Honble YADAV, J.–The present first appeal was posted for disposal of the application moved under Sec.5 of the Indian Limitation Act on 3.7.99 on which date Shri Sanjeev Johari and Shri Ravi Bhansali accepted notice on behalf of respondent No.2. Since notice was accepted by the learned counsel Mr. Sanjeev Johari and Mr. Ravi Bhansali on Behalf of respondent No.2, therefore the case was posted today for disposal of the application moved under Sec.5 of the Indian Limitation Act. (2). The present first appeal has been filed u/Sec. 96 CPC against the judgment and decree dated 1.10.97 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, No.1, Udaipur whereby he dismissed the suit No.4 of 1997 of the appellants on the ground that Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain a suit pertaining to Land Acquisition Act which is self-contained Act. In support of his judgment, the learned Additional District Judge, No. 1 Udaipur has placed reliance on a decision rendered by the Apex Court in case of Laxmi Chand & Ors. vs. Gram Panchayat, Kararia & Ors. (1). (3). Dis-satisfied with the impugned judgment and decree dated 1.10.97, the present first appeal has been filed, which is reported to be barred by laps of time by 476 days. (4). I have gone through the explanation given for condonation of inordinate delay of 476 days. (5). It is to be noticed that notification under Sec.4 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act was published on 12.11 1962 whereas notification under Sec.6 was published on 28.2.1963. (6). Aggrieved against the aforesaid two notifications, the appellants preferred writ petition No.664 of 1969, which was dismissed on the ground of limitation on 5.1.1971. After dismissal of the writ petition by the learned Single Judge of this Court on 5.1.1971, the present appellants filed a Regular Civil Suit before the learned Civil Court, which was dismissed on 1.9.75. Against dismissal of the Civil Suit dt. 1.9.75, an appeal was filed before this Court which was remanded by the learned Single Judge of this Court on 25.2.1987. After remand by this Court, when the matter was again taken up before the learned Additional District Judge, it was dismissed by impugned judgment holding that jurisdiction of civil court is impliedly barred under Sec.9, CPC. 1.9.75, an appeal was filed before this Court which was remanded by the learned Single Judge of this Court on 25.2.1987. After remand by this Court, when the matter was again taken up before the learned Additional District Judge, it was dismissed by impugned judgment holding that jurisdiction of civil court is impliedly barred under Sec.9, CPC. In support of his aforesaid conclusion, the learned trial court has placed reliance on the decision rendered by the Apex Court in case of Laxmi Chand (supra) as mentioned hereinabove in the preceding paragraphs of this judgment. (7). Against the impugned judgment passed by the learned Additional District Judge, No.1, Udaipur dated 1.10.97, nine writ petitions were filed before the learned Single Judge of this Court. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that aforesaid nine writ petitions were dismissed as withdrawn on 5.4.99 on the ground of alternative remedy available by way of filing appeal. This is how the present appeal has been filed explaining the delay in filing the present appeal against the judgment impugned. (8). It is urged by the learned counsel for the appellants Mr. M. Mridul assisted by Mr. Sunil Mehta that the present appellants were prosecuting their remedies in competent court, therefore, in computing the period of limitation, in the present appeal, the time during which, the appellants were prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding whether in a court of first instance or appeal or revision or in writ petitions against the same defendant respondent should be excluded as the proceeding relates to the same subject- matter in issue. According to the learned counsel for the appellats, if time taken in filing nine writ petitions against the impugned judgment under appeal is excluded then delay can be condoned and appeal may be admitted for decision on merit. (9). Learned counsel Mr. Ravi Bhansali appearing on behalf of respondent No.2 vehemently opposed the condonation of delay. It is urged by the learned counsel for the respondent that once it is established that against the notification issued under Sec.4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, the present appellants have filed a writ petition before this Court, which was dismissed on 5.1.71 then thereafter dismissal of the writ petition they have no legal justification whatsoever to file a civil suit. It is urged by the learned counsel for the respondent that dismissal of the writ petition by the High Court under Art.226 of the Constitution of India on 5.1.71 challenging the legality and validity of the notification issued under Sec.4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act had attained finality and after dismissal of the writ petition, the learned civil court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. (10). It is strenuously urged by the learned counsel for respondent No.2 that the controversy involved in the present application for condonation of delay is squarely covered by the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in case of Laxmi Chand (supra) wherein it is specifically ruled by the Apex Court that the scheme of the Act is complete in itself and thereby the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to take cognizance of the cases arising under the Land Acquisition Act, by necessary implication, stood barred. It is also specifically ruled in Para 3 of the said decision that jurisdiction of the Civil Court is impliedly barred under Sec.9 CPC to take cog- nizance relating to legality and validity of the notification issued under Sec.4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. The only right an aggrieved person has is to approach the contitutional courts namely, the High Court and the Supreme Court under their plenary power under Articles 226 and 136 respectively. (11). There is substance in the argument of the learned counsel for the respo- ndent. Suffice it to say in this regard that the decision rendered by the Apex Court in cases of Laxmi Chand (supra) is binding upon this Court as a precedent within the meaning of Article 141 of the Constitution of India, which clearly provides that law declared by Supreme Court shall be binding on all courts within the territory of India. This Court has no option except to act in accordance with the pronounce- ment of decision of the Supreme Court in case of Laxmi Chand (supra) within the meaning of Art. 144 of the Constitution of India according to which all authorities civil and judicial in the territory of India shall act in the aid of the Supreme Court pronouncement. (12). (12). In view of the discussion made hereinabove, in my considered opinion, this Court has no option except to act in the aid of pronouncement by the Supreme Court made in case of Laxmi Chand (supra). Once it is held that there is inherent lack of jurisdiction to take cognizance in the matter relating to notification issued under Sec.4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act by the Civil Court then it is not possible for this Court to presume that the appellants were prosecuting their reme- dies before the Civil Court with due diligence as envisaged under Sec.14 of the Indian Limitation Act. The possibility of due diligence in the present case is also ruled out as the appellants had filed the civil suit after dismissal of their writ petition under Art.226 of the Constitution of India by learned Single Judge of this Court on 5.1.1971 refusing to interfere with the legality and validity of the notification issued under Sec.4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act which was made subject-matter of dispute in the present suit. (13). From the discussion made hereinabove, I am not satisfied with the explanation of inordinate delay of 476 days in filing this present appeal. The cause shown in the application for condonation of delay is not sufficient within the mean- ing of Sec..5 of the Indian Limitation Act. The plaintiff-appellants are not entitled to get benefit of Sec.14 of the Indian Limitation Act. (14). As a result of the aforesaid discussion, the application moved under Sec.5 of the Indian Limitation Act is rejected and present first appeal is hereby dismissed as barred by laps of time.