Judgment A.K.Ganguly, J. 1. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. The enquiry report has been filed before this Court. It appears from the enquiry report that even though the said report held the petitioner guilty of the charges but the same is not in very clear terms. In the said report there are some observations which are in favour of the petitioner. 3. Be that as it may, the said report does not exonerate the petitioner that is the view which this Court gathers on a perusal of the said report. In the said report, there is observation that the petitioner is trying to take advantage of the principle of the benefit of doubt. 4. In a domestic enquiry, the delinquent normally does not get exoneration from the charges on the principle of the benefit of doubt. An enquiry in a departmental proceeding is quite different from a criminal trial where such benefit is available as the charges are to be proved beyond all reasonable doubt. 5. However, it is not disputed that the said enquiry report was not served on the petitioner prior to imposition of the penalty, but the said enquiry report was made available to the petitioner after penalty was imposed upon the petitioner. Against the said imposition of penalty the petitioner has filed an appeal and the said appeal has also been dismissed as being time barred. 6. This Court has asked the learned counsel for the respondent why the dismissal order of the petitioner shall not be set aside for the prejudice arising out of non-furnishing of the enquiry report. To that, learned counsel for the respondent urges two points. Firstly, the learned counsel submits that the petitioner has to prove his prejudice, and mere non-furnishing of the report is not a ground to set aside the order of punishment. Secondly, he urges that the report has been made available to the petitioner before filing of the appeal, and as such, he has opportunity to raise all questions in the appeal, and the appellate authority is to consider the entire matter. In support of the said submission the learned counsel has relied on a judgment of the Hon ble Supreme Court in the case of "Union Bank of India vs. Vishwa Mohan" reported in (1998) 4 S.C.C. page-310. 7. In support of the said submission the learned counsel has relied on a judgment of the Hon ble Supreme Court in the case of "Union Bank of India vs. Vishwa Mohan" reported in (1998) 4 S.C.C. page-310. 7. Relying on the said judgment, learned counsel argued that furnishing of enquiry report to the employee before his filing of appeal satisfies the requirement of natural justice as the employee concerned will get an opportunity to assail the report before the appellate authority. In fact, the learned Judges of the Supreme Court has upheld a principle to that effect. But on a closer examination of the ratio as laid by the Hon ble Supreme Court in the case of Vishwa Mohan (supra) it appears that those principles were enunciated in the facts of that case. In para-12 of the judgment, the learned Judges were of the view that in the public interest the banking business needs absolute devotion, diligence, integrity and honesty. As otherwise the confidence of the public/depositers would be impaired. In para-12 it has been said very clearly which I quote: "It needs to be emphasised that in the banking business absolute devotion, diligence, integrity and honesty needs to be preserved by every bank employee and in particular the bank officer. If this is not observed, the confidence of the public/depositers would be impaired. It is for this reason we are of the opinion that the High Court had committed an error while setting aside the order of dismissal of the respondent on the ground of prejudice on account of non-furnishing of the enquiry report/findings to him."(Emphasis added). 8. There are other reasons also why this Court is of the view that the aforesaid conclusion of the Hon ble Supreme Court may be read as confined to the facts of that case. It appears that the attention of the Hon ble Supreme Court was not drawn to Us earlier decision in the case of Institute of Chartered Accountants of India vs. L.K.Ratna & ors. reported in A.I.R. 1987 S.C. page-71. in Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (supra), the question was the right of a member of the said Institute to get a hearing by the Council of the Institute after a disciplinary authority has submitted its report to the council in respect of allegations of misconduct against some of its members. reported in A.I.R. 1987 S.C. page-71. in Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (supra), the question was the right of a member of the said Institute to get a hearing by the Council of the Institute after a disciplinary authority has submitted its report to the council in respect of allegations of misconduct against some of its members. Such enquiry has to be held under the provisions of Chartered Accountant Act, 1949 and it was urged before the Hon ble Supreme Court that under section 22A there is a provision of appeal, and the provision of Section 22A is a complete safeguard against any insufficiency in the original proceeding before the council. it was urged before the Hon ble Supreme Court that in the right of appeal conferred under section 22A of the Act and no limitation has been imposed on the scope of the appeal, so the appellant is entitled to urge in such an appeal every ground which is available to him before the council. it was further high-lighted since such appeal was before the High Court, any insufficiency, of natural justice before the council can be cured by such elaborate right of appeal before the appellate authority which is the High Court itself. 9. The aforesaid contention was repelled very strongly by the Hon ble Supreme Court by referring to Wades Administrative law and quoting the learned authors views as follows: "In principle there ought to be an observance of natural justice equally at both stages." The strong Bench of the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case quoted with approval the observation of Prof. Wade as follows: "If natural justice is violated at the first stage, the right of appeal is not so much a true right of appeal as a corrected initial hearing; instead of fair trial followed by appeal, the procedure is reduced to unfair trial followed by fair trial." 10. The learned Judges in Institute of Chartered Accountants (supra) also approved the principles laid down by Justice Megarry in the case of Leary vs. National Union of Vehicle Builders, reported in 1971(1) Chancery page-34. The learned Judges in Institute of Chartered Accountants (supra) also approved the principles laid down by Justice Megarry in the case of Leary vs. National Union of Vehicle Builders, reported in 1971(1) Chancery page-34. The learned Judges of the Supreme Court quoted the observation of Justice Megarry extensively, which I reproduce below: "If one accepts the contention that & defect of natural justice in the trial body can be cured by the presence of natural justice in the appellate body, this has the result of depriving the member of his right of appeal from the expelling body. If the rules and the law Combine to give the member the right to a fair trial and the right of appeal, Why should he be told that he ought to be satisfied with an unjust trial and a fair appeal? Even if the appeal is treated as a hearing de novo, the member is being stripped of his right to Appeal to another body from the effective decision to expel him. I cannot think that natural justice is satisfied by a process whereby an unfair trial, though not resulting in a valid expulsion, will nevertheless have the effect of depriving the member of his right of appeal when a valid decision to expel him is subsequently made. Such a deprivation would be a powerful result to be achieved by what in law is a mere nullity; and it is no mere griviality that might be justified on the ground that natural justice does not mean perfect justice. As a general rule, at all events, I hold that a failure of natural justice in the trial body cannot be cured by a sufficiency of natural justice in an appellate body." (emphasis added) The learned Judges of the Supreme Court also noted that the judgment of Magarry, J was followed by the High Court of Canada in Re Cardinal and Board of Commissioners of Police of City of Cornwall and also by the Supreme Court of New Zealand in Wisland vs. Medical Practitioners Disciplinary Committee, (1974)1 NZLR 29 and also by the Court of Appeal of New Zealand in Reid vs. Rowley, (1977)2 NZLR 472. 11. 11. In view of such authoritative pronouncement in Institute of Chartered Accountants (supra) by the Supreme Court on this question, this Court, with utmost respect, accept the aforesaid proposition of the Supreme Court in the case of Vishwa Mohan (supra) as confined to the facts of that case. 12. So this Court is of the opinion that in the facts of the present case, the aforesaid principles cannot be, however, applied. A person while working as conductor in Bihar State Road Transport Corporation should also maintain integrity and honesty, but he cannot possibly be compared with the employees of a Bank on whose honest discharge of duty depends the confidence of the general public in the Banks functioning. 13. The next question is one of prejudice. In the context of a departmental enquiry which often leads to serious punishment the concept of prejudice must be understood broadly. This Court is of the view that in such a situation prejudice would mean any dis-advantage, disability arising out of non-supply of the enquiry report. 14. If the copy of enquiry report is not served upon the. employee concerned, the employee will obviously not know its contents. But the disciplinary authority knows it and on consideration of the report imposes penalty on him. Even where the employee has a right to make a representation on the proposed penalty, his representation, without knowledge of the contents of the report, is bound to be ineffective and inadequate and will not be sufficiently persuasive on the departmental authority so that it may change its view. 15. It is obvious that in a departmental proceeding, the employee has much at stake. His livelihood and honour depend on its outcome. Taking all these facts into account, this Court finds that in suGh situation normally non-furnishing of the report causes a prejudice and the employee concerned is denied of a proper opportunity of defence. There may be cases of exceptions as in cases of admission or of deliberate non-participation in the enquiry or where the conclusion reached is irresitible on facts. Non-supply of the report in such cases may not cause any prejudice. 16. Therefore, this Court is of the opinion that non-service of a copy of the enquiry report in this case where the report itself contains vascillating observations caused prejudice to the petitioner. Non-supply of the report in such cases may not cause any prejudice. 16. Therefore, this Court is of the opinion that non-service of a copy of the enquiry report in this case where the report itself contains vascillating observations caused prejudice to the petitioner. This Court cannot therefore sustain the order of dismissal which is at Annexure-4, and the same is therefore quashed. But as a result of quashing of Annexure-4 this Court does not reinstate the petitioner, nor does this Court direct the respondent Corporation to pay the petitioner his entire back wages. But this Court gives the following directions, in the facts of this case, I. Since enquiry report has already been served upon the petitioner there is no requirement of further service of the enquiry report. The petitioner is directed to make a representation to the Managing Director (respondent no.3) within a period of one month from today. II. Such representation of the petitioner must be considered and disposed of by a speaking order by respondent no.3 within a period of three months from the date of receipt of the said representation. III. The question of petitioners reinstatement/payment of back wages will depend upon the outcome of the said order to be passed by the Respondent no.3. This writ petition is thus allowed to the extent indicated above. Since Annexure-4 is quashed, no effect be given to Annexure-6.