JUDGMENT Surinder Sarup, J.: The suit of the plaintiff was decreed by the trial Court i.e. Sub-Judge (IV), Shimla by judgment dated 17th of April, 1990 and a decree was passed restraining the defendants from interfering with his possession in the suit land comprised in Khewat No. 4 min, Khatauni No. 5, Kitas 11, measuring 30 Bighas and 3 Biswas situated at Mauza Bashalari, Tehsil Suni, District Shimla, hereinafter to be called "the land in dispute". 2. The defendants went up in appeal and the same has been dismissed by the District Judge, Shimla by his judgment dated 19th of August, 1992. Hence, the present second appeal. 3. The plaintiff filed the suit for permanent prohibitory injunction for restraining the defendants from interfering in his possession over the land in dispute on t he pleadings that he was in exclusive possession of the same continuously from the time of his ancestors for the last more than 35 years. It was alleged that the plaintiff as well as his predecessors-in-interest have been recorded as sub-tenants of the same since the year 1952-53. It is further alleged that the status of sub-tenants was wrongly deleted from the revenue record. Per force the plaintiff applied for the correction of the same to the revenue authorities. The same was still pending before the revenue officer. In the meantime, the defendants filed an appeal which was dismissed by the Collector, Shimla. Mutation of ownership rights was set-aside by the Collector in appeal. Thereafter, the defendants forcibly attempted to dispossess him from the land in dispute which necessitated proceedings under Section 145 of the Cr. P.C. The same were also decided in favour of the plaintiff. It was pleaded that being the sub-tenant, the plaintiff had acquired ownership rights by virtue of Section 104 of the H.P. Land Reforms and Tenancy Act. Since the defendants did not desist from interfering in his peaceful possession, he had to file the suit. 4. In the written statement, the defendants took up the preliminary objections, that the suit in the present form is not maintainable, that the plaintiff has no locus standi to file it; that he is estopped from filing this suit on account of his own acts, deeds, admission conduct, silence and consent; that the suit is no within time and that it is not properly valued for the purposes of Court fee and jurisdiction. On merits, it was pleaded that earlier the land in dispute was owned and possessed by Lekh Ram, Ghanshayam Dass, Smt. Sewati, Mathku, Gangu, Devi Dass, Hima Ram and Chhangu. Due to some dispute, these persons came to be recorded as tenants while the ownership was shown as being that of the State. The abovementioned persons filed a civil suit challenging the auction and the same was ultimately decreed. Since then they were in possession of the land in dispute. It was pleaded that it is in the joint ownership of the persons recorded in the column of ownership in the revenue record. It was denied that the plaintiff or his predecessors-in-interest remained in exclusive possession of the land in dispute. According to the written statement, an application for partition had been filed before the Assistant Collector, Sunni. It was submitted that the parties are in joint possession of the land and the plaintiff has no right to claim exclusive possession for himself. 5. On the pleadings of the parties, the trial Court framed the following issues:- (1). Whether the defendants are interfering with the possession of the plaintiff over the suit land as alleged ? O.P.P. (2) Whether the suit is not maintainable ? O.P.D. (3)- Whether the plaintiff is estopped to file the suit as alleged ? O.P.D. (4) Whether the plaintiff has no locus-standi to file the suit ? O.P.D. (5) Whether the suit is time barred ? O.P.D. (6) Whether the suit is not properly valued as alleged ? O.P.D. (7) Relief. 6. The findings under issue No.(l) went in favour of the plaintiff while issues No. (2) to (6) were decided against the defendants, the suit was thus decreed in the terms aforementioned. The appeal filed by the defendants-appellants having been dismissed by the learned lower appellate Court, they have come up in second appeal. 7. Learned counsel for the parties have been heard at length. The record of the case has also been perused with their assistance. 8. It has been submitted on behalf of the appellants that the trial Court failed to frame material issues, for example, one relating to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court, no such objection has been taken in the written statement. The record of the case has also been perused with their assistance. 8. It has been submitted on behalf of the appellants that the trial Court failed to frame material issues, for example, one relating to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court, no such objection has been taken in the written statement. Moreover, in para-17 of the judgment of the lower appellate Court, it has been stated that neither in the appeal nor at the time of arguments, it has been pointed out as to what were those material issues which arose out of the pleadings of the parties and were not framed. In other words, the said point of want of jurisdiction of the civil Court in the matter was also not raised before the learned lower appellate court. Apart from these reasons, as has been rightly observed in the impugned judgment by the learned lower appellate Court, once the parties have led their evidence, they were well aware of the case and the controversy involved therein and non- framing of an issue or issues becomes of an academic interest only and has no effect on the merits of the case. Additionally, it has not been shown as to how any prejudice, if at all, has been caused to the defendants-appellants due to this. Thus, there is no merit in this contention. 9. As regards the issue of limitation, the submission of the learned counsel for the appellants appears to be wholly misconceived in as much as there is a specific issue being issue No.(5). The same has been decided against the defendants by the trial Court by holding that no evidence was led by them in support of this issue, as also in respect of the other issues arising out of the preliminary objections raised in the written statement. That being the factual position, this aspect of the submission of the learned counsel for the appellants is absolutely devoid of any force. 10. It has then been submitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that the statement of DW-1 Narain Dass, if read as a whole, does not amount to admission regarding the adoption of Surat Ram by Devi Dass as his son. In this connection, he has referred to paras-17 and 18 of the judgment of the learned lower appellate Court. On going through! In this connection, he has referred to paras-17 and 18 of the judgment of the learned lower appellate Court. On going through! the statement of DW-1 Narain Dass, it cannot be said that the finding of the learned lower appellate Court in para-18 of the judgment that Devi Dass had adopted the plaintiff as his son, is erroneous. Moreover, when both the Courts below have given concurrent findings based on appreciation of evidence in favour of the plaintiff-respondent, this Court would not re-appreciate the same in second appeal. 11. It has next been submitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that there has been misreading of evidence in this case. In this connection, he has referred to Ex.D-13 which is a Jamabandi for the year 1986-87 in which Surat Ram is shown as son of Ishru. Be that as it may, the finding of the learned lower appellate Court is that the said document records the earlier tenants or their successors as the owners, but the land is shown in possession of the plaintiff-respondent as a co-sharer and that he continued to be in exclusive possession of the land in dispute after Devi Dass. Here again, it is not for this Court to go into the question whether the reasons given in the impugned judgment are wrong or otherwise because it is not a case of misreading of evidence. For the same reason, the submission of the learned counsel for the appellants with regard to interpretation of the document Ex.D-10 which is a Jamabandi for the year 1981-82 cannot be accepted. The reason for this is that it has been observed in the impugned judgment of the learned lower appellate Court that the entries in the subsequent revenue records, including Ex.D-10 are basically based on the entries which were incorporated in the Misal Hakiat and these entries are contrary to the factual position, as the same have been continuously challenged as being incorrect by the plaintiff-respondent. 12. Apart from the above submissions, the learned counsel for the appellants wanted this Court to re-appreciate and re-consider other documentary evidence on the record e.g. Ex.D-2 (receipt), Ex-D-4 (mutation) and Ex.D-1 which is an order dated 10th of June, 1949 passed by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Kusumpti. 12. Apart from the above submissions, the learned counsel for the appellants wanted this Court to re-appreciate and re-consider other documentary evidence on the record e.g. Ex.D-2 (receipt), Ex-D-4 (mutation) and Ex.D-1 which is an order dated 10th of June, 1949 passed by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Kusumpti. In so far as these documents are concerned, the same have been taken into consideration by the learned lower appellate Court and have been discarded on the ground that they are of no use and consequence because these related to the position as it prevailed on and before 10th of June, 1949. This is apparent from para-13 of the impugned judgment. It is not for this Court in second appeal to go into the reason and come to a different conclusion than that of the learned lower appellate Court, when apparently the reason on the face of it is not perverse or erroneous. 13. The learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that a suit against co-sharer for injunction was not maintainable in the present case and the remedy of the plaintiff was by way of a suit for partition of the land in dispute. Thus, according to the learned counsel, the decree for injunction could not be passed in the present case. There is no merit in this argument also. The learned lower appellate Court on the basis of the evidence on the record has come to the conclusion that the same shows Devi Dass as an adoptive father of Surat Ram plaintiff as being in possession of the land in dispute as a sub-tenant right from the year 1953 till the year 1967, i.e. for a continuous period of 14 years without any change in the entries and this further shows that he was liable to pay rent to the tenants. In this view of the matter, it has not been established that the parties to the dispute in the present case were co-sharers in the land in dispute. Moreover, the trial Court has held while deciding issue No.(2) that no evidence has been led by the defendants in support of this issue. In the face of the existence of these facts, the rulings cited by the learned counsel for the appellants in support of this argument are not applicable. Moreover, the trial Court has held while deciding issue No.(2) that no evidence has been led by the defendants in support of this issue. In the face of the existence of these facts, the rulings cited by the learned counsel for the appellants in support of this argument are not applicable. The same are :- (1) The Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Suresh Chandra Jaipuria & Anr., AIR 1976 Supreme Court 2621. . (2) Sunil Kumar & Anr. v. Ram Prakash & Ors., AIR 1988 Supreme Court 576. In relation to his submission regarding issue No. (2) to the effect whether the suit is not maintainable, the learned counsel for the appellants has placed reliance on Besru v. Shibu, 1991(1) Shim. L. C. 343 and Chuhniya Devi v. Jindu Ram, 1991(1) Shim. L. C. 223. In view of the above discussion and the concurrent findings in favour of the plaintiff-respondent findings in favour of the plaintiff-respondent recorded by both the Courts below on the basis of the evidence on the record, these authorities are not applicable to the facts of the present case. 14. In support of his argument that notwithstanding the fact that both the lower Courts have decreed the suit of the plaintiff- respondent, this Court can still interfere in second appeal by appreciating the evidence on the record, the learned counsel for the appellants has placed reliance on a railing of the Apex Court reported as Sundra Naicka Vadiyar (dead) by LRs. & Anr. v. Ramaswami Ayyar (dead) by his LRs., AIR 1994 Supreme Court 532. On the facts of that case, it was held by the Apex Court that interference in second appeal by the High Court was justified. That was done because findings on possession had been recorded by the lower Courts in that case by ignoring material documents and other evidence, which is not the case here. Moreover, it has been recently held in two reported decisions of the Apex Court that the High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Section 100 C.P.C. only on the basis of substantial questions of law which are to be framed at the time of admission of the second appeal and the same has to be heard and decided only on the basis of such duly framed substantial questions of law. Reference in this connection may be made to the case reported as Dnyanoba Bhaurao Shemade v. Maroti Bhaurao Marnor, (1999) 2 Supreme Court Cases 471. In that case, the Courts below had come to their concurrent conclusion on appreciation of evidence. However, in second appeal, the High Court proceeded to re-appreciate the evidence. This course adopted by the High Court was held clearly without jurisdiction by the Apex Court. Similarly, in the case reported as Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar & Ors. 1999(4) Supreme 108 (S.C.). It has been held that concurrent findings of fact howsoever erroneous cannot be disturbed by the High Court in second appeal. 15. No other point has been urged. 16. For the reasons recorded above, this appeal fails and is dismissed. But in view of the contentions issues involved, the parties are left to bear their own costs. Appeal dismissed.