Judgment :- K.A. Abdul Gafoor, J. The petitioner has approached this Court challenging Exts. P7, P12, P14 and P16. Based on a preliminary enquiry report forwarded by the Government, disciplinary action was initiated against the petitioner. An enquiry Officer was appointed. His findings were that the petitioner was not guilty of the charges. That was submitted to the disciplinary authority and the disciplinary authority in Ext. P7, after noting that the Enquiry Officer has found the charges not proved, directed "de novo oral enquiry" against the petitioner, as according to him, several of the pieces of evidence against the petitioner had not been taken note of. Ext. P7 is the order, thus ordering a de novo enquiry. Thereafter a de novo enquiry was conducted. The finding was that the petitioner was not guilty of the charges. The disciplinary authority examined the report. Ext. P10(a) is the report. That was communicated by the disciplinary authority with Ext. P10 show cause notice as to why postponement of increment for a period of one year with cumulative effect shall not be awarded as a punishment on the petitioner. To propose such an award, the disciplinary authority disagreed with the findings of the enquiry officer on the ground that the enquiry officer has failed to appreciate the evidence adduced in the enquiry'. No other reasons were stated for disagreement. Which was the findings disagreed to by the disciplinary authority was also not stated. Ext. P10 was replied to by the petitioner. Considering the reply, Ext. PI2 order was passed by the disciplinary authority confirming the decision contained in Ext. P10. The petitioner filed an appeal, Ext. P13. The Government considered that statutory appeal as a review petition in Ext. P14 and confirmed the penalty imposed as per Ext. P12, as the Government did not find any merit to alter the decision of the disciplinary authority, the Director General of Police. The petitioner sought for review of the order. That was also dismissed as per Ext. PI6, as according to the Government, "no fresh ground to reconsider the earlier decision of Government' was urged. It is in the above circumstances, the petitioner has approached this Court challenging Ext. P7 order directing de novo enquiry, Ext. P12 final order passed in the disciplinary action, Ext. P14 order on the appeal filed by the petitioner and Ext. P16 order in review by the Government. 2. Assailing Ext. It is in the above circumstances, the petitioner has approached this Court challenging Ext. P7 order directing de novo enquiry, Ext. P12 final order passed in the disciplinary action, Ext. P14 order on the appeal filed by the petitioner and Ext. P16 order in review by the Government. 2. Assailing Ext. P7, the petitioner submits that even if the disciplinary authority is of the view that all the evidences had not been taken note of by the enquiry officer in finding the delinquent not guilty of the charges, the option available for the disciplinary authority is not to direct a de novo enquiry but to disagree with the findings of the enquiry officer on the basis of the material available on record and continue the action. When an enquiry officer had been fully constituted and when that enquiry officer had submitted his report, it cannot be wiped out and 'de novo enquiry' cannot be ordered'. 3. The petitioner is well justified in this submission. This Court, in the decision reported in Kesavan Namboodiri v. State of Kerala (1982 KLT 512) held, of course with reference to R.15 of the Kerala Civil Services (Classification, Control and appeal) Rules, as follows: "the Disciplinary Authority cannot wipe out the inquiry already conducted and direct a de novo enquiry. Where the findings of the enquiring authority are adverse to the delinquent officer, it is open to the Disciplinary Authority to consider the material and evidence, come to a different conclusion and exonerate him from charges. If, on the other hand, the inquiring authority holds that the charges are not proved, it is open to the Disciplinary Authority to take a different view and record findings. Where the Disciplinary Authority is satisfied that some evidence which would have been available was not collected by the Inquiring Authority, it may even direct the Inquiring Authority to proceed further with the inquiry in the interests of justice. There is no provision in the rules to order a de novo inquiry after wiping out the inquiry already conducted." Thus, in this case, the disciplinary authority could have either disagreed with the findings based on reasons or directed the Inquiry Officer to continue the inquiry by collecting available evidence. Instead, a different Inquiry Officer was appointed and the proceedings were continued afresh against the petitioner. Thus, the petitioner is perfectly justified in availing Ext. P7. 4. Instead, a different Inquiry Officer was appointed and the proceedings were continued afresh against the petitioner. Thus, the petitioner is perfectly justified in availing Ext. P7. 4. Inspite of the illegality in Ext. P7, the petitioner participated in the de novo enquiry proceedings conducted against him. That also resulted in a finding favourable to the petitioner. This time, the disciplinary authority disagreed with the findings of the enquiry officer on the ground that the enquiry officer failed to appreciate the evidence on record, and proposed to award a punishment of postponement of increment for a period of one year with cumulative effect by serving Ext. P10 show cause notice. 5. The petitioner contends that the disciplinary authority can very well disagree with the findings of the enquiry officer and come to a different finding on the charges. Even if the disciplinary authority disagrees with the findings, the delinquent shall have an opportunity, while showing cause against the proposed penalty, to contend before the disciplinary authority that such disagreement is not based on evidence available on record and that based on the evidence available on record, no guilt can be established. In this regard, the petitioner tries to fortify his contention citing the decision reported in Punjab National Bank v. S.P. Gael (1998 (2) KLT SN 47) that "The principles of natural justice would demand that the authority which proposes to decide against the delinquent officer must give him a hearing. When the inquiry report is in favour of the delinquent officer but the disciplinary authority proposes to differ with such conclusions then that authority which is deciding against the delinquent officer must give him an opportunity of being heard, for otherwise he would be condemned unheard. In departmental proceedings what is of ultimate importance is the finding of the disciplinary authority. Principles of natural justice have to be read into Regulation 7(2). Whenever the disciplinary authority disagrees with the inquiry authority on any article of charge then before it records its own findings on such charge, it must record its tentative reasons for such disagreement and give to the delinquent officer an opportunity to represent before it records its findings." 6. In this case, the counsel contends that the tentative reason for such disagreement is not communicated to the delinquent in Ext. P10 show cause notice. In this case, the counsel contends that the tentative reason for such disagreement is not communicated to the delinquent in Ext. P10 show cause notice. Thus, he had been deprived of an opportunity to defend himself before the disciplinary authority who came to the conclusion of finding of guilt inspite of the favourable findings by the enquiring authority in Ext. P10(a). 7. Reading of Ext. P10 discloses that no reasons for disagreement with the findings had not been communicated to the delinquent, the petitioner. Therefore, the action taken on the basis of Ext. P10 show cause notice culminating in Ext. P12 order imposing the penalty of withholding increment for one year with cumulative effect, is unjustified, and therefore, Ext. P12 is liable to be quashed. 8. The petitioner resorted to the alternate remedy of statutory appeal impugning Ext. P12 before the Government. Ext. PI3 is the appeal. It is specifically stated that, that was an appeal. It is contended in paragraph 6 of Ext. P13 that the disciplinary authority when disagreed with the findings of the enquiry officer did have a responsibility to specify how and why he disagreed with the findings of the enquiry officer. That has not been done in the case on hand. Therefore, the imposition of penalty was wrong. Inspite of this specific contention in Ext. P13, the Government before whom that appeal was filed, did not advert to that aspect. The Government took Ext. P13 appeal only as a review petition as in discernible from Ext. P14. The Government did not advert to the specific contention in the appeal with regard to the disagreement with the findings of the enquiry officer. Thus, the petitioner also did not get a fair treatment in the hands of the appellate authority, the Government. The petitioner attempted to correct the error committed by the Government in Ext. P14, by filing a review petition. That also was brushed aside with the usual words that 'no fresh grounds to reconsider the earlier decision of Government) by Ext. P16, an innocuous order. 9. Thus, the petitioner did not get a fair treatment in the hands of the disciplinary authority, the Director General of Police as well as the appellate authority, the Government, inspite of the petitioner's attempt for review of the so called appellate order, Ext. P14. 10. P16, an innocuous order. 9. Thus, the petitioner did not get a fair treatment in the hands of the disciplinary authority, the Director General of Police as well as the appellate authority, the Government, inspite of the petitioner's attempt for review of the so called appellate order, Ext. P14. 10. As the disciplinary authority did not show any reason for disagreement of the findings in favour of the petitioner to punish him and as the appellate authority did not, inspite of the specific contention in that regard advert to that aspect, Exts. P12 and P14 are liable to be quashed. Equally so is Ext. P16. 11. As the petitioner acquiesced to the de novo enquiry ordered and as the final conclusion in this original petition, as regards Exts. P12, P14 and P16 is in favour of the petitioner, there is no reason presently, at this distance of time and after the entire exercises are over, to quash Ext. P7. Accordingly, the original petition is allowed quashing Exts. P12, P14 and P16. Consequences follow.