JUDGMENT S.P. Khare, J. 1. This is a second appeal under Section 100 C.P.C. While admitting this appeal on 29.4.1986 the following substantial question of law was framed :- Whether the lower appellate Court was right in passing a decree for ejectment and in rejecting the amendment application filed by the defendant/appellant challenging the derivative title of the plaintiff'. 2. The facts relevant for the decision of this question are that defendant Shivcharanlal is tenant of the plaintiff on the first floor of house No. 755-755-A, Tel-gali Mhow at monthly rent of Rs. 11/-. The plaintiff claimed that the suit accommodation is required by him bonafide for the residence of himself and his family members who are 17 in number and he is residing with his family members in rented house No. 900, Chotabazar, Mhow at a monthly rent of Rs. 30/-. The defendant admitted that he is tenant of the plaintiff. However, the requirement of the plaintiff being genuine was disputed on the plea that he demanded rent at the rate of Rs. 20/- per month. 3. There is concurrent finding of the trial Court and the first appellate Court that the requirement of the plaintiff is bonafide as there are now 22 members in his family and he is living in a rented house. There can be no interference in second appeal in such a concurring finding of fact. In appeal an application for amendment of the written statement was made and that has been rightly rejected by the first appellate Court as there was a clear admission in the written statement that the defendant is tenant of the plaintiff in the suit accommodation and that admission could not be withdrawn at the appellate stage without assigning any valid reason. 4. In this appeal two applications of the defendant for amendment of the written statement were allowed and the case was remitted by order dated 18.12.1991 to the first appellate Court on the following issue :- Whether purchase of house by registered saledeed dated 28.2.1991 by the plaintiff's brother and sons and obtaining decree for vacant possession of the two rooms by the plaintiff in the suit No. 48-A/78 brings about an end to the plaintiff's requirement in regard to the suit accommodation. 5. 5. Accordingly some fresh evidence was recorded and after appreciation of that evidence the first appellate Court has answered the issue mentioned above in the negative by order dated 4.8.1992. This order runs into 21 pages. The evidence adduced by both the sides has been discussed exhaustively and it has been held that House No. 900 Chotabazar, Mhow which has been purchased by the plaintiff's brother by registered sale-deed dated 28.2.1991 is not sufficient to accommodate the members of the family of the plaintiff. This is the house which was in occupation of the respondent as tenant before the passing of the eviction decree by the trial Court. I have gone through the discussion of the evidence and the reasoning given by the first appellate Court in the order dated 4.8.1992. There is no perversity or unreasonableness. The plaintiff's family has grown after the decree of the eviction was passed by the trial Court and newly purchased house No. 900, Chotabazar, Mhow is insufficient to accommodate them. This house consists of six rooms and in view of the size of the family of the plaintiff and his brothers it cannot be said to be reasonably suitable for all the members of the family. So far as the two rooms in the suit house are concerned the plaintiff has not been able to obtain the actual possession from the tenant as Civil Suit No. 48-A of 1978 has been remanded by the first appellant Court for fresh decision. 6. The appellant/defendant has submitted another application dated 29.10.1996 (I.A. No. 5411/96) under Order 6 Rule 17 C.P.C. for amendment of the written statement. In this application it is stated that the plaintiff's mother Gorabai has died on 10.10.1995 and therefore her need has come to and end. It is also stated that the plaintiff's brother Ramchandra and his wife and children are now living in Harniyakhedi in house no. 102 and his name finds place in the voter-list of that area. It is further stated in this application that the plaintiff's brother Babulal and nephew Prahalad have purchased house no. 899 Chotabazar, Mhow by registered sale-deed dated 31.5.1996 and have got it vacant possession and thus their need for the suit accommodation is also extinguished. In reply to this application, the respondent/plaintiff has stated that his mother Gorabai has died in 1995. 899 Chotabazar, Mhow by registered sale-deed dated 31.5.1996 and have got it vacant possession and thus their need for the suit accommodation is also extinguished. In reply to this application, the respondent/plaintiff has stated that his mother Gorabai has died in 1995. It is further stated that the plaintiff's brother Ramchandra is still living with his family in house No. 900, Chotabazar, Mhow. That is the finding of the first appellate Court in the order dated 4.8.1992. The respondent/plaintiff has further admitted that his brother Babulal and his nephew Prahalad have purchased house no. 899. That house is 100 years old and it is in the shape of Khandahar', There is a shop and latrine and bath-room on the ground-floor in this house. There are two rooms on the first floor of this house. It will require re-building before it can be used for residence. Now there are 31 members in the family of the plaintiff/respondent. 7. The appellant has filed another application under Order 7 Rule 7 C.P.C. for dismissal of the plaintiff's suit on the ground that his family members have purchased the house mentioned above for their residence. In reply to this application the respondent/plaintiff has stated that there are 31 members in his family and at the time of the institution of the suit their number was 17. Now there are six boys in the family who are of marriageable age. This reply has been supported by an affidavit of the respondent. 8. It has been argued on behalf of the appellant that legal position is well settled that the alleged requirement of the plaintiff for the suit accommodation must subsist till the time the eviction decree is affirmed by the final Court and as in the present case new houses have been acquired during the pendency of the second appeal by the respondent/plaintiff, the requirement has been adequately met and now he does not require the suit accommodation bonafide for his own residence and for the members of his family. It has also been argued that a fresh issue should be framed by this Court in respect of the house No. 899 and the case should be remitted to the first appellate Court as was done earlier by the order dated 18.12.1991 and finding should be called from that Court. 9. It has also been argued that a fresh issue should be framed by this Court in respect of the house No. 899 and the case should be remitted to the first appellate Court as was done earlier by the order dated 18.12.1991 and finding should be called from that Court. 9. It cannot be lost sight of that the suit was originally filed on 6.12.1978 and since then more than 20 years have passed, it would not be in the interest of justice to remit or remand this case again. It is admitted that the respondent/plaintiff's brother and nephew have purchased house no. 899 by registered sale-deed dated 31.5.1996. An affidavit has been filed by the respondent/plaintiff alongwith reply in which full details of the family of the plaintiff has been given. Now there are 31 members in the family of the plaintiff/respondent and six boys are the marriageable age. It is further stated that there are only two rooms for the purpose of residence on the first floor of the house no. 899. It is apparent that even this house does not satisfy the requirement of the grown up family of the respondent/plaintiff. Therefore it is not necessary to remit or remand this case and a decision has been arrived at in light of the material produced by both the parties. Essential facts are not in dispute and therefore, this case is not being remitted again. The Supreme Court observed in Prabhakaran Vs. State of Tamilnadu AIR 1987 S.C. 2117 ; "Litigations in landlord=tenant cases must come to end quickly". This Court in Kailashcand Vs. Vinod 1993 MPLJ 961 has observed : "None should opt to see justice crying in silence for such a long time. Procedural wrangle should not be seen in action for erosion of faith in the system. People are tired of waiting. The dispensation of justice should be sure and swift. Justice should not be made to appear as a teasing illusion. Tardy pace in such cases, built on bona fide requirements, should be spurned and verdict, one way or the other should be expenditions". Relying upon these decisions it has been held by this Court in Pratap Singh Vs. Sharad Chand 1998 (2) M.P.L.J. 315 that the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 is a beneficial legislation - beneficial both to landlord and tenant. Relying upon these decisions it has been held by this Court in Pratap Singh Vs. Sharad Chand 1998 (2) M.P.L.J. 315 that the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 is a beneficial legislation - beneficial both to landlord and tenant. It protects the tenants against unreasonable eviction, but at the same time ensures that the accommodation is made available to the landlord on proof of specified grounds. The legislature does not discourage the persons from constructing buildings. 10. It has been emphasied on behalf of the appellant after citing a number of decisions that it is the duty of the respondent/plaintiff in such a case to establish his need and of the members of his family objectively. There can be no quarrel with the well established proposition that the requirement of the respondent/plaintiff must be genuine and honest. 11. After considering the entire material on record this Court is of the opinion that the respondent/plaintiff still requires the suit accommodation for his own residence and for the members of his family. The accommodation which has been acquired by the respondent/plaintiff's family members is not sufficient to accommodate the large family members is not sufficient to accommodate the large family of 31 members of the plaintiff. On an objective determination of the size of the family and the total accommodation in the two houses purchased by the family members of the plaintiff, it is found that the respondent/plaintiff still bonafide requires the suit accommodation for his own residence and for the members of his family. The need of the respondent/plaintiff still subsists and has not come to and end. Therefore, the impugned judgment and decree of the first appellate Court affirming the judgment and decree of the trial Court does not require any interference by this Court. 12. The second appeal is dismissed. Appeal dismissed