Judgment : Since caveat was entered, I heard the learned counsel on both sides at the time of admission itself. 2. In both these Second Appeals, defendants are the appellants. Landlord filed a suit for eviction as O.S.No.2367 of 1981 on the file of I Additional District Munsif, Tiruchirapalli. Another suit was filed by landlord as O.S.No.3191 of 1981 on the file of same court for mandatory injunction directing tenant to demolish the unauthorised construction and restore the leased portion to its original position. Before institution of suit, lease was also terminated by registered notice under Sec.106 of Transfer of Properties Act. 3. Reason for terminating tenancy was that the tenant defaulted payment of rent for six months from January, 1979 and when demand was made, defendants put false contention. After termination of tenancy a sum of Rs.3,600 was paid, which was accepted by landlord, without prejudice to his rights to get possession. Plaintiff sought eviction of tenant with damage in use and occupation after the period of tenancy. According to plaintiffs lease was composite lease i.e., building and furniture and therefore civil court got jurisdiction to entertain the same. 4. As against the said contention, appellants contend that the transaction is not composite lease, but only a lease of building and consequently, only Rent Control Court got jurisdiction to decide the matter. It is further submitted that the furniture that are now seen in the premises belong to appellants and not part of the lease. 5. Suit for mandatory injunction was filed on the allegation that defendants have made unauthorised constructions and have also effected some changes within the building and the same is liable to be removed. Defendants denied the same in their written statement and prayed for dismissal of the suit. 6. Trial court as per judgment dated 20.12.1991 held that the suit transaction is composite lease and consequently, civil court got jurisdiction. It is also found that the furniture was also given at the time of lease and is now in the possession of defendants. Ex.A-7 was relied on for the said purpose. Trial court found that even though Ex.A-7 is not registered it can be looked into for collateral purpose i.e., to prove the admission of parties which do not require registration. Ex.A-7 was relied on for the said purpose. Trial court found that even though Ex.A-7 is not registered it can be looked into for collateral purpose i.e., to prove the admission of parties which do not require registration. It is also found that defendants have made unauthorised construction and changes in the building and the name is also liable to be removed. Mandatory injunction was also granted. Damages for use and occupation was also awarded. 7. Thematter was taken on appeal by the appellants in A.S.Nos.50 of 1996 and 51 of 1996 on the file of Principal Subordinate Judge, Tiruchirapalli. Lower appellate court also confirmed the decision of trial court and dismissed both the appeal. 8. Theconcurrent judgments of courts below are assailed in these Second Appeals. 9. The following substantial questions of law have been raised in the memorandum of appeals: S.A.No.740 of 1999: (a) whether the courts below have got jurisdiction to entertain the suit for recovery of possession as claimed by the plaintiff against the defendants. .(b) Whether the courts below are justified in coming to the conclusion that the lease transaction in respect of the suit schedule property in O.S.No.2367 of 1981 is a composite lease, especially when the prayer in the said suit itself is only for recovery of the suit schedule property alone and not the movables alleged to have been leased out to the defendants/. (c) Whether the courts below are justified in coming to the conclusion that the lease transaction between the plaintiffs and the defendants is a composite lease based on Ex.A-7 especially the plaintiffs have not even pleaded in respect of Ex.A-7 and also not included in the prayer portion for the recovery of the moveables mentioned under Ex.A-7. S.A.No.741 of 1999: (a) Whether the court below are justified in granting a decree for mandatory injunction while the plaintiffs have not proved the construction alleged to have been constructed by the defendants. .(b) Whether the decree for mandatory injunction can be sustained especially when the plaintiffs have miserably failed to prove the damages caused by the defendants so as to warrant a decree for mandatory injunction. 10. The main question that is urged by the learned counsel for appellants is that the reliance on Ex.A-7 by Court below is illegal. .(b) Whether the decree for mandatory injunction can be sustained especially when the plaintiffs have miserably failed to prove the damages caused by the defendants so as to warrant a decree for mandatory injunction. 10. The main question that is urged by the learned counsel for appellants is that the reliance on Ex.A-7 by Court below is illegal. Reason for such an argument was that even according to plaintiff term of lease is five years and the lease deed Ex.A-7 not being registered is inadmissible in evidence. It should not be looked into for any purpose and what is the subject of the lease is an essential term of the lease and therefore reliance on Sec.49 of the Registration Act cannot be termed as collateral purpose. Recovery of possession should not have been allowed. 11. I do not find any substance in the said contention. It is true that Ex.A-7 is not registered. It could be seen from various documents and relied by the appellate court that prior to the lease where were correspondence between the parties and in fact registration was avoided only to reduce the expenses. A document which requires registration, but not registered could be considered for collateral purposes. Proviso to Sec.49 is clear on that point. In this case, lease of immovable property is admitted. Whether movables were also given to defendants at the time of lease is the only matter in issue. For the limited purpose, whether movables were given to defendants, Ex.A-7 could be looked into and that does not require registration. 12. An unregistered lease deed is admissible in evidence to prove the admission by parties as to what is the subject matter of the lease and to prove how the defendants came into possession of the properties. In the decision of Sreedharan v. Narayana Bhakthan Sreedharan v. Narayana Bhakthan Sreedharan v. Narayana Bhakthan 1975 K.L.T. 128 their Lordships held thus, “The rent deed is executed by the lesser alone. It is also not registered and therefore it is inadmissible to prove the creation of a lease by an instrument. But, it is admissible to prove the creation of a lease by oral agreement accompanied by delivery of possession as mentioned in Sec.107 of the Transfer of Property Act. The rent deed can be relied on to establish the jural relationship between the parties. But, it is admissible to prove the creation of a lease by oral agreement accompanied by delivery of possession as mentioned in Sec.107 of the Transfer of Property Act. The rent deed can be relied on to establish the jural relationship between the parties. It contains an admission or an acknowledgment by the defendant who is sought to be made liable that he is a tenant and that is the best evidence that one can possibly have as to the oral agreement of a lease. It is well known that documents relating to sales, leases and mortgages come into existence only after agreements are arrived at between the parties to these transactions. The lessor and lessee generally agree to the terms of the tenancy beforehand and then reduce to writing what has been agreed upon. In such cases oral agreement of lease can be spelt out of the rent deed executed by the lessee and there can be no bar for a court from looking into such a document for the purpose.” [Italics supplied] 13. Rustomji on Registration, commenting on Registration Act, has considered what is meant by collateral purpose. Learned author says thus: “It is well-settled in a long series of decisions (which have since received statutory recognition by the Amending Act of 1929, vide the concluding words of the new proviso to Sec.49 of the Registration Act) that a compulsorily registrable but unregistered document is admissible in evidence for a collateral purpose which does not require registration, i.e., for any purpose other than that of creating, declaring, assigning limiting or extinguishing a right to immovable property. The expression” collateral purpose “ is no doubt a very vague one and the court must decide in each such case whether the purpose for which it is sought to use the unregistered document is really a collateral one or is to establish directly title to the immovable property sought to be conveyed by the document. But by the simple device of calling it a” collateral purpose “ a party cannot use the unregistered document in any legal proceedings to bring about indirectly the effect which it would have had if registered. Nor is it a collateral purpose when the compulsorily registrable but unregistered document it sought to be used for the express and direct purpose of (for instance) creating or extinguishing rights in immovable property. Nor is it a collateral purpose when the compulsorily registrable but unregistered document it sought to be used for the express and direct purpose of (for instance) creating or extinguishing rights in immovable property. To be “collateral”, the fact must be independent of, or divisible from, the purpose to effect which the law requires registration. “Collateral purpose” means purpose other than that for creating, declaring assigning, limiting or extinguishing a right to immovable property. Documents compulsorily registrable under Sec.17 may be used for collateral purpose, so the implication of collateral persons in a suit is very significant. “ [Italics supplied] 14. Plaintiff is relying on Ex.A-7 not for the purpose of proving lease of immovable property but only to prove that movables were also given in lease. For creating lease of movable properties, no registration is required. That will be a collateral purpose. Apart from the same, Ex.A-7 contains the admission and acknowledgment of tenant that he has taken movables along with the building. Evidence of P.W.1 was also believed by the courts below in holding that movables were also leased to defendant. The contention of defendant that he purchased the movables also was found against. The concurrent finding on that point are not liable to be interfered with. 15. It is not disputed by defendants that if it is a composite lease, Rent Control Act will have no application. That is why they have taken that contention. Lease was only for the building and not for the movables. 16. It has come out in evidence that respondents have filed an application under Rent Control Act and on the contention of appeals same was dismissed on the ground that it is a composite lease and Rent Control Act will not apply in view of the exemption under Sec.30 of the Act. It is thereafter landlord filed the civil suit to get possession of the building from the appellants. To prove that it is composite lease, Ex.A-7 has been marked in the lower court which shows that the building was let by the fixtures, furnitures, etc. with the object of tenant to run business. It could be seen from Ex.A-7 that along with 24 rooms all the furnitures for necessary use of those rooms was also let to the appellants. Both the courts concurrently found that Ex.A-7 is valid and executed by the defendants. with the object of tenant to run business. It could be seen from Ex.A-7 that along with 24 rooms all the furnitures for necessary use of those rooms was also let to the appellants. Both the courts concurrently found that Ex.A-7 is valid and executed by the defendants. To hold that Ex.A-7 is valid, prior correspondence between parties also is to be taken into consideration. Once Ex.A-7 is held to be genuine, the only conclusion that is possible is that it is composite lease. 17. All the questions of law only centers round on the interpretation of Ex.A-7. All the questions of law are found against the appellants. 18. In the result, both the appeals are dismissed. No costs. Consequently, C.M.P.Nos.7855 and 7856 of 1999 are also dismissed.