JUDGMENT : 1. The petitioner has impugned in the present petition, under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India, the judgment and order passed by the Industrial Court, Maharashtra at Pune on 27 July 1989 in revision application filed by the petitioner against the judgment and order of the Second Labour Court, Pune, on 16 December 1985, in his complaint of unfair labour practice against respondent 1. The petitioner was in the employment of the first respondent as a machinist from 1 September 1970 and was designated as Assistant Supervisor on promotion at the time when his services were terminated with effect from 8 April 1984. 2. Being aggrieved by the said order of termination from employment the petitioner filed a complaint of Unfair Labour Practice under S. 28 of the MRTU and PULP Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) read with items (1)(a), (1)(b), (1)(d), (1)(f) and (1)(g) of Sch. IV of the Act. The petitioner had challenged the said order of termination on the ground that it was in violation of S. 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, read with rule 82 framed thereunder. The nub of the petitioner's complaint was that the first respondent-employer had not prepared a seniority list under the rules before passing the impugned order of retrenchment and that he was senior in service and could not be retrenched when three other juniors of his category were retained and continued in the employment. The second limb of his complaint was that at the time of retrenchment he was not offered the amount of retrenchment compensation in accordance with S. 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. On the aforesaid basis he prayed for reinstatement with full back-wages and continuity of service. The first respondent employer filed its written statement and contested the claim of the petitioner mainly on the ground that the petitioner was not a workman as defined under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, as he was holding the post of Assistant supervisor and his duties were of Supervisory nature. According to the employer company, he was holding the capacity of a supervisor and was drawing wages exceeding Rs. 1,500 per month. It was therefore contended by the employer-company that his complaint was not maintainable and the same should be dismissed with costs. 3. According to the employer company, he was holding the capacity of a supervisor and was drawing wages exceeding Rs. 1,500 per month. It was therefore contended by the employer-company that his complaint was not maintainable and the same should be dismissed with costs. 3. As far as the grievance of the petitioner that the petitioner was senior to the other three Assistant Supervisors, who were continued in employment, is concerned it is the say of the employer-company that the petitioner was in the tool department which was a separate department wherein the petitioner was employed in a separate category of Assistant Supervisor and the other three Junior Assistant Supervisors were employed in other different departments which were not affected by retrenchment of more than 90 workmen from company. It was the case of the employer-company that on account of slack season it had no business and orders, and therefore, it had resorted to lay-off and retrenchment of 90 workmen which resulted in an adverse effect on the tool department and, therefore, it became necessary to terminate the petitioner's employment. The employer-company has denied the charge of unfair labour practice and any colourable exercise or bad faith on its part as against the petitioner. The employer-company had also vehemently denied the charge of victimisation for the trade union activities of the petitioner. 4. On the basis of the aforesaid pleadings both the parties adduced their respective oral and documentary evidence before the Labour Court. On the point of the petitioner being a workman he has not led any satisfactory evidence before the Labour Court to show that he was continuing to do the work of machinist and that he squarely fell within the four corners of the definition of workman under S. 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. He ought to have produced his promotion order and also ought to have narrated in detail the work which he was doing to show that his duties did not attract the exceptional part of the definition of workman and that his predominant duties were that of a workman only. On the contrary the employer-company has produced documentary evidence and had also examined one witness to prove that the petitioner was holding the post in a supervisory capacity. On the contrary the employer-company has produced documentary evidence and had also examined one witness to prove that the petitioner was holding the post in a supervisory capacity. It has also produced the petitioner's duty list on record and evidence to show that he was supervising the work of other workers who were working under him. It is also produced on record that the petitioner was having supervisory and other authority over the workers from whom he was supposed to get the work done. The employer-company had also placed material on record that the petitioner was recommending and granting leave to the workers who were working under him and was handling administration of his unit. As against the aforesaid material placed by employer-company before the Labour Court there is hardly any material evidence adduced by the petitioner in his favour in respect of his duties or work. He has not denied that he was not performing the work which was narrated in the duty list. Further it is also an admitted fact that as an Assistant Supervisor he was getting conveyance allowance of Rs. 175 which was payable only to the employees of supervisory capacity. The Labour Court has assessed and appreciated the entire material on record and has come to a conclusion that the petitioner did not fall within the definition of workman as defined under S. 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The Labour Court also considered the bona fides of the employer-company and has recorded that there was nothing mala fide in the order of termination of the petitioner. It has mentioned only one fact that if the company had retrenched 99 workmen it was not difficult for the company to include the petitioner's name also in the list of retrenched workmen. The decision of the employer-company to retrench 99 workmen was out of business compulsions and termination of the petitioner was a consequence of the retrenchment of 99 workmen from employer-company. The Labour Court has also recorded its finding on the other point that three other Junior Assistant Supervisors were continued in employment. It has come to a conclusion that they were employed in different departments and the petitioner's department was adversely affected by the order of the retrenchment of 99 workmen. It could not be said that though the retrenchment had not affected those departments still an axe should fall on those departments. It has come to a conclusion that they were employed in different departments and the petitioner's department was adversely affected by the order of the retrenchment of 99 workmen. It could not be said that though the retrenchment had not affected those departments still an axe should fall on those departments. There cannot be a chain of retrenchment or termination in the company to satisfy the criteria of so-called seniority. According to the company, the retrenchment of 99 workmen had adversely affected the work in its tool room department and therefore termination of the Assistant Supervisor in that department became necessary. In the said department he was the only employee who could be terminated from employment. In my opinion the order of the Labour Court is based on cogent and sufficient-material and there is no infirmity in its order. On both the point the Labour Court has given its findings on the basis of evidence and material on record. 5. The petitioner was aggrieved by the said order of the Labour Court, and, therefore, he carried the matter in revision before the Industrial Court under S. 44 of the Act. Though the supervisory powers of the Industrial Court are narrow in order to satisfy itself regarding the legality, validity and perversity of the order of the Labour Court the Industrial Court has resorted to an exercise of scanning through the whole evidence to find out whether the conclusions of the Labour Court were based on evidence and material on record. The Industrial Court has gone through the entire evidence and has confirmed the order of the Labour Court that the petitioner was not satisfying the tests of being a workman under S. 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and that he squarely fell in the exception part of the definition holding the supervisory capacity and performing the duties of the supervisory nature. In order to find out whether the order of the Labour Court is based on evidence and proper material this exercise was necessary for Industrial Court and according to me, it has rightly come to the conclusion that the petitioner complaint was not maintainable, he being not a workman under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and, therefore, his complaint was not maintainable. The Industrial Court has also found that there was no substance in the grievance of the petitioner that his juniors were continued in employment. The Industrial Court has also found that there was no substance in the grievance of the petitioner that his juniors were continued in employment. The Industrial Court has agreed with the findings and conclusions of the Labour Court. I have also once again thoroughly gone through both the orders of the Labour Court and the Industrial Court and also the evidence on record. I am satisfied that there is no reason to interfere with the impugned order of the Industrial Court dismissing the petitioner's revision application as there was no error apparent on the face of record of the Labour Court. In view of the aforesaid discussion, I do not find any merits in the writ petition, which deserves to be dismissed. However there will not be any order as to costs as against the petitioner he being an employee. Rule is discharged.