ORDER S.P. Khare, J. 1. This is a revision under Section 23-E of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act) against the order dated 29-9-1997 in case No. A-90 (7)430/89 of the Rent Controlling Authority, Indore, directing the non-applicant to put the applicant in possession of the suit accommodation. 2. Mehmooda Khanam is a widow. She is covered by the definition of landlord given in Section 23-J of the Act. The petitioner is tenant in a portion of the house No. 50, Nayapura, Indore. It had been let out to him by the applicant's father-in- law Mohammed Bashir in the year 1952. After his death he left behind three sons. One of them was Abdul Aziz. He was husband of the applicant. He has also died. His two brothers are alive. 3. The applicant submitted an application under Section 23-A of the Act before the Rent Controlling Authority. That is a special provision for eviction of tenant on the ground of bonafide requirement. According to the applicant the suit accommodation is required by her bonafide for occupation as residence for herself and for her family members. She has two sons and two daughters. She has no other house at Indore. Her one son is employed in defence services and he is posted at New Delhi. She is at the moment living with him in a Government quarter. This house has been gifted to her by the two brothers of her husband. She is in occupation of one room of this house in which the moveables belonging to her mother-in-law are kept. 4. The case of the non-applicant is that the alleged need of the applicant is a mere pretence to get the house vacated. She is not interested in living at Indore. She wants to sell this house. Her husband during his life-time had written the letter dated 21-11-1986 (Ex. D-1) to him to help him to get this house sold so that he may purchase a house in New Delhi. There has been no gift of the house to the applicant by the brothers of her husband and therefore, in their absence the present application is not maintainable. 5. D-1) to him to help him to get this house sold so that he may purchase a house in New Delhi. There has been no gift of the house to the applicant by the brothers of her husband and therefore, in their absence the present application is not maintainable. 5. After recording the evidence of both the sides the Rent Controlling Authority by the impugned order has upheld the plea of the applicant that she requires the suit accommodation bonafide for her residence and for her family members and she has no other house of her own at Indore. It has also been held that in view of the hibanama executed by the two brothers of her husband she alone is owner of the house. 6. In this revision it has been argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the findings of the Rent Controlling Authority are perverse. It has been urged that an objective appraisal of the evidence on record shows that the applicant does not intend to occupy the house in dispute for her residence. It is pointed out that her husband was a director in All India Radio and her one son is Wing Commander in defence services and therefore her status is such that she would not live in this house. It is said that the case set up by her is highly improbable. On the other hand it is stated by the learned counsel for the respondent that she has established her felt need for the suit accommodation and as she has no other house of her own the impugned order is unassailable in this revision. 7. After hearing the learned counsel for both the sides this Court is of the opinion that the finding of the Rent Controlling Authority cannot be said to be perverse or unreasonable. It is not in dispute that the applicant is a widow and she has no other house of her own. She has to live with her son at the place of his posting as she has no other house to live at Indore. The house belonged to her father-in-law and after his death and the death of her husband she has to live there. There is nothing unreasonable in the predilection shown by her to live in this house at the fag end of her life. The house belonged to her father-in-law and after his death and the death of her husband she has to live there. There is nothing unreasonable in the predilection shown by her to live in this house at the fag end of her life. Her husband wrote the letter to the non-applicant during his life-time expressing a desire to sell this house and settle at New Delhi but before he could accomplish his wish he died. This letter reveals that the non-applicant was a man of his confidence at that time and for that reason he wrote that letter to him. He was not having enough money to buy a house at New Delhi without selling the house in dispute. With his death that chapter is over. That letter does not negative the need of his widow after his death. Now her need is genuine. Her requirement of the suit accommodation is reasonable. She has the compelling necessity and intense need to occupy this house. The Government quarter in which she is living with her son is no substitute for her own house. The non-applicant is living in this house for more than 40 years. An owner of a house cannot be denuded of his or her rights while affording statutory protection to the tenant. After all he cannot become practically an owner of that house. That is not the legislative intent. The landlord must get possession of the house back when it is required by her for her own residence, otherwise it will be a self-defeating exercise to achieve the goal of socio-economic justice. 8. There is a statutory presumption incorporated in Section 23-D (3) of the Act that the requirement of the landlord under Section 23-A (a) of the Act is bonafide. Apart from this statutory provision the applicant by the evidence on record has proved her bonafide requirement. A number of rulings have been cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner on the meaning of "bonafide requirement". The principles laid down in those rulings have been kept in view while assessing the facts of the present case. It must be added that the need in this area is not so much on forensic or legal niceties but to look at the practical realities. 9. The principles laid down in those rulings have been kept in view while assessing the facts of the present case. It must be added that the need in this area is not so much on forensic or legal niceties but to look at the practical realities. 9. The learned counsel for the petitioner has made a scathing attack on the hibanama executed by the brothers of the husband of the applicant. It is not necessary to decide its validity in this case at the instance of a stranger to this document. The applicant is undisputably a co-owner of the house in dispute and she is entitled to submit the application under Section 23-A of the Act. Hibanama at least is an express or implied consent of the other co-owners given to the applicant to gel the house vacated. One of the brothers has been examined and his consent is express. Several rulings have been cited on this point also but it is enough to refer to a passage from the celebrated commentary on the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 by Shri S.D. Sanghi 1994 Edition Page 617 and that passage neatly sums up the law on this point: "Jurisprudentially it is not correct to say that a co-owner of a property is not its owner. He owns every part of the composite property along with others and it cannot be said that he is only a part-owner or a fractional owner of the property ...... a co-owner is as much an owner of the entire property as any sole owner and the absence of other co-owners will not disentitle a co-owner from maintaining an action for eviction when the other co-owners do not object to the same." It is a happy coincidence that the present case has been argued by the senior Advocate whose view has been extracted in the above passage. In view of this legal position the applicant is entitled to maintain the action for eviction as co-owner if it is assumed that the said hiba suffers from any legal infirmity. 10. The petition is dismissed.