( 1 ) A discharged probationer, discharged from Judicial Service is before this Court in a petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution, inter alia questioning the orders made by the competent authority as illegal inasmuch as there was no fair play and observance of rule of natural justice before framing the impugned order. ( 2 ) IN support of the prayer in the petition, it is stated that petitioner was appointed on probation as Civil Judge (Junior Division) in the Judicial Service by respondents by their letter of appointment dated 12-10-1993 and was posted to Munsiff's Court at Chintaman. It appears he reported for duty at Chintamani on 19-10-1993. It is his case that he has satisfactorily completed the period of probation since the respondents have not extended the period of probation after completion of initial period of two years probation, but that assertion is difficult to accept. ( 3 ) WHILE petitioner was still on probation, he was served with an order dated 26-2-1996 by respondents, discharging him from service with immediate effect for the reason he is unsuitable to hold the post of Munsiff, exercising their powers under Rule 6 (1) of the Karnataka Civil services (Probation) Rules, 1977, hereinafter referred to as 'rules'. The legality or otherwise of the aforesaid order is called in question by the petitioner, being aggrieved by the same. ( 4 ) LEARNED Counsel for the petitioner contends that the order discharging petitioner from judicial service cannot be considered as an order of discharge simpliciter but is an order with stigma and therefore before framing such an order, the principles of natural justice should have been followed. The Counsel further contends that the termination of petitioner's services without affording an opportunity to show cause against such an action is violative of Article 14 of the constitution and provisions of Probation Rules. Lastly it is submitted that since the respondents have allowed the petitioner to continue in service even after the expiry of initial period of probation he is deemed to have been admitted to regular employment and therefore he could not have been discharged from service, if it is found that he is not suitable for the post which he was holding without complying with the provisions of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution. Therefore it is submitted that the unilateral action taken by the respondents is highly illegal and invalid and requires to be set aside by this Court and a direction should be issued to the respondents to reinstate the petitioner into service with all consequential benefits. ( 5 ) SRI A. K. Patil, learned Counsel for the State justifies the impugned order. ( 6 ) IN my opinion, none of the issues canvassed by learned Counsel for the petitioner requires any lengthy discussion since they are no more debatable in view of the law declared by Apex Court in catena of decision. In my view, it is suffice only to notice them while considering the issues deliberated by the learned Counsel for the petitioner before this Court. ( 7 ) AS early as in the year 1964, the Supreme Court in the case of Management of Mis. Express newspapers (Private) Limited, Madurai v Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Madurai, was pleased to observe that a person appointed on probation would not ordinarily get automatic confirmation in service on the expiry of the stipulated probationary period and that if he is allowed to continue in service without any action being taken by the employer either by way of confirmation or by way of termination, he would continue only as probationer even after the expiration of period of probation. In the instant case after the expiration of period of probation on 19-10-1995, the respondents have not declared the satisfactory completion of period of probation. In the absence of any order to that effect, petitioner continues to be probationer for all purposes. ( 8 ) PETITIONER who is continued in service even after initial period of probation is discharged from service for the reason he is unsuitable to hold the post of Munsiff by the respondents by their impugned notification dated 26-2-1996. It is stated that the tenor of the order casts a stigma and therefore provisions of Article 311 (2) should have been complied by the respondents before terminating the services of the petitioner. In my opinion even this contention has no substance whatsoever in view of the law declared by Supreme Court in the case of Hari Singh Mann v state of Punjab and Others. In my opinion even this contention has no substance whatsoever in view of the law declared by Supreme Court in the case of Hari Singh Mann v state of Punjab and Others. In the said decision, the Supreme Court was pleased to observe that the order terminating the services of a probationer on the ground of unfitness for confirmation is not a stigma which can be called discharge by punishment. This well-settled legal principle was reiterated by Supreme Court in the case of M. Venu Gopal v Divisional Manager, Life Insurance corporation of India, Machilipatnam, Andhra Pradesh and Another, where the service of the probationer was terminated on the ground of unsatisfactory performance during probation, it was held that no notice was required to be given before terminating the service. ( 9 ) A perusal of the impugned order shows that the probationer is discharged from service as he in unsuitable to hold the post for which he was appointed. The order does not cast any stigma and nor it is punitive in nature. It is most innocuous order though the reason for taking such an action is unsatisfactory service profile. In that view of the matter, it is not necessary to conduct any enquiry or to follow principles of natural justice before such termination. ( 10 ) LASTLY, merely because respondents had granted two increments to the petitioner during petitioner's probation period, it does not give him the status of a permanent employee unless and until the respondents declare by an order in writing the satisfactory completion of the period of probation as required under the probation rules which governs the service condition of the petitioner. ( 11 ) FOR the reasons stated above, petition deserves to be dismissed. Accordingly petition is dismissed. Rule discharged. In the facts and circumstances of the case, parties are directed to bear their own costs.