute a class by themselves so as to bring their case within the purview of reasonable classification, if the purpose of granting immunity for prosecution is ensuring peace of mind in old age. KEEPING in view the scope of rule making power under Art. 309 of the Constitution, the third proviso to R. 2. 2 cannot be interpreted as laying down anabsolute or general embargo on prosecution of a government servant if the conditions stated therein are satisfied. Even if on first impression the said rule may appear to be placing such an embargo it has to be interpreted by taking recourse to the well settled rule of reading down a provision so as to bring it within the framework of its source of power without, of course, frustrating the purpose for which such provision was made, Clause (b) of R. 2. 2 which can be called the substantive clause reserves to the government the right of withholding or withdrawing of pension or any part of it, whether permanently or for a specified period and the right of ordering the recovery from a pension of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused to Govt. if, in a departmental or judicial proceeding, the pensioner is found guilty of grave misconduct or negligence during the period of his service, including service rendered upon re-employment after retirement. The purpose of the third proviso to R. 2. 2 is to carve out an exception to the right conferred on the government by the substantive clause if the conditions contemplated by the proviso are fulfilled. Thus purpose can be achieved if the said proviso by adopting the rule of reading down is interpreted to mean that even if a government servant is prosecuted and punished in judicial proceedings instituted in respect of cause of action which arose on an event which took place more than four years before such institution the government will not be entitled to exercise the right conferred on it by the substantive provision contained in Cl. (b) with regard to pension of such a government servant. The word "such" in the beginning of the third proviso also supports this interpretation. " ( 9 ) FROM the aforesaid enunciation of law it is absolutely clear that neither the State Government nor the Central Government can create an embargo for initiation of prosecution against a government servant on expiry of certain period. The rule cannot create an impediment for prosecution which is provided under penal statutes, as Pension rule has its own limitation. ( 10 ) MR. Kochar has invited my attention to the decision rendered in the case of Amrit Rao Mukut Rao Survey (supra ). It is his submission that in the aforesaid decision it has been held that such a rule would govern the field. I have carefully perused the aforesaid decision. In the said decision the learned single Judge found on facts that the complaint was made within time. The impact and effect of the Rules have not been decided. It is well settled in law that a decision is a precedent for what it decides not what can be inferred from it. I have carefully perused the aforesaid decision. In the said decision the learned single Judge found on facts that the complaint was made within time. The impact and effect of the Rules have not been decided. It is well settled in law that a decision is a precedent for what it decides not what can be inferred from it. In this regard I may profitably refer to the decision rendered in the case of Ambika Quarry Works etc. v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1987 SC 1073 :"the ratio of any decision must be understood in the background of the facts of that case. It has been said long time ago that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides, and not what logically follows from it. " ( 11 ) IN view of the preceding analysis, the decision rendered in the case of Amrit Rao Mukat Rao Survey (Supra) is distinguishable. ( 12 ) AS both the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner are devoid of merit, the revision petition accordingly stands dismissed. Petition dismissed. .