JUDGMENT 1. - This Misc. Petition has been filed by Avtar Singh, the then Dy. S.P. against the order dated 7.2.1991 passed by the Munsif and Judicial Magistrate, Deedwana, taking cognizance against him under Sections 148, 324, 326 and 149, IPC. 2. The short facts of the case are these. Rukmani w/o one Devilal died of burn injuries on 16.3.1983 at Deedwana. The Magistrate enquiry was held under Section 174, Cr.P.C. The police was of the view that the deceased had burnt herself by pouring kerosene oil upon her body. The conclusion arrived at by the police did not find favour with the villagers. On 17.8.1983 Ganpat Vaishnav and some other persons made an application before the Collector, Nagaur alleging that Devilal, husband of Rukmani had illicit relations with one Anuradha and enquiry be held after registering a case under Section 302, IPC. A case under Section 302, IPC was, therefore, registered against Devilal. When the investigation was going on, the villagers went to the office of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Deedwana, to register their protest but as he was not available, they went to the Police Station, Deedwana. The petitioner and other police personnel were there. The complainant's case is that the petitioner called Ganpat inside the police station and fired a shot at him. The crowd protested against the action of the petitioner which further enraged him and he directed the police personnel to open fire at the crowed resulting into firing. Various persons received injuries in the occurrence including Ganpat, Manakchand, Ramgopal, Rajendra, etc. A private complaint was filed by complainant Gopal Vaishnav against the petitioner and others, on which an enquiry was held by the Judicial Magistrate, Deedwana under Chapter XV, Cr. P.C. After examining the witnesses, the learned Judicial Magistrate took cognizance under Sections 148, 324, 326 read with Section 149, IPC against the petitioner and six others vide order dated 7.2.1991. That order is under challenge. 3. Mr. Kharlia, learned Counsel for the petitioner, pointing out that Avtar Singh, petitioner who was Dy. S.P. at the relevant time, and was engaged with the investigation of the case, was at the police station when crowd of thousands of people had collected and pelted stones on the police personnel, contended that in order to disperse the crowd and to defend the police personnel, the petitioner had to order the firing whereby some persons received injuries. S.P. at the relevant time, and was engaged with the investigation of the case, was at the police station when crowd of thousands of people had collected and pelted stones on the police personnel, contended that in order to disperse the crowd and to defend the police personnel, the petitioner had to order the firing whereby some persons received injuries. The contention was that the act of the accused on duty in the discharge of his official duty, and he being a public servant not removable by the authority other than the State Government, could not be prosecuted without sanction of the State Government under Section 197, Cr.P.C. 4. Mr. Kachhwaha, learned Public Prosecutor and Mr. Soni, learned Counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, contended that it could not be the official duty of the petitioner to cause injuries or to order to open fire at the crowd and, therefore, the protection of Section 197, Cr.P.C. was not available to the petitioner. 5. The question to be considered is whether protection under Section 197, Cr.P.C. is available to the petitioner in respect of his act of opening fire or ordering his subordinates to do so at the police station. The learned Magistrate has held that the firing could not be the act in the discharge of the official duty of the petitioner and it was abuse of the office which he held. 6. Sub-section (1) of Section 197, Cr.P.C. reads as follows :"197. The learned Magistrate has held that the firing could not be the act in the discharge of the official duty of the petitioner and it was abuse of the office which he held. 6. Sub-section (1) of Section 197, Cr.P.C. reads as follows :"197. Prosecution of Judges and public servants - (1) When any person who is or was a Judge or Magistrate or a public servant not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Government is accused of any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, no Court shall take cognizance of such offence except with the previous sanction - (a) in the case of a person who is employed or, as the case may be, was at the time of commission of the alleged offence employed, in connection with the affairs of the Union, or the Central Government; (b) In the case of a person who is employed or, as the case may be, was at the time of commission of the alleged offence employed, in connection with the affairs of a State, or the State Government : Provided that where the alleged offence was committed by a person referred to in Clause (b) during the period while Proclamation issued under Clause (1) of Article 356 of the Constitution was in force in a State, Clause (b) will apply as if for the expression "State Government" occurring therein, the expression "Central Government" were substituted. The question for consideration is if there was nexus between the act of the petitioner and his duties as to claim protection under Section 197, Cr.P.C. 7. In the case of Matajog Debey v. H.C. Bihari, AIR 1956 SC 44 , the Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court considered the scope of Section 197, Cr.P.C. and laid down the law in the following terms. "There must be a reasonable connection between the act and the discharge of official duty; the act must bear such relation to the duty that the accused could lay a reasonable but not a pretended or fanciful claim, that he did it in the course of the performance of his duty." 8. The case of State through C.B.I. v. B.L. Verma, 1997 (10) SCC 772 , throws light on what is the 'purported act in the discharge of official duty'. The case of State through C.B.I. v. B.L. Verma, 1997 (10) SCC 772 , throws light on what is the 'purported act in the discharge of official duty'. In the case, the allegations were that the Director, Enforcement had abused his official position while discharging his official duties. It was held that the abusing of the official position would not oust the necessity of sanction under Section 197, Cr.P.C. to take cognizance of the offence. 9. In the case of Pukhraj v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1973 SC 2591 , considering the scope of protection available under Section 197, Cr.P.C., Their Lordships observed as under:- "The sanction is not restricted only to cases of anything purported to be done in good faith, for a person who ostensibly acts in execution of his duty still purports so to act, although he may have a dishonest intention. Nor is it confined to cases where the act, which constitutes the offence, is the official duty of the official concerned. Such an interpretation would involve a contradiction in terms, because an offence can never be an official duty. The offence should have been committed when an act is done in the execution of duty or when an act purports to be done in the execution of duty. The test appears to be not that the offence is capable of being committed only by a public servant and not by anyone else, but that it is committed by a public servant in art act done or purporting to be one in the execution of his duty. The section cannot be confined to only such acts as are done by a public servant directly in pursuance of his public office, though in excess of the duty or under a mistaken belief as to the existence of such duty. Nor need the act constituting the offence be so inseparably connected with the official duty as to form part and parcel of the same transaction. What is necessary is that the offence must be in respect of an act done or purported to be done in the discharge of an official duty. It does not apply to acts done purely in a private capacity by a public servant. What is necessary is that the offence must be in respect of an act done or purported to be done in the discharge of an official duty. It does not apply to acts done purely in a private capacity by a public servant. Expressions such as the "capacity in which the act is performed", "cloak of office" and "professed exercise of office" may not always be appropriate to describe or delimit the scope of the section. An act merely because it was done negligently does not cease to be one done or purporting to be done in execution of a duty." 10. In the case of State of Maharashtra v. Dr. Budhikota Subbarao, (1993) 3 SCC 339 =II (1993) CCR 119 (SC) , Their Lordships observed that the word 'cognizance' means 'jurisdiction' or 'the exercise of jurisdiction' or 'power to try and determine causes'. In common parlance it means 'taking notice of'. A Court, therefore, is precluded from entertaining a complaint or taking notice of it or exercising jurisdiction if it is in respect of a public servant who is accused of an of fence alleged to have been committed during discharge of his official duty. It has been further observed that the mandatory character of the protection afforded to a public servant is brought out by the expression "no Court shall take cognizance of such offence except with the previous sanction". Use of the words, 'no' and 'shall' makes it abundantly clear that he bar on the exercise of power of the Court to take cognizance of any offence is absolute and complete and very cognizance is barred. 11. This Court in the case of Harish Chandra v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 1998 Cr. L.R. (Raj.) 136 , had occasion to discuss the scope of Section 197, Cr.P.C. In that case, the allegations were that the police officer had beaten the father of the complainant mercilessly to extract his confession. This Court held that interrogation is part of the official duties and, therefore, if any excess was committed during investigation, there was reasonable connection between the act and the duties and the cognizance without sanction under Section 197, Cr.P.C. could not be taken. 12. In Shivlal Mathur v. State of Rajasthan, 1996 RCC 375 , the allegations were that the police official had hurled abuses and inflicted a cane blow and kept the complainant in police lockup. 12. In Shivlal Mathur v. State of Rajasthan, 1996 RCC 375 , the allegations were that the police official had hurled abuses and inflicted a cane blow and kept the complainant in police lockup. It was held that the acts of the police official had a nexus with the discharge of his duty as a public servant. 13. In the case of Rameshwar Dayal v. State of Rajasthan, 1991 Cr. L.R. (Raj.) 563 , this Court while considering the scope and relevant language occurring in Section 197 of the Code "any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of the official duty" and relying on the cases of Federal Court, Privy Council, Supreme Court and Delhi High Court held at para No. 9 of the report as follows:- "The test for application of Section 197 of the Code is whether it was committed in the discharge of official duty. There must be a reasonable connection between the act and the official duty, and it does not matter even if the matter exceeds what is strictly necessary for the discharge of the duty." 14. The Delhi High Court in the case of Satyavarat v. State, 1992 (3) Crimes 654 , considered the scope of Section 197, Cr. P.C. The facts of that case were then one 1' was detained in police custody in connection with the F.I.R. of the cognizable offence and he was tortured while in police custody. It was held that there appears to be a reasonable connection between the alleged atrocities committed upon 'T' and discharge of official duties by the police officials in connection with the investigation of the F.I.R. and the alleged atrocities, seemed to have nexus with the official duties of the police. 15. So also in the case of Pritam Singh v. Delhi Administration, 1987 Crl. L.J. 872 , the facts were that the complainant who was scooterist was manhandled and insulted by the police officials while on traffic duty. It was also alleged that the police officials had detained the scooterist even after challaning him for the purpose of recovering composition money. So also in the case of Pritam Singh v. Delhi Administration, 1987 Crl. L.J. 872 , the facts were that the complainant who was scooterist was manhandled and insulted by the police officials while on traffic duty. It was also alleged that the police officials had detained the scooterist even after challaning him for the purpose of recovering composition money. It was held that the acts done by the police officials was while discharging their official duty as there was reasonable connection between the alleged act and discharge of the official duty and sanction for their prosecution was necessary under Section 197, Cr.P.C. 16. The gist of the rulings referred to above is that the essential requirement postulated for the sanction of prosecution of the public servant is when the offence alleged against the public servant was done by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duties. In such a situation, it postulates, that the public servant's act is in furtherance of the performance of his official duty. If the act/omission is integral to the performance of public duty, the public servant is entitled to the protection under Section 197(1) of Cr.P.C. Without the previous sanction, the complaint against him for the alleged offence, cannot be proceeded with in the trial. The policy of the Legislature is to afford reasonable protection to public servants acting or purporting to act in the discharge of their duties. This protection has of course certain limits and can only be claimed in the circumstances where the acts complained against and alleged to have been done by the public servants are reasonably connected with the discharge of their official duties. 17. Keeping in view the aforesaid legal position, now it is to be seen if the acts of the petitioner related to the discharge of his official duties. 18. It is not disputed that the petitioner was a public servant not removable from his office save by the sanction of the State Government. It is also not in dispute that the occurrence is alleged to have taken place outside the police station where various persons had collected. 18. It is not disputed that the petitioner was a public servant not removable from his office save by the sanction of the State Government. It is also not in dispute that the occurrence is alleged to have taken place outside the police station where various persons had collected. It is further not in dispute that the investigation of the case of the untimely death of Rukmani was being conducted by the petitioner and people had collected at the police station to register their protest as they thought that the investigation was not on correct lines. At this stage, the Court is simply concerned with the contention that whether there was reasonable connection with the alleged offence and the official duty of the petitioner. Maintenance of law and order is the foremost duty of the police. The facts are that the crowd had collected outside the Police Station and it had indulged in stone throwing. It was the duty of the petitioner to protect the Police Station and the personnel. It is possible to argue that the petitioner acted slightly in excess of duty, but that would not oust the necessity of the sanction. It is made clear that the above observations do not mean that the petitioner did not commit any offence. If the allegations made out a case against him, he can certainly be tried but after sanction is accorded by the State Government under Section 197, Cr.P.C. 19. For the reasons aforesaid, it has to be held that the act of the petitioner was done in the purported discharge of his duties and, therefore, he could not be prosecuted without obtaining the sanction of the State Government under Section 197, Cr.P.C. The order taking cognizance against him is liable to be quashed. 20. Consequently, the Misc. Petition succeeds. The impugned order qua petitioner is quashed. This order will not prevent the complainant or the State Government to prosecute the petitioner for the alleged offence after sanction for his prosecution under Section 197, Cr.P.C. is accorded.Petition allowed. *******