JUDGMENT 1. - Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned counsel for the respondents as well as the learned Additional Government Advocate. 2. In this writ petition, two questions arise for determination : (1) Whether the application dated 5th July, 1997 filed by Shri Jugta Ram-respondent No. 7 (defendant No. 2) praying that the writ petition filed on behalf of the petitioner be allowed in terms of the compromise arrived at between the petitioner and Jugta Ram-respondent No. 7 (defendant No. 2), duly attested on 4-7-1985 before the Sub-Divisional Officer, Bhinmal, deserves to be allowed? (2) Whether the judgment dated 5-11-1984 passed by the Assistant Collector dismissing the suit filed by the petitioner, the judgment dated 17-6-86 passed by the Revenue Appellate Authority, Jodhpur dismissing the first appeal filed on behalf of the petitioner and the judgment dated 17-7-1986 passed by the Board of Revenue dismissing the second appeal filed on behalf of the petitioner, suffer from any illegal infirmity so as to warrant interference by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India? QUESTION NO. 1 3. The learned counsel for the respondent No. 7 (defendant No. 2) have prayed that the writ petition should be disposed of in accordance with the compromise entered into between the petitioner and the respondent No. 7. The said compromise purports to have been attested by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Bhinmal on 4th July, 1995. The prayer has been contested by the learned counsel for the respondent No. 3. 4. The facts which are relevant for the disposal of the above mentioned prayer made by the petitioner and the respondent No. 7 may be summarised as below:- The petitioners' predecessor in title Taja (since deceased), who was father of petitioners Nos. 1 to 4 and 6 to 10 and husband of petitioner No. 5, filed a suit on 21st April, 1975 in the Court of Assistant Collector, Bhinmal for declaration of Khatedari rights in respect of agriculture land measuring 16 bighas of Khasra No. 366 situated in village Bhadvi, Tehsil Bhinmal, District Jalore. The total area of the land bearing khasra No. 366 is 112-3 bighas. The total area of the land bearing khasra No. 366 is 112-3 bighas. The plaintiff Taja's case and that 16 bighas of land lying on the northern side out of the khasra No. 366 (measuring 112-3 bighas was his khatedari land and the remaining portion of the land of khasra No. 366 was in cultivatory possession of defendant Dharma (since deceased), now represented by defendants Nos. 2 to 7. It was further alleged by the plaintiff Taja that on account of a mistake, the entire land of khasra No. 366 was entered in the name of defendant No. 1. It was also alleged by the plaintiff Taja that he had taken the disputed 16 bighas of land of khasra No. 366 in exchange of his another field from defendant No. 1 Dharma in the month of Bhadva Badi of Samwat year 2009 and a written deed in respect of which had been executed by the defendant No. 1 Dharma in favour of the plaintiff. In short, on the basis of a deed to be a deed of exchange, the plaintiff Taja claimed Khatedari rights over the disputed 16 bighas of land of Khasra No. 366 and in his suit he prayed for declaration of his khatedari rights.. The suit was dismissed by the Assistant Collector, Bhinmal vide judgment dated 5-11- 1984. The first appeal was filed before the Revenue Appellate Authority against the judgment dated 5-11-1984 passed by the Assistant Col lector, Bhinmal. The first appeal was dismissed by the Revenue Appellate Authority, Jodhpur vide judgment dated 17th June, 1986. The second appeal was preferred before the Board of Revenue, but the same was also dismissed by the Board of Revenue vide judgment dated 17th July, 1986. Feeling aggrieved by the judgments passed by the Assistant Collector, Bhinmal, the Revenue Appellate Authority, Jodhpur and the Board of Revenue, Ajmer, the petitioner filed this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution and prayed that a writ in the nature of certiorari or in the nature of a writ or any other appropriate order may be issued quashing the judgment dated 17-7-1986 passed by the Board of Revenue as well as the judgment dated 5-11-1984 passed by the Assistant Collector, Bhinmal and the suit filed by the petitioner should be decreed. 5. 5. The petitioners who were the legally heirs of the original plaintiff Taja, have entered into a compromise with Jugta Ram-respondent No. 7 (defendant No. 2) and they have prayed that the writ petition should be disposed of on the basis of the compromise dated 29th June, 1995, attested on 4-7-1995 by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Bhinmal. 6. The application made by the petitioner and respondent No. 7 has been opposed by the court sell for the respondent No. 3 because it is against his interest as well as against the interest of other respondents. In the reply dated 29th August, 1996,. it has been stated on behalf of Achla Ram that Jugta Ram-respondent No. 7 (defendant No. 2) has sold the disputed land to Dana and Achla s/o Dharmaji for a consideration of Rs. 23,0001 and a sale-deed was executed on Ind July, 1988 and it was duly registered. A photostat copy of the registered sale-deed has also been filed by. the contesting respondents. 7. The learned counsel for the respondent Achla Ram has submitted that since the respondent No. 7 had sold the land to Dana and Achla s/o Dharmaji for a consideration of Rs. 23,000/- by registered sale-deed dated 2nd July, 1998, the respondent No. 7 ceased the right or title in the disputed land and, therefore, he is not competent to enter into any compromise in respect of the disputed land and the writ petition cannot be decided in terms of the alleged compromise. It is also submitted by the learned counsel for the respondent Achla Ram that Sarja s/o Teja and Smt. Pemi widow of Karma have died. 8. The photostat copy of the sale-deed dated 2nd July, 1988 shows that Jugta Ram (respondent No. 7) had sold 16 bighas of land of khasra No. 366 to Dana and Achla s/o Dharmaji for a consideration of Rs. 29,000/-. The petitioners and respondent No. 3 have not produced any document to show that the sale-deed dated 2nd July, 1988 is not in respect of the land in dispute. In these circumstances, it must be said that since the respondent No. 7 executed a registered sale-deed in favour of respondents Nos. 2 and 3 on 2nd July, 1988, for a consideration of Rs. 29,000/-, the respondent No. 7 could not enter into the alleged compromise dated 29th June, 1995. In these circumstances, it must be said that since the respondent No. 7 executed a registered sale-deed in favour of respondents Nos. 2 and 3 on 2nd July, 1988, for a consideration of Rs. 29,000/-, the respondent No. 7 could not enter into the alleged compromise dated 29th June, 1995. j, therefore, find sufficient force in the submission made by the learned counsel for the respondents Nos. 2 and 3 that on account of the sale-deed dated 2nd July, 1988, the respondent No. 7 could not enter into any compromise with the petitioners in respect of the disputed land and, therefore, this writ petition cannot be disposed of in terms of the alleged compromise dated 29th June, 1995. There is yet another real on which prevents this Court from disposing of the writ petition in terms of the alleged compromise dated 19th June, 1995. The right of the parties to adjust a suit wholly or in part by a lawful agreement of compromise is governed by the provisions of Rule 3 of Order XXIII of the Civil procedure Code. Rule 3 of Order XXIII of the Civil Procedure Code reads : "3. Compromise of suit.- Where it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that a suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise, in writing and signed by the parties or where the defendant satisfies the plaintiff in respect of the whole or any part of the subject-matter of the suit, the Court shall order such agreement, compromise or satisfaction to be recorded, and shall pass a decree in accordance therewith so far as it relates to the parties to the suit, whether or not the subject-matter of the agreement, compromise or satisfaction is the same as the subject-matter of the suit provided that where it is alleged by one party and denied by the other that an adjustment or satisfaction has been arrived at, the Court shall decide the question; but no adjournment shall be granted for the purpose of deciding the question, unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded, thinks fit to grant such adjournment. Explanation.- An agreement or compromise which is void or voidable under the Indian Contract Act, 1872), shall not be deemed to be lawful within the meaning of this rule." Rule 3B of Order XXIII reads:- "3B. Explanation.- An agreement or compromise which is void or voidable under the Indian Contract Act, 1872), shall not be deemed to be lawful within the meaning of this rule." Rule 3B of Order XXIII reads:- "3B. No agreement or compromise to be entered in a representative suit without leave of Court.- (1) No agreement or compromise in a representative suit shall be entered into without the leave of the Court expressly recorded in the proceedings; and any such agreement or compromise entered into without the leave of the Court so recorded shall be void.- (2) Before granting such leave, the Court shall give notice in 'such manner as it may think fit to such persons as may appear to it to be interested in the suit. Explanation.- In this rule, "representative suit" means.- (a) a suit under Section 91 or Section 92, (b) a suit under Rule 8 of Order 1, (c) a suit in which the manager of an undivided Hindu family sues or is sued as representing the other members of the family, (d) any and other suit in which the decree passed may, by virtue of the provisions of this Code or of any other law for the time being in force, bind any person who is not need as party to the suit." Rule 4 of Order XXIII reads : "4. Proceedings in execution of decrees not affected.- Nothing in this order shall apply to any proceedings in execution of a decree or order." 9. A bare reading of Rule 3, 3(b) and Rule 4 of Order XXIII of the Civil Procedure Code shows that the parties are entitled to a decree on the basis of a compromise between them, only if the compromise is filed during the pendency of the suit or an appeal and the compromise is in accordance with the provisions contained in Rule 3, 3(b) and is not hit by Rule 4 of Order XXIII of the Civil Procedure Code. Once, a suit has been finally disposed of and a decree has been passed by the Court and such decree had been affirmed in appeal and has become final, the parties cannot seek the reversal of the decree passed by the competent Courts on the basis of a compromise arrived at between them. Once, a suit has been finally disposed of and a decree has been passed by the Court and such decree had been affirmed in appeal and has become final, the parties cannot seek the reversal of the decree passed by the competent Courts on the basis of a compromise arrived at between them. Rule 4 of Order XXIII clearly provides that nothing contained in the Order XXIII of the Civil Procedure Code shall apply to any person for execution of a decree or an order. The execution of a decree or order takes place only after the decree or the order has become final. Therefore, in view of Rule 4 of Order XXIII of the Civil Procedure Code, it must be said that the intention of the legislature is that once the order or decree has become final, the provisions of Rules 1, 2 and 3 of Order XXIII of the Civil Procedure Code cannot be applied. 10. In the instant case, the suit filed by the petitioners' predecessor Teja Ram was dismissed by the Assistant Collector, Bhinmal. The first appeal was dismissed by the Revenue Appellate Authority, Jodhpur and the second appeal was dismissed by the Board of Revenue, Ajmer. The decree passed by the Assistant Collector, Bhinmal, thus, became final subject of course to the jurisdiction of this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. The petition filed in this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution is neither a suit in itself nor it can be treated as a continuation of the suit filed by the petitioners predecessor's in interest in the Court of Sub-Divisional Officer, Binmal nor the continuation of the appeal filed before the Revenue Appellate Authority and the Board of Revenue. Therefore, the provisions of Rule 3 of Order XXIII of the Civil Procedure Code have no application to this case. It may be pointed out that in view of the explanation given below Section 141 of the Civil Procedure Code, the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution are not included in the expression "proceedings" for the purpose of Section 141 of the Civil Procedure Code. It means that the provisions of Rule 3 of Order XXIII of the Civil Procedure Code have no application to the proceedings of a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 11. It means that the provisions of Rule 3 of Order XXIII of the Civil Procedure Code have no application to the proceedings of a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 11. It may also be pointed out that while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, this Court does not exercise the same powers which are available to the appellate Court, hearing an appeal. The extraordinary powers conferred on this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, though wide, are circumscribed by judicial stand and the limited object, which is merely to ensure that the inferior authorities of the State, act in accordance with law and exercise their powers in conformity with the norms established for them. Besides, the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by the High Court is discretionary. In appropriate cases, this Court has ample jurisdiction to refuse to entertain the writ petition, if a Court considers such a course to be necessary in the interest of justice. I, therefore, hold that once the decree was passed by the trial Court has become final, because the same has been affirmed by a Court of competent jurisdiction hearing the first appeal and the second appeal, the parties cannot seek the reversal of the judgment and decree which has become final by filing a compromise during the pendency of the writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution.11A. In light of above reasons, the prayer to dispose of the writ petition in terms of the compromise dated 29th June, 1995 entered into by the petitioners and the respondent No. 7, deserves to be rejected on two grounds. Firstly, that such a prayer is not maintainable, because the writ petition is not a continuation of the suit or an appeal and in view of Section 141 and Rules 3 and 4 of Order XXIII of the Civil Procedure Code, the judgment and degree which have become final, cannot be interfered with on the ground that the parties have entered into a compromise regarding the subject matter. The second ground on which the prayer must be rejected is that the respondent No. 7 sold the disputed 16 bighas of land of khasra No. 366 to the respondents Nos. 2 and 3 for a consideration of Rs. The second ground on which the prayer must be rejected is that the respondent No. 7 sold the disputed 16 bighas of land of khasra No. 366 to the respondents Nos. 2 and 3 for a consideration of Rs. 29,000/- by registered sale-deed dated 2nd July, 1988 and having transferred his right and interest in the land in dispute to the respondent Nos. 2 and 3, ceased to have any right to enter into any compromise with the petitioners regarding the disputed land. Unless, of course he can establish in a Court of competent jurisdiction by appropriate proceedings that the alleged sale deed dated 2nd July, 1988 is not binding on him. The prayer to dispose of the writ petition in terms of the compromise dated 29th June, 1995 deserves to be rejected and is hereby rejected.Petition dismissed. *******