ORDER A. K. Mathur, C.J. - This is a Miscellaneous Appeal directed against order dated 30-11-1994 passed by the First Additional District Judge, Bilaspur in Civil Case No. 16A of 1988 whereby the learned Additional District Judge has set aside the arbitration award on the ground that it is not on the stamp paper. 2. Brief facts which are necessary for disposal of the appeal are that that appellant M/s. Radha Madav Engineering Enterprises, Begumpet, Hyderabad entered into an agreement with the respondent General Manager, National Thermal Power Corporation, Korba to design, manufacture, supply, transportation to site, unloading erection, testing and commissioning of Mill Reject Handling System for Korba Super Thermal Power Project. The agreement was signed on 27-4-1981. Certain disputes were raised by M/s. Radha Madhav Engineering Enterprises (appellant) and therefore the claims were referred to arbitration and Shri R. S. Gupta, a retired District Judge was appointed as Arbitrator to go into the claims of the appellant. During the pendency of these arbitration proceedings, the respondent General Manager N.T.P.C. encashed the performance guarantee given by the State Bank of India, Hyderabad. When this encashment of the performance guarantee was made by the respondent No. 1, the appellant raised an issue before the Arbitrator Shri R. S. Gupta but he declined to go into that matter because no such reference on the said issue was made before the Arbitrator. Then the appellant approached the authorities for referring the matter to arbitration and the respondent No. 1 appointed Shri S. M. Nagmoti (respondent No. 2) as a sole Arbitrator to go into the matter, whether the encashment of the performance guarantee was rightly done by the respondent No. 1 or not. 3. The Sole Arbitrator Shri S. M. Nagmoti gave his award on 24-4-1987 concluding the award in the following terms : "(1) The preliminary objections raised by the respondent are rejected. (2) On the claim for refund of bank guarantee encashment amount of Rs. 2.48 lacs, I allow the same. (3) On the claim for damages on account of loss of reputation and goodwill of the claimant because of illegal encashment by respondent resulting in closure of other business transactions to be entered into by the claimant etc. for Rs. 2.50 lacs, I reject the same. 2.48 lacs, I allow the same. (3) On the claim for damages on account of loss of reputation and goodwill of the claimant because of illegal encashment by respondent resulting in closure of other business transactions to be entered into by the claimant etc. for Rs. 2.50 lacs, I reject the same. (4) On the claim for interest at 22% per annum on the encashment amount from the date of the encashment till realisation, I reject the same. Thus, the claimant is entitled to a sum of Rs. 2.48 lacs (Rs. Two lacs forty eight thousand only) which I hereby award, and direct the respondent to pay to the claimant with interest at 12% per annum from the date of award till realisation. The parties shall bear their own cost as incurred." 4. An application was made by the appellant before the Court under Section 14 of the Arbitration Act for a direction to the Arbitrator to file the award. The award was filed by the Arbitrator before the Court for making it a rule of the Court. The Court issued notices and heard the parties. It was held by the Additional District Judge, Bilaspur that the award cannot be made a rule of the Court because it is not on the stamp paper. On this preliminary objection, the learned Additional District Judge declined to make the award rule of the Court. Aggrieved by order dated 30-11-1994 passed by the Additional District Judge, Bilaspur the present Miscellaneous Appeal had been filed by the Appellant. A cross-objection was also been filed by the respondent. 5. The learned counsel for the appellant submits that the learned Court below should not have declined to make the arbitration award a rule of the Court and should not have rejected the award in toto; and instead, if the award was not on a stamp paper, it could have remitted the award to the Collector of Stamps for affixing proper duty or penalty, as the case may be. As against this, Shri Nair, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 pressed his cross-objection and submitted that as a matter of fact, the reference was not arbitrable and, therefore, the award should be quashed on that count. 6. As against this, Shri Nair, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 pressed his cross-objection and submitted that as a matter of fact, the reference was not arbitrable and, therefore, the award should be quashed on that count. 6. So far as the maintainability of cross-objection is concerned, the learned counsel for appellant submitted that cross-objection of the respondent No. 1 is not maintainable in view of the recent decision of the Apex Court in the case of Superintending Engineer v. B. Subba Reddy ( AIR 1999 SC 1747 = 1999(2) Arb. LR 304). Before entering into the merit of the case, we may at this state dispose of the objection raised by the appellant with regard to the maintainability of the cross-objection. The Apex Court recently in the case of B. Subba Reddy (supra), has taken the view that in arbitration proceedings which are governed by the Arbitration Act, there is no provision for filing the cross-objection and, therefore, their Lordships of Apex Court ruled that in arbitration proceedings, cross objection is not maintainable. It was observed by the Apex Court as under : "24. From the examination of these judgments and the provisions of Section 41 of the Act and Order 41, Rule 22 of the Code, in our view, following principles emerge : (1) Appeal is a substantive right. It is creation of the statute. Right to appeal does not exist unless it is specifically conferred. (2) Cross-objection is like an appeal. It has all the trappings of an appeal. It is filed in the form of memorandum and the provisions of Rule 1 of Order 41 of the Code, so far as these relate to the form and contents of the memorandum of appeal apply to cross-objection as well. (3) Court-fee is payable on cross-objection like that on the memorandum of appeal. Provisions relating to appeals by indigent person also apply to cross-objection. (4) Even where the appeal is withdrawn or is dismissed for default, cross-objection may nevertheless be heard and determined. (5) Respondent even though he has not appealed may support the decree on any other ground but if wants to modify it, he has to file cross-objection to the decree which objection he could have taken earlier by filing an appeal. (4) Even where the appeal is withdrawn or is dismissed for default, cross-objection may nevertheless be heard and determined. (5) Respondent even though he has not appealed may support the decree on any other ground but if wants to modify it, he has to file cross-objection to the decree which objection he could have taken earlier by filing an appeal. Time for filing objection which is in the nature of appeal is extended by one month after service of notice on him of the day fixed for hearing the appeal. This time could also be extended by the Court like in appeal. (6) Cross-objection is nothing but an appeal, a cross-appeal at that. It may be that the respondent wanted to give quietus to whole litigation by his accepting the judgment and decree or order even if it was partly against his interest. When, however, the other party challenged the same by filing an appeal statute have the respondent a second chance to file an appeal by way of cross-objection if he still felt aggrieved by the judgment and decree or order. 25. In the present case, as noted above, the respondent did not file any appeal under Section 39 of the Act in the High Court which right he admittedly had when the award of interest @ 18% per annum was reduced to 12% per annum by the Trial Court. Section 41 of the Act is merely procedural in nature. If there is no right of cross-objection given under Section 39 of the Act, it cannot be read into Section 41 of the Act. Filing of cross-objection is not procedural in nature. Section 41 of the Act merely prescribes that procedure of the Code would be applicable to the appeal under Section 39 of the Act. We are, therefore, of the opinion that cross-objection by the respondent was not maintainable and the High Court was not correct in holding otherwise and restoring the award of interest to 18% per annum and, thus, interfering in the decree of the Trial Court. We are, therefore, of the opinion that cross-objection by the respondent was not maintainable and the High Court was not correct in holding otherwise and restoring the award of interest to 18% per annum and, thus, interfering in the decree of the Trial Court. Since the Arbitration Act is a Code in itself and by virtue of Section 41, only procedure of the Code of Civil Procedure is made applicable to these proceedings and since the appeal is a creature of a statute and cross-objection is nothing but an appeal and that is not contemplated in the Arbitration Act, therefore, such a cross-objection has been held by the Apex Court to be not maintainable. In this view of the matter, we are of the opinion that the objection raised by the appellant should be sustained. We therefore hold that the cross-objection filed by the respondent No. 1 is not maintainable and the same is rejected. 7. Now coming on the merits of the case, the learned A.D.J. has declined to make the award a rule of the Court primarily on account of the fact that it was not on the stamp paper. In this connection, it may be mentioned that the appellant requested the Court of learned A.D.I. that if the award is not on stamp paper and if it requires to be stamped, then he is prepared to comply with that and the Court may pass any order to this effect; but that request was rejected by the Court and it was pointed out that if the appellant had got it stamped before steps were taken for getting the award made a rule of the Court, it would have been possible, but once the award has been filed in the Court, then it cannot be permitted to be remitted for registration or for paying the stamp duty on the award. On this ground, the learned A.D.J. declined to make the award a rule of the Court and rejected the prayer of the appellant. 8. It may be relevant to mention here that the learned A.D.J. found the award in all other respects legal except on the technical objection that it was not on stamp paper. On this ground, the learned A.D.J. declined to make the award a rule of the Court and rejected the prayer of the appellant. 8. It may be relevant to mention here that the learned A.D.J. found the award in all other respects legal except on the technical objection that it was not on stamp paper. In this circumstance, the proper course for the learned A.D.J. in the present case was that when the award was found to be in order in all respects and it only suffered from technical objection of not being on sufficient stamp paper, then instead of declining to make the award a rule of the Court, the Court should have remitted the award to the Collector of Stamps for payment of proper stamp duty or penalty, particularly when a request was made by the appellant to the Court. This genuine request of the appellant should not have brushed aside by the Court on the technical ground that the award suffered from non-payment of necessary stamp duty. Deficiency of stamp duty or any other deficiency could have been made good by passing appropriate orders, but to reject the award on this ground was not proper and just on the part of the learned A.D.J. In this connection, our attention was invited to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Rikhabdass v. Ballabhdas and others ( AIR 1962 SC 551 .), wherein their Lordships have taken the view that it is true that the award cannot be remitted to the Arbitrator with a direction to rewrite it on a stamp paper and resubmit to the Court because the Arbitrator has become functus officio but at the same time, their Lordships while parting with the case observed as under : "11. In the result, this appeal is allowed. The orders of the Courts below remitting the award are set aside. The appellant will get the costs throughout. Nothing that we have said in this judgment will affect the right of the parties to take such steps, if any are available to them at law, for curing the defect arising from the award being on an unstamped paper." It was further observed thus : "The award which is an 'instrument' within the meaning of the Stamp Act was required to be stamped. Being unstamped, the award could not be received in evidence by the Court, nor could it be acted upon. But the Court was competent to impound it and to send it to the Collector with a certificate in writing stating the amount of duty and penalty levied thereon. On the instrument so received the Collector may adjudge whether it is duly stamped and he may require penalty to be paid thereon, if in his view it has not been duly stamped. If the duty and penalty are paid, the Collector will certify by endorsement on the instrument that the proper duty and penalty have been paid." It is clear that their Lordships felt that this technical difficulty is going to be more harsh to the parties, therefore, there hastened to add that if this technical difficulty could be cured then any observation made in judgment will not affect the rights of the parties. In the case of Hindustan Steel Ltd. v. M/s. Dilip Construction Company ( AIR 1969 SC 1238 .), their Lordships have held that the Stamp Act is a fiscal measure enacted to secure revenue for the State on certain classes of instruments and it is not an arm to a litigant to meet the case of his opponents. The stringent provisions of the Act are conceived in the interest of the revenue. Their Lordships have observed that once the object is secured according to law, the party staking his claim on the instrument will not be defeated on the ground of initial defect in the instrument. Their Lordships observed thus : "5. The Stamp Act is a fiscal measure enacted to secure revenue for the State on certain classes of instruments : it is not enacted to arm a litigant with a weapon of technicality to meet the case of his opponent. The stringent provisions of the Act are conceived in the interest of the revenue. Once that object is secured according to law, the party staking his claim on the instrument will not be defeated on the ground of the initial defect in the instrument. Viewed in that light the scheme is clear. The stringent provisions of the Act are conceived in the interest of the revenue. Once that object is secured according to law, the party staking his claim on the instrument will not be defeated on the ground of the initial defect in the instrument. Viewed in that light the scheme is clear. Section 35 of the Stamp Act operates as a bar to an unstamped instrument being admitted in evidence or being acted upon; Section 40 provides the procedure for instruments being impounded, sub-section (1) of Section 42 provides for certifying that an instrument is duly stamped, and sub-section (2) of Section 42 enacts the consequences resulting from such certification." The fiscal statute should not have been taken as a measure to defeat a legitimate claim of the appellant. Proper course, as we have already observed above, for the learned A.D.J. was to remitted the award to the Collector of Stamps for being properly stamped or for any penalty to be imposed. On payment of such duty and/or payment of penalty if any, the award could have been made a rule of the Court. 9. Our attention was also invited to a decision of this 'Court given recently in the case of Santosh Champalal Jain v. Smt. Vimta Bai ( 1998(2) MPLJ 164 = 1998 (Suppl.) Arb. LR 338). His Lordship, after relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Hindustan Steel Limited (supra), and a decision of this Court in the case of Shivlal v. Union of India ( AIR 1975 MP 40 ), remitted the case to the Trial Court to decide the matter in accordance with Jaw keeping in view the observations made by the Supreme Court in the case of Hindustan Steel Limited (supra) and Shivlal (supra). In the present case, we are of the opinion that the approach of the learned Court below in declining to make the award a rule of the Court was not justified. We therefore remit the case back to the A.D.J. to refer the arbitration award to the Collector of Stamps for proper stamping and after the same is properly stamped, to pass orders in accordance with law. 10. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The order passed by the Trial Court is set aside and the case is remitted to the Trial Court for deciding the matter in the light of directions made above. 10. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The order passed by the Trial Court is set aside and the case is remitted to the Trial Court for deciding the matter in the light of directions made above. There shall be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.