JUDGMENT - SINHA D.D., J.:---Heard Shri Borkar, learned Counsel for the petitioner, Shri A. Shelat, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 and Shri Deopujari. A.G.P., for the respondents 2 and 3. 2.The learned Counsel for the petitioners submitted that the petitioners are restricting the challenge in the instant petition only to the notification dated 26th July, 1949 issued by the Government in exercise of the powers conferred by Clause 30 of the Central Provinces and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949 by which the Provincial Government was pleased to exempt from all the provisions of the order:--- (i) any house belonging to a Municipality, a Notified Area Committee or a Janpad Sabha; and (ii) any house used as place of entertainment within the meaning of Clause (b) of section 2 of the Central Provinces and Berar Entertainments Duty Act, 1936 (XXX of 1936). 3.Shri Borkar, learned Counsel for the petitioner, contended that the erstwhile Provincial Government, in exercise of the powers conferred by section 2 of the central Provinces and Berar Letting of Accommodation Act, 1946 made the order titled as "Central Provinces and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949" providing certain protections to the tenants which is intended to benefit the tenants at large and safeguard their interest by making provisions debarring the landlords from making the demand for any premium as a condition precedent to letting the house, further by making the provisions for fixation of fair rent and also permission to terminate the tenancy. It is contended that the erstwhile Provincial Government provided protection to the tenants in occupation of the houses for residential or business purposes situated within the Municipal limits. It is submitted that the above-referred notification exempts the houses belonging to the Municipality, and therefore, the tenants in occupation of such houses have been deprived of the protection of the said order as the said order does not apply to the houses belonging to Municipality. 4.It is further contended by the learned Counsel that the petitioners are tenants of respondent No. 1 in respect of the premises in their occupation and respondent No. 1 is the landlord. 4.It is further contended by the learned Counsel that the petitioners are tenants of respondent No. 1 in respect of the premises in their occupation and respondent No. 1 is the landlord. Since the tenements in occupation of the petitioners are exempted from the provisions of the Rent Control Order, the petitioners are deprived of the protection provided therein which is available to the tenants-in-occupation of the houses belonging to the private individual. It is further contended by the learned Counsel that the notification in question is discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, since it does not stand the test of reasonable classification and, therefore, contended that the same be declared as null and void. 5.The Counsel for the respondent No. 1 contended that the controversy in question is no more res integra and is covered by the judgment of Apex Court reported in A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 153 (Baburao Shantaram More v. Bombay Housing Board)1, as well as A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 2009 (Maganlal Changanlal (P.) Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay)2. It is contended by learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 that the notification in question is not violative of Article 14 since the State is entitled to carve out reasonable classification in relation to the object of the Act as well as legislation. It is further contended that the controversy in question in view of the above referred judgment of the Apex Court does not survive and, therefore, the petition is liable to be dismissed. 6.Since the petitioner has given up other challenges raised by the petitioner in the instant writ petition, we are not required to consider the same, and therefore, we are only required to consider whether the impugned notification which is the subject matter of challenge, is violative of Article of 14 of the Constitution of India as alleged by the petitioner. 7.It is necessary to take into consideration that the principles of equality does not mean that every law must have universal application for all the persons who are not by nature, attainment or circumstances in the same position, as the varying needs of different classes of persons often require separate treatment. 7.It is necessary to take into consideration that the principles of equality does not mean that every law must have universal application for all the persons who are not by nature, attainment or circumstances in the same position, as the varying needs of different classes of persons often require separate treatment. We should not forget that the principle does not take away from the State the power of classifying persons or legitimate purposes and every classification is in some degree likely to produce some inequality, and more production of inequality is not enough to render the statute or a provision violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It denies equal protection only when there is no reasonable basis for the differentiation. 8.The term "reasonable classification" connotes that it must be real and substantial and must bear some just and reasonable relation to the object of the legislation and, therefore, mere differentiation or inequality of treatment or inequality of burden does not per se amount to discrimination within the inhibition of the equal protection clause. In order to attract operation of the clause, it is necessary to show that the selection or differentiation is unreasonable or arbitrary; that it does not rest on any rational basis having regard to the object which the legislature has in view. 9.In view of the above referred guiding principle vis a vis Article 14 of the Constitution and taking into consideration the challenge raised by the learned Counsel, it will be proper for us to consider the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in the above referred judgments. In the case of Baburao Shantaram More v. Bombay Housing Board, reported in A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 153, the Court has observed : "There can be no question that this exemption is given by section 4 to certain classes of tenants and this classification is based on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes them from other tenants and this differentia has a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Act. It is the business of the Government to solve the accommodation problem and satisfy the public need of housing accommodation. It was for the purpose of achieving this object that the board was incorporated and established. It is the business of the Government to solve the accommodation problem and satisfy the public need of housing accommodation. It was for the purpose of achieving this object that the board was incorporated and established. It is to be expected that the Government or local authority or the board would be actuated by any profit-making motive so as to unduly enhance the rents or eject the tenants from their respective properties as private landlords are or are likely to be. Therefore, the tenants of the Government or local authority or the board are not in need of such protection as the tenants of private landlords are and this circumstance is a cogent basis for differentiation. The two classes of tenants are not by force of circumstances placed on an equal footing and the tenants of the Government or local authority or the board cannot, therefore, complain of any denial of equality before the law or real discrimination, for the two classes are not similarly situated. Neither section 4 of the Bombay Rent Act nor section 3-A of the Bombay Housing Act can, therefore, be challenged as unconstitutional on the ground of contravention of Article 14 of the Constitution." 10.In the instant petition, the petitioners have challenged the impugned notification as referred to above primarily on the ground that the tenants-in-occupation of the tenements belonged to the State Government or local authority being exempted from the operation of the Rent Control Order, 1949, were deprived of the protection provided to the similarly situated other tenants in occupation of the houses belonging to the private individuals. It is further submitted that this discrimination which is sought to be implemented by the State Government through the impugned notification is apparently, therefore, violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It is difficult for us to accept the contention raised by the learned Counsel in view of the ratio laid down by the above-referred judgment which, in terms, lays down that it is not to be expected that the Government or local authority or the board would be actuated by any profit making motive so as to unduly enhance the rents or eject the tenants from their respective properties as private landlords are or are likely to be. It is further held that the tenants of the Government or local authority or the Board are not in need of such protection as the tenants of private landlords are and this circumstance is a cogent basis for differentiation. It is also specifically observed that the two classes of tenants are not by force of circumstances placed on equal footing and the tenants of the Government or local authority or the board cannot, therefore, complain of any denial of equality before the law or of equal protection of the law. 11.Similarly, the Apex Court in its judgment reported in A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 2009 Maganlal Chhagganlal (P.) Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay, in para 23 observed: "The law is now well settled that the legislature has power of making special laws to attain particular ends, and for that purpose it may select or classify persons and things upon which such laws are to operate. But the mere fact of classification is not sufficient to relieve a statute from the reach of the equality clause contained in Article 14. To get out of its reach it must appear that not only a classification has been made but also that it is one based on some real distinction, bearing a just and reasonable relation to the object of the legislation, and is not a mere arbitrary selection." The Apex Court has further observed: "So far as municipal premises are concerned, the members of the public are vitally interested in seeing that such premises are freed from unauthorized occupation as speedily and expeditiously as possible in order that the Municipal corporation should be able to implement its policy of slum clearance, speedy development of municipal estates and providing for more housing accommodation, which are projects redounding to public benefit. This element of public interest in speedy and expeditious recovery of possession from unauthorized occupants is absent in case of premises belonging to private parties. The speedy machinery for eviction of unauthorized occupants from municipal premises is, therefore, justified, in that it is in the interest of the public that speedy and expeditious recovery of municipal premises from unauthorized occupiers is made possible through the instrumentality of a speedier procedure, instead of the elaborate procedure by way of civil suit involving both expense and delay. The speedy machinery for eviction of unauthorized occupants from municipal premises is, therefore, justified, in that it is in the interest of the public that speedy and expeditious recovery of municipal premises from unauthorized occupiers is made possible through the instrumentality of a speedier procedure, instead of the elaborate procedure by way of civil suit involving both expense and delay. Speedy justice is today, in view of the existing procedural skein of an ordinary suit, an almost impossible feat. There is, thus, a valid basis of differentiation between occupiers of municipal premises and those of other premises, and there is a rational relation and nexus between the basis of the classification and the object of the legislation." 12.Taking into consideration, the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in the above-referred judgment and applying it to the issue in question, we have no hesitation to hold that there is a valid basis of differentia between the premises under occupation of the petitioners belonging to Municipal council as well as the premises under occupation of private individuals belonging to the private landlords. There is also a regional nexus between the basis of the classification and the object of the legislation. In that view of the matter and for the reasons stated above, the challenge on the ground of denying equal protection vis a vis Article 14 of the Constitution must fail. 13.Hence, the petition being misconceived and devoid of substance, is dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed. -----