Judgment :- M.P. Janaki Ammal and Company is the appellant herein. 2. The claim petition was filed by the appellant before the Tribunal, seeking for compensation of Rs. 1,70,000/- for the damage caused to its vehicle in the accident, occurred due to the negligent driving of the driver of the vehicle belonging to the Dindugul Kottampatti Transport, the first respondent herein. 3. The Tribunal awarded only Rs. 29,817.15 and directed the owner of the vehicle and the insurance company to pay the said amount to the claimant. Aggrieved by the inadequacy of the quantum, the claimant has filed this appeal before this Court. 4. The claimant was doing Tourist Taxi business. The Tourist Van bearing registration No. TNR 9946 was belonging to them. On the early morning of 16-1-1987, one Murthy of Madurai, booked the said vehicle for the family trip to Madurai, Thekkadi, Suruli, etc. The vehicle had left at 5.45 a.m. When the vehicle reached near Upparpattivilakku at about 10.30 a.m. on the Theni to Cumbum Road, the bus bearing registration No. TNW 9594 came in the opposite direction with a high speed in a rash and negligent manner, and dashed against the Van TNR. 9946. As a result of the impact, the Van belonging to the appellant, got completely damaged. Some of the passengers travelled in the Van and the driver died at the spot. Therefore, a criminal case was registered against the driver of the bus. 5. The Van was kept at the workshop from 16-1-1987 to 11-5-1987. Therefore, towards the loss of income during that period and towards the expenditure incurred for the repairs, the claimant, in the claim petition, sought Rs. 1.70,000/- as compensation. 6. The owner of the bus, first respondent herein, remained ex parte . The insurance company, second respondent herein, filed a counter. 7. During the course of enquiry, on behalf of the claimant, PW.1, Lakshmanan, the Manager was examined and Exs. A1 to A6 were marked. On the side of the respondent, no evidence was adduced. 8. On analysis of the materials available on record, the Tribunal held that the claimant would be entitled to only Rs. 29,817.15 towards the expenditure incurred for repairs and that it would not be entitled to any amount for the loss of income during the period when the vehicle was kept idle. This award is under challenge in this appeal. 9. On analysis of the materials available on record, the Tribunal held that the claimant would be entitled to only Rs. 29,817.15 towards the expenditure incurred for repairs and that it would not be entitled to any amount for the loss of income during the period when the vehicle was kept idle. This award is under challenge in this appeal. 9. The learned counsel for the appellant would raise the following two contentions :— “1. The Tribunal ought to have considered the two receipts marked as Ex. A1 series which shows that on 13-4-83, Rs. 28,000/- was paid as advance to the workshop and on 18-4-83, the balance amount of Rs. 29,817.15 was paid. But, the Tribunal accepted only one receipt i.e. for Rs. 29,817.15 and rejected the other receipt dated 13-4-83 on the ground that it was not an original one. Both the receipts are original. Therefore, the claimant would be entitled to the entire amount of Rs. 57,817.15 i.e., (Rs. 29, 817.15 +Rs. 28,000). 2. The vehicle was kept idle for about 118 days during which period the repairs were rectified. The loss of income suffered by the claimant would also be taken to mean “damages to the property”. Therefore, the Tribunal ought to have awarded an amount for that head also.” 10. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for the insurance company would resist the submission by stating that the claimant would not be entitled to any amount for the loss of income, as it would not include “the damages to the property”. 11. On a careful consideration of the rival contentions in regard to the first point urged by the counsel for the appellant, I am of the view that the Tribunal has committed a mistake in not taking into consideration of the original receipt dated 13-4-1983 by which it is shown that the claimant had paid Rs. 28,000/- to the repairing Workshop i.e. Cheema Autokrafts, towards advance. The Tribunal was under the misconception that the said receipt is not original and rejected the said claim. However, it awarded Rs. 29,817.15 on the basis of the receipt dated 18-4-1983. 12. On a careful perusal of the records, the receipt dated 13-4-1983 would show that it is also original, in which the signature of the person concerned on behalf of the Cheema Autokrafts is found for the advance payment of Rs. 28,000/-. However, it awarded Rs. 29,817.15 on the basis of the receipt dated 18-4-1983. 12. On a careful perusal of the records, the receipt dated 13-4-1983 would show that it is also original, in which the signature of the person concerned on behalf of the Cheema Autokrafts is found for the advance payment of Rs. 28,000/-. PW.1 would also speak about both the amounts and he would specifically state that he had incurred expenditure of Rs. 57,817.15 towards repairing charges in the Chief Examination itself. Therefore, the award is liable to be modified to the effect that the claimant would be entitled to both the amounts i.e.. Rs. 28,000/- + Rs. 29,817.15 = Rs. 57,817.15. The claimant is also entitled to get the above amount along with 12% interest per annum from the date of claim petition till the date of payment. Accordingly, the impugned award is modified. 13. Regarding the second point, I am of the view that the claimant would not be entitled to any amount towards the loss of income sustained by the claimant during the period when the vehicle was kept idle in the workshop for repairs. This aspect has been elaborately dealt with by this Court in the decision reported in 1992 Notes of Recent Cases 13 ( Nesamony Transport Corporation Ltd v. Kochammal ). 14. It is held by this Court that the expression “damage to property” would take in only monetary compensation to set right the actual damage caused to the property in an accident involving the use of a motor vehicle. The expression “damage to any property of a third party” has to be necessarily restricted in its application to the actual damage caused to the property and cannot, in the absence of any indication in Section 110(1) of the Act, be expanded. 15. The above view has also been taken in the following decisions:— “1. 1992 ACJ 133 {Kerala State Road Transport Corporation v. Bhaskaran ) 2. 1993 ACJ 412 (MP.) ( New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Subhash Jain ) and 3. 1992 ACJ 276 ( New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Nathmal Bhajanka)” 16. The Division Bench of Kerala High Court, in the decision reported in 1992 ACJ 133 (cited supra). 1992 ACJ 133 {Kerala State Road Transport Corporation v. Bhaskaran ) 2. 1993 ACJ 412 (MP.) ( New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Subhash Jain ) and 3. 1992 ACJ 276 ( New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Nathmal Bhajanka)” 16. The Division Bench of Kerala High Court, in the decision reported in 1992 ACJ 133 (cited supra). While elaborately dealing with this position of law, disagreed with the judgment of Karnataka High Court and held that by enacting Section 110 of the Act, the Parliament never intended to confer jurisdiction on the Claims Tribunal to determine the damages falling under the head consequential pecuniary losses suffered by a person in relation to torts concerning property. Under Section 110 (1) of the Act, the State Government may, by notification, constitute the Tribunal for the purpose of adjudicating upon claims for compensation in respect of accidents involving “ damages to any property of a third party ”. The words employed in the section, namely, “..for the purpose of adjudicating upon claims for compensation in respect of accidents involving damages to any property” make it clear that the intention of the Parliament was to deprive the Civil Court of its jurisdiction to decide the question pertaining to the basic pecuniary losses in relation to torts concerning property. This also would make it clear that the Parliament never intended to have the ‘consequential pecuniary losses’ suffered by a person on account of the damage to the property involved in the accident also to be adjudicated upon by the Claims Tribunal. If it had such an intention, the Parliament would very well make the said intention clear by using the words and consequential loss of use, loss of property: after the words ‘damage to property’. 17. Under these circumstances, I am in entire agreement with the above decisions as the above view has been expressed after interpreting the sections and the intention of the legislation. 18. The other contra judgments reported in 1993 ACJ 778 ( Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation v. Pishori Lal ) and 1982 ACJ 199 ( Sri Ranganathar Transports (P) Ltd. v. Tanjore Co. op. Marketing Federation Ltd. ), rendered by the single Judge of this Court, may not be of any use to this case, since the ratio has not been decided there. 19. op. Marketing Federation Ltd. ), rendered by the single Judge of this Court, may not be of any use to this case, since the ratio has not been decided there. 19. Under those circumstances, I am of the opinion that the claimant/appellant would not be entitled to any other amount except the costs incurred towards the damage to the property. However, it is made clear that on the other heads, the claimant is at liberty to file a civil suit, as Section 110(F) of the Act does not bar the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in respect of the same. 20. With the above observations, the appeal is partly allowed. No costs.