JUDGMENT S.P. Srivastava, J. Feeling aggrieved by the order allowing the writ petition filed by the present respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 3, and quashing the acquisition proceedings for the land in dispute, the present appellant, who had been impleaded as respondent No. 5 in the writ petition and for whose benefit the land in dispute had been acquired has come up in appeal seeking redress praying for the reversal of the impugned order. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant as well as Shri K.B. Chaturvedi, learned Government Advocate representing the State-respondents Nos. 4 to 5 and have carefully perused the record. 2-A. None has appeared on behalf of respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 3 in spite of service of notice. The facts in brief shorn of details and necessary for the disposal of this appeal lie in a narrow compass. A notification u/s 4 of the Land Acquisition Act dated 4-9-1987 was published in the Madhya Pradesh Gazette dated 18-9-1987 declaring that an area of 8.790 hectares of village Maharajpura Ramana and an area of 2.153 hectares of village Maharajpura-Gird was required for a public purpose which was disclosed to be "Seema Suraksha Bal Ke Karmachariyon Ko Grih Nirman Hetu Bhumi Ka Arjan". It was also indicated that the map (plan) in respect of the land sought to be acquired could be seen at the office of Ziladhyaksh. The land in dispute as has been noticed by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order is confined to an area of 4 bighas and 17 biswas of the aforesaid land situate in village Maharajpura-Ramana. In the aforesaid notification apart from the name of the village where the land in dispute stand the survey plot numbers with three specified areas sought to be acquired had been disclosed. The notification u/s 6 of the Act dated 4-11-1987 in respect of the aforesaid acquisition was published in Madhya Pradesh Gazette on 27th November, 1987. The notices in the proceedings u/s 9 of the Act were issued on 10-12-1987 and the award was given on 31-3-1988 determining the total amount of compensation at a figure of Rs. 15,23,412/- in respect of the entire area sought to be acquired including the area now in dispute. The notices in the proceedings u/s 9 of the Act were issued on 10-12-1987 and the award was given on 31-3-1988 determining the total amount of compensation at a figure of Rs. 15,23,412/- in respect of the entire area sought to be acquired including the area now in dispute. The notice u/s 9 of the Act issued to petitioner No. 1 Datarsingh was served personally and the notice issued to Anturam, the petitioner No. 2 was served through his major brother, who had received it for him. The petitioner No. 3 had moved an application on 29-10-1987 for being registered as a Public Trust. This application was, however, rejected vide the order passed by the Registrar dated 19th April, 1988. The substance of the notification issued u/s 4 of the Act was published in the locality where the land in dispute situate. It was pasted on the Choupal of Maharajpura-Ramana and Maharajpura-Gird. The service report, a copy of which has been filed on record, indicates that Datarsingh himself had signed as a witness testifying the publication of the notice. The service report is dated 29-9-1987. The notice u/s 6 of the Act was served in the locality on 1-12-1987. The service report shows the names of Sonpal and Harlal as witnesses. 5A. The writ petition was supported by an affidavit of Ramvilas Sharma, claiming himself to be Managing Trustee of petitioner No. 3 and also holding the power of attorney of petitioner No. 2 who had asserted on personal knowledge in paragraph 5 of the writ petition that so far as the petitioners have been also able to ascertain the notification u/s 4 had not been published in two daily news papers circulating in the locality where the land is situate nor a public notice of the substance of such notification was given at the convenient places in the locality. In paragraph 6 of the writ petition it had been asserted that even the notification u/s 6 of the Act was not given any local publicity nor had been published in local news papers having circulation in the locality. In paragraph 7 of the writ petition it was asserted that neither the notification u/s 4 nor the notification u/s 6 of the Act were served on any of the petitioners. In paragraph 7 of the writ petition it was asserted that neither the notification u/s 4 nor the notification u/s 6 of the Act were served on any of the petitioners. They were however served the notice u/s 9 of the Act and it was thereafter that they came to know about the notifications under sections 4 and 6 of the Act. The petitioners had prayed for the quashing of all the notifications issued under the provisions of Land Acquisition Act including the entire proceedings relating to the acquisition of the land in dispute. Respondents Nos. 1 to 4 in the writ petition filed a return/counter affidavit in opposition to the writ petition denying the correctness of the assertions made by the petitioners. It was asserted that the notices u/s 4 of the Land Acquisition Act apart from being published in the Gazette were also published in two local news papers having circulation in the locality. It was also asserted that the notice u/s 4 of the Act was also affixed at the importance places of the concerned village as well as on the notice board of the Collectorate and all formalities as required under the law were duly complied with. It was also denied that the petitioner No. 3 was a Charitable trust as claimed. The correctness of the allegations made in paragraph 6 of the writ petition were denied. It was asserted that the notification u/s 6 were notified in the locality where the land situated and also published and two local news paners in addition to the Government Gazette. The allegations made in paragraph 7 of the writ petition were not disputed but it was asserted that there was no requirement of law that notification must be served personally effected on the persons. It was however stated that the notification u/s 9 of the Act were duly served personally on the petitioners. It was claimed that there was no violation of the provisions of the Act. It was also asserted that the provisions contained in sections 39, 40 and 41 of the Act were duly complied with and consent was obtained from the State Government. A copy of the consent order was filed as Annexure R-VI and the copy of the agreement was also filed as Annexure R-VII. It was claimed that an amount of Rs. It was also asserted that the provisions contained in sections 39, 40 and 41 of the Act were duly complied with and consent was obtained from the State Government. A copy of the consent order was filed as Annexure R-VI and the copy of the agreement was also filed as Annexure R-VII. It was claimed that an amount of Rs. 15,23,412/- had been deposited by the date when the return had been filed and out of it a sum of Rs. 6,17,261.30 had already been paid to the holders by way of compensation. The respondent No. 5 had filed an application on 21-8-1989 bringing on record the Dakhalnamas showing that the possession of the land in dispute had been delivered to the society on 17-5-1988. The learned Single Judge in the impugned order had come to the conclusion that the petitioners had a right to maintain the writ petition and the objection to the effect that they had no locus standi to prefer the writ petition was not liable to be sustained. The learned Single Judge had further came to the conclusion that there was nothing on the record to indicate that the notification was published in the daily news papers and the description of the land as contained in the notification u/s 4 of the Act could not be taken to a sufficient description and there was no sufficient compliance of the mandatory requirement envisaged u/s 4 of the Act. It was further held that there was no grave emergency to shift the place of religious worship to another place. It was also found that the nature of the purpose for acquisition was not such where individual good has to give way to public good. During the pendency of the appeal an application, I.A. No. 5419/97, had been filed by Anturam, the petitioner No. 2, praying that he had received the entire amount of compensation on 10-6-1997 and had also handed over possession of the land in dispute and was no longer interested in prosecuting the case and his writ petition may be dismissed allowing the appeal. Learned counsel for the appellant has strenuously urged that taking into consideration the facts and circumstances established on record especially the conduct of the petitioners-respondents and the subsequent developments, referred to hereinabove, sufficient ground has been made out for interference in this appeal and the impugned order deserved to be set aside. Learned counsel for the appellant has strenuously urged that taking into consideration the facts and circumstances established on record especially the conduct of the petitioners-respondents and the subsequent developments, referred to hereinabove, sufficient ground has been made out for interference in this appeal and the impugned order deserved to be set aside. It has further been urged that the petitioners-respondents had the knowledge of the impugned proceedings from the very beginning and no justifiable ground for exercising the extra-ordinary discretionary jurisdiction envisaged under Article 226 of the Constitution could be said to have been made out for the quashing of the entire proceedings including the notifications at their instance. The Apex Court has consistently taken the view that planned residential development is a public purpose and elaboration thereof after acquisition may be undertaken at a later point of time. When an authority constituted under an Act initiates the action for acquisition of a large area of land comprising several plots for planned development, the specification of a particular land needed for a specified purpose intended to be undertaken for the development, ultimately to be taken up, is not a condition precedent to initiate the action for acquisition and publication of the notification u/s 4(1) of the Act in the Gazette does not get vitiated on account thereof. Further, the Apex Court in its decision in the case of Ajay Krishan Shinghal, etc. etc. Vs. Union of India and Others, had indicated that it is not the law and could not and would not be the law that publication of the substance of section 4(1) notification in the locality should be established beyond the shadow of doubt. Presumption u/s 114(c) of the Evidence Act, is available that official acts have been done unless proved otherwise. So far as the question relating to vagueness of the notification is concerned, suffice it to say that in the case of an acquisition of a large area of land comprising several plots belonging to different persons, the specification of the purpose can only be with reference to the acquisition of the whole area. Unlike in the cases of a small area, it may be practically difficult to specify the particular public purpose of which each and every item of land comprised in the area is needed. Unlike in the cases of a small area, it may be practically difficult to specify the particular public purpose of which each and every item of land comprised in the area is needed. As observed by the Apex Court in its decision in the case of State of Tamil Nadu and others etc. Vs. L. Krishnan and others etc., it is not appropriate to insist upon the Government particularising the use of each and every bit of the land so notified would be put to. While it is true that the State has to exercise its statutory power in a reasonable and fair manner more particularly where the subject-matter is acquisition of the property/land, a person feeling aggrieved by a notification u/s 4(1) of the Act has also to be vigil and must act for the redressal of his grievances with the utmost despatch. As observed by the Apex Court in its decision in the case of Aflatoon and Others Vs. Lt. Governor of Delhi and Others, to have set on the fence and allowed the Government to complete the proceedings on the basis that the notification u/s 4(1) of the Act and the declaration u/s 6 of the Act were valid and then to attack the notification on grounds which were available at the time when the notification was published would be putting a premium on dilatory tactics. Laches on the part of an aggrieved person feeling prejudiced by a notification u/s 4(1) of the Act, seeking redress by approaching the Court of equity having discretionary jurisdiction may be taken to be fatal especially when the approach is at a time when the awards have already been passed or were about to be passed. In the present case, the award had been passed on 31-3-1988. Further, in a situation where the Government has allotted a large portion of the land after the acquisition proceedings had been finalised and the rights of the third parties have accrued in the land in question who are not before the Court, it will be an other instance when the intervention of equity may not be called for at all. In fact, as clarified by the Apex Court in its decision in the case of Ramniklal N. Bhutta and another Vs. State of Maharashtra and others, the power under Article 226 of the Constitution is discretionary. In fact, as clarified by the Apex Court in its decision in the case of Ramniklal N. Bhutta and another Vs. State of Maharashtra and others, the power under Article 226 of the Constitution is discretionary. It has to be exercised only in furtherance of interest of justice and not merely on the making out of a legal point and in the matter of land acquisition for public purposes, the interests of justice and the public interest coalesce. The Courts have to weigh the public interest vis-a-vis the private interest while exercising the power under Article 226 of the Constitution and it is open to the High Court to direct, in case it finds finally that the acquisition was vitiated on account of non-compliance with some legal requirement that the persons interested shall also be entitled to a particular amount of damages to be awarded as a lump sum or calculated at a certain percentage of compensation payable. It was made amply clear that there are many ways of affording appropriate relief and redressing a wrong. The quashing of the acquisition proceedings is not the only mode of redress and it is ultimately a matter of balancing the competing interests. In the present case, as has already been noticed hereinabove, Anturam, the petitioner No. 2, has already moved an application stating that he had received the compensation and has delivered the possession of the land in dispute and no longer interested in prosecuting the writ petition praying that his writ petition be dismissed. Datarsingh, the petitioner No. 1, had knowledge of the proceedings from the very beginning and as is evident from Annexure R5-7 he received the compensation determined in the proceedings payable to him on 11-8-1988. So far as the petitioner No. 3 is concerned, the application dated 29-10-1987 seeking registration of the alleged trust as a Public Trust has been rejected by the Competent Authority, the Registrar, vide the order dated 19th April, 1998. The writ petition had been filed on 5-4-1988, while the award finalising the proceedings u/s 9 of the Act had been given by the Land Acquisition Officer on 30-3-1988 arid approved by the Collector on 31-3-1988. It may be noticed that the Apex Court in its decision in the case of State of Haryana and others Vs. The writ petition had been filed on 5-4-1988, while the award finalising the proceedings u/s 9 of the Act had been given by the Land Acquisition Officer on 30-3-1988 arid approved by the Collector on 31-3-1988. It may be noticed that the Apex Court in its decision in the case of State of Haryana and others Vs. Dewan Singh and others, , had clearly indicated that after the award has been made the Court would not be justified to quash the notification u/s 4(1) of the Act and declaration u/s 6 of the Act. Considering the totality of the circumstances noticed hereinabove we are of the clear opinion that sufficient ground has been made out for interference in the impugned order. In the result, this appeal succeeds and setting aside the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge the writ petition filed by the respondents giving rise to this appeal is dismissed. There shall, however, be no order as to costs. Final Result : Dismissed