ORDER C.K. Prasad, J. 1. Petitioner was a Constable working with the Central Industrial Security Force and at the relevant time, he was posted at Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd., (B.H.E.L) Bhopal. While he was posted as such, a departmental enquiry was initiated against him for three charges. Enquiry Officer found the petitioner guilty of all the three charges and submitted its report. Disciplinary Authority agreeing with the report of the Enquiry Officer, by order dated 12th June, 1989 awarded punishment of dismissal of the petitioner from service. He preferred appeal against the aforesaid order and the Appellate Authority by order dated 11.12.1989 (Annex. P-14) modified the punishment of dismissal from service to that of removal from service. By this writ petition, filed under Article 226 of 227 of the Constitution of India, petitioner prays for quashing of the aforesaid orders of the Disciplinary Authority as also the Appellate Authority. 2. Short facts giving rise to the present writ petition are that by memo dated 17.12.1998, petitioner was informed that a departmental enquiry shall be held against him for the three charges mentioned in the said memo. According to the charge-sheet, petitioner on 21.8.1988, without any authority or permission of his superior officer, made entires in the Rojnamcha of 'C' & 'D' Company regarding Constable M.L. Singh 'on medical home rest' by snatching the Rojnamcha from the constable on duty A.K. Mandi. Second charge related to his absence in the evening roll call on 11.11.1988 as also on 3.12.1988. According to the charge aforesaid, conduct of the petitioner in not attending to evening roll call clearly shows that he does not want to be present at the evening roll-call which is an act of gross indiscipline and misconduct. Third charge is related to the language used by him against his superior officers when he was asked to explain reasons of his absence on 3rd December, 1988 in the evening roll-call. 3. Petitioner submitted his reply dated 7.1.1981 in response to the charge-sheet and he clearly denied having made any entry in Rojnamcha. In the reply he has stated that there is no question of his making any entry in the Rojnamcha as he was not on duty on the alleged date of incident i.e. 21.8.1981. He termed the charge levelled against him to be malicious. In the reply he has stated that there is no question of his making any entry in the Rojnamcha as he was not on duty on the alleged date of incident i.e. 21.8.1981. He termed the charge levelled against him to be malicious. However, during the course of enquiry, he has taken a complete somersault and stated that the entry made in the Rojnamcha was at the request of the Constable. A.K. Mandi who was on duty on the said date and he asked him to make entry as he did not know Hindi language at all. As regards the second charge of his absence in the evening roll-call on 11.11.1988 and on 3.12.1988 petitioner in his reply has admitted his absence but explained the reasons thereof. As regards his absence on 11.11.1988, he has stated that an explanation was called from him and promised to be regular in attendance in future, he was let off and in that view of the matter he cannot be departmentally proceeded against for the same charge again. As regards his absence on 3.12.88, he stated that after doing his daily chorus, he slept at about 13.30-14.00 hrs. and he did not get up at the time of evening roll-call and hence did not attend the same. According to the petitioner, sleep is natural process and he did not remain absent in the evening roll-call intentionally. As regards the third charge, petitioner has admitted that he has used filthy and derogatory language against superiors, but he tired to explain the same by saying that he was facing tremendous problem and in such a state of mind, he used such language, but his intention was in fact not to use inappropriate language against his superiors. 4. Enquiry Officer on consideration of materials placed before it, found the petitioner guilty of all the charges and submitted his report on 31.5.1989. The disciplinary authority agreeing with the finding of the Enquiry Officer by a detailed order dated 12.6.1989 (Annex. P-13) awarded the punishment of dismissal of petitioner from service. Appeal preferred by the petitioner against the aforesaid order has been partly allowed and the punishment of dismissal from service has been substituted by removal from service. 5. Mr. Rajendra Tiwari appears on behalf of the petitioner whereas, respondents are represented by Sri. L.S. Singh. Mr. P-13) awarded the punishment of dismissal of petitioner from service. Appeal preferred by the petitioner against the aforesaid order has been partly allowed and the punishment of dismissal from service has been substituted by removal from service. 5. Mr. Rajendra Tiwari appears on behalf of the petitioner whereas, respondents are represented by Sri. L.S. Singh. Mr. Tiwari, appearing on behalf of petitioner submits that finding that petitioner snatched away the Rojnamcha and made entry in the same unauthorisedly is perverse and the same does call for interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. Mr. L.S. Singh, however, appearing on behalf of the respondents submits that the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer and the Disciplinary Authority are on consideration of relevant materials and on the facts available on record, only conclusion which can be drawn is that the petitioner made entries in the Rojnamcha unauthorisedly after snatching the same from the Constable on duty A.K. Mandi. He submits that this Court cannot act as the Court of Appeal against finding of the of the departmental authorities. He has drawn my attention to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Apparel Export Promotion Council Vs. A.K. Chopra, A.I.R. 1999 SC 625, in which it has been held as follows - The High Court appears to have overlooked the settled position that in departmental proceedings, the Disciplinary Authority is the sole judge of facts and in case an appeal is presented to the Appellate Authority, the Appellate Authority has also power/and jurisdiction to re-appreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion, on facts, being the sole fact finding authorities. Once findings of fact, based on appreciation of evidence are recorded, the High Court in writ jurisdiction may not normally interfere with those factual findings unless it finds that the recorded findings were based either on no evidence or that the findings were wholly perverse and/or legally untenable. The adequacy or inadequacy of the evidence is not permitted to be canvassed before the High Court. Since the High Court does not sit as an Appellate Authority, over the factual findings recorded during departmental proceedings, while exercising the power of judicial review, the High Court cannot normally speaking substitute its own conclusion, with regard to the guilt of the delinquent, for that of the departmental authorities. 6. Since the High Court does not sit as an Appellate Authority, over the factual findings recorded during departmental proceedings, while exercising the power of judicial review, the High Court cannot normally speaking substitute its own conclusion, with regard to the guilt of the delinquent, for that of the departmental authorities. 6. It is relevant here to state that after the petitioner was served with charge-sheet, he emphatically denied that he had ever made any entry in the Rojnamcha on 21.8.1988. He had also accepted that he was not on duty on the said date and according to the reply, the charge of making entry in the Rojnamcha was malicious. However when the entry although made by the petitioner, but denied by him was sent for opinion of handwriting expert and when he gave his report that the entry is in the handwriting of the petitioner and the said report was made available to the petitioner, he made a complete somersault and came out with the plea that such an entry was made at the request of the Constable on duty A.K. Mandi. A.K. Mandi in his evidence has clearly stated that he never asked the petitioner to make entry in the Rojnamcha. In my opinion, finding of guilt recorded by the departmental authorities cannot be said to be perverse and bearing in mind the caution of the Supreme Court in case of A.K. Chopra (supra), finding of fact based on appreciation of evidence having been recorded, I am not inclined tot interfere with the findings in writ jurisdiction. 7. Mr. Tiwari contends that the allegation that petitioner is habitual in not attending the evening roll-call on the basis of his absence only for two days, cannot be concluded. It is relevant here to state that the petitioner did not appear in the evening roll-call on 11.11.1988. Explanation was sought from him and he promised that in future, he shall attend the evening roll-call regularly. Again on 3.12.1988, he did not attend the evening roll call. In such circumstances, respondents are right in holding that the petitioner is habitual in not attending the roll-calls. 8. Further submission of Mr. Explanation was sought from him and he promised that in future, he shall attend the evening roll-call regularly. Again on 3.12.1988, he did not attend the evening roll call. In such circumstances, respondents are right in holding that the petitioner is habitual in not attending the roll-calls. 8. Further submission of Mr. Tiwari is that any act done by a person is for his benefit and as the entry allegedly made by the petitioner in relation to 'medical home rest' of Constable M.L. Singh, is in no way beneficial to him and in the absence of any mens-rea, it is improbable that the petitioner could have made any such entry. I do not have the slightest hesitation in rejecting the submission of Sri Tiwari. On fact, it has been found that the petitioner had made entry in the Rojnamcha unauthorisedly and merely on the ground that he was not personally benefited by the same, charge of misconduct cannot be said to be disproved. I am of the opinion that on materials placed, authorities of the department were right in holding that petitioner made entries in the Rojnamcha unauthorisedly. I do not find any substance in the submission of Shri Tiwari that the finding of guilt recorded in relation to charge No. 1 is in any way perverse. 9. Mr. Tiwari then contends that Constable A.K. Mandi has lodged a report on 22.8.1988, but a copy of the same has not been given to the petitioner and this vitiates the enquiry. In support of this submission, he has placed reliance on a judgment of the Supreme Court in case of the State of Punjab Vs. Bhagat Ram, AIR 1974 SC 2335 wherein it has been held as follows :- The meaning of a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken is that the Government Servant is afforded a reasonable opportunity to defend himself against charges on which inquiry is held. The Govt. Servant should be given an opportunity to deny his guilt and establish his innocence. He can do so when he is told what the charges against him are. He can do so by cross-examining the witnesses produced against him. The object of supplying statements is that the Government Servant will be able to refer to the previous statements of the witnesses proposed to be examined against the Government servant. He can do so when he is told what the charges against him are. He can do so by cross-examining the witnesses produced against him. The object of supplying statements is that the Government Servant will be able to refer to the previous statements of the witnesses proposed to be examined against the Government servant. Unless the statements are given to the Government Servant, he will not be able to have an effective and useful cross-examination. Another decision of the Supreme Court on which Shri Tiwari has placed reliance is the case of State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Mohd. Sharif, AIR 1982 SC 937 , in which it has been held as follows :- Secondly, it was not disputed before us that a preliminary inquiry had proceeded the disciplinary inquiry and during the preliminary inquiry statement of witnesses were recorded but copies of these statements were not furnished to him at the time of the disciplinary enquiry. Even the request of the plaintiff to inspect the file pertaining to preliminary inquiry was also rejected. In the face of these facts which are not disputed, it seems to us very clear that both the first appeal Court and the High Court were right in coming to the conclusion that the plaintiff was denied reasonable opportunity to defend himself at the disciplinary inquiry; it cannot be gainsaid that in the absence of necessary particulars and statements of witnesses he was prejudiced in the matter of his defence. Having regard to the aforesaid admitted position it is difficult to accept the contention urged by the counsel for the appellant that the view taken by the trial Court should be accepted by us. 10. Aforesaid report of Shri Mandi has not been taken cognizance by the Enquiry Officer, the Disciplinary or the Appellate Authority. In my opinion, non-furnishing to the petitioner the document, has in no way prejudiced his case. Matter would have been different, had the Enquiry Officer resorted to the said document to record the finding of guilt. Non-furnishing of each and every document does not violate the principle of natural justice. Hence, I do not find any merit in this submission of Shri Tiwari. 11. Mr. Matter would have been different, had the Enquiry Officer resorted to the said document to record the finding of guilt. Non-furnishing of each and every document does not violate the principle of natural justice. Hence, I do not find any merit in this submission of Shri Tiwari. 11. Mr. Tiwari contends that although the petitioner did not attend the evening roll call on 11.11.1988 and 03.12.1988, he was let off after cautioning for his absence on 11.11.1988 & on 03.12.1988, petitioner did not appear as he remained sleeping at that point of time. He submits, that the extreme penalty of removal from service is not fit to be awarded for the petitioner's absence on two days in evening roll calls. He submits that the matter be remitted back to the Disciplinary Authority to consider the question of punishment. Mr. L.S. Singh, however, appearing on behalf of the respondents submits that the petitioner is a member of the Force and absence of the members of the Force at the time of roll call amounts to gross indiscipline and in case such action of the members of the Force is taken lightly, it will create indiscipline in the Force. 12. In support of his submission Shri Tiwari has placed reliance in cases of the State Bank of India & Others Vs. Samrendra Kishore Endow and another, ( 1994 2 SCC 537 and B.C. Chaturvedi Vs. Union of India and others, AIR 1966 SC 484. My attention has been drawn to paragraph-14 from the judgment of State Bank of India & others (supra), which reads as follows - Now coming to the facts of this case, it would appear that the main charge against the respondent is putting forward a false claim for reimbursement of expenditure incurred for transporting his belongings from Phek to Amarpur. So far as charge 5 is concerned there is no finding that the account become irregular or that any loss was incurred by the Bank on account of the irregularity committed by the respondent. In the circumstances it may be that the punishment of removal imposed upon the respondent is harsh but this is a matter which the Disciplinary Authority or the Appellate Authority should consider and not the High Court or the Administrative Tribunal. In the circumstances it may be that the punishment of removal imposed upon the respondent is harsh but this is a matter which the Disciplinary Authority or the Appellate Authority should consider and not the High Court or the Administrative Tribunal. In our opinion, the proper course to be adopted in such situations would be to send the matter either to the Disciplinary Authority or the Appellate Authority to impose appropriate punishment. My attention has been drawn to paragraph 18 from the judgment of B.C. Chaturvedi (supra) which reads as follows :- A review of the above legal position would establish that the disciplinary authority and on appeal the appellate authority, being fact finding authorities have exclusive power to consider the evidence with a view to maintain discipline. They are invested with the discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. The High Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof. 13. Having appreciated the rival submission, I am of the opinion that absence of the member of a Force in the evening roll call cannot be compared to the absence of some other public servants holding innocuous position. Here, in the present case, petitioner was a member of the Force and he did not present himself in the evening roll calls. Not only this petitioner has been found to have made entry in Rojnamcha unauthorisedly. Further on being asked to explain he has used derogatory words for his superior. Cumulative effect of all these could have reasonably led any disciplinary authority to take the decision for removal of service of the employee. Hence, decision of the respondents to remove the petitioner from service cannot in any way said to be harsh calling for interference by this Court. Reference in this connection can be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in case of Apparel Export Promotion Council Vs. Hence, decision of the respondents to remove the petitioner from service cannot in any way said to be harsh calling for interference by this Court. Reference in this connection can be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in case of Apparel Export Promotion Council Vs. A.K. Chopra, AIR 1999 S.C. 625 , in which it has been held as follows :- Even in so far as imposition of penalty or punishment is concerned, unless the punishment or penalty imposed by the Disciplinary or Departmental Appellate Authority, is either impermissible or such that it shocks the conscience of the High Court, it should not normally substitute its own opinion and impose some other punishment or penalty. 14. As a last straw, Mr. Tiwari states that the petitioner has been subjected to this harsh punishment as he has ventured to complain and speak about the evil eye of his officers towards his wife. In this connection, he has drawn my attention to application (Annexure-1) filed by him. Respondents have stated that no such application exits in their record. Further the purported incident is alleged to have taken place when the petitioner was posted at Mumbai. Action has been taken against the petitioner, while he was posted at Bhopal. Complaint has not been made against the Inquiry Officer, Disciplinary Authority or the appellate authority. It is very difficult to accept that every officer of the Force will gang up to punish the petitioner. I consider this to be an argument of desparation and it is rejected accordingly. 15. All the submissions made on behalf of the petitioner having no substance, I do not find any merit in the writ petition and it is dismissed accordingly. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to cost. Security amount, if deposited, shall be refunded to the petitioner. Petition dismissed