ORDER 1. The petitioner, by mean" of this petition, has approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking relief for quashing the order dated 30th June, 1989 passed by the Collector Hoshangabad, which is Annexure-C to the petition and for issuance of a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents not to compel the petitioner to get the lease deed registered which is exempted under the provisions of law. 2. Thus, the only point involved in the petition is whether the lease deed which is in respect of immovable property and is for a period exceeding one year requires registration under the Registration Act, 1908 or not? 3. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that so far as facts are concerned. same have no relevance except the fact relating to lease and that too in relation to nature of the lease and also the nature of the property. In the present case it is undisputed that the lease was in respect of immovable property and it was for a period exceeding one year. Learned counsel submitted that in the case of Ramnarayan Trivedi and others v. State of M.P. and others (1961 JLJ 1364 = 1962 MPLJ.1) Division Bench of this Court took the view that the lease being of the Government lands was exempted under the provision of Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act. 1882 and the document creating such a lease did not require registration as provided under Section 90 of the Registration Act. 1908. 4. In the case so relied the facts were that by a public auction held on 23rd November 1944 lease hold rights in certain Nazul plots in the town of Knandwa were sold and one Trivedi, predecessor of the plaintiffs-appellants Nos. 1 to 5, was declared to be the purchaser in consideration of his bid on a premium of Rs. 35,000/- and annual ground rent payable by the said purchaser for the said plots was accordingly determined. After due acceptance of the said bid a lease deed dated the 28th January 1946 was duly executed by the Deputy Commissioner. Khandwa, representing the State Government as the lessor and by Trivedi as the lessee. 35,000/- and annual ground rent payable by the said purchaser for the said plots was accordingly determined. After due acceptance of the said bid a lease deed dated the 28th January 1946 was duly executed by the Deputy Commissioner. Khandwa, representing the State Government as the lessor and by Trivedi as the lessee. But before the document could be got registered an application was made on behalf of the plaintiffs to the Nazul officer on 21st April 1946 that the lease deed may be drawn in favour of all of them as they had entered into a partnership and they would be holding that plot as such partners for purposes of erecting a cinema theatre hall thereon to be run in partnership. The matter was, therefare, referred to the Commissioner and on his acceptance of this alteration another lease deed in favour of all the plaintiffs was drawn up on 5th September 1946. This deed too could not be executed by all the plaintiffs-lessees till 20th October 1947 on which date it was registered. Thereafter the lessees paid ground rent for the years 1948-49 and 1949-50. But the Deputy Commissioner, Khandwa, by his order dated 20th March 1950 served on the plaintiffs a notice of demand for rent of the years 1946-47 and 1947-48. The plaintiffs disputed their liability to pay the rent as demanded on the ground that there was no lease of the plots in their favour during those two years. However they paid the amount under protest on 10th May 1950 and filed the suit for refund of the same against the State of Madhya Pradesh. The defendant-State disputed the claim of the plaintiffs and contended that the initial lease dated 28th January 1946 although granted to Trivedi was in fact for the benefit of all the plaintiffs, and as they were placed in possession of the plots in February 1946 They were liable to pay the rent as was paid by them. In the alternative it was urged that even if the plaintiffs were held to be not liable for the rent they were liable to pay for the use and occupation of those plots at the same rate as rent and the State was therefore entitled to retain that amount in liquidation of that liability. 5. In the alternative it was urged that even if the plaintiffs were held to be not liable for the rent they were liable to pay for the use and occupation of those plots at the same rate as rent and the State was therefore entitled to retain that amount in liquidation of that liability. 5. The Court found that the initial lease, being unregistered, was not a valid lease and hence there could be no liability on the plaintiffs to pay any rent for the two years in suit. As to the claim of the defendant-State to retain the money recovered from the plaintiffs towards compensation for the use and occupation of the plots, it was held by the Court that since the plots were leased out for the specific purpose of constructing a cinema theatre thereon, the compensation amount could not be equal to the annual rent inasmuch as the plaintiffs had not obtained a licence to exhibit cinematograph till 15th November 1946. Besides the plea raised by the defendant being one of set-off, and as on 10th May 1950 when the recovery was made by the defendant the claim for the use and occupation had become time-barred, there could be no legal recovery for the years 1946-47 and 1947-48 and as such set-off could not be claimed. 6. In the first appeal it was held that the parties originally did not intend to regard the document as a completed or operative lease, and that therefore, it did not create any valid liability against the plaintiffs for the payment of rent In respect of the land for the year 1946-47 and 1947-48. 7. In second appeal, the learned Single Judge of the High Court held that the rights of the parties would be governed by the second lease dated 20th October 1947 and, therefore, no rent as such was payable for the years 1946-47 and 1947-48, but held the plaintiffs liable to pay for use and occupation of the plots. 8. In Letters Patent Appeal, the conclusion arrived at dismissing the appellants suit was found right, but the reasoning upon which the conclusion was arrived at, was not found correct as learned Single Judge proceeded. 8. In Letters Patent Appeal, the conclusion arrived at dismissing the appellants suit was found right, but the reasoning upon which the conclusion was arrived at, was not found correct as learned Single Judge proceeded. upon the view that in this case lease of the Nazul plots could be made only by a registered instrument and as there was no such document creating tenancy of the material period, the appellants were liable for damages for use and occupation in respect of their possession of the ]and during that period, and it was stated that the mistaken view overlooked the fact that the lease being of Government lands was exempted from the provisions of Section ] 07 of the Transfer of Property Act and a document creating such a lease did not require registration as provided under Section 90 of the Registration Act, and that there, as demise of the lands when subsequent to the acceptance of the appellants bid at the auction held on 23rd November 1944 they took possession of the land in February. 1946. 9. In the present case the petitioner was granted a permanent lease, as is stated by the learned counsel for the petitioner and the petitioner was asked by the Nazul offficer to get the document registered. The petitioner presented the document before the Sub-Registrar, Hoshangabad asking to issue him certificate to the effect that the lease does not require registration u/s. 90 of the Registration Act. The Sub-Registrar returned the lease deed in original hand to hand by saying that there is no provision in the Indian Stamp Act to issue such certificate and the document is prima facie exempted under the provisions of Section 90 of the Registration Act from registration. 10. So far as Division Bench is concerned, the argument as advanced by the learned State Counsel is that the facts of that case were different. So far as the facts are concerned, that decision is on its own facts as in that case the lease was granted in respect of land which was auctioned and auction was taken by the lessee. 11. So far as the present case is concerned. it is necessary to analyse the provision of law. Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 is as extracted below "107. 11. So far as the present case is concerned. it is necessary to analyse the provision of law. Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 is as extracted below "107. A lease' of immoveable property from year to year, or for any term exceeding one year or reserving a yearly rent, can be made only by a registered instrument. All other leases of immoveable property may be made either by a registered instrument or by oral agreement accompanied by delivery of possession. Where a lease of immoveable property is made by a registered instrument such instrument or, where there are more instruments than one each such instrument shall be executed by both the lessor and the lessee: Provided that the State Government may, from time to time by notification in the official Gazette, direct that leases of immovable property, other than leases from year to year, or for any term exceeding one year or reserving a yearly rent, or any class of such leases, may be made by unregistered instrument or by oral agreement without delivery of possession. It provides lease of immoveable property from year to year, or for any term exceeding one year can be made only by a registered instrument, but the proviso is added which says that the State Government by notification may direct that lease of immoveable property, other than leases from year to year or for any term exceeding one year, may be made by unregistered instrument or by oral agreement without delivery of possession. So far as this proviso is concerned, it is not attracted as the lease in respect of the immoveable property from year to year, or for a period exceeding one year is not excepted out from the main clause of Section 107 of the Act as here it was with delivery of possession. 12. So far as this proviso is concerned, it is not attracted as the lease in respect of the immoveable property from year to year, or for a period exceeding one year is not excepted out from the main clause of Section 107 of the Act as here it was with delivery of possession. 12. Section 17 of the Registration Act provides the documents which require registration and one of the categories of the document is leases of immoveable property from year to year, or for any term exceeding one year and the State Government by means of proviso has been authorised by the legislature for granting exemption from the operation of sub-section (1) of Section 17 any leases executed in any district or part of a district the terms granted by which do not exceed- five years i.e. exemption can be granted in respect of leases the term of which do not extend years and the annual rents reserved by which do not exceed fifty rupees. So there is no question of issuance of notification by the State Government in regard to such of the cases as is the present case. 13. The question for consideration arises only in regard to the exemption of certain documents from registration executed by or in favour of Government. One of the categories of the documents is mentioned in Clause (d) of Section 90 (1) of the Registration Act which reads as : "(d) sanads, inam title-deeds and other documents purporting to be or to evidence grants or assignments by Government of land or of any interest in land:" 14. In the present case permanent lease is granted by the State Govt. in favour of the petitioner and this lease is in respect of interest in the land. The question for consideration is whether, provision of Section 90 of the Registration Act, 1908 would be attracted in the present case or not. It is submited by the learned counsel that Section 90 does not speak of exemption to remain confined to the land which was taken on auction and lease in respect of which is granted. In the case referred to above, the lease was in respect of the land taken on auction. 15. It is submited by the learned counsel that Section 90 does not speak of exemption to remain confined to the land which was taken on auction and lease in respect of which is granted. In the case referred to above, the lease was in respect of the land taken on auction. 15. Learned State Counsel submitted that Section 90 operates in a different field and it grants exemption of certain documents executed by or in favour of Government and the submission is that apart from other documents, the documents, sanads inam, title-deeds and other documents purporting to be or in evidence grants or assignments by Government of land or of any interest in land are exempted and would not cover the lease granted by the Government in favour of the petitioner. 16. "Lease" has been defined under Section 2(7) of the Registration Act, 1908 and the definition is inclusive not exhaustive and it is defined as "lease" includes a counterpart, kabuliyat, an undertaking to cultivate or occupy, and an agreement to lease." 17. Here in the present case lease granted in favour of the petitioner is a permanent lease. Lease granted in favour of the petitioner is assignments of interest in land by the Government in favour of the petitioner. 18. In view of above, the petition has no merit. It is rejected. No order as to costs. Security amount deposited, if any, may be refunded.