JUDGMENT - Smt. DESAI RANJANA, J.:---This petition filed under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 ('the Code' for short) and under Article 227 of the Constitution of India relates to proceedings initiated under section 145 of the Code in respect of room No. 10, 3rd floor, Madhavji Building, S.V.P. Road, Opp. Alankar Cinema, Bombay (hereinafter referred to as the disputed premises). The petition seeks setting aside of the orders dated 17-7-1992 being Exhibits 'F', 'G' and 'H' to the petition, passed by the learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, IV Court, Girgaon, Bombay in Case Nos. 932/N/1992 and 933/N/1992. By the order at Exhibit 'F' preliminary notice under section 145(1) of the Code is issued to the respondents. By order at Exhibit 'G' petitioners have been called upon to give their written statement in respect of their respective claim about possession of the disputed premises. By order at Exhibit 'H' the petitioners have been called upon to give their say as to why the application of respondent No. 1 praying for sealing of the disputed premises should not be granted. 2. Shortly stated, the facts are as under:--- The petitioners are cousins. Petitioner No. 2 is the adopted son of respondent No. 1, petitioner No. 2 is residing at the disputed premises. It is the case of the petitioners that the relevant documents in support of the factum of possession such as, ration card, cooking gas etc. are in possession of petitioner No. 2. According to the petitioners, respondent No. 1 had never stayed in the disputed premises. Respondent No. 1 resides at room No. 8, Vishram Building, 3rd Kumbharwada, Bombay. Respondent No. 1 moved the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, IV Court, Girgaon, Bombay, by application dated 22nd June, 1992 under section 145 of the Code for taking action against the petitioners. He also filed an application under section 146 of the Code praying for sealing of the disputed premises. On 2-7-1992, petitioner No. 2 filed a declaratory suit being Suit No. 4241 of 1992 contending that, he is entitled to enjoy, use and occupy the disputed premises and for injunction restraining respondent No. 1 from disturbing and interfering with his possession of the same. On 2-7-1992, petitioner No. 2 filed a declaratory suit being Suit No. 4241 of 1992 contending that, he is entitled to enjoy, use and occupy the disputed premises and for injunction restraining respondent No. 1 from disturbing and interfering with his possession of the same. On 7th July, 1992, on a Notice of Motion taken out by petitioner No. 2, ad interim injunction was granted by the City Civil Court restraining respondent No. 1 from interfering with petitioners' possession. It is the case of the petitioners that by suppressing the fact that, an order of injunction was granted in favour of petitioner No. 2, respondent No. 1 obtained the order dated 17-7-1992 from the learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, IV Court, Girgaum, wherein it is observed that, there is likelihood of breach of peace. The learned Magistrate issued preliminary notice under section 145(1) of the Code. He also passed other consequential orders which are also under challenge in this petition. 3. I have heard Mr. A.G. Sabnis, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners and Mr. Rajendra Shirodkar, learned Counsel appearing for the respondents. Mr. Sabnis assailed the initiation of proceedings under section 145 of the Code on three grounds. Drawing my attention to paragraph 9 of the application under section 145 of the Code filed by respondent No. 1, Mr. Sabnis urged that, in the application the fact that the petitioners are in joint possession of the disputed premises with respondent No. 1 is admitted by respondent No. 1. The relevant portion of paragraph 9 reads thus: "I say that I was occupying the front portion of R. No. 10 admeasuring 13' x 16' on the 3rd floor of Madhavji Building, Opp. Alankar Cinema, S.V.P. Road, Bombay-400 004 and both the respondents were occupying rear portion of the said R. No. 10." Mr. Sabnis argued that in a case where joint possession is admitted, the question of initiation of proceedings under section 145 of the Code does not arise at all as, in such a situation, the learned Magistrate becomes functus officio and the application has to be dismissed forthwith. In support of this submission, Mr. Sabnis argued that in a case where joint possession is admitted, the question of initiation of proceedings under section 145 of the Code does not arise at all as, in such a situation, the learned Magistrate becomes functus officio and the application has to be dismissed forthwith. In support of this submission, Mr. Sabnis has drawn my attention to A.I.R. 1967 Allahabad 44 (Khem Chand v. Balwant)1, where, while dealing with the question of joint possession, the Allahabad High Court observed thus: "The proceedings under section 145 do not contemplate a case of joint possession and once the Magistrate, on a consideration of evidence reaches a conclusion that the parties are in joint possession of the subject matter of the dispute he becomes functus officio and the proceedings under section 145, Criminal Procedure Code should be dropped." He then drew my attention to A.I.R. 1951 Rajasthan 156 (Nahar Singh v. The State)2, where the Rajasthan High Court was also considering a question of joint possession. The observations of the Rajasthan High Court, which are relevant for the purpose of this case are as under: "Where a Magistrate finds after enquiry that the parties were in joint actual possession of the property in dispute, he should drop the proceedings started under section 145. And further in such a case, the Magistrate cannot proceed to pass an order under section 146." In the case on hand joint possession is admitted in paragraph 9 of the application. In view of the peculiar facts of the present case and in the light of the above judgments, in my opinion, the learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate could not have proceeded with the proceedings under section 145 of the Code. 4. Secondly, Mr. Sabnis argued that in view of the pendency of the civil litigation, the learned Magistrate had no jurisdiction to proceed under section 145 of the Code. In this connection, Mr. Sabnis placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 472 (Ram Sumer Puri Mahant v. State of U.P. and others)3. 4. Secondly, Mr. Sabnis argued that in view of the pendency of the civil litigation, the learned Magistrate had no jurisdiction to proceed under section 145 of the Code. In this connection, Mr. Sabnis placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 472 (Ram Sumer Puri Mahant v. State of U.P. and others)3. In the facts of that case, the Supreme Court was considering whether when in respect of certain properties, in a suit for possession and injunction, the question of title was gone into and the suit was dismissed and an appeal had been carried from the decree of the Civil Judge and the same was pending, parallel criminal proceedings under section 145 of the Code could be initiated. The Supreme Court observed thus: "When a civil litigation is pending for the property wherein the question of possession is involved and has been adjudicated, initiation of a parallel criminal proceeding under section 145 of the Code would not be justified. The parallel proceedings should not be permitted to continue and in the event of a decree of the Civil Court the Criminal Court should not be allowed to invoke its jurisdiction particularly when possession is being examined by the Civil Court and parties are in a position to approach the Civil Court for interim orders such as injunction or appointment of Receiver for adequate protection of the property during pendency of the dispute. Multiplicity of litigation is not in the interest of the parties nor should public time be allowed to be wasted over meaningless litigation." 5. Coming to the facts of the present case, the application under section 145 of Criminal Procedure Code is dated 22-6-1992. Admittedly, the petitioners filed a suit in respect of the said premises on 2-7-1992. The ad interim injunction order restraining respondent No. 1 from entering the suit premises was passed on 7-7-1992. The preliminary order passed by the learned Magistrate is dated 17-7-1992. It appears that the fact that ad interim injunction order was passed on 7-7-1992 was not brought to the notice of the learned Magistrate on 17-7-1992 when he passed the preliminary order for, if it was pointed out to the learned Magistrate, the learned Magistrate would not have proceeded to pass the preliminary order. It appears that the fact that ad interim injunction order was passed on 7-7-1992 was not brought to the notice of the learned Magistrate on 17-7-1992 when he passed the preliminary order for, if it was pointed out to the learned Magistrate, the learned Magistrate would not have proceeded to pass the preliminary order. It has also been pointed out to me that on 19-9-1992 the ad interim order came to be confirmed and therefore there is no justification for continuation of proceedings under section 145 of the Code. 6. On the other hand, Mr. Shirodkar the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1 urged there is sufficient justification for continuation of the said proceedings. He argued that not in all cases where civil proceedings are pending, criminal proceedings are stayed as a matter of course. He submitted that in the present case the action under section 145 of the Code was initiated prior to the civil suit and hence the said proceedings must proceed. I am unable to agree with Mr. Shirodkar. Joint possession is admitted by respondent No. 1. Though action under section 145 of the Code was initiated prior to the suit, ad interim injunction order passed by the Civil Court was not pointed out to the learned Magistrate and the learned Magistrate was persuaded to issue preliminary notice under section 145(1) of the Code. When civil suit is pending the parties could have very well approached the Civil Court for appropriate orders. Besides the ad interim order is later on confirmed. To the facts of the present case the ratio of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Ram Sumer Suri's case (supra) is clearly attracted. The continuation of the proceedings under section 145 of the Code is therefore clearly not justified. 7. The third point urged by Mr. Sabnis is that, the learned Magistrate erred in not passing a reasoned order. The relevant portion of section 145 of the Code reads thus: "Section 145. The continuation of the proceedings under section 145 of the Code is therefore clearly not justified. 7. The third point urged by Mr. Sabnis is that, the learned Magistrate erred in not passing a reasoned order. The relevant portion of section 145 of the Code reads thus: "Section 145. Procedure where dispute concerning land or water is likely to cause breach of peace.---(1) Whenever an Executive Magistrate is satisfied from a report of a Police Officer or upon other information that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace exists concerning any land or water or the boundaries thereof, within his local jurisdiction, he shall make an order in writing stating the grounds of his being so satisfied, and requiring the parties concerned in such dispute to attend his Court in person or by pleader, on a specified date and time, and to put in written statements of their respective claims as respects the fact of actual possession of the subject of dispute." It is clear from a bare reading of the said section that, when a Magistrate is satisfied that the dispute is likely to cause breach of peace, he has to make an order in writing stating the grounds of his being so satisfied. It is not as if the moment the report is submitted the Magistrate has to initiate action. He has to apply his mind to the imminent possibility of breach of peace. He must be satisfied about the need to initiate proceedings, record his reasons and then proceed to take action. In this connection, my attention is drawn to the judgment of this Court (Vishwanath Kashinath Virkar v. Nitinchand Keshavji Gala)4, reported in 1995(3) Bom.C.R. 525 where this Court observed thus: "It is essential for the assumption of jurisdiction by the Magistrate that he should be "satisfied" from a report of a Police Officer or from other information, which would include an application by the party dispossessed, that there is likelihood of breach of peace. Where the Magistrate fails to record in his preliminary order the reasons for his satisfaction, or the grounds for his satisfaction the order cannot be sustained. Failure to record a finding by the Magistrate vitiates the proceedings." 8. In the present case, the order dated 17-7-1992 merely states that there will be likelihood of breach of peace. Where the Magistrate fails to record in his preliminary order the reasons for his satisfaction, or the grounds for his satisfaction the order cannot be sustained. Failure to record a finding by the Magistrate vitiates the proceedings." 8. In the present case, the order dated 17-7-1992 merely states that there will be likelihood of breach of peace. The learned Magistrate has given no reasons on the basis of which, he has stated that there was likelihood of breach of peace. In my opinion, the ratio of the judgment in Vishwanath's case (supra) is clearly attracted to the facts of this case. 9. For all these reasons, I am of the opinion that, the initiation of proceedings under section 145 of the Code cannot be sustained. Needless to say that while arriving at this conclusion, this Court has not gone into the merits of the rival contentions of the parties as regards their title and other rights to the disputed property which only the Civil Court is competent to adjudicate upon. 10. In this view of the matter, the proceedings in Case Nos. 932/N/92 and 933/N/1992 pending in the IVth Court, Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Girgaon, Bombay, are quashed and set aside. The petition is disposed of accordingly. Order accordingly. -----