ORDER Khan, J. -- 1. The principal question that arises for consideration and determination in these Appeals is whether M.P. Stock Exchange was a 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 and if not whether it could still be made amenable to Writ Jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. 2. Four Writ Petitions (WP. No. 1454/93, 1928/93, 1410/95 and 493/97) were filed by writ petitioners claiming different reliefs against respondent 'Exchange', A preliminary objection questioning their maintainability was taken on the plea that respondent Exchange was not a "State" under Article 12 and thus, not amenable to writ jurisdiction, The writ Court formulated a question whether the Stock Exchange was a "State" under Article 12 and whether it was amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 and upon a detailed discussion and analysis found that it was neither a "State" because Central Government had no effective control or involvement in it nor was it otherwise amenable to writ jurisdiction under Art. 226, because it did not discharge any public duty. The Court consequently dismissed all the writ petitions as not maintainable. 3. Writ petitioners are up in appeal against this. Their case expectedly is that the Stock Exchange was a "State" under Article 12 and alternatively otherwise amenable to writ jurisdiction under Art. 226, engaged as it was in discharge of public duty, responsibility and functions imposed on it under the relevant statute, and the Rules/Bye laws. 4. Appellants' counsel Mr. Mathur contended that the Stock Exchange had all the trappings of the "State" and was an "authority" of the State and in as much as its entire functioning was governed and regulated by the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956 and the Rules, conferring power on the Central Government to direct and regulate its functioning every inch. Under the Act it was to be recognized by the Government which could also impose conditions on it related to qualification of its members and •the manner of execution of its contracts. The government was also to nominate three of its representatives on its Board and to also audit its accounts and to call for periodical reports about its functioning. All this indicated that the government exercised effective and persuasive control over it making it an "Authority" to bring it within the meaning "State" under Article 12. The government was also to nominate three of its representatives on its Board and to also audit its accounts and to call for periodical reports about its functioning. All this indicated that the government exercised effective and persuasive control over it making it an "Authority" to bring it within the meaning "State" under Article 12. He alternatively argued that even if it was not regarded so, it could as well be amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 as it was discharging public duties and functions under the statute and the rules. He cited AIR 1993 SC 2178 (Unni Krishnan JP & others v. State of Andhra Pradesh), AIR 1996 A.P. 413 (Rakesh Gupta v. Hyderabad Stock exchange Ltd.) and AIR 1991 Bombay 30, (Mrs. Sejal Rikeen Dalal v. Stock Exchange) in support. 5. Mr. Rege, L/c for respondent-Exchange on the other end made a very fine distinction between the government control and regulation from within and outside. According to him the test to be applied was whether the government exercised deep and effective control over the management and internal working of the body to make it an Instrumentality/Agency/authority of the "State". If it exercised only out-side regulatory control under the provisions of the statute, as in the present case, the body could not be labelled an "Authority" or Instrumentality" of the "State" under Art. 12. He submitted that the Exchange was only an association of Brokers engaged in buying and selling of securities and was not performing any public duty as such. It may be that its functioning was related to the Public Interest but that was not enough unless it was further shown that it performed a public duty and then alone, it could be brought within the fold of writ jurisdiction. He sought support from AIR 1961 SC 21 . AIR 1995 Karnataka 420 and AIR 1995 Kerala 373. 6. Arguments advanced on both sides appear attractive on the face. So does the judgment of the writ Court which surveys the legal scene on the subject matter to conclude that the Stock Exchange was neither a "State" under Art. 12 nor amenable to writ jurisdiction under Art. 226. We would have accepted this position and gone with tide but for some conceptual reservations, which persuade us to take a partially contrary view in the matter. 7. We would have accepted this position and gone with tide but for some conceptual reservations, which persuade us to take a partially contrary view in the matter. 7. It requires to be clarified at the very out-set that a body or association, a society or a corporation may not strictly fall within the definition of "State" under Art. 12 and yet may be amenable to writ jurisdiction under Art. 226, if it satisfied the newly evolved tests of being engaged in discharge of public duty/functioning and responsibility and disclosing an element of public interest in its functioning. Gone are days when the writ was believed to run only up to the "State" under Article 12. The concept had undergone a sea change and made spectacular advance over the years widening the frontiers and horizons of the writ jurisdiction. Now it was available even against private persons, bodies, associations and corporations if it was found that a statutory public duty, was cast on these and an element of public interest was present in their functioning. This was so because of the liberal interpretation placed by the Supreme Court on the provisions of Art. 226 conferring writ jurisdiction on the High Court and distinguishing it from the ambit and contours of Art. 12 occurring in Chapter III of the Constitution dealing with fundamental rights. It was accordingly propounded that Art. 226 was so much wider in scope as the amplitude of the language used in it indicated and conferred expansive and extra ordinary power on the High Court to affect any person including a private individual and was available for any purpose. It was also affirmed that Art. 12 was relevant only for enforcement of fundamental rights under Art. 32 whereas Art. 226 empowered High Court to issue writs both for fundamental and non fundamental rights and to "any person or authority" which was not confined to statutory authorities and instrumentalities of the "State" only and which could cover any other person or body performing the public duty. Even though it was noticed that no limitation was imposed on the powers of the High Courts for exercise of extra ordinary writ jurisdiction, yet it was hinted that the Court was to observe some well established restraints and was not expected to cross laid down self imposed limits unless the exceptional situation so demanded to reach injustice. Even though it was noticed that no limitation was imposed on the powers of the High Courts for exercise of extra ordinary writ jurisdiction, yet it was hinted that the Court was to observe some well established restraints and was not expected to cross laid down self imposed limits unless the exceptional situation so demanded to reach injustice. This position was all along affirmed' in various judgments by the Supreme Court, be that in Dwarikanath v. ITO AIR 1965 SC 81, Praga Tools Corporation v. C. V. Imanual & ors. AIR 1969 SC 130&, Rohtas Industries Industries Ltd. & ors. v. Rohtas Industries Staff Union & ors. AIR 1976 SC 425 and Andi Mukta 's case AIR 1989 SC 1607 . The Court in this case brought out a marked distinction in the scope of Articles 12 and 226 in the following terms: "The term "authority" used in Article 226, in the context, must receive a liberal meaning unlike the term in Article 12. Article 12 is relevant only for the purpose of enforcement of fundamental rights under Art. 32. Article 226 confers power on the High Courts to issue writs for enforcement of the fundamental rights as well as non-fundamental rights. The words "Any person or authority" used in Article 226 are, therefore, not to be confined only to statutory authorities and instrumentalities of the State. They may cover any other person or body performing public duty." 8. The concept received a new dimension in Praga Tools' case wherein the Court observed as under: ''The form of the body concerned is not very much relevant, What is relevant is the nature of the duty imposed on the body. The duty must be judged in the light of positive obligation owned by the person or authority to the affected party. No matter by what means the duty is imposed, if a positive obligation exists mandamus cannot be denied. Mandamus cannot be denied on the ground that the duty to be enforced is not imposed by the Statute. Commenting on the development of this law, Professor De Smith states: To be enforceable by mandamus a public duty does not necessarily have to be one imposed by statute. It may be sufficient for the duty to have been imposed by charter, common law, custom or even contract. We share this view. Commenting on the development of this law, Professor De Smith states: To be enforceable by mandamus a public duty does not necessarily have to be one imposed by statute. It may be sufficient for the duty to have been imposed by charter, common law, custom or even contract. We share this view. The judicial control over the fact expanding maze of bodies affecting the rights of the people should not he put into watertight compartment. It should remain .flexible to meet the requirements of variable circumstances. Mandamus is a very wide remedy which must be easily available to reach injustice wherever it is found Technicalities should not come in the way of granting that relief under Article 226" 9. The focus on nature of duty as a determination factor was again underscored in celebrated Unni Krishnan's case AIR 1993 SC 2178 by toe Court thus: "The emphasis in this case is as to the nature of duty imposed on the body. It requires to be observed, that meaning of authority under Art. 226 came to be laid down distinguishing the same term from Article 12. Inspite of its if the emphasis is on the nature of duty, on the same principle, it has to be held that these educational institutions discharge public duties." 10. The Court later recorded caution and struck balance in Air India Statutory Corporation and others v. United Labour Union & others 11997 (9) SCC 377] holding as under: ''In LIC v. Escorts Ltd, the Court had pointed out that the difficulty will lie in demarcating the frontier between the public law domain and the private law field The question must be decided in each case with reference to the particular action the activity in which the State or the instrumentality of the State is engaged when performing the action, the public law or private law character of the question and the host of other relevant circumstances. (Emphasis supplied) 11. The net position that emerges is that no shackles could be put on the writ power of High Court on technicalities it which was wide and unlimited to strike at injustice. But this power was not exercisable like a bull in the china shop, as observed by the Supreme Court was subject to well settled self imposed restraints and limitations. 12. But this power was not exercisable like a bull in the china shop, as observed by the Supreme Court was subject to well settled self imposed restraints and limitations. 12. The tests laid down by the Supreme Court, though not exhaustive, in International Air Port Authority's case AIR 1979 SC 1628 ; Ajay Hesia AIR 1981 SC 487 and Central Inland Water Transport Corporation (AIR 1985 SC 1571) cases were relevant for determining whether the body/society/company was a "State" within the meaning of Art. 12 and whether a writ could issue to it for enforcement of fundamental or legal rights. But what required to be noted was that even though such body may fail to come up to these tests, it may yet be amenable to writ jurisdiction under Art. 226 for reasons of being engaged in discharge of public duty/responsibility/functions cast on it by the statute and the Rules or by any charter, contract or common law and because of existence of an element of public interest in its functioning. The form of the body would not constitute a decisive factor in such determination. But a demarcation was required to be made between public law domain and the private law field. Where the body was wholly and purely a private body with no public duty cast on it and no element of public interest involved in its operations and if the rights claimed against such body were also private in nature and character, then it would not be surely attracting the writ jurisdiction. The question was therefore, to be decided with reference to nature of the action complained of, the activity in which the body was engaged and other circumstances. 13. Summarising it, a body may not partake the character and status of "State" under Art. 12 and still be amenable to writ jurisdiction under Art. 226 in case of breach of public duty cast on it, by the statute, Rules and bye-laws. But even then, a distinction was to be drawn between a private law action and a public law one. The writ jurisdiction would not be available where the claimed right and the action complained were wholly private in nature and character, viewed in this back drop, all that remained to be examined was whether respondent Stock Exchange was amenable to writ jurisdiction. The writ jurisdiction would not be available where the claimed right and the action complained were wholly private in nature and character, viewed in this back drop, all that remained to be examined was whether respondent Stock Exchange was amenable to writ jurisdiction. For this it becomes necessary to know the nature of the functioning of the Stock Exchange and the extent of control and regulation exercised by the statute and Rules over it and through it by the Central Government and whether it performed any public duty cast on it by the statute and whether any element of public interest was present in its functioning. 14. Stock Exchange, as commonly known, is a body of individuals engaged in the business of selling, buying or dealing in securities. It provides facilities to liquify capital to enable a person to convert his/her investment made in a Company into cash by disposing of the shares held to some one else. It thus, gives mobility to the capital in the absence of which the capital invested in the from of shares would be locked up. 15. The stocks and shares in the Exchange are dealt in three ways: (i) Spot delivery contract (ii) Ready delivery contract and (iii) Forward contracts. These contracts sometimes also carry the risk of degenerating into speculative transactions amounting to pure gambling which could subvert the main object of Stock Exchange. That is why the Securities Contracts (regulation) Act 1956 was enacted to prevent undesirable transactions in securities by prohibiting certain business action and by providing for some other connected matters. 16. The Act provides for general control over trading methods and practice of the Stock Exchange exercisable through Central Government. So much so that no stock Exchange can be set-up without the permission of the Government and its recognition by it in terms of Sections 4 and 19. The Central Government is also empowered to lay down conditions related to member-ship, Rules and Bye-laws etc., while granting such recognition which could be withdrawn by it in the interests of trade and public interest under Section 5. The Government is also empowered to call for periodical returns of the Exchange and to direct inquiry into its affairs under Sec. 6 and correspondingly the Exchange is duty-bound to furnish annual reports to the government under Sec.7. 17. The Government is also empowered to call for periodical returns of the Exchange and to direct inquiry into its affairs under Sec. 6 and correspondingly the Exchange is duty-bound to furnish annual reports to the government under Sec.7. 17. A recognised Stock Exchange can make Rules to provide for certain matters contained in Section 7-(a) but these are enforcible only with the approval of the Central Government which can also direct making of such Rules in respect of the Constitution of Stock Exchange, powers of management and its office bearers, the manner in which the business was to be transacted by it, the qualification for its member-ship and the procedure for registration of the members and above all the suspension exclusion and the re-admission of members. The Exchange was also allowed to make Bye-laws but only with the approval of Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) which could also make such Bye-laws on its own regarding the host of matters specified in Section 9. 18. What was significant to note was that Central Government was empowered to supersede the governing body of a recognized Stock Exchange and even to suspend its business in case of emergency and it could also prohibit contracts in certain areas to prevent undesirable speculation in terms of Sections 11, 12 and 13. It was also competent to make Rules for giving effect to the objects of the Act u/S. 30, pursuant whereto such Rules stand already framed and are in force. 19. These Rules called "The securities Contract (Regulations) Rules, 1957]] prescribe the mode and method for a host of matters, including the form of application for recognition, fees to be paid, documents to be filed, qualifications for member-ship, the manner in which contracts were to be confirmed and inquiry in the affairs of the Exchange conducted, the books of accounts and other documents to be maintained and securities to be listed in the Exchange and so on. 20. All this showed that though the stock Exchange satisfied most of the well established tests to qualify for a "State", yet it fell short of requirement in certain respects. It possessed all trappings so much so that it owed its existence to the Central Government because it could not be set-up without its permission and recognition. It could be also superseded by it and its business suspended in the interest of trade and public. It possessed all trappings so much so that it owed its existence to the Central Government because it could not be set-up without its permission and recognition. It could be also superseded by it and its business suspended in the interest of trade and public. Its Rules and Bye-laws were also subject to the approval of the government or SEBI. Three of its members of the Governing Body were also nominated by the government. Its accounts and affairs were subject to government audit and scrutiny and so on. What was, however, missing was that Central Government had no hand in its internal functioning and management, nor any financial involvement nor any domination in its management. Therefore, even if its eligibility for qualifying for the "State" was a border line case, it required to be still examined whether it could still attract writ jurisdiction under Art. 226 because of being engaged in discharge of public duty and presence of element of public interest in its functioning. 21. There are conflicting D.B. Judgments by the Kerala and Andhra Pradesh High Courts on this aspect of the matter. While Kerala High Court in Salish Nayak's case AIR 1995 Kerala 373 had curled that Stock Exchange was not discharging any public duty but the Andhra Pradesh High Court had held to the contrary. However, it is surprising that a careful analysis of the provisions of the Act, the Rules and the subject matter of Bye-laws to be made by the Exchange should have escaped notice in these judgments. That perhaps explains the conflict of opinion by the two Courts unsupported by any detailed reasoning on whether the Exchange was discharging any public duty which in turn was liable to give rise to rights and obligations. 22. The superficial understanding of the nature of the Stock Exchange operations would suggest that it was not engaged in discharge of any public duty as such, so long it dealt with dealing and buying and selling of Company shares. But there was more to it than meets the eye. 23. It goes undisputed that the existence and functioning of the Stock Exchange was provided for and regulated by the Act and the Rules made thereunder which had the consequence of making it a public authority if not statutory body in the strict sense of that term. But there was more to it than meets the eye. 23. It goes undisputed that the existence and functioning of the Stock Exchange was provided for and regulated by the Act and the Rules made thereunder which had the consequence of making it a public authority if not statutory body in the strict sense of that term. It could qualify to be statutory body also even though it did not owe its birth to the statute because all its ins and outs were regulated by the statute and the Rules and also Bye-laws to be made under such statute. 24. It can't also be overlooked that the Act and the Rules made thereunder provided for do's and dont's for its operations. For instance the Act prohibited contracts in certain cases and declared contracts in notified areas illegal in certain circumstances. It required the Exchange to submit annual reports and periodical returns regarding its affairs also cast a duty on it to frame Rules and Bye-laws with the approval of the Central Government or SEBI as the case may be. Similarly, Rules prescribed for qualifications of membership of the Exchange, the manner of inquiry into the affairs of the Exchange and the requirements for listing of security on the Exchange. Likewise, Bye-laws required to be made by Stock-Exchange provided for manner and method for host of matters including Regulation of blank transfers and of budlas, determination and declaration of market rates, the terms, conditions and incidents of contracts, the levy and recovery of fees, fines and penalties, fixing the scale of brokerage making, comparing and closing of bargains, etc. 25. All this enabled Stock Exchange to perform duties which were public in nature and wherein the element of public interest was present. If it was required not to enter into a contract of a particular type or to enlist security of a specified category or to enlist members of a particular qualification, it was discharging a public duty imposed on it and if this gave rise in turn to any rights and obligations the same were surely enforceable in the writ jurisdiction It cannot be washed away that the Exchange under the statute Rules and the Bye Laws obligations in number of areas of its operation. Therefore, if any breach was alleged of such obligations by the aggrieved person invoking any of the rights created in the process, writ jurisdiction would always be available to such person in such circumstances. 26. We accordingly hold that even if Stock Exchange was not regarded "State" under Art. 12 it could still be amenable to writ jurisdiction under Art 226 in certain cases where it was shown that' it was performing statutory/public duty cast on it under the statute, Rules and Bye-Laws' giving rise to an obligation which it owed to the aggrieved party and which was breached in some manner. It would, therefore, all depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. There may be cases where the writ would certainly issue and cases where the writ jurisdiction would not be available. A dealing or a transaction within the Exchange may be private in nature but where its manner and method was covered by statutory Rules and Bye-Laws and a breach alleged thereof even that would attract the writ jurisdiction on account of breach of statutory duty. As such Stock Exchange could be subject to the writ jurisdiction depending upon the nature of the action complained of and the obligation arising out of it, having its genesis in the Act, Rules and Bye-Laws framed thereunder. 27. Therefore, while agreeing with the reasoning of the writ Court partly these appeals are allowed to the limited extent indicated above. The dismissed writ petitions shall accordingly revive and be posted before appropriate Bench for examination of the nature of issues involved and for their determination in the light of the legal position enunciated.