Judgment V.S. SIRPURKAR, J: 1. The petitioner herein challenges the order which is passed by the respondent against one P.M.Kumar alias Nondi Kumar alias Rajkumar, son of Murugandam, dated 12.11.1998 directing his detention under Sec.3(l)(i) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (hereinafter called ‘the COFEPOSA Act’). 2. The brief facts, which would help understanding the controversy lie in the narrow area, are as follows: On 20th October, 1997 a boat was allegedly found near Muthupet during the patrolling by the officers of the Customs Department. There were some persons in the said boat (Vallam). Some persons with the Customs Department saw the boat. The Customs Department suspected foul play and tried to approach the boat. Some persons in the boat escaped under the cover of darkness, while four persons were apprehended, they being Gnanaseelan, C.Subbiah, Savariyar Adimai and Munisamy. Under their statements, all that was found in the boat, was some engine oil cans and some medicines. It was felt that these goods amount to a total sum of Rs.1,03,256. It was felt that these persons, who were in the spot, had tried to smuggle the said medicines and engine oil to Srilanka. Their statements were recorded from which it was revealed that the engine oil as well as medicines were lying at the house of one P.M.Kumar alias Nandi Kumar alias Rajkumar Before they were loaded in the boat and despatched to Srilanka, the Customs Department seized them on 24.10.1997. On 25.10.1997 the detenu came to be arrested and was remanded to some other date. A complaint came to be made before the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Madurai on 16.12.1997 and the conviction on the basis of this complaint was on 30th April, 1988 whereby the detenu was convicted for the offence under Sec.135(l)(b)(ii) of the Customs Act and was fined to pay Rs.750. On this backdrop, on 12.11.1998 for the first time, the order of detention came to be passed with a view to preventing the detenu from carrying on the smuggling activities. Along with the order, some additional documents were also served and the booklet bore the stamp of the office of the Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise, Trichy. 3. The learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner Mr.Kumar firstly resists the point that the detention order is hopelessly belated. Along with the order, some additional documents were also served and the booklet bore the stamp of the office of the Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise, Trichy. 3. The learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner Mr.Kumar firstly resists the point that the detention order is hopelessly belated. He points out that even the order has been passed nearly one year and one month after the incident. He further points out that at any rate on 24.10.1997 the customs authorities became aware of the activities on the part of the detenu and on the very next day the detenu was arrested. He further points out that even calculating the period from there, it would be more than one year. The learned senior counsel further argues that the whole order as also the grounds in support thereof are silent about this period and also silent as to why the compelling necessity of detention was felt only after one year. It is further pointed out by the learned senior counsel that barring the facts which took place in October, 1997 and the conviction which ensued in the month of April, 1998, no further facts are referred to suggest that something occurred at least after the first arrest or after the conviction of the detenu so as to feel the compelling necessity to detain the detenu. 4. The learned Public Prosecutor however points out that this was a serious attempt of smuggling medicines and engine oil to Srilanka against the provisions of the Customs Act and, therefore, there is nothing wrong if the authorities felt the need to detain the detenu even after one year. The counter suggests that since the matter was pending with the ministry to decide as to whether the action was under ‘the COFEPOSA Act’ or not, the period of one year was lost and only ultimately when it was felt that it would be necessary to detain the detenu that the order came to be passed. 5. On this backdrop it has to be seen as to whether there was any necessity much less compelling necessity to detain the detenu under the provisions of the ‘COFEPOSA Act’. 6. It is trite law that there has to be a live link between the activities of the detenu and the decision to detain him. 5. On this backdrop it has to be seen as to whether there was any necessity much less compelling necessity to detain the detenu under the provisions of the ‘COFEPOSA Act’. 6. It is trite law that there has to be a live link between the activities of the detenu and the decision to detain him. There is no hard and fast rule regarding the time limit within which the order of detention can be passed. Taking into account the past activities, the order must shown the application of mind on the part of the Detaining Authority. In that behalf, it should be reflected in the order as to why the Detaining Authority has not chosen to take an action in the interregum. This is all the more necessary, where the interregum is as long as a year or more than that. Reading the order and the grounds we find that there is not a single word regarding this necessity. The only explanation which has come by way of counter for passing the order after one year is that the file was lying for the decision in the ministry. That according to us could not be a valid reason. We are of the clear opinion that there is absolutely no explanation and justification for this erroneous delay of one year in between the date when for the first time the detenu was implicated and the passing of the order of detention against him. In view of this, we are of the clear opinion that the order suffers from illegality and it is vitiated. The petition will have to be allowed and is accordingly allowed. The impugned order is quashed and it is directed that the detenu be released and set at liberty forth with, unless he is required in any other case.