JUDGMENT This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court dated 22.12.1995 in Civil Appeal No. 103A/1995 by District Judge, Raipur dismissing the same and confirming the judgment and decree dated 4.1.1993 in Civil Suit No. 29A/1990 by II Civil Judge, Class II, Raipur decreeing the suit of the respondent-plaintiff for eviction of the defendant-appellant. The relevant facts required for the disposal of this appeal are that the plaintiff-respondent filed a suit for eviction and realisation of arrears of rent, mesne-profits, etc. on the averment that the appellant-defendant was his tenant in the suit-premises on the monthly rent of Rs. 200/-. The tenancy of the defendant-appellant commenced from the 1st of each calendar month and ended with he calendar month. The suit-premises was let out to the appellant-defendant upto the period of 31 st December, 1986 after which the defendant-appellant had undertaken to vacate the same. However, defendant-appellant did not vacate the suit-premises. It was also averred that as per the agreement between the parties, the suit-accommodation was required bona fide by the plaintiff-respondent for the business of his wife and son and that they have no other suitable alterriative accommodation of their own for the purpose. There was an agreement between the parties that two months' notice would be given for vacating the suit-premises. Accordingly, a notice dated 13.6.1990 was sent by the plaintiff-respondent to the appellant through his counsel. However, since the appellant-defendant did not vacate the suit-premises even after the period of two months of the notice, the suit for his eviction, arrears of rent, etc. was filed. The defendant-appellant resisted the suit on various counts. However, the allegation of the plaintiff-appellant that there was an agreement between the parties that notice for a period of two months would be given was not specifically controverted. Further it was admitted by the defendant-appellant that notice dated 13.6.1990 was received by the defendant-appellant. However, it was averred by' him that even after the notice, he continued to be the tenant under law. The learned trial Court held that the respondent-plaintiff required the suit-premises bona fide for starting his business and accordingly decreed his suit for eviction and arrears of rent, etc. against the defendant-appellant. However, it was averred by' him that even after the notice, he continued to be the tenant under law. The learned trial Court held that the respondent-plaintiff required the suit-premises bona fide for starting his business and accordingly decreed his suit for eviction and arrears of rent, etc. against the defendant-appellant. The learned lower appellate Court held that the M.P. Accommodation Control Act is not applicable to the area where the suit-premises is situate and, therefore, no ground u/s 12 of that Act was required to be proved by the landlord-plaintiff and need no decision. It was further held by the learned lower appellate Court that notice (Ex. P-2) dated 13.6.1990 was given for a clear period of two months and, therefore, there was due compliance of section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and the tenancy of the defendant-appellant was duly terminated. Accordingly, the appeal was found to have without any meric and was dismissed. This second appeal has been admitted on the following substantial question of law: "Whether, notice of termination dated 13.6.90 validly terminated the tenancy of the respondent'?" It is admitted position of the case that there was an agreement between the parties that two months' notice would be given by the plaintiff-landlord to the defendant-tenant, as has been pleaded by the former in para 14 of the plaint, which was not been specifically controverted in the written statement by defendant-appellant. It is also clear that notice dated 13.6.1990 was sent by registered post and the suit was filed on 23.8.1990, i.e., after the lapse of 2 months 10 days. The postal receipt of sending the notice is Ex. P-3 and the acknowledgment of the defendant is Ex. P-4. In the circumstances, the suit has been filed after the expiry of two months 10 days, after sending the notice and, therefore, there appears to be a clear notice of two months given by the respondent-plaintiff to the defendant-appellant, as has been held by the learned lower appellate Court. In fact, it may be noticed that the defendant-appellant has nowhere averred or proved that the notice was not in terms of the contract as above between the parties. It appears that for the first time in second appeal, he has raised this contention. However, the above 'contention in view of pleadings and evidence led by parties, has no merit and cannot be accepted. It appears that for the first time in second appeal, he has raised this contention. However, the above 'contention in view of pleadings and evidence led by parties, has no merit and cannot be accepted. The learned counsel for the appellant also tried to contend that the notice (Ex. P-2) is not in terms of section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, inasmuch as, it does not state that his tenancy stands terminated with the expiry of the tenancy month. Obviously, he is referring to the later part of section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, which would come into play only when there is no contract or local law or usage to the contrary. As noticed earlier, the admitted position of the case is that the contract between the parties was that two months' notice would be given by the landlord-plaintiff to the tenant -defendant. This was not controverted or objected to by the defendant-appellant in his written statement. Therefore, the notice being in full compliance of the contract as above, the same could not be objected to by the defendant-tenant. The contention as above of the learned counsel for the appellant-defendant, therefore, cannot be accepted. In view of above, it is held that the notice (Ex. P-2) duly terminated the tenancy of the defendant-appellant. There is no force in this appeal. The same stands dismissed.