Judgment :- Defendants 2 to 12 on the file of District Munsifs Court, Aruppukottai are the revision petitioners. 2. An ex parte decree was passed against them and they moved an application under Order 9 Rule 13 of Code of Civil Procedure. There was a delay of 163 days in filing the application and the same was explained in LA. 1575 of 1996. 3. The application was seriously opposed by respondents and by the impugned order lower Court dismissed the same. 4. I do not think that the lower Court has exercised its judicial discretion properly. 5. Unless there is evidence of culpable negligence or latches from which an inference can be drawn that the parties are adopting dilatory tactics, the explanation offered by petitioner is to be liberally considered. By absenting himself or by not filing application in time, party is not going to gain anything. 6. In this case, petitioners have said that they are agriculturists and after written statement was filed, they went for their work, far away from plaint schedule property, since they are poor labourers and they have to earn their livelihood only from their labour, and in spite of advocate having informed them, they could not appear before the Court, Prima facie, the statement seems to be true. Any party will give preference to earn for his livelihood first and then only participate in litigation. In this case, petitioners can never be said as negligent at any point of time and they have taken all steps for prosecuting the case in the early stage. When the case came up in the list they absented themselves for the reasons stated above. Hence, ex parte decree was passed. 7. In this connection, the previous conduct of the petitioner is also a relevant factor to be considered. There was prior litigation between the same parties and petitioners were successful in the earlier suit. The success in the earlier suit shows that they have been earnest in prosecuting litigation and the defence in the present case, also seems to be the plea of res judicata . I am not going into the merits of the case, but I am taking this circumstance only to show that petitioners were all along active in prosecuting the litigation and they were never party to dilatory tactics. 8. I am not going into the merits of the case, but I am taking this circumstance only to show that petitioners were all along active in prosecuting the litigation and they were never party to dilatory tactics. 8. In the decision reported in 1998 AIR SCW 3139 = 1998 (7) SCC 123 =1999-1-L.W. 739) ( N. Balakrishnanv. M. Krishna-murthy ), in paragraphs 11 to 13, their Lordships held thus, “11. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. Law of limitation fixes a life span for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and the wasted time would never revisit. During efflux of time newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the Courts. So a life span must be fixed for each remedy., Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. Law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim Interest reipudlicae up sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of the parties, They, are meant to see, that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly, The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time”. 12.A Courtknows that refusal to condone delay would result in foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his cause. There is no presumption that delay in approaching the Court is always deliberate. This Court has held that the words “sufficient cause”. Under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice vide Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari , AIR 1969 SC 575 and State of West Bengal v. The Administrator Howrah Municipality , AIR 1972 SC 749 . 13.It must be remembered that in every case of delay there can be some lapse on the part of the litigant concerned. That alone is not enough to turn down his plea and to shut the door against him. 13.It must be remembered that in every case of delay there can be some lapse on the part of the litigant concerned. That alone is not enough to turn down his plea and to shut the door against him. If the explanation does not smack of mala fides or it is not put-forth as part of a dilatory strategy the Court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. But when there is reasonable ground to think that the delay was occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time then the Court should lean against acceptance of the explanation. While condoning delay the Court should not forget the opposite party altogether. It must be borne in mind that he is a loser and he too would have incurred quite a large litigation expenses. It would be a salutary guideline that when courts condone the delay due to laches on the part of the applicant the Court shall compensate the opposite party for his loss.” (emphasis supplied) In the earlier portion of the same Judgment, their Lordships held that the discretion will have to be exercised taking into consideration the object of Limitation Act, especially Section 5. Their Lordships further went on and said that even if the discretion exercised by lower Court is not proper, the superior Court would be free to consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such superior Court to come to its own finding even untramrneled by the conclusion of the lower Court. 9. In this case, I find that sufficient cause has been made out for condonation of delay and lower Court has not exercised the discretion properly. When the delay has been excused, naturally ex parte decree also will have to be set aside, and I do so, I direct lower Court to restore O.S. 234 of 1983 on the file and proceed with case in accordance with law. 10. I direct lower Court to give reasonable opportunity to both parties to adduce evidence. Being the suit of the year 1983, I am sure, Lower Court will take expeditious steps to dispose of the same, but that must be done after giving reasonable opportunity to both parties. 11. The revision petition is allowed as above. No costs. Consequently, C.M.P. No. 655 of 1997 is closed.