ORDER Maithli Sharan, J. 1. This is a petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure invoking inherent jurisdiction of this Court. 2. The brief facts of the case lie in a narrow compass. The petitioners are the prosecution witnesses in Sessions Trial No. 49 of 1987 (State of M.P. v. Anup Singh and eight others) pending in the Court of First Additional Sessions Judge, Shivpuri, in which the non-petitioners No. 1 to 9 are being tried for the offences under Sections 302, 307, 326, 147, 148 & 149 of the Indian Penal Code for causing deaths of two persons viz., Parmalsingh and Bhaiyalal, and for causing injuries to other persons. These petitioners were examined in the above mentioned sessions trial in the year 1987. On 19-8-99 they submitted an application under Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, through a private counsel, praying for their re-examination in the Court as they wanted to disclose the fact that actually they had not witnessed the alleged incident in question for which the accused persons/non-petitioners were being tried. They further alleged in their application that whatever they had deposed earlier in the Court, it was all done on account of fear and coercion applied by some dacoits and the police, and actually they had not identified the accused persons. 3. The learned Trial Court rejected the aforesaid application filed by the petitioners on the ground that it appeared to be collusive in nature, and further that recalling of the witnesses for fresh examination was not warranted in law. Being aggrieved by the impugned order dated 19-8-1999 passed by the learned Trial Court the petitioners (prosecution witnesses) have filed the instant petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 4. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioners and the learned Govt. Advocate for the State at length, on admission. 5. Admittedly, the petitioners were examined as prosecution witnesses in the above mentioned sessions trial in the year 1987, but, surprisingly enough they did not allege anything in their application under Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as to what type of coercion or inducement or threat was applied on them by the dacoits or the police that they remained apprehended and coerced for such a long period of twelve years and could not come to the Court to place their grievance before it. The hiding of this important and crucial fact by itself goes to indicate something fishy in the matter. If the petitioners, at all, were coerced, apprehended or threatened by some of the dacoits or the police, or for that matter by anybody, then certainly it was required of them to approach the Court at the earliest available opportunity to place their grievance. There is not even an iota to indicate as to why they could not avail such an earlier opportunity for such a long time of twelve years. 6. True, under Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure wide powers are given to the Court to summon any person as a witness if his evidence appears to be essential for the just decision of the case. But it is a settled principle of law that the Court is enjoined to exercise a judicial discretion and it cannot act on its whims and caprices, one way of the other; there must be material available on record to act upon. Looking to the impugned order passed by the learned Trial Court I find much substance in it and it cannot be said that it had not exercised judicial discretion in rejecting the application filed by the petitioners under Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The circumstances dilated in this case not only do not go to indicate that there has been any illegality on the part of the learned trial Magistrate in passing the impugned order, but in fact, as also observed by the learned Trial Court, there appears to have been some collusion of the petitioners with the accused persons/non-petitioners which prompted the petitioners to move an application under Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure after a long gap of twelve years. Thus, in fact, it is the petitioners who have abused the process of the Court. 7. In view of the above circumstances this petition is devoid of any merit, and it could not be said that there has been any abuse of the process of the Court on the part of the learned trial Judge. Consequently, this petition is not admitted, and is dismissed in limine.