JUDGMENT MS. KAMLESH SHARMA, J.—Petitioners are the plaintiffs whereas respondents and five others, namely, Nand Lal, Tulsi Ram, Chinti Devi, Vidhya Devi and Kaushalya Devi are the defendants in Civil Suit No. 317-1 of 1993 pending before Sub-Judge, Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, inter alia, for declaration that the sale deed of Khasra No. 155 min measuring 0-5 biswas made by defendants and four others in favour of respondents-defendants is illegal, void having no effect on their right, title and interest. The plaintiffs had also filed an application under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2, Civil Procedure Code seeking interim injunction against respondents-defendants restraining them from raising construction over the land measuring 0.5 bighas comprised in Khasra No. 155/1. Both the Courts below have dismissed this application holding that there is no prima facie case in favour of the plaintiffs since the land in question was exclusively owned and possessed by Smt. Persino and was never in possession of Bardoo, the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs, as a tenant. The District Judge has also noticed the stand of the plaintiffs in earlier suit filed by Sanjiv Kumar son of defendant Nand Lal & Anil Kumar s/o defendant Tulsi against the plaintiffs whereby they had only claimed that their father Bardoo was a tenant of original owner Smt. Persino Devi over the suit land measuring 10.2 Bighas including Khasra No. 155 min measuring 5.12 Bighas and did not claim tenancy over Khasra No. 155/ 1 measuring 0.5 bighas. Feeling aggrieved the plaintiffs have filed the present revision petition. 2. This Court has heard learned Counsel for the parties and gone through the record. Relying upon the judgment of Supreme Court in The Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Suresh Chandra Jaipuria and another, AIR 1976 SC 2621, learned Counsel for respondents-defendants has opposed this revision petition on the ground that in view of the concurrent findings of fact by both the Courts below no interference is called for in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 115, Civil Procedure Code. He has further referred to the judgment of Supreme Court in M/s. Bhojraj Kunwarji Oil Mill and Ginnig Factory and another v. Yograjsinha Shankersinha Parihar and others, AIR 1984 SC 1894, to argue that even if a different view on the material on record is possible this Court shall not interfere in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. He has further referred to the judgment of Supreme Court in M/s. Bhojraj Kunwarji Oil Mill and Ginnig Factory and another v. Yograjsinha Shankersinha Parihar and others, AIR 1984 SC 1894, to argue that even if a different view on the material on record is possible this Court shall not interfere in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. Further submission of learned Counsel is that unless the subordinate Courts have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in them by law, or have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or have acted in the exercise of their jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity the revisional jurisdiction of this Court cannot be invoked. Even erroneous decision on question of law having no relation to question of jurisdiction cannot be corrected in revisional jurisdiction. For making these submissions he has relied upon the judgments in Pandurang Dhondi Chougule and others v. MarutiHari Jadhav and others, AIR 1966 SC 153; The Managing Director (MG) Hindustan Aeronautics Limited and another v. Ajit Prasad Tarway, AIR 1973 SC 76. 3. On the other hand, learned Counsel for the petitioners has argued that where the orders of the Courts below are perverse and unjust it is the duty of this Court in the exercise of its revisional powers to interfere. Referring to Clause (ii) of second proviso to Section 115, Civil Procedure Code learned Counsel has urged that if the order would occasion a failure of justice or cause irreparable injury to the party against whom it was made it can be set aside in exercise of revisional jurisdiction even if the subordinate Court passing such an order appears to have not committed jurisdictional error. This interpretation, urged by learned Counsel, deserves outright rejection as proviso cannot control the main provision; rather it further puts rider on the conditions given in the main provision. Even if an order suffers from illegality or material irregularity of jurisdictional error it shall not be set aside unless the conditions provided under Clauses (i) and (ii) of second proviso are fulfilled. In other words, the impugned order should be such as to finally dispose of the suit or proceedings had it been in favour of the revision petitioner or it should not occasion a failure of justice or cause irreparable injury to the revision petitioner if allowed to stand. In other words, the impugned order should be such as to finally dispose of the suit or proceedings had it been in favour of the revision petitioner or it should not occasion a failure of justice or cause irreparable injury to the revision petitioner if allowed to stand. The word or used between clause (a) and clause (b) of the proviso has been used in the disjunctive sense. 4. Instead of enlarging the scope of Section 115, as is being urged by learned Counsel for the petitioners, it stands narrowed down. It is further argued by learned Counsel that the decision can be said to be perverse when the materikl pleadings or documents are wilfully dis-regarded. According to him, in the present case, the District Judge has though referred to the earlier suit but has failed to take note of the fact that it stood dismissed by decree and judgment dated 27.3.1995 declaring that the will dated 25.7.1987 executed by Persino Devi in favour of the plaintiffs in the said suit was invalid and the defendants (now plaintiffs) were declared owners in possession by allowing their counter claim. Relying upon this decree and judgment the submission of learned Counsel is that defendants Nand Lal and others, who had acquired title to the land of Persino Devi by way of said Will, had no authority to sell the land measuring 0.5 bighas comprised in Khasra No. 155/ 1 in favour of respondents-defendants, as such, they have no right, title and interest in this land. Learned Counsel has also referred to the revenue record, more specifically the Jamabandi for the year 1958-59 wherein Khasra No. 155 measuring 5.17 bighas is shown to be in the ownership of co-owner Persino Devi through Bardoo predecessor-in-interest of respondents-defendants. In the later Jamabandis for 1966-67 to date Khasra No. 155 is bifurcated into 155 min measuring 0.5 bighas in self-cultivation of co-owner Persino Devi and another Khasra No. 155 min measuring 5.12 bighas is shown in possession of Persino Devi though Bardoo, the predecessor-in-interest of plaintiffs. The nature of land measuring 0.5 bighas comprised in Khasra No. 155 min was shown Barani in the Jamabandi for the year 1966-67 which was changed to Gair Mumkin Abadi in the later Jamabandis. The nature of land measuring 0.5 bighas comprised in Khasra No. 155 min was shown Barani in the Jamabandi for the year 1966-67 which was changed to Gair Mumkin Abadi in the later Jamabandis. Assailing the bifurcation of Khasra No. 155 and change in the nature of Khasra No. 155 min measuring 0.5 bighas learned Counsel has submitted that Bardoo the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs continued to be the tenant of Khasra No. 155 min measuring 0.5. bighas and later on became owner thereof, as such, Persino Devi had no right to bequeath this land in favour of defendants Nand Lal and others enabling them to further sell it to respondent-defendants. 5. These arguments of learned Counsel for the plaintiffs are though attractive yet fallacious for the reasons that the decree and judgment dated 27.3.1995 in tht earlier suit, filed by Sanjiv Kumar and Anil Kumar, has not become final as admittedly appeal against it is pending in the Court of District Judge, Bilaspur and land measuring 0.5 bighas comprised in Khasra No. 155 min was not part of the land which was subject matter of said suit. Rather from the written statement filed on behalf of the plaintiffs and in the statement of Ranjhu son of Bardoo (DW-2), plaintiff No. 2, a copy whereof is placed on record by the respondents-defendants it is clear that in the earlier litigation the plaintiffs never claimed that Bardoo, the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs, was tenant over land measuring 0.5 bighas comprised in Khasra No. 155 min. So far the revenue entries are concerned, these were in existence since 1966-67 and at no point of time these have been assailed by the plaintiffs before they had filed the present suit claiming themselves to be in possession as tenant or as owner after acquiring proprietary rights. As per these entries Persino Devi was in self-cultivation of land comprised in Khasra No. 155 min. (155/1) measuring 0.5 bighas since 1966-67 having every right to bequeath it by way of Will. Therefore, the concurrent findings arrived at by both the Courts below are neither perverse nor unjust calling for interference in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. As per these entries Persino Devi was in self-cultivation of land comprised in Khasra No. 155 min. (155/1) measuring 0.5 bighas since 1966-67 having every right to bequeath it by way of Will. Therefore, the concurrent findings arrived at by both the Courts below are neither perverse nor unjust calling for interference in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. Rather in view of the law laid down in respect of scope of revisional jurisdiction in the judgments cited by learned Counsel for respondents-defendants, it is not a fit case to interfere in the impugned order in exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 115, Civil Procedure Code. 6. In the result, the revision petition is rejected. Any observation made in this judgment will not effect the merits of the civil suit pending in the trial Court. The records be sent to trial Court immediately who will proceed with the trial in accordance with law. Parties will appear before the trial Court on 21.6.1999. Petition rejected.