P. K. JAIN, J. The respondent No. 3 Smt. Sumitra Devi filed suit No. 185/91 against the petitioner for cancellation of sale-deed, dated 19-9-1989 (registered on 23-3-1990) and for possession in case the Court finds possession of the defendants or any portion of the suit property and further relief claimed was for permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering in the possession of the plaintiff over the properties described in Schedule C of the plaint. It was claimed by the plaintiff that she was Bhumidhar in possession of the properties described in Schedule Aa, Ba and Sa of the plaint. After death of her husband, the plaintiffs, and defendants No. 2 and 3 contested series of litigations in Civil as well as Revenue Courts. Defendant No. 2 on the basis of forged Will and defendant No. 3 on the basis of illusory family settlement con tested the said litigation against the plain tiff but they were unsuccessful. The plain tiff has been carrying on the agricultural activities with the help and supervision of one Chandra Hari Shukla. She has also executed a Will dated 19-9-1989 in favour of Chandra Hari Shukla which was not liked by the defendant No. 4. After execu tion of the said Will defendant No. 4 started gaining sympathy of the plaintiff even though he was in collusion with the defendants No. 1 to 3. Defendant No. 4, in collusion with remaining defendants made a proposal to the plaintiff that she may not bequeath her entire property to Chandra Hari Shukla. She may give property of village Bas Pokhar to Chandra Hari Shuk la and may give property of village Pachaura to defendant No. 4 and may ex ecute a Will in this regard. She was promised that Rs. 3 (), 0 ()0/- which was kept with defendant No. 4 shall be deposited in the name of the plaintiff. On 19-9-1989 defendant No. 4, brought the plaintiff to Basti and represented that he had come to get Will in favour of Chandra Hari Shukla registered. She was promised that Rs. 3 (), 0 ()0/- which was kept with defendant No. 4 shall be deposited in the name of the plaintiff. On 19-9-1989 defendant No. 4, brought the plaintiff to Basti and represented that he had come to get Will in favour of Chandra Hari Shukla registered. The defendant No. 4 got a document prepared contents of which were not known to the plaintiff and repre senting that the documents related to be queathing the properties of village Pachaura to defendant No. 4 and that of village Bas Phokhar to Chandra Hari Shukla, her thumb impressions were ob tained by the defendant No. 2 in collusion with the remaining defendants. The docu ment was got registered. The defendants No. 1 to 3 cladestinely got their names mutuated in the Revenue Record on the strength of said document. No notice or summons were issued to the plaintiff. In the month of August, 1991, the defendants started claiming that they, will not permit the plaintiff to cultivate the land and they would make unauthorised possession over her house. It was then that the plaintiff came to know that the deed dated 19-9-1989 was not Will but the sale-deed in favour of the defendants No. 1 to 3. The plaintiff obtained a copy of Khatauni. She claimed that the documents in question was void and was liable to be cancelled. It was on these allegations that the aforesaid reliefs were claimed. 2. The defendants contested the suit on various grounds and denying the aforesaid claims they pleaded that the suit was barred by the provision of Section 331of U. P. Z. A. & L. R. Act. It was also pleaded that the consolidation operation in the village had started and Civil Court has no jurisdiction and the suit stands abated. 3. On the above pleas of the defen dants, the trial Court framed the following issues No. 6 and 7: 6. Whether the Court has no jurisdiction to try the suit? 7. Whether the suit stands abated in view of the provision of Section 5 of the Consolida tion of Holdings Act? 4. 3. On the above pleas of the defen dants, the trial Court framed the following issues No. 6 and 7: 6. Whether the Court has no jurisdiction to try the suit? 7. Whether the suit stands abated in view of the provision of Section 5 of the Consolida tion of Holdings Act? 4. The trial Court tried the aforesaid issues as preliminary issues and on con sideration of the argument advocated by both the sides as well as the relevant law the trial Court held that the declaration of rights of plaintiff was not involved but the only question involved was whether the sale-deed in question was obtained by playing fraud. Therefore, neither Revenue Court nor the Consolidation Court can grant the reliefs claimed by the plaintiff. The trial Court consequently held that the suit was maintainable and triable by the Civil Court. 5. The defendants filed a revision before the District Judge, Basti which was also dismissed vide judgment and order dated 20-4-1993. 6. Order of the trial Court deciding issues Nos. 6 and 7 dated 4- 12-1992 and judgment of the Revisional Court dated 20-4-1993 are sought to be quashed through the present writ petition. 7. Sri Ramesh Chandra Counsel for the petitioners and Sri VP. Chaudhari, learned Counsel for respondent No. 3 have been heard at length. Respondent No. 3 has filed counter-affidavit. No rejoinder- af fidavit has been filed by the petitioners. The petition, with the consent of the learned Counsel for the parties, is being fully dis posed of/decidedattheadmissionstage. 8. Learned Counsel for the petitioners submits that in view of the provision of Section 5 (2) (a) of U. P. Con solidation of Holdings Act (hereinafter called the Act) all the proceedings and every suit in respect of declaring of rights, interest or, for declaration or adjudication of any other right for which proceedings can or ought to be taken under the Act pending before any Court, whether of the first instance or of appeal, reference or revision will stand abated on the land lying in the consolidation area after Notifica tion under sub-section (2) of Section 4 of the Act has been published. It is submitted that in the instant case there is no dispute that the notification with respect of dis puted land was published and the land in dispute was under consolidation opera tion. It is submitted that in the instant case there is no dispute that the notification with respect of dis puted land was published and the land in dispute was under consolidation opera tion. It is further submitted that the docu ment in question was void document and the Court below has wrongly held it to be voidable document. Reliance is placed on Smt. Dulari Devi v. Janki Singh and others, AIR 1990 SC1173, and Smt. Ram Gulabiv. Ram Autar and others, 1995 RD 361 . Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 3 has submitted that the findings of the Court below is that the document was voidable and not void,>ignatures of respondent No. 3 were not Disputed but it was alleged that the signal res were ob tained by playing fraud. It is further sub mitted that in case of voidable document only Civil Court has jurisdiction to cancel such a document. Reliance is placed on Sri Bismillah v. Janeshwar Prasad, AIR 1990 SC 540 ; Ram Sakal Singh v. M$t. Munakko Devi, 1997 Alldcj 1154 (SC)9. 9. Before considering rival conten tions, it would be proper to state that fol lowing legal position has crystallized from a catena of judicial pronouncement of the Apex Court as well as of this Court and various other Courts: (1) Normally the Civil Court has jurisdic tion to decide all the civil disputes and it is for the party who seeks to oust the jurisdiction of Civil Court to establish his contention. It is further well settled that a statute ousting the jurisdiction of a Civil Court just be strictly construed. It is well settled that the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not to be readily inferred but that such exclusion must either be explicitly expressed or clearly implied (See Abdul Waheed Klwn v. Bhawani, AIR 1966 SC 1718 ; Smt. Bismillah v. Janeshwar Prasad and others, AIR 1990 SC 540 ; and/tow Padarath v. A. DJ. , Full Bench decision (Lucknow Bench), 1989 A. WC. 290. (2) The question of jurisdiction depends upon the allegations in the plaint and not the merits or the result of the suit. In order to determine the precise nature of the action, the pleadings should be taken as a whole. , Full Bench decision (Lucknow Bench), 1989 A. WC. 290. (2) The question of jurisdiction depends upon the allegations in the plaint and not the merits or the result of the suit. In order to determine the precise nature of the action, the pleadings should be taken as a whole. The real point is not the stray or loose expressions which abound in artistically drafted plaints, but the real substance of the case gathered by constru ing pleadings as a whole. (See Smt. Bismillah v. Janeshwar Prasad, AIR 1990 SC 540 , and Ram Sakal Singh v. Mosamat Monako Devi and others, 1997 Alld. Civil Journal 1154 (Supreme Court decision ). (3) Distinction is drawn between the document where it is wholly or partially invalid so it can be disregarded by any Court or authority without a decree of cancellation and document where it has to be actually set aside before it can cease to have any legal effect. In cases where the documents arc void the Court or other authority can ignore it but in cases of voidable document, the document can not be ignored by the Court or any authority unless it is cancelled or declared void by a competent Court. See Gorakli Nath Dubey v. Narain Singh, 1994 (1) SCR 339: AIR 1973 SC 2451 followed in Smt. Bismillah v. Janeshwar Prasad (supra), Ram Sakal Singh v. Mosamat Monako Devi and other (supra), Ram Padarath v. A. DJ. (supra) and Smt. Dulari Devi v. Janardan Singh and others, AIR 1990 SC 1113. 10. It was held in Gorakhnath Singhs case (supra) as follows: "we think that a distinction can he made between cases where a document is wholly or partially invalid so that it can be disregarded by any Court or authority and one where it has to be actually set aside before it can cease to have legal effect. " 11. In Ram Prakash s case (supra) of full Bench of this Court has held as follows: "so far as voidable documents like those obtained by practising coercion, fraud, mis representation, undue influence etc. are con cerned, their legal effect cannot be put to an end without its cancellation. But a void document is not required to be cancelled necessarily. In Ram Prakash s case (supra) of full Bench of this Court has held as follows: "so far as voidable documents like those obtained by practising coercion, fraud, mis representation, undue influence etc. are con cerned, their legal effect cannot be put to an end without its cancellation. But a void document is not required to be cancelled necessarily. Its legal effect if any can be put to an end to by declaring it to be void and granting some other relief instead of cancelling it. Once it is held to be void it can be ignored by any Court or authority being of no legal effect or consequence. A document executed without free consent or one which is without consideration or the object of which is unlawful or executed by a person not competent to contract like a minor or in excess of authority would be void to that extent only. " 12. It may further be pointed out that in the instant case both the Courts below have held the document in question which is sought to be cancelled a voidable docu ment. This finding of Court below is how ever, seriously challenged by the petitioner in the present writ petition. The next contention of learned Counsel for the petitioner is that according to the plaint allegations, the plaintiff has never ex ecuted the sale-deed nor she was paid any consideration and the defendants had no money to pay the amount of Rs. 72, 500/ -. Thus, according to the plaint allegations, the document in question was executed without any consideration. Therefore, it was a void document and the Court below wrongly held that it was a voidable docu ment. Learned Counsel, for the plaintiff-respondent has submitted that it is true that no sale consideration was paid at the time of execution of the document in ques tion but there are clear allegations that the document was obtained fraudulently and by misrepresenting that the document of Will being executed and the Courts below rightly held that it was a voidable docu ment. 13. 13. As pointed out above, in Ram Padarath s case, (supra) it was held that the document executed without free consent or without payment of consideration or the object of which is unlawful or executed by a person not competent to contract like a minor or person having no authority or title to transfer is a void document. Whereas documents which are obtained by practising coercion, fraud, mis representation or undue influence are those documents which are termed as voidable document and the executant of such document may get the same cancelled on the ground of fraud, coercion, mis representation or undue influence. In the instant case, there is no doubt there are allegations that fraud was played upon plaintiff-respondent and a document which she never intended to execute and for which she had never consented was got executed. The facts alleged are that after winning over the confidence of the plain tiff-defendant No. 4 persuaded to her to execute two Wills, one in favour of Chandra Hari Shukla and the other in favour of defendant No. 4 and the plaintiff had executed the disputed documents under the impression that she was execut ing the Will whereas the defendants actually got the sale- deed executed on the pretext that the Wills were being executed. The documents in dispute were thus got executed by playing fraud on the plaintiff-respondent. There is however, distinction between the cases in which a document intended to be executed is got executed by obtaining consent of the executor of such document by practising coercion, fraud, misrepresentation or undue influence and the documents which are got executed fraudulently without executant of such document having ever consented to ex ecute such a document. The last category of documents shall be documents without consent and not document for which con sent has been obtained fraudulently. There may be cases where a document has been executed not by the real owner or in respect of the property in excess of the interest or ^document without consent of the executant to execute a particular na ture of document which will include the documents where for example, consent was given for executing a gift-deed in favour of x but document executed in favour of y. In such case the document shall be void for want of either title of the executant or for want of free consent of the executant. Such cases are to be distin guished from cases where consent to ex ecute a particular nature of document say a gift-deed or a Will is obtained by playing fraud or practising coercion, mis- repre sentation or undue influence upon the executant. This last category of document shall be voidable document whereas the documents of the nature described earlier or the like nature shall be void document. 14. In Ningawwa v. Byrappa, AIR 1968 SC 956 , the Apex Court has held as follows: "the legal position will be different if there is a fraudulent misrepresentation nor merely as to the contents of the document but as to its character. The authorities make a clear distinc tion between the fraudulent misrepresentation as to the character of the document and fraudulent misrepresentation as to the contents thereof. With reference to the former, it has been held that the transaction is void while in the case of latter it is merely voidable. " In Foster v. Mackinnon, (1869) R 4 CP 704, the action was by the endorsee of a bill of exchange. The defen dant pleaded that he endorsed the bill on a fraudulent representation by the accept or that he was signing a guarantee. In holding that such a plea was admissible the Court observed: If (signature) is invalid not merely on the ground of fraud, where fraud exists, but on the ground that the mind of the signer did not ac company the signature; in other words, that he never intended to sign, and therefore, in con templation, of law never did sign, the contract to which his name is appended. . . The defendant never intended to sign that contract or any such contract. He never intended to put his name to any instrument that then was or thereafter might become negotiable. He was deceived, not merely as to the legal effect, but as to the actual contents of the instrument. " 15. The above observations of the Supreme Court in Ningawwa v. Byrappa case (supra), were followed in case of Smt. Dularia v. Janardan Singh others, AIR 1990 SC 1173 , that was a case in which the facts were almost pa railed to the present case. The plaintiff claimed that s e was illiterate lady. Her daughter was wise of defendant No. 6. The defendants No. 3 and 4 were brothers of defendant No. 6. The plaintiff claimed that s e was illiterate lady. Her daughter was wise of defendant No. 6. The defendants No. 3 and 4 were brothers of defendant No. 6. Defenants Nos. 3 and 4 gained the confidence of the plaintiff and she confided in them her desire to make gift of her entire properties in favour of her daughter. Defendants No. 3 and 4 readily agreed to make arrange ment to execute and register a necessary deed. Two deeds were executed on which the plaintiff was made to put her thumb impressions without reading over the con tents of the documents or understanding their character. She was told, and she honestly believed that she was executing a gift- deed in favour of her daughter as desired by her. She had in fact executed two deeds one of which was a gift-deed in favour of her daughter and the other was a sale-deed in favour of all the defendants. This was a clear case of fraud practised upon the plaintiff by the defendants. The plaintiff, however, pleaded that she did not know that she had executed a sale-deed in favour of the defendants in respect of her property. A suit for cancellation of the sale-deed was filed. When the matter went up to the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court held as follows: "from the facts narrated above,, about which, as stated earlier, there is no dispute. It is clear that this is a case where the plaintiff-appel lant was totally ignorant of the mischief played upon her. She honestly believed that the instru ment which she executed and got registered was a gift-deed in favour of her daughter. She believed that the thumb impressions taken from her were in respect of that single document. She did not know that she executed two documents, one of which alone was the gift-deed, but the other was a sale-deed of the property in favour of all the defendants. This was. therefore, a case of fraudulent misrepresentation, as to the char acter of the document executed by her and not merely as to its contents or as to its legal effect. The plaintiff appellant never intended to sign what she did sign. She never intended to enter into the contract to which she unknowingly be came a party. Her mind did not accompany her thumb impressions. The plaintiff appellant never intended to sign what she did sign. She never intended to enter into the contract to which she unknowingly be came a party. Her mind did not accompany her thumb impressions. This is a case that falls within the principle enunciated in Ningawwa v. Byrappa, AIR 1968 SC 956 , (supra) and it was, therefore, a totally void transaction. According ly, as stated in Gorakh Nath Dube, AIR 1973 SC 245. (supra), the suit is not maintainable by reason of the bar contained in the Act. " 16. Learned Counsel for the plaintiff-respondent has drawn the attention of this Court to the observations made by Honble the Supreme Court in case of Smt. Bismillah, (supra) and has vehemently contended that Honble Supreme Court has held in the said case that the distinction based on the character of the document and the contents of the document was con sidered unsatisfactory. The distinction based on the character and contents of a document is not without its difficulties in its practical application. The difficulty is to be resolved on a case by the basis on the facts of each case and not by adverting to any principle of general validity applicable to all cases. The decision in Smt. Bismillah case, in my view is not applicable to the facts of the present case. Firstly, that was a case in which the executant intended to execute a document relating to the management of the estate under an instru ment of agency. Such a document was drafted in Hindi, a language which was not known to the plaintiff and later on it was discovered by her that it contains un authorised clause empowering the defen dant to sell the property and the defen dants taking advantage of such clause ex ecuted a sale in favour of other defendants who were their close relation and con fidants. Secondly, that was a case in which defence taken was the suit was barred by Section 331 of U. P. Z. A. L. R. Act. In Smt. Bismillahs case the plaintiff intended to execute a document authorising some of the defendants to manage her property and such a document was executed and she signed the document believing the docu ment was for authorising the defendants to manage her property. In Smt. Bismillahs case the plaintiff intended to execute a document authorising some of the defendants to manage her property and such a document was executed and she signed the document believing the docu ment was for authorising the defendants to manage her property. The defendants had actually fraudulently added a clause authorising him power to sell their proper ty to the plaintiff. Therefore, there was fraudulent addition, in the contents of the document. There was no change in the character of the document. Whereas in the present case, the nature of the document which the plaintiff-respondent have in tended to execute was fraudulently changed and as a matter of fact the plaintiff-respon dent had never intended or consented the execution of the sale-deed in favour of the defendant. It may further be pointed out that the present in case where objection is taken in view of Section 5 (2) U. P. Con solidation of Holdings Act, the suit stands abated. It has been held that scope of Sec tion 5 (2) of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act is much wider than the scope of Section 311 of U. P. Z. A. & L. R. Act. Even the Full Bench in the case of Ram Padarath, (supra) had observed as follows: "the jurisdiction of the consolidation authorities or Courts is wider than that of the civil or revenue Court and adjudication by them is final and cannot be reopened by any civil or revenue Court in view of bar for the same con tained in Section 49 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act which even bars the case which should have been raised before the consolida tion authorities, but not raised. The decisions given under U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act even in respect of void documents do not throw light conclusively regarding jurisdiction of Civil and Revenue Court with reference to Section 331 of U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. The provisions of Section 331 of the Act cannot be interpreted with reference to the provisions of or language used in U. P. Con solidation of Holdings Act. It is sound principle of interpretation that provisions of another Act are not to be taken as guide for interpreting the provisions of another Act which are not in pari materia with the former Act. It is sound principle of interpretation that provisions of another Act are not to be taken as guide for interpreting the provisions of another Act which are not in pari materia with the former Act. The cases under U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act regarding the jurisdiction of consolidation authorities throw great Sight on the question of extent or exclusiveness of the jurisdiction of revenue and civil Court but they do decide or resolve this controversy fully. " 17. In above observations of the Full Bench in Ram Padarath case were fol lowed by this Court in case of Smt. Gulabi v. Ram Autar, 1995 RD 361 . 18. As regards the case of Ram Sakal Singh (supra) cited by the learned Counsel for the plaintiff- respondent is concerned, it may be pointed out that the provision of Section 5 (2) of U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act are in pari materia the same as provision of Section 4 (c) of the Bihar Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation Act, 1956. In case of Ram Sakal Singh (supra) the facts were that one Sukhari Singh had executed a gift deed with respect to the property men tioned in Schedule-A of the plaint in favour of the defenant- appellant, a stranger to the family. Thereafter he can celled the gift-deed by another deed and then he executed a sale-deed in favour of the plaintiff-respondent. The plaintiff-respondent filed a suit for declaration that the gift-deed executed in favour of the defendant- appellant was obtained by the appellant by playing fraud on Sukhari Singh and therefore, it was voidable. He further sought a declaration that Sukhari Singh had validly executed sale-deed in his favour after cancellation of the gift-deed in favour of the defendant-appellant. Pend ing the suit a Notification under Section 3 of the Bihar Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation Act, 1956 was issued and thereafter an objec tion was raised, apart from other pleadings that the suit stood abated by the operation of the Section 4 (1 ) (c) of the Act. The con current finding of the first appellate Court as well as the High Court were that the gift deed is voidable document and, therefore, the suit for cancellation of gift-deed was maintainable in Civil Court. 19. The con current finding of the first appellate Court as well as the High Court were that the gift deed is voidable document and, therefore, the suit for cancellation of gift-deed was maintainable in Civil Court. 19. The Honble Supreme Court has held as follows: "in view of the above finding recorded after elaborate consideration, the District Judge held that the gift-deed dated 4-12-1959 was voidable. Therefore, the declaration, that the gift-deed is voidable is well justified. The con tention that it is void is devoid of force. As a consequence, the Civil Court had jurisdiction and the suit had not abated. " 21. Since in Ram Sakal Singhs case, (. supra) the finding of the first appellate Court as well as the High Court that the gift-deed in question was a voidable docu ment was upheld by the Supreme Court. It was found that the suit was cognizable by the Civil Court, voidable document can not be avoided by the Revenue Court un less it was cancelled by the competent Court and the Consolidation Court can not cancel such a document. In the present case, as has been found above, the sale-deed in question is not voidable docu ment. It is on the other hand a void docu ment. Therefore, in view of the provisions contained in Section 5 (2) of U. P. Con solidation of Holdings Act the Civil Court shall have no jurisdiction to try the suit. There is no dispute that during the pen dency of the suit a notification under Sec tion 5 (2) of U. P. Consolidation of Hold ings Act had made and the village where the land in question was situated had gone into consolidation operation. Therefore, the suit in respect of the agricultural land which has been included in the consolida tion operation by notification under Sec tion 5 (2) of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act shall stand abated. 22. For the foregoing reasons, the writ petition is allowed and the finding of the trial Court as confirmed by the appel late Court on Issue No. 7 is quashed and it is held that the suit stands abated by Notification under Section 5 (2) of U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. No order as to costs. Petition allowed. .