Judgment SUDHIR KUMAR KATRIAR, J. 1. This Criminal Revision Application is directed against the judgment dated 18-8-1988, passed by Mr. Satyendra Kumar Gupta, 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, West Champaran, Bettiah, in Criminal Appeal No. 32/87 Piyush Kanti Deo V/s. State of Bihar, whereby he has affirmed in full the judgment dated 18-8-87, passed by Mr. Ram Nath, Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bettiah, in Tr. No. 4/86 GR No. 73/81 State of Bihar V/s. Piyush Kanti Deo. The trial Court by its judgment convicted the petitioner under Section 409, IPC and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six years, and further sentenced him to pay a fine of Rs. 5,000/-, and in default whereof he was further to suffer a sentence for six months, rigorous imprisonment. The sentences were to run consecutively. 2. According to the prosecution case, the petitioner was a Nazir in Sikta Block in the district of West Champaran at the relevant point of time. According to the written report dated 17-1-1981 (Ext.2), the informant, Tripurari Sharan Srivastava (PW-7), the petitioner herein had been entrusted with the duty of taking bill No. 174/80-81, for Rs. 16,000/-, to the Collector, West Champaran, Bettiah, for his counter-signature and thereafter for presentation in the Treasury for encashment. The accused-petitioner did not return to Sikta Block till 15-1-1981 and, therefore, information was sent to the higher authorities at Bettiah. The informant, who was the Project Executive Officer, Sikta Block, along with other functionaries went to Bettiah and tried to ascertain the where-abouts of the accused-petitioner where it was learnt that he had encash 8 MRD bills totalling Rs.1,65,000/- which he did not deposit in the concerned Bank account of the Government. The aforesaid report dated 17-1-1981 gave the details of the 8 bills. The written report was lodged on 17-1-1981, and on the basis of which a formal FIR (Ext.3), was drawn, and a police case was registered against the accused-petitioner under Section 409, IPC. The Police investigated the allegations and submitted charge-sheet against the accused-petitioner under Section 409 IPC. The learned CJM was pleased to take cognizance and framed charges against, the petitioner under Section 409, IPC. The petitioner did not plead guilty and claimed to be tried. 3. The prosecution examined altogether following ten witnesses. The Police investigated the allegations and submitted charge-sheet against the accused-petitioner under Section 409 IPC. The learned CJM was pleased to take cognizance and framed charges against, the petitioner under Section 409, IPC. The petitioner did not plead guilty and claimed to be tried. 3. The prosecution examined altogether following ten witnesses. Awadhesh Kumar Verma (PW-1) Was the Head Clerk in the office of the SDO, Bettiah; Bihari Nath Mishra (PW-2), was posted as an Assistant in the Government Treasury, Bettiah, and was looking after miscellaneous revenue deposit and repayment; Ram Bahal Singh (PW-3) was posted as Accountant in the Government Treasury at Bettiah; Kailash Prasad Gupta (PW-4) was posted as Nazir at Sikta Block; Akhileshwar Kumar Choudhary (PW-5), was posted as an officer in the State Bank of India at Bettiah; Khaderu Mishra (PW-6) was a junior Managment officer of the State Bank of India at the Cash counter and was declared hostile; Tripurari Sharan Srivastava (PW-7), the informant, was posted as the Project Executive Officer at Sikta Block at the relevant point of time; another Tripurari Sharan Srivastava (PW-8); was the Investigating Officer of the case; Bimal Kumar (PW-9), was posted as Judicial Magistrate at Bettiah, and had recorded the confessional statement of the accused under Section 164 Cr PC; and Mahesh Prasad (PW-10), was posted as Head Clerk in the Block Office at Sikta at the relevant point of time. 4. The prosecution has proved the following documents. Ext. 1 is general cash book of Sikta Block; Ext. 2 is written report of the informant; Ext. 3 is the signature of the informant on the formal FIR, and the formal FIR is Ext. 4. 5. It is relevant to state that about two years and eight months after the occurrence, the petitioner had surrendered in a police station at Calcutta i.e. on 6th or 7th September 1983. He was lodged in Barrackpur jail and wherefrom the police had brought him to Bettiah. Thereafter, his confessional statement under Section 164, Cr PC was recorded on 16-9-1983 by Mr. Bimal Kumar (PW-9), who was then posted as Judicial Magistrate at Bettiah. 6. The defence has examined only one witness, namely, Hira Lal (DW-1). He has proved Exts. A and A/1 which are entries in paragraphs 30 and 6 of the case diary respectively. Thereafter, his confessional statement under Section 164, Cr PC was recorded on 16-9-1983 by Mr. Bimal Kumar (PW-9), who was then posted as Judicial Magistrate at Bettiah. 6. The defence has examined only one witness, namely, Hira Lal (DW-1). He has proved Exts. A and A/1 which are entries in paragraphs 30 and 6 of the case diary respectively. After the conclusion of the trial, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bettiah, convicted the petitioner under Section 409, IPC, and sentenced him as stated above. The petitioners appeal was dismissed and the conviction and sentence recorded by the trial Court was affirmed in full. The learned appellate Court recorded the following findings of facts in the impugned judgment substantially affirming those of the trial Court: (i) The petitioner was posted as a Nazir in the Sikta Block in January 1981, (ii) Bill Nos. 150 to 157 were handed over to the accused-petitioner for obtaining the counter-signature of the Collector, Bettiah, (iii) After obtaining the countersignature of the Collector, Bettiah, the accused-petitioner had presented the same in the Government. Treasury which were duly passed by PW-2. (iv) The 8 bills in question amounting to Rs. 1,65,000/- was paid to the petitioner in cash. (v) The confessional statement of the accused-petitioner under Section 164, Cr PC was duly recorded by PW-9, and the legal requirements were substantially complied with. (vi) The accused had confessed his guilt. Thus, the entire allegation that the accused had encashed the 8 bills and misappropriated a sum of Rs.1,65,000/- is proved by the confessional statement alone, let alone the other evidence on record. The accused-petitioner was required to transfer the aforesaid bill amount from ALP head to MRD head and the same were required to be taken to the Block Office, but the petitioner instead encashed the same and misappropriated it. 7. While assailing the validity of the impugned judgment, learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the prosecution has failed to prove the prosecution case beyond all reasonable doubts. In view of the nature of the prosecution case, it should have been primarily proved by documentary evidence. The prosecution case has instead been sought to be proved by oral evidence which is also unsatisfactory. In view of the nature of the prosecution case, it should have been primarily proved by documentary evidence. The prosecution case has instead been sought to be proved by oral evidence which is also unsatisfactory. In other words, in her submission, the prosecution has not been able to prove beyond all reasonable doubts that the petitioner had taken the 8 bills in question from Sikta Block, presented the same in the Government. Treasury at Betiah, had got the same passed, and received the case from the cash counter at the State Bank of India, Bettiah Branch. 8. Learned APP submitted in reply that the issues are concluded by findings of facts, which are quite reasonable and bear a reasonable nexus with the evidence on record. Major portion of the evidence of the prosecution witnesses have gone unchallenged in the cross-examination on behalf of the accused. He further submitted that the evidence of the prosecution witnesses has to be read with the confessional statement made by the accused under Section 164, Cr PC. The two are complementary to each other, and corroborate each other. He has relied on a judgment of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1999 SC 981 State of Kerala V/s. Putumana Illath Jathavedan Namhoodiri, in an effort to convince this Court that the scope of criminal revisional jurisdiction against a judgment of conviction is very limited. 9. I have carefully considered the submissions of both sides and I am convinced that the learned APP is right in his submission that the present proceeding is concluded by findings of facts. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has taken me through the entire evidence on record, oral as well as documentary, in an effort to establish that the same is too deficient to prove the prosecution case. This Court does not intend in its criminal revisional jurisdiction to substitute its views in place of those of the courts below. That is the function of the appellate Court, not the revisional Court. On the basis of the materials on record, it is not at all possible to state that the findings of facts recorded by the trial Court are perverse. On the contrary, I state that those are quite logical and bear a reasonable nexus with the materials on record. That is the function of the appellate Court, not the revisional Court. On the basis of the materials on record, it is not at all possible to state that the findings of facts recorded by the trial Court are perverse. On the contrary, I state that those are quite logical and bear a reasonable nexus with the materials on record. This Court is convinced that the findings of fact recorded by the appellate Court are reasonable and are quite possible conclusions flowing from the evidence on record. In fact, I go to the extent of stating that on a perusal of the entire evidence on record that I reach the same findings of fact as recorded by the courts below. Learned APP has rightly relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1999 SC 981 (supra), paragraph 5 of which is set out hereinbelow. "5. Having examined the impugned judgment of the High Court and bearing in mind the contentions raised by the learned Counsel for the parties, we have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that in the case in hand, the High Court has exceeded its revisional jurisdiction. In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting, miscarriage of justice. But, the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate Court nor can it be treated even as a second Appellate Jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to re-appreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to gross miscarriage of justice. On scrutinizing the impugned judgment of the High Court from the aforesaid stand point, we have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the conviction of the respondent by re-appreciating the oral evidence. On scrutinizing the impugned judgment of the High Court from the aforesaid stand point, we have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the conviction of the respondent by re-appreciating the oral evidence. The High Court also committed further error in not examining several items of evidence relied upon by the Additional Sessions Judge, while confirming the conviction of the respondent. In this view of the matter the impugned Judgment of the High Court is wholly unsustainable in law and we, accordingly set aside the same. The conviction and sentence of the respondent as passed by the Magistrate and affirmed by the Additional Sessions Judge in appeal is confirmed. This appeal is allowed. Bail-bonds furnished stand cancelled. The respondent must surrender to serve the sentence." 10. Learned APP is equally right in his submission that oral evidence on behalf of the prosecution has to be read with the confessional statement of the accused under Section 164, Cr PC and the evidence of PW-9 who had recorded the confessional statement. The Vice versa is equally true. In other words, the two are complementary and supplementary to each other, and corroborate each other. As stated above, the written report (Ext. 2), is dated 17-1-1981, and after about two years and eight months, on 6th or 7th of September, 1983, the petitioner had voluntarily surrendered in a police station at Calcutta. On errand, the Bettiah police had brought him from Calcutta. His confession statement under Section 164, Cr PC was recorded on 16-9-1983 by Mr. Bimal Kumar, Judicial Magistrate, Bettiah, who was examined in. support of the prosecution case as PW-9. According to the confessional statement, the accused had on 6th or 7th of September, 1983, voluntarily surrendered in Noihaddi police station in Calcutta. He was then taken to Barrackpur jail from where the Bettiah police had rought him to Bettiah. As to the allegations of misappropriation of Rs.1,65,000/-. he said that on 10-1-1981 he had withdrawn a sum of Rs.1,65,000/- from the Government Treasury at Bettiah on the basis of the 8 bills in question. He had committed the offence in conspiracy with two friends of his father whose names are mentioned in his statement. He further stated that the conspiracy had completely deprived him of his discretion and wisdom (Buddhi Bhrast Ho Gaya Tha). He had committed the offence in conspiracy with two friends of his father whose names are mentioned in his statement. He further stated that the conspiracy had completely deprived him of his discretion and wisdom (Buddhi Bhrast Ho Gaya Tha). He had withdrawn the entire amount on the suggestion of the said two persons and the three together had gone to Calcutta. He had stayed at the house of Nitya Nand Ghosh, one of the Co-conspirators. It had been decided that the misappropriated amount will be distributed amongst themselves. He has further said that he does confess his guilt and he is liable to the punishment. He requested the Magistrate that in case he is awarded the sentence of imprisonment, he should be lodged in a jail away from Bettiah where he can have solitude and aloofness. In accordance with the mandate of Section 164, Cr PC, the Magistrate has recorded the following statement towards the end of the confessional statement: "Btpf^ «RfH *ft m® eWMchdf ^r few I 11. Bimal Kumar, Judicial Magistrate, Bettiah who had recorded the aforesaid confessional statement, was examined as PW-9. He has stated in his deposition that he identified the accused-petitioner standing in the dock. He had confessed the allegation of misappropriation of Rs. 1,65,000/- which he had withdrawn on 10-1-1981 by encashing 8 bills from the Government Treasury at Bettiah. The same was in pursuance of a conspiracy of three persons including the accused-petitioner. PW-9 has proved the confessional statement which is in his own handwriting and is marked Ext.1. He has stated in his cross-examination that the entire procedure for recording confessional statement was followed. The same is not in the form of questions and answers. The same could not be recorded in the prescribed form because of absence of the same. He had orally and clearly explained to the accused-petitioner that the confessional statement of the accused may go against him and may be used against him. No question was put to PW-9 about false implication or that he was making the statement under some duress or threat. The whole of the cross-examination of PW-9 is set out hereinbelow : 12. It is thus manifest from a close scrutiny of the confessional statement and the deposition of PW-9 that the accused-petitioner had made his confessional statement voluntarily, free from duress. The whole of the cross-examination of PW-9 is set out hereinbelow : 12. It is thus manifest from a close scrutiny of the confessional statement and the deposition of PW-9 that the accused-petitioner had made his confessional statement voluntarily, free from duress. The fact that the bills were encashed way back in January 1981 and he had voluntarily surrendered on 6th or 7th of September 1983 is more than adequate evidence of the fact that he had far more than sufficient time for reflection. He has stated in his statement that he was in Calcutta without his family. All this must have filled him with contribution and overwhelmed him with loneliness caused by the absence of his family. He was after all in hibernation for 2 years and eight months and, therefore, there could not have been the question of being chased by the police or under any kind of duress or threat. He must have reflected over the entire matter leading to his voluntary surrender and voluntary confession of the guilt. Secondly, he had surrendered on 6th or 7th of September 1983, and his confessional statement was recorded on 16-9-1993. There was thus sufficient time on the second leg also for reflection. There is no evidence on record, nor there is any cross-examination of, or suggestion to, the prosecution witnesses that the accused was under duress, threat, or pressure at the hands of any body including the police to confess his guilt. Thirdly, the confessional statement read with the deposition of PW-9 makes it abundantly clear that the petitioner was under no duress, no threat and had made his statement voluntarily. I, therefore, reach the conclusion without hesitation that the confessional statement of the accused- petitioner was perfectly voluntary, of his own free will and volition, completely and entirely unoppressed by any threat or duress. He had sufficient time to think freely whether or not to make the confessional statement. 13. This takes me on to another vital aspect of the matter on which both sides have advanced elaborate arguments. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the provisions of Section 164, Cr PC have not been properly and strictly followed in the present case, the relevant portion of which is set out hereinbelow for the facility of quick reference : "164. Recording of confessions and statements. (1)..................... Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the provisions of Section 164, Cr PC have not been properly and strictly followed in the present case, the relevant portion of which is set out hereinbelow for the facility of quick reference : "164. Recording of confessions and statements. (1)..................... (2) The Magistrate shall, before recording any such confession, explain to the person making it that he is not bound to make a confession and that, if he does so, it may be used as evidence against him; and the Magistrate shall not record any such confession unless, upon questioning the person making it, he has reason to believe that it is being made voluntarily. (3)........................................ (4) Any such confession shall be recorded in the manner provided in Section 281 for recording the examination of an accused-person and shall be signed by the person making the confession; and the Magistrate shall make a memorandum at the foot of such record to the following effect: "I have explained to (name) that he is not bound to make a confession and that, if he does so, any confession he may make may be used as evidence against him and I believe that this confession was voluntarily made, It was taken in my presence and hearing, and was read over to the person making it and admitted by him to be correct, and it contains a full and true account of the statement made by him. (Signed) A. B. Magistrate." (5)............................................... (6).............................................. 13.1. Learned Counsel submitted that the confessional statement gives no impression that the learned Magistrate had forewarned him that his confession may be used as evidence against him. She has relied on the following reported judgment : (i) Sarwan Singh V/s. State of Punjab, AIR 1957 SC 637 . (ii) Kehar Singh V/s. State Delhi Admn, AIR 1988 SC 1883 . (iii) Shivappa V/s. State of Karnataka, (1995) 2 SCC 76 . 13.2. Learned APP has submitted in opposition that the provisions of Section 164, Cr PC have been sub-stantially complied with in the present case law is well settled that the confessional statement needs some corroboration which is entirely satisfied in the present case. The fact that some corroboration is needed is a rule of prudence normally observed by the courts as a matter of abundant precaution, and is no requirement of Section 164 read with Section 281 of the Code. The fact that some corroboration is needed is a rule of prudence normally observed by the courts as a matter of abundant precaution, and is no requirement of Section 164 read with Section 281 of the Code. In fact, the confessional statement of the accused in the present case itself proves the guilt of the accused fully. He has submitted that the evidence on record other than the confessional statement is by itself adequate to prove the guilt of the accused. He further submits that the observance of the provisions of Section 164 Cr PC with all its rigours can be supplemented by evidence. The omission, if any, in the confessional statement in the present case has been fully satisfied by the deposition of PW-9 the Judicial Magistrate, who had recorded that same. Learned Counsel further submitted that the judgments relied-on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner really support the prosecution case. He has relied on the following reported judgments : (i) Sarwan Singh V/s. Stae of Punjab, AIR 1957 SC 637 . (ii) Shankaria V/s. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1978 SC 1248 . (iii) State of U.P. V/s. Boota Singh, AIR 1978 SC 1771. 14. As to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Sarwan Singhs case(supra), the following portion may be usefully quoted : "Nevertheless usually courts require some corroboration to the confessional statement before convicting an accused-person on such a statement. What amount of corroboration would be necessary in such a case would always be a question of fact to be determined in the light of the circumstances of each case. In the present case, the learned Sessions Judge has considered the question about the voluntary character of the confession made by Sarwan Singh and has found in favour of the prosecution ........................................................ ................................................Prima facie whether or not the confession is voluntary would be a question of fact and we would be reluctant to interfere with a finding on such a question of fact unless we are satisfied that the impugned finding has been reached without applying the true and relevant legal tests in the matter. ............................................................. ................................................Prima facie whether or not the confession is voluntary would be a question of fact and we would be reluctant to interfere with a finding on such a question of fact unless we are satisfied that the impugned finding has been reached without applying the true and relevant legal tests in the matter. ............................................................. There can be no doubt that, when an accused-person is produced before the Magistrate by the investigating officer, it is of utmost importance that the mind of the accused-person should be completely freed from any possible influence of the police and the effective way of securing such freedom from fear to the accused-person is to send him to jail custody and give him adequate time to consider whether he should make a confession at all. It would naturally be difficult to lay down any hard and fast rule as to the time which should be allowed to an accused-person in any given case. However speaking generally, it would, we think, be reasonable to insist upon giving an accused-person at least 24 hours to decide whether or not he should make a confession. Where there may be reason to suspect that the accused has been persuaded or coerced to make a confession, even longer period may have to be given to him before his statement is recorded." 14.1. As to the judgment in the case of Kehar Singh (supra), paragraph 117 may be usefully quoted : "On a consideration of the above decisions it is manifest that if the provisions of Section 164 (2) which require that the Magistrate before recording confession shall explain to the person making confession that he is not bound to make a confession and if he does so, it may be used as evidence against him and upon questioning the person if the Magistrate has reasons to believe that its is being made voluntarily then the confession will be recorded by the Magistrate. The compliance of the sub-section (2) of Section 164 is, therefore, mandatory and imperative and non-compliance of it renders the confession inadmissible in evidence. Section 463 (old Section 533) of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that where the questions and answers regarding the confession have not been recorded evidence can be adduced to prove that in fact the requirements of sub-section (2) of Section 164 read with Section 281 have been complied with. Section 463 (old Section 533) of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that where the questions and answers regarding the confession have not been recorded evidence can be adduced to prove that in fact the requirements of sub-section (2) of Section 164 read with Section 281 have been complied with. If the Court comes to a finding, that such a compliance had in fact been made the mere omission to record the same in the proper form will not render it in admissible in evidence and the defect is cured under Section 463 (Section 533 of the old Criminal Procedure Code) but when there is non-compliance of the mandatory requirement of Section 164(2) Criminal Procedure Code and it comes out in evidence that no such explanation as envisaged in the aforesaid sub-section has been given to the accused by the Magistrate this substantial defect cannot be cured under Section 463 Criminal Procedure Code" (Emphasis supplied). 14.2. As to the judgment in Shivappas case (supra), the following portion of paragraphs 6 and 7 may be extracted : "6. From the plain language of Section 164, Cr PC and the rules and guidelines framed by the High Court regarding the recording of confessional statements of an accused under Section 164, Cr PC, it is manifest tiiat the said provisions emphasis an inquiry by the Magistrate to ascertain the voluntary nature of the confession. This inquiry appears to be the most significant and an important part of the duty of the Magistrate recording the confessional statement of an accused under Section 164, Cr PC. The failure of the Magistrate to put such questions from, which he could ascertain the voluntary nature of the confession detracts so materially from the evidentiary value of the confession of an accused that it would not be safe to act upon the same. Full and adequate compliance not merely in form but in essence with the provisions of Section 164, Cr PC and the rules framed by the High Court is imperative and its non-compliance goes to the root of the Magistrates jurisdiction to record the confession and renders the confession unworthy of credence.................... 7. Full and adequate compliance not merely in form but in essence with the provisions of Section 164, Cr PC and the rules framed by the High Court is imperative and its non-compliance goes to the root of the Magistrates jurisdiction to record the confession and renders the confession unworthy of credence.................... 7. The Magistrate who is entrusted witii the duty of recording confession of an accused coming from police custody or jail custody must appreciate his function in tiiat behalf as one of a judicial officer and he must apply his judicial mind to ascertain and satisfy his conscience that the statement the accused makes is not on account of any extraneous influence on him. That indeed is the essence of a voluntary statement within the meaning of the provisions of Section 164, Cr PC and the rules framed by the High Court for the guidance of the subordinate courts. Moreover, the Magistrate must not only be satisfied as to the voluntary character of the statement, he should also make and leave such material on the record in proof of the compliance with the imperative requirements of the statutory provisions, as would satisfy the Court that sits in judgment in the case, that the confessional statement was made by the accused voluntary and the statutory provisions were strictly complied with." 14.3. As to the judgment in Shankarias case (supra) the Supreme Court laid down as follows in paragraph 22 of the report: "22. This confession was retracted by the appellant when he was examined at the trial under Section 311, Cr PC on June 14, 1975. It is well settled that a confession, if voluntarily and truthfully made, is an efficacious proof of guilt. Therefore, when in a capital case the prosecution demands a conviction of the accused, primarily on the basis of his confession recorded under Section 164, Cr PC, the Court must apply a double test: (1) Whether the confession was perfectiy voluntary ? (2) If so, whether it is true and trustworthy ? Satisfaction of the first test is a sine qua non for its admissibility in evidence. If the confession appears to the Court to have been caused by any inducement, threat or promise such as is mentioned in Section 24, Evidence Act, it must be excluded and rejected brevi manu. (2) If so, whether it is true and trustworthy ? Satisfaction of the first test is a sine qua non for its admissibility in evidence. If the confession appears to the Court to have been caused by any inducement, threat or promise such as is mentioned in Section 24, Evidence Act, it must be excluded and rejected brevi manu. In such a case, the question of proceeding further to apply the second test, does not arise. If the first test is satisfied, the Court must before acting upon the confession, reach the finding that what is stated therein is true and reliable. For judging the reliability of such a confession, or for that matter of any substantive piece of evidence, there is no rigid canon of universal application. Even so, one broad method which may be useful in most cases for evaluating a confession may be indicated. The Court should carefully examine the confession and compare it with the rest of the evidence, in the light of the surrounding circumstances and probabilities of the case. If on such examination and comparison, the confession appears to be a probable catelogue of events and naturally fits in with the rest of the evidence and the surrounding circumstances, it may be taken to have satisfied the second test." (Emphasis supplied.) 14.4. As to the judgment in the case of State of UP V/s. Boota Singh, (supra), it was a case of retracted confession and yet relied on by the Supreme Court for the purpose of conviction of the accused after setting aside the judgment of acquittal of the High Court. The supreme Court held as follows in paragraph 11 of the report. "The High Court was, therefore, not justified in brushing aside the well reasoned finding of the Sessions Judge on this point merely on the basis of speculation and the circumstances which were in fact not proved. As however the confession was a retracted one it could be acted upon only if substantially corroborated by independent circumstances. It is not necessary that a retracted confession should be corroborated in each material particular, but it is sufficient that there is a general corroboration of the important incidents mentioned in the confession. As however the confession was a retracted one it could be acted upon only if substantially corroborated by independent circumstances. It is not necessary that a retracted confession should be corroborated in each material particular, but it is sufficient that there is a general corroboration of the important incidents mentioned in the confession. In the instant case, we find that the circumstances proved by the prosecution not only amount to a complete corroboration of the confession but provide additional circumstantial evidence against the respondent which are of a conclusive nature. We would now deal with the confession in the light of the observations made above. 15. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts and circumstances of the present case, this Court is convinced that the confession of the accused-petitioner was perfectly voluntary. This Court is in full agreement with the findings recorded in this behalf by the courts below. As found here-in-above, the occurrence took place on. 10-1-81 at Bettiah, and the accused-petitioner had voluntarily surrendered on 6th or 7th of September, 1983, in a Police Station at Calcutta. He had, thus, two years and eight months for reflection which is a very important circumstance in the present case to reach the conclusion that the confession was perfectly voluntary, entirely free from any duress or threat. As found here-in-above, it is manifest from the confessional statement read with the evidence of PW-9 that the provisions of Section 164(2), Cr PC have been fully complied with. The confessional statement of the accused has to be read with the evidence of PW-9 and the same are covered by the provisions of Section 463 of the Code. The defect, if any, in recording the confessional statement has been satisfactorily cured by the evidence of PW-9 in terms of Section 463 of the Code. The Magistrate had explained to the accused-petitioner that he was not bound to make a confession, and if he did so, it may be used as evidence against him. It has equally been found by both the courts below with which this Court fully agrees that the confession had been made voluntarily. As laid down by the Honble Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgments, if the questions and answers regarding confession have not been recorded, then evidence can be adduced to prove that. It has equally been found by both the courts below with which this Court fully agrees that the confession had been made voluntarily. As laid down by the Honble Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgments, if the questions and answers regarding confession have not been recorded, then evidence can be adduced to prove that. In fact, the requirement of sub-section (2) of Section 164 read with Section 281 have been complied with and the defect, if any, has been fully cured under Section 463 of the Code. On examination of the entire matter, this Court is convinced that the requirements of Section 164, Cr PC had been complied with in the present case and corroborated by other evidence on record. In fact, both supplement and complement each other. 16. In the result, this revision application fails and is accordingly dismissed. The impugned judgment dated 18-8-1988, passed by the learned 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Bettiah, in Criminal Appeal No. 32 of 1987, is hereby upheld. The bail bond of the petitioner is hereby cancelled and he is directed to surrender in the trial Court forthwith to serve the remainder of the sentence.