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1999 DIGILAW 767 (BOM)

Mohammed bhai s/o Miyabhai and others v. State of Maharashtra and others

1999-10-27

A.S.BAGGA, B.H.MARLAPALLE

body1999
JUDGMENT - B.H. MARLAPALLE, J.:---Writ Petition No. 905/86: The petitioner No. 1 claims to be the owner of lands located in Survey Nos. 16, 17 and 91 of village Mukundwadi, taluka and District Aurangabad. The Government of Maharashtra issued notifications on 30th October, 1972, 3rd February, 1973 and 4th May, 1973 under section 40(1)(b) of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 (hereinafter referred to as the M.R.T.P. Act for short) and constituted and appointed City and Industrial Development Corporation of Maharashtra as a Special Planning Authority for the development of Aurangabad Notified Area specified in the schedule which included the land of the petitioner. On 24-5-1973 the Special Planning Authority issued a Notification under section 126 and reserved, allotted and designated the area including the lands of the petitioner and prepared a Development Plan. On 16th October, 1975 the Planning Authority modified the Development Plan of 1973 and published a final notification under section 126(2) of the .M.R.T.P. Act and in the schedule thereof lands in Survey No. 16 admeasuring 8 H and 17 R, Survey No. 17 (P.T) admeasuring 8 H and 29 R and Survey No. 91 admeasuring 5 H. and 26 R were sought to be acquired. It is pertinent to note at this stage that by Government Notification dated 30th August, 1971 issued under section 151(1) of the M.R.T.P. Act, the powers exercisable by the State Government under sub-section (2) and (4) of section 126 of the M.R.T.P. Act were delegated to the Commissioners of the divisions and, therefore, the final notification under section 126(2) dated 16th October, 1975 came to be published by the Divisional Commissioner at Aurangabad. The corrigendum to the said notification was issued by the competent authority and the same has been published in the Government Gazette dated 9-9-1976 wherein it has been shown that the area sought to be acquired from Survey No. 17 P.T was reduced from 8 H and 29 R to 8 H and 3 R. 2. The petitioner No. 1 was issued notice under section 9(3) and (4) of the Land Acquisition Act on 20-9-1976. The petitioner No. 1 was issued notice under section 9(3) and (4) of the Land Acquisition Act on 20-9-1976. It appears that thereafter, the petitioner No. 1 alienated part of the land under acquisition from Survey No. 17 in favour of the petitioners No. 2 and 3 i.e. by a sale deed dated 8-12-1980 in favour of the petitioner No. 3 and by another sale deed dated 11-12-1979 in favour of the petitioner No. 2 to the extent of 2 acres, 20 gunthas and 2 acres respectively. The petitioner No. 1 along with other owners whose lands were sought to be acquired pursuant to the notification dated 24th May, 1973, had filed objections for the said proposal. By the notification dated 16-10-1975 the Special Land Acquisition Officer, CIDCO was vested with the powers of Collector for the purpose of acquisition of land mentioned in the schedule thereto. It appears that subsequently, by exercising powers under section 52-A(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, the Collector has delegated powers in favour of the Land Acquisition Officer, Sharda Colony, Aurangabad. The said Officer has thereafter, passed award in respect of the lands under acquisition on 23rd September, 1986. 3. This petition has been filed on 22nd September, 1986 and by an order dated 22-9-1986 this Court had granted interim stay of delivery of possession till 29-9-1986 and on 29-9-1986, the petition was admitted by vacating the order of interim relief. The petitioners have challenged the notification dated 16th October, 1975 and the notices issued under section 9 of the Land Acquisition Act. In addition, the petitioners have challenged the Constitutional validity of sections 125, 126, 128 and 129 of the M.R.T.P. Act. The challenge to the Constitutional validity of sections 125, 126, 128 and 129 has not been seriously pressed and the arguments have been mainly advanced in respect of the first prayer namely quashing of the notification dated 16th October, 1975 and the notices issued under section 9 of the Land Acquisition Act. 4. Writ Petition No. 1360 of 86: The petitioner is the petitioner No. 1 in Writ Petition No. 905/86 and has prayed for quashing of the notification dated 16th October, 1975 and the award dated 23-9-86. By order dated 2-2-1987 the petition was admitted and interim stay regarding taking possession of the subject land by the Land Acquisition Officer granted earlier was confirmed. By order dated 2-2-1987 the petition was admitted and interim stay regarding taking possession of the subject land by the Land Acquisition Officer granted earlier was confirmed. However, in Civil Application No. 2909 of 90, the interim order was vacated on 26-2-1990 relying upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of (Kaliyappan v. State of Kerala)1, reported in 1989(1) S.C.C. 113. 5. Writ Petition No. 1179 of 89: The petitioner No. 1 is petitioner No. 3 in Writ Petition No. 905/86 and petitioner No. 5 is petitioner No. 2 in Writ Petition No. 905/86. The petitioner No. 3 has purchased the land in Survey No. 17 from petitioner No. 1 in Petition No. 905/86 on 19-5-83. The petitioner No. 4 has also purchased land admeasuring 1 acre 10 gunthas and 3 acres from Survey No. 17 owned by the petitioner No. 1 in Writ Petition No. 905/86 on 19-5-83 and 11-10-79 respectively. This Court had admitted the petition by order dated 8-5-1989 and directed to be heard along with Writ Petition No. 905 of 86. The prayer for interim relief was specifically rejected. The challenged in the petition is mainly to the award dated 23-9-1986 to the extent of 9 acres which was purchased by the petitioners from the original owner i.e. petitioner No. 1 in Writ Petitioner No. 905 of 86. 6. Writ Petition No. 1610/91: This petition has been filed by the petitioner Nos. 1, 3, 4, 5 and 6 in Writ Petition No. 1179 of 1989 and four others. The petitioner No. 5 is in fact, the brother of the petitioners No. 1 to 4 and he does not show as to how he has purchased any land from original owner independently. The petitioner Nos. 8 and 9 claim that they have purchased land from original land owner Mohmad Bhai on 7-9-87 and total area is about 1 acre and 35 gts. This petition was admitted on 18-7-1991 and the interim relief granted earlier was vacated. The substantive prayer of the petitioners is to issue directions against the respondent No. 2 to make rehabilitation of the petitioners before they are dispossessed from their lands and they should be re-allotted 12.5% of the land acquired. This petition was admitted on 18-7-1991 and the interim relief granted earlier was vacated. The substantive prayer of the petitioners is to issue directions against the respondent No. 2 to make rehabilitation of the petitioners before they are dispossessed from their lands and they should be re-allotted 12.5% of the land acquired. It appears that the cause of action for filing this petition is directly connected and based on the circular issued by the Government of Maharashtra on 3rd March, 1990 whereby the Government resolved to return 12.5% of the acquired land to the original owners of the lands which were acquired in Pimpri-Chinchwad New Township Development Authority, Near Pune. The petitioners claim that they are also similarly placed land owners and the Government ought to have followed the same policy in their case and returned 12.5% land to the petitioners. It is candidly conceded that the petition mainly centres around for the benefits of the petitioner No. 7 who had originally purchased 2 acres and 20 gunthas land from Mohmad Bhai and the possession of only 2 acres has been taken by the respondent No. 3 7. Writ Petition No. 907/86: The petitioners in this petition claim that they are owners of lands in Survey Nos. 22,21/3, 15/3, 15/2 and 15/1 of village Mukundwadi, taluka and District Aurangabad covered under the notification dated 16th October, 1975. They have, therefore, challenged the said notification as well as the Constitutional validity of sections 125, 126, 128 and 129 of the M.R.T.P. Act. However, during the course of arguments, the challenge to the Constitutional validity of sections 125, 126, 128 and 129 of the M.R.T.P. Act was given up and main challenge was only to the legality of the award passed by the Land Acquisition Officer on 23-9-1986. 8. Writ Petition No. 1040/86: The petitioner claims to be the owner of land admeasuring 5 acres and 19 gunthas in Survey No. 16 which is also covered under the notification dated 16th October, 1975 and challenge raised by the petitioner is in para materia with the challenge in Writ Petition No. 907/86. 9. 8. Writ Petition No. 1040/86: The petitioner claims to be the owner of land admeasuring 5 acres and 19 gunthas in Survey No. 16 which is also covered under the notification dated 16th October, 1975 and challenge raised by the petitioner is in para materia with the challenge in Writ Petition No. 907/86. 9. It is, therefore, evident that in all these petitions, the challenge is mainly to the award passed by the Land Acquisition Officer on 23-9-1986 and, therefore, we are required to examine the said issue on the basis of the affidavits filed in reply as well as the record/documents made available or produced before us. 10. The challenge to the award is on the following grounds: A) The notice issued under section 126(2) of the M.R.T.P. Act on 16-10-1975 is contrary to the proviso thereunder inasmuch as, the said notice was not issued within a period of one year from the date of publication of the draft regional plan. B) No notice in respect of an inquiry under section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act was issued to any of the petitioners. C) The provisions of section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act have been violated while passing the award on 23-9-1986. D) The award dated 23-9-1986 has been passed by an Officer who was alien to the proceedings and the said award is without any valid authority in law. E) The respondents claim to have taken possession of the land by making only a paper arrangement and for all legal purposes, the petitioners are deemed to be in possession of the subject land during the pendency of these petitions. F) Principles of natural justice have been violated while passing the impugned award and the respondents/authorities have denied the right of equality guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution inasmuch as, the policy decision which has been taken in respect of the land owners whose lands were acquired for the Pimpri Chinchwad Development Authority has not been extended to the petitioners regarding the return of 12.5% of the acquired land. G) The Guardian Minister for Aurangabad District had reportedly made a public statement which appeared in a local newspaper dated 7th January, 1973 that the Government had decided to withdraw certain lands from the acquisition as was contemplated by Government Notification dated 30th October, 1972 and, therefore, the State was estopped from proceeding to acquire the petitioners' lands. GROUND A 11. The proviso to sub-section (2) of section 126 of the M.R.T.P. Act has been amended by Maharashtra Act No. 10/1994 and as per the pre-amended proviso, the period for making the declaration was three years as against the period of one year in the amended proviso. In the instant case admittedly, the pre-amended proviso was applicable and, therefore, the learned Counsel rightly did not press for this challenge. Even otherwise the mere expiry of the said period does not invalid the award as has been held by this Court in the case of (Shishikant Sadashiv Bagwe v. State of Maharashtra)2, 1995(3) Bom.C.R. 646 : A.I.R. 1995 Bom. 172 and the Supreme Court in the case of (State of Maharashtra another v. Sant Jogindersingh Kishansingh others)3, A.I.R. 1995 S.C. 2181. GROUND B 12. It has been contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioners that even if it is presumed that the inquiry conducted under section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act is administrative in nature, the principles of natural justice are required to be followed and, therefore, it was incumbent upon the respondents to issue notice to the petitioners and provide an opportunity to appear before the Land Acquisition Officer before the impugned award was passed. The learned Counsel in this regard has relied upon a judgment of this Court in the case of Shishikant Sadashiv Bagwe (supra) and a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of (R.L. Sharma v. Managing Committee, Dr. Hari Ram (Co-edn). H.S. School)4, A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 2155. The relevant observations in the case of Shishikant Bagwe (supra) read: "The manual of the Land Acquisition Act provides that the Land Acquisition Officer shall serve notices on persons whose names appear on the official record and also on those persons, to the knowledge of the Land Acquisition Officer, have interest in the land". H.S. School)4, A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 2155. The relevant observations in the case of Shishikant Bagwe (supra) read: "The manual of the Land Acquisition Act provides that the Land Acquisition Officer shall serve notices on persons whose names appear on the official record and also on those persons, to the knowledge of the Land Acquisition Officer, have interest in the land". This Court was dealing with an issue as to whether the award passed under section 11 would be vitiated if land owners or the occupants were not issued notice under section 9(3) of the Land Acquisition Act and it was held that the award did not suffer from any infirmity on the ground of non service of such notices. In the case of R.L. Sharma (supra) the Supreme Court in para No. 9 of its judgment observed that in Administrative law, rules of natural justice are foundational and fundamental concepts and law is now well settled that the principles of natural justice are part of the legal and judicial procedures. 13. Section 11 falls in Part II of the Land Acquisition Act and it provides that on the days fixed or on any other day to which the enquiry has been adjourned, the Collector shall proceed to enquire into the objections (if any) which any person interested has stated pursuant to a notice given under section 9 to the measurements made under section 8, and into the value of the land at the date of the publication of the notification under section 4(1) and into the respective interests of the persons claiming compensation and thereafter shall make an award taking into consideration the factors listed thereunder. Section 9 provides for notices to persons interested and states that the land owners or such interested persons in the land under acquisition shall be issued notices under sub-sections (1), (3) and (4). The provisions of Part II of the Land Acquisition Act will have to be read in sequence i.e. one after another and if they are so read, the notices to be issued under section 9 are required to be followed by the steps to be taken under section 10 by the Collector and then comes the inquiry which is contemplated under section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act before an award is passed. In the instant cases i.e. in Writ Petition Nos. In the instant cases i.e. in Writ Petition Nos. 905/86, 1360/86, 1179/89 and 1610/91 the original land owner was admittedly served with a notice under section 9 of the Act in the year, 1976 and none of the other petitioners i.e. purchasers of land were in picture when these notices were issued because their sale deeds have been executed only in the year, 1979 onwards. Section 11 of the Act does not contemplate any separate notice to be issued while conducting the inquiry for passing an award by the Collector in addition to the notice which was given under section 9 of the said Act and, therefore, even if it is presumed that the petitioners were not issued a separate notice for conducting an inquiry under section 11 of the Act so as to pass an award, the award cannot be vitiated and, therefore, we reject the contention raised on that count. GROUND C 14. In the case of State of Maharashtra and another v. Sant Joginder Singh, A.I.R. 1995 S.C. 2181, the Supreme Court has held that the provisions of section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act are not applicable to the acquisition proceedings instituted under sections 125 and 126 of the M.R.T.P. Act. In view of this settled position of law, we need not examine the challenge to the award on this ground and the said challenge does not sustain. GROUND D 15. The award has been passed by the Special Land Acquisition Officer, Aurangabad on 23-9-1986. The learned Counsel for the petitioners relied upon the judgment of this Court in the case of (Nusli N. Wadia v. State of Maharashtra)5, 1999(1) Bom.C.R. (O.O.C.J.)442 : 1999(1) Mah.L.R. 542 and in the case of (Arjan Singh v. State of Punjab)6, A.I.R. 1959 Punjab 538. The notification issued on 16th October, 1975 clearly states that the Special Land Acquisition Officer, CIDCO, Aurangabad was appointed under Clause (c) of section 3 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 to perform the functions of the Collector for all proceedings thereafter to be taken up in respect of the subject lands and he was also directed under section 7 of the said Act to take orders for the acquisition of the subject lands. Section 3(c) of the said Act defines the expression "Collector" and it means the Collector of a district and includes a Deputy Commissioner and any officer or a person specially appointed by the appropriate Government or by the Commissioner to perform the function of a Collector under the said Act. Section 52-A(2) provides that the Collector may, subject to the general or special orders of the Government, delegate any of his powers or functions under the Land Acquisition Act to any officer not below the rank of a Tahsildar or to a Land Acquisition Officer specially appointed by the Government in this behalf. In Writ Petition No. 1360 of 86 an affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondents wherein it has been clearly stated that initially the Special Land Acquisition Officer (CIDCO) was appointed to perform the functions of Collector and the Collector by exercising his powers under section 52-A(2), had appointed the Land Acquisition Officer, Sharda Colony to continue and complete the further proceedings. This affidavit has been filed as back as on 26th November, 1987 and there is nothing on record to controvert the statement or to challenge the statement during the last 12 years. From the file presented before us we see the order dated 27-4-1983 passed by the Collector, Aurangabad ordering the land acquisition cases pertaining to Municipal Council, Aurangabad (under M.R.T.P. Act) and land acquisition cases pertaining to CIDCO (under M.R.T.P. Act) stood transferred to the Special Land Acquisition Officer, MIW, Special Land Acquisition Officer, J.P., Special Land Acquisition Officer, B C Project and Special Land Acquisition Officer, Aurangabad, as shown in the enclosed list. We are convinced that the award impugned has been passed by a competent officer and the award cannot be held to be illegal and the contention that the award has been passed by an alien officer or an officer who had no authority, cannot be sustained. GROUND E 16. Pursuant to our directions vide order dated 14-10-1999 the copies of documents like the award passed on 23-9-1986, panchanama of possession/possession receipts and payment receipts of compensation, have been brought on record. GROUND E 16. Pursuant to our directions vide order dated 14-10-1999 the copies of documents like the award passed on 23-9-1986, panchanama of possession/possession receipts and payment receipts of compensation, have been brought on record. A copy of the panchanama dated 30th March, 1990 at page 26 of the compilation shows that the possession panchanama in respect of the land in Survey No. 17 admeasuring 6 H was drawn in the presence of two witnesses by the representative of the Tahsildar, Aurangabad and it has been noted that the landlord remained absent. Vide the said panchanama, the land was handed over to the Administrator of CIDCO. Similarly, on page 27 there is a panchanama dated 29-9-1990 which states that possession of the land of Rukhminibai Narayan and Bhanudas, Ramesh and Ambadas, all sons of Shri Namdeo was taken in the presence of witnesses. Possession receipt was also obtained on the same day from CIDCO, Aurangabad. There is a letter dated 15-2-1997 addressed to the learned District Judge, Aurangabad by the Special Land Acquisition Officer stating therein that from Survey No. 17 of Mukundwadi village, land admeasuring 7 H and 32 R was taken in possession and compensation to Shri Ramesh, Ambadas and Bhanudas, all sons of Namdeo Khotkar as well as to Kishanrao and Eknathrao Khotkar was paid on 4-3-1992. However, the balance amount of the compensation could not be disbursed in view of the disputes regarding ownership and hence the amount of Rs. 2,80,012/- came to be deposited alongwith the said letter. In the compilation of documents, we have also seen the panchanama receipts drawn in respect of other lands which are subject matters in these petitions. In the case of (Balmokand Khatri Educational and Industrial Trust, Amritsar v. State of Punjab and others)7, 1996(4) S.C.C. 212 , the Supreme Court, inter alia, observed that it is difficult to take physical possession of the land under acquisition and the normal mode of taking possession is drafting a panchanama in the presence of panchas and taking possession and giving delivery to the beneficiaries is the accepted mode of taking possession of the land. Subsequent thereto, the retention of possession would tantamount only to illegal or unlawful possession. This view was again reiterated by the Supreme Court in the case of (M/s. Larsen and Toubro Ltd. v. State of Gujrat)8, A.I.R. 1998 S.C. 1608. Subsequent thereto, the retention of possession would tantamount only to illegal or unlawful possession. This view was again reiterated by the Supreme Court in the case of (M/s. Larsen and Toubro Ltd. v. State of Gujrat)8, A.I.R. 1998 S.C. 1608. We, therefore, hold that in the instant cases the possession has been taken over in respect of the subject lands either in the presence of the concerned land owners or in some cases, compulsorily in the absence of the land owner. This possession is a lawful possession in view of the fact that the panchanamas have been drawn in the presence of the witnesses, possession has been handed over to body for whom the lands were being acquired and possession receipts are also on record. The ingredients laid down by the Apex Court for valid possession are thus, proved and duly exhibited. We, therefore, hold that the possession of the subject land has been taken by the respondents during pendency of these petitions. GROUND F 17. The learned Counsel for the petitioners vehemently urged before us that the principles of natural justice have been violated inasmuch as, there was no opportunity made available to the petitioners to show that their title to the land under acquisition was proper and they were in lawful possession. It has been admitted that the original land owners were served with notices under section 9(3) and (4) of the Land Acquisition Act much prior to the sale deeds that were executed in favour of the subsequent holders of the lands. Even otherwise, failure to issue a notice under section 9(3) does not vitiate award as has been held by the Supreme Court in the case of (Nasik Municipal Corporation v. Harbanslal Laikwant Rajpal)9, 1997(4) Bom.C.R. 455 : 1997(4) S.C.C. 199 . We must also note that the petitioners No. 2 and 3 in Writ Petition No. 905/86 and all the petitioners in Writ Petition No. 1179/89 and Writ Petition No. 1610/91 are not the original owners of the subject land and they have come in possession of these lands pursuant to the sale deeds dated 11-10-1979, 8-12-1980, 19-5-1983 and 7-9-1987 as is clear from the averments made in Writ Petition No. 1610 of 91. In the case of (State of Maharashtra and another v. Umashankar Rajabhau and others)10, 1996(1) S.C.C. 299 , the Supreme Court held that the purchase of the land covered under the notification under section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, subsequent to the date of such notification, is illegal and it does not bind the State after such a notification was published. The same view has been reiterated by the Supreme Court in the subsequent judgments in the case of (U.P. Jal Nigam, Lucknow v. Kalra Properties (P) Ltd.)11, 1996(3) S.C.C. 124 and in the case of (Ajay Krishan Shinghal and others v. Union of India and others)12, 1996(10) S.C.C. 721 and it is now well established that the post notification sale of the land under acquisition is illegal and such a sale does not bind the State. In the instant cases, the notification has been issued on or prior to 16-10-1975 and these petitioners i.e. petitioner Nos. 2 and 3 in Writ Petition No. 905 of 86 and petitioners in Writ Petition No. 1179 of 89 as well as Writ Petition No. 1610 of 91 did not own the subject lands at that time. Such subsequent owners of the land cannot raise a plea that they were not heard before the award was passed and the award should be, therefore, declared as illegal. GROUND G 18. The petitioners have also relied upon a statement made by the Minister for Urban Development as was reported allegedly on 7th January, 1973 in a local newspaper. It is contended in this regard that the Honourable Minister had declared that the Government had decided to withdraw certain lands from acquisition as was contemplated by the Government notification dated 30th October, 1972. The statement made by the Minister allegedly in a public function or while addressing a group of citizens, cannot be implied by any stretch of imagination, a policy decision. Even otherwise, a newspaper report cannot be a basis to claim that the Government was estopped from proceeding further and when the statement was allegedly reported on 7th January, 1973, most of these petitioners had no concern with the subject lands. We do not find any force in the challenge to the award raised on these grounds or to the acquisition proceedings. 19. We do not find any force in the challenge to the award raised on these grounds or to the acquisition proceedings. 19. Writ Petition No. 1610 of 91 has been filed by solely relying upon a Government Resolution issued by the Government of Maharashtra on 3rd March, 1990 and it has been contended that from the possession of the petitioner No. 7, the respondents had acquired admittedly, the land admeasuring only two acres and the remaining 20 gunthas land was not acquired. The Government of Maharashtra through the Department of Urban Development, issued a Government Resolution dated 3rd March, 1990 and decided that the land to the extent of 12.5% from the acquired land should be returned to the original land owners. The same plea has been raised in the instant petition and a direction is sought to be issued against the State of Maharashtra to extend such a benefit to the petitioner No. 7. The learned Counsel also contended that denial of similar benefit amounts to causing discrimination between similarly placed land owners in the State of Maharashtra and thus, violates the guarantee enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It is not for this Court to issue directions to the State of Maharashtra to frame a policy and nothing stopped the petitioner or any of the petitioners to approach the State of Maharashtra and claim such a relief. The said petitioners in Writ Petition No. 1610 of 91 were already before this Court in Writ Petition No. 907 of 86 and 1179 of 89 challenging the legality of the acquisition proceedings as well as the award. Even para 2 of the said Government Resolution dated 3rd March, 1990 indicates that the policy declared therein was not applicable to the land owners in whose cases the land acquisition proceedings were completed and they were paid compensation. In the instant cases also the proceedings for acquisition are complete in all respects. 20. Once the land acquisition proceedings are completed, the acquired land has been taken over and the award has been passed, challenge to the land acquisition proceedings or the award cannot be entertained. When the writ petitions were filed, some of the petitioners were in possession of their respective lands. 20. Once the land acquisition proceedings are completed, the acquired land has been taken over and the award has been passed, challenge to the land acquisition proceedings or the award cannot be entertained. When the writ petitions were filed, some of the petitioners were in possession of their respective lands. However, as on today even the possession of the lands has been handed over and none of the petitioners remained in possession of the acquired land except Smt. Rukhminibai who continues to be in possession of 20 gunthas of land. The Supreme Court in the case of (Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Industrial Development Investment Co. Pvt. Ltd., and others)13, 1996(11) S.C.C. 501 held, inter alia, that once the land acquisition proceedings are completed, the land vests in the State, free from all encumbrances and proceedings become final, and therefore, they are not open to challenge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India on the ground of non compliance with any statutory requirement (s). The remedy available in such cases to the aggrieved landlord is only to claim higher compensation by filing a reference under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. Civil Application has been filed in Writ Petition No. 905 of 86 raising additional grounds of challenge to the impugned award in para 16-A, which we have already dealt with. It has also been contended by way of the said amendments that the petitioner has learnt that the respondent No. 3 CIDCO has changed its policy and awarded 30 to 35% of the land to the original owners. It is also contended that the respondent No. 3 has recommended withdrawal of acquisition from Survey No. 16, to the State Government. We are afraid, we cannot take cognizance of these allegations and in any case, the petitioners can approach the respondent No. 3 for claiming similar benefits and it is for the respondents to decide, if such representations are made, on their own merits. 21. From the documents on record, we have also noticed that the petitioners have already filed proceedings for higher compensation and these proceedings are pending before the competent forum. In addition, the subsequent purchasers have raised some disputes against the land owner of Survey No. 17. 21. From the documents on record, we have also noticed that the petitioners have already filed proceedings for higher compensation and these proceedings are pending before the competent forum. In addition, the subsequent purchasers have raised some disputes against the land owner of Survey No. 17. The petitioners kept on filing writ petitions from the year 1986 to 1991, apparently to stall the handing over of possession of the subject lands to respondent No. 3, and the interim prayers in this regard were declined by the Court from time to time. 22. For the above stated reasons, we are satisfied that the challenge to the acquisition proceedings in terms of the notification dated 16-10-1975 as well as the award passed on 23-9-1986 cannot be sustained on any ground and the writ petitions are, therefore, dismissed. Interim orders, if any, stand vacated. Rule discharged. No costs. While parting with the cases, we make it clear that our judgment would not preclude the concerned petitioners to approach either the State Government or the CIDCO, praying for concession on the basis of the alleged policy decisions those were announced during the pendency of these petitions and if such representations are made, we are sure the authorities concerned would decide them on their own merits and as expeditiously as possible. Petitions dismissed.