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Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

1999 DIGILAW 741 (MP)

Rajendra Prasad Mangal v. The Cantonment Board

1999-09-16

S.P.KHARE

body1999
ORDER S.P. Khare, J. 1. This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for quashing the order dated 27.6.1987 (Annexure P-19) of respondent No. 3 General Officer, Commanding-in-chief. 2. The petitioner is transferee of the original lessees of bungalow No. 8, Theatre Road, Cantonment, Jabalpur. The land appertenant to this bungalow is 2.20 acres. The lease deed dated 5.3.1922 (Annexure P-1) was executed by the Secretary of State. This land was in "B-3 category on resumable tenure". Clause xii of the lease-deed provides that the house shall not be occupied for the purpose of a hospital, bank, hotel, shop or school without the previous written sanction of the officer Commanding the Division given with the concurrence of the Local Government. On the considerations for the grant of sanction is whether the site would be required in future for the "extension of cantonment" or "for the accommodation of military officers or civil officers". Clause XXVII of the lease-deed further provides that the Local Government may resume the land or any portion thereof at any time after giving one month's notice in writing and on payment of compensation for such building standing on the land or portion thereof as shall have been erected under proper authority. 3. On 22.12.1986 the petitioner submitted an application seeking sanction for construction of a residential-cum-commercial shopping complex on the land in dispute. The building plan was annexed to the application in which construction of 30 shops was proposed. The Defence Estate Officer (DEO) objected to the grant of the sanction from the "land point of view". The petitioner claimed that there was "deemed sanction" under Section 181 (6) of the Cantonment Act, 1924 and proceeded with the construction. In the meeting of the Cantonment Board held on 16.4.1987 the majority of the members were of the view that the deemed sanction had accrued to the petitioner. The President of the Board dissented and suspended the majority decision under Section 51 (1) of the Act. In the meeting of the Cantonment Board held on 16.4.1987 the majority of the members were of the view that the deemed sanction had accrued to the petitioner. The President of the Board dissented and suspended the majority decision under Section 51 (1) of the Act. The matter was referred to the General Officer, Commanding-in-Chief and he, after giving an opportunity of hearing to the Cantonmnet Board, by the impugned order dated 27.6.1987 in exercise of the powers under Section 52 (1) (b) of the Act directed that the majority decision of the Board shall not be carried into effect as erection of shopping complex is not permissible on the site held on resumable tenure in terms of the Government policy dated 18.6.1982 Annexure P-21. 4. By the judgment and decree dated 6.5.1982 in civil suit No. 26-A of 1989 instituted by the Cantonment Board against the petitioner the district Judge. Jabalpur held that there was no "deemed sanction" and the Board is entitled to demolish the construction illegally made by the petitioner. This judgment though set-aside in first appeal was restored by the Division Bench of this Court in L.P.A. No. 7 of 1994 on 18.4.1995 closing the chapter of deemed sanction. There was Special Leave Petition by the petitioner before the Supreme Court and in pursuance of the directions given therein the Cantonment Board sent a copy of letter dated 25.4.1987 rejecting the building plan to the petitioner. Subsequently the Supreme Court directed the petitioner by order dated 15.12.1995 to "adopt such remedy as may be open to him" in view of the impugned order dated 27.6.1987. 5. The petitioner's case is that the proposed construction as per application of the petitioner was sanctioned by the Cantonment Board by resolution dated 16.4.1987. The General Officer, Commanding-in-Chief did not give any opportunity of hearing to the petitioner before passing the impugned order and thus there has been violation of the principles of natural justice. There is no policy decision in the letter dated 18.6.1982 that erection on the site is not permissible. The impugned order is discriminatory as a number of similarly situated persons have been granted construction permission. 6. The case of the respondents is that the application of the petitioner for permission to construct the shopping complex was never allowed. The majority decision was cancelled by the order in question. The impugned order is discriminatory as a number of similarly situated persons have been granted construction permission. 6. The case of the respondents is that the application of the petitioner for permission to construct the shopping complex was never allowed. The majority decision was cancelled by the order in question. There was no need of any show-cause notice or hearing to the petitioner as the application and the documents submitted by him were considered for arriving at the decision. There is no discrimination. 7. The learned counsel for the both the sides have been heard. The General Officer, Commanding-in-Chief actually exercised his veto power conferred upon him by law and cancelled the majority decision of the cantonment Board. There was no formal communication of the decision of the Board to the petitioner in writing. The suspension of the majority decision by the President and its cancellation by the General Officer, Commanding-in-Chief were steps or a part of the process of the consideration of the application of the petitioner for the proposed construction no finality was attached to the majority decision of the Board. In such a situation there was no need to hear the petitioner afresh. He had already submitted all the relevant papers. The decision of the General Officer, Commanding-in-Chief was based on the terms of the lease-deed and the policy of the Government. A shopping complex could not be permitted on the land appertenant to the residential bungalow in breach of the terms of the lease-deed. The petitioner does not hold the land in dispute free-hold. He is not the absolute owner of that land. The lease is coupled with restrictive covenants. The site is resumable by the lessor on payment of compensation for the existing building. Granting of sanction to build on this land a shopping complex would be unduly onerous if it is decided to resume the land in future. The impugned decision is based on relevant and material considerations. 8. The case of the Supreme Court in Cantonment Board, Dinapur Vs. Taramani Devi AIR 1992 S.C. 61 cited on behalf of the petitioner is distinguishable as in that case the Cantonment Board had already granted the formal permission to make additions in the building on terms and conditions given in the sanction order and that was sought to be reviewed by the General Officer. Taramani Devi AIR 1992 S.C. 61 cited on behalf of the petitioner is distinguishable as in that case the Cantonment Board had already granted the formal permission to make additions in the building on terms and conditions given in the sanction order and that was sought to be reviewed by the General Officer. In that context it was held that it was necessary to give hearing to the applicant. In the present case the majority decision had not become final. It was still inchoate. It has been cancelled by an authority legally competent to do so and on valid considerations. 9. The charge of discrimination has been denied. The petitioner has filed a list with the amended petition showing the names of the persons to whom the sanction has been granted for building shops. According to the respondents those persons are not equally circumstanced. That is a disputed question of fact and there is not sufficient material on record on which this factual dispute may be resolved by this Court. At any rate a bad or wrong precedent does not have a binding efficacy. There is equality before law and equal protection of law. No equality can be claimed if there is any breach of observance of law in a given case. At least the Court will not countenance the theory that law should be ignored and bad precedent should be directed to be followed. That would amount to giving a mandate against the rule of law. There is no discrimination. 10. The petition is dismissed. Petition dismissed