O. P. GARG, J. ( 1 ) THIS writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is directed against the order dated 15. 12. 1998 passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer 1. Allahabad (for short r. C. E. O. ) declaring the vacancy of the second floor portion of premises No, 31/31 Sardar Patel marg, Allahabad under Section 12 of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act ). ( 2 ) PUT briefly, the facts of the case are that Shambhoo Chopra, respondent No. 5, who is owner/landlord of premises No. 31/31, Sardar Patel Marg, Allahabad intimated the District magistrate about the vacancy of the accommodation on the second floor of the aforesaid house stating that Rizwan Ullah, who was in occupation of the same as a tenant has delivered vacant possession to the landlords and has cleared rent up to May, 1998. On this intimation, the r. C. E. O. deputed the Rent Control Inspector (for short r. C. I. ) to verify the facts. A report after spot inspection was submitted by the RCI on 13. 7. 1998. He found that Usman Gani Khan, present petitioner and his family members are residing in the disputed accommodation comprising two large sized rooms, one small room, two shall balconies, a terrace and usual amenities of kitchen and toilet, on the second floor of the house. It was also reported that Usman gani Khan was in occupation of accommodation for the last about two years though there was no order of allotment in his favour. After the receipt of the report of the RCI. notices were issued to the occupant Usman Gani Khan as well as the landlords. The petitioner appeared before the r. C. E. O. and took the plea in his objection that he is in occupation of the disputed accommodation right from 1976 with the consent of the landlord to whom initially a sum of Rs. 100 per month was paid as rent but in course of lime, it came to be graduated to Rs. 500 per month, though no receipts have been issued. The landlord, it was alleged, refused to receive the rent from the month of June 1998 and consequently, the petitioner was compelled to deposit the rent in Court of Civil Judge (Junior Division) West. 500 per month, though no receipts have been issued. The landlord, it was alleged, refused to receive the rent from the month of June 1998 and consequently, the petitioner was compelled to deposit the rent in Court of Civil Judge (Junior Division) West. Allahabad, under Section 30 of the Act. The landlord denied the above facts. Rizwan Ullah who was earlier tenant of the disputed accommodation, filed an affidavit to depose that the disputed accommodation was never occupied by Usman Ganl Khan and that after paying the rent upto March 1998, he (Rlzan Ullah)put the landlord-Shambhoo Chopra in peaceful possession of the accommodation in question. After taking Into consideration the material available on record and the circumstances attending the case, the learned R. C. E. O. by the impugned order dated 15. 12. 1998 came to the conclusion that the petitloner-Usman Gani Khan was an unauthorized occupant of the disputed accommodation and accordingly a deemed vacancy under Section 12 of the Act was declared. It is this order, which has been challenged by the petitioner before this Court by Invoking its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The grounds of challenge mentioned in the writ petition are that the landlord has another house to live in and, therefore, he does not need the disputed accommodation for his occupation, that the petitioner is depositing rent continuously and that the dispute arose when the petitioner deposited rent in court. It is prayed that the impugned order dated 15. 12. 1998, a copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, be quashed and the respondents be commanded not to interfere with the possession of the petitioner over the disputed accommodation. ( 3 ) RESPONDENT No. 5-Shambhu Chopra, who is one of the co-landlords has filed a counter-affidavit repelling all the submissions made by the petitioner. It has been emphatically denied that the petitioner is a tenant in any portion of the premises No. 31/31 Sardar Patel Marg, allahabad, known as Chopra Building. It is asserted that the petitioner is not in occupation of the disputed accommodation with the consent of the landlord and he being an Illegal occupant, a deemed vacancy under Section 12 of the Act has been rightly declared by the R. C. E. O. No rejoinder-affidavit has been filed. It is asserted that the petitioner is not in occupation of the disputed accommodation with the consent of the landlord and he being an Illegal occupant, a deemed vacancy under Section 12 of the Act has been rightly declared by the R. C. E. O. No rejoinder-affidavit has been filed. ( 4 ) HEARD Sri Rajesh Nath Tripathi, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri P. C. Srivastava, who appeared on behalf of the landlords-respondent Nos. 2 to 6, as well as learned standing counsel. ( 5 ) IT is an indubitable fact that the respondent Nos. 2 to 6 are the owners/landlords of the premises, known as Chopra Building bearing old No. 31/31 (new No. 15/a) Sardar Patel Marg, allahabad. It is also common case of the parties that the petitioner Usman Gani Khan is in occupation of second floor portion of the said building. According to the landlords, the said portion was earlier in occupation of Rizwan Ullah Siddiqul as a tenant and that he had vacated the same and delivered possession to the landlords after paying rent upto May, 1998 and consequently, an intimation of vacancy, as required under the law, was given by the landlords to the District Magistrate. This intimation led to an enquiry by R. C. E. O. and during the course of enquiry, as stated above, it transpired that Usman Gani Khan asserts his occupation with the consent of the landlord. It is further admitted that the petitioner Usman Gani Khan is not occupying the disputed accommodation in pursuance of order of allotment in his favour. In fact, he has admitted that there is no order of allotment in his favour. His assertion is that his possession over the disputed accommodation stands regularized in view of the provisions of section 14 of the Act. ( 6 ) PARTIES to this writ petition would swim or sink with the finding whether the petitioner ts in occupation of the disputed accommodation with the consent of the landlord since 1976 and if so, his possession as a tenant stands regularized or whether he is an unauthorized occupant. ( 6 ) PARTIES to this writ petition would swim or sink with the finding whether the petitioner ts in occupation of the disputed accommodation with the consent of the landlord since 1976 and if so, his possession as a tenant stands regularized or whether he is an unauthorized occupant. ( 7 ) THE sheet anchor of the case of the petitioner is that though he is not in possession of the disputed accommodation in pursuance of order of allotment, but his possession stands regularized in view of the provisions of Section 14 of the Act as he is occupying the said accommodation since 1976 with the consent of the landlord. Now the question is whether in the light of the facts and circumstances of the case. the petitioner is entitled to protection as afforded by Section 14. Section 14 was inserted in place of the old one by U. P. Act No. 28 of 1976 with effect from 5. 7. 1976. Section 14 carves out certain categories of cases under which a tenant or licensee would be entitled to get his tenancy or occupation regularized, although he entered into possession without any allotment order. On the language of Section 14, as it stands, by the legal fiction created thereunder, any person who was in possession with the consent of the landlord immediately before 5. 7. 1976 would automatically be deemed to be a tenant under the Act notwithstanding the provisions of Section 11 to the contrary. In this connection, a reference may be made to the decision of this Court in the case of Girish Nath Pandey v. Jagannath Prasad, 1983 (1) ARC 696. Thus, the provisions of Section 14 are self-operating in nature. By it, the legislature has provided that any person in occupation of a building as licensee or a tenant with the consent of the landlord or the tenant or any person in occupation of it in any capacity, immediately before the commencement of U. P. Act 28 of 1976, would be entitled to get his occupation or tenancy regularized provided that no proceeding for his eviction was pending. The object of the newly inserted section is to confer on an occupant of a building or part thereof with the consent of the landlord on the relevant date, a status of a deemed tenant or authorized licensee and thereby extend the protective umbrella of the Act to him. The benefit of Section 14 is not automatic. A person claiming benefit of the said section is required to establish that he was licensee or tenant and he was in possession on the date immediately before the commencement of the Act No. 28 of 1976. The provision of Section 14 came to be interpreted in the decision of this Court in Ratan Lal v. District Judge Bulandshahr and others, 1979 ARC 251. The view taken in that case was that the Court cannot assume the consent of the landlord in the matter. A consent of a landlord needed for conferring the rights under Section 14 of the Act cannot be presumed or assumed. It has to be proved. It is possible that in some case, the consent may be express whereas in others implied. But without proof of consent, the benefit of Section 14 cannot be extended. The expression immediately before the commencement of the Uttar Pradesh Urban buildings [regulation of Letting, Rent, and Eviction) (Amendment) Act, 1976 has reference to the occupation of the licensee or the tenant, as the case may be. Any person coming into possession of a building with the consent of the landlord after (he commencement of U. P. Act no. 28 of 1976 shall not be entitled to the benefit of Section 14. In Dharam Chandra Gogia v. IV addl. District Judge. 1978 (UP) RCC 386 and Smt. Rajeshwari v. IXth Addl District Judge, kanpur, 1983 (1) ARC 550, it was held that where the tenancy came to an end before the commencement of amending Act of 1976, the protection of Section 14 can be denied because it could not be said that occupier was in possession of the premises as a tenant with the consent of the landlord immediately before the commencement of the Act. In Jawahar Lal Varma v. IIIrd addl. District Judge, Meerut, 1986 (UP) RCC 163, the petitioner was in occupation of the premises from the year 1977 and, therefore, he was denied the benefit of Section 14. In Jawahar Lal Varma v. IIIrd addl. District Judge, Meerut, 1986 (UP) RCC 163, the petitioner was in occupation of the premises from the year 1977 and, therefore, he was denied the benefit of Section 14. ( 8 ) IN the Instant case, the petitioner has made a sweeping allegation that he has been in possession of the disputed accommodation since 1976. He has not specified any particular date on which he carne in occupation of the accommodation in question. There is also no concrete or tangible evidence on record to establish his possession prior to 5. 7. 1976 on which the amending act came into existence. The matter was considered by this Court in the case of Smt. Laxmi sharma v. District Judge, Dehradun and others, 1983 UPRCC 633. In that case, the petitioner instead of mentioning the date, the affidavit simply stated that the petitioner was in possession since July 1976, It was held that this averment was not sufficient in law. An argument was advanced on behalf of the petitioner in that case that the averment that she was in possession since July. 1976 with statement that the tenancy was monthly established with the help of general Clauses Act. that the petitioner shall be deemed to have come in possession since 1st july. 1976 was not accepted. It was further observed that to claim benefit under Section 14. the petitioner should have come with specific case. Apart from it, it was observed, even assuming that the petitioner was in possession, it should have been as licensee or tenant with the consent of the landlord. The respondent-landlords have emphatically denied the possession of the petitioner over the disputed accommodation at any point of time. According to them, the question of induction of the petitioner with their consent did not arise. It has come on record that one Rizwan ullah Siddiqui was in occupation of the disputed accommodation and that he vacated the said accommodation after clearing the rent for the period up to May, 1998. Since the accommodation was in occupation of Rlzwan Ullah Siddiqui-tenant. the same accommodation could not have been in occupation or possession of the present petitioner. It has come on record that one Rizwan ullah Siddiqui was in occupation of the disputed accommodation and that he vacated the said accommodation after clearing the rent for the period up to May, 1998. Since the accommodation was in occupation of Rlzwan Ullah Siddiqui-tenant. the same accommodation could not have been in occupation or possession of the present petitioner. It appears that the petitioner found an entry in the disputed accommodation on account of his connivance with the outgoing tenant, rizwan Ullah Siddiqui, Both, on factual and legal matrix, it is clear that the petitioner has not been in possession of the disputed accommodation since before 5th July 1976 with the consent of the landlords. In view of the finding recorded by the R. C. E. O. which has withstood the test of scrutiny of this Court, there can be no escape from the conclusion that the petitioner is not entitled to the protection under Section 14 of the Act. ( 9 ) THE other limb of the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that no vacancy had taken place, and. therefore, the possession of the petitioner cannot be disturbed. In support of his contention. Sri Tripathi. learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the various decisions of this Court as well as Honble Supreme Court, which are Dr. (Mrs.) Gyan Ghapa v. District Judge, Allahabad and others, 1979 ARC 59 : Khubi Singh Yadav and others v. District judge. Allahabad and others, 1980 ARC 99 : Smt. Maddi Devi and another v. Addl. District judge Kanpur and others, 1981 ARC 167 Virendra Kumar Agarwal v. VIIth Additional District judge. Kanpur and others. 1983 ARC 451 ; Mohd. Azeern v. District Judge Aligarh and others. 1985 (2) ARC 85 and M/s. Khanna Brothers, Kanpur and others v. Smt. Sita Devi and others, 1985 (2) ARC 415. I have thoroughly scrutinized each one of the above decisions and find that the various observations made in the said decisions are not germane to the controversy in hand. Learned counsel was not in a position to indicate as to for what purpose the aforesaid decisions have been cited. My feeling is that the learned counsel for the petitioner has tried to unnecessarily stuff the aforesaid rulings, which are not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. Learned counsel was not in a position to indicate as to for what purpose the aforesaid decisions have been cited. My feeling is that the learned counsel for the petitioner has tried to unnecessarily stuff the aforesaid rulings, which are not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. ( 10 ) THE entire controversy now boils down to this : that the petitioner has neither an order of allotment in his favour nor he 15 entitled to the protection under Section 14 of the Act and consequently. he stands relegated to the status of unauthorized occupant without allotment. Such a person has to be treated with reference to the provisions of Sections II and 13 of the Act. A bare reading of Sections 11 and 13 of the Act shows that a person who occupies accommodation without an order of allotment in his favour even if it be with the consent of the landlord, but whose occupation is not protected by Section 14 of the Act, the said occupation is and is to be treated in the eyes of law to be in unauthorized occupation of the accommodation. This aspect of the matter came to be considered by a Division Bench of this Court In the case of Geep industrial Syndicate Ltd. Allahabad v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer. Allahabad, 1982 (1)ARC 585, in which Honble K. C. Agrawal, speaking for the Bench, held that : "section 11 of the Act imposes a prohibition or restriction against letting without an allotment order. Section 12 contemplates certain contingencies in which a landlord or tenant of a building would be deemed to have ceased to occupy it. Section 13 provides for restriction on occupation of building without allotment order. A conjoined reading of Section 11 imposes prohibition on letting without allotment order. Section 13 places restriction on occupation without an allotment or release. These two sections are required to be read together. Reading these two sections, it would appear that neither could a landlord let out a premises without an allotment order nor can anyone occupy it. These two provisions were enacted to undo the effect of a Full Bench decision of this Court in Udho Dass v. Prem Prakash. 1993 SC FB RC 334. Reading these two sections, it would appear that neither could a landlord let out a premises without an allotment order nor can anyone occupy it. These two provisions were enacted to undo the effect of a Full Bench decision of this Court in Udho Dass v. Prem Prakash. 1993 SC FB RC 334. " the aforesaid decision now stands affirmed by a decision of the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Nootan Kumar and others v. IInd Additional District Judge, Banda and others, 1993 SC fbrc 334. The ratio decidendi of the Full Bench decision is that from the provisions contained in Sections 11, 13, 17 and 31 of the new Act, it is clear as the light of day that an agreement involving transaction of either letting by the landlord or occupation by any person of any building except in pursuance of an order of allotment or release being prohibited has to be treated to have been invalidated by the statute rendering it void and unenforceable in a Court of law. No remedies are open to either party to an agreement the very formation of which is illegal by virtue of any provision of a statute. It is firmly settled that if an agreement is made to do or suffer a prohibited act, the agreement will be unenforceable, and no Court will extend its assistance for its implementation. A controversy of identical nature, as is Involved in the instant case, had come up for consideration before this Court in the case of Sarvendra Pal Jaggi v. Additional District Magistrate (Civil Supplies) Meerut, 1993 (I) AIM 489. wherein it was held that the vacancy in such circumstance will come into existence by operation of law. This Court observed that when a person enters in possession without an allotment order, under law his possession cannot be better than that of an unauthorized occupant and it could also not improve on account of length of period he occupied it as such. The Court further observed that from the very inception the possession of such person can be only unauthorized and if on the admitted fact the effect of the law is that the premises shall be treated as vacant and open for allotment or release it could not be ignored on account of conduct of the respondent-landlord. In another case in R. S. Sinha v. Addl. In another case in R. S. Sinha v. Addl. District Judge, Lucknow and others, 1994 (1) ARC 418, it was held that a deeming clause has got its own effect and creates a legal fiction. Occupation with the consent of the landlord may in ordinary parlance not be said to be unauthorized occupation because of the consent of the landlord but even in such case where a person occupies a building with the consent of the landlord but without an allotment order in his favour, such a person occupies it as unlawful occupant. ( 11 ) A short and swift reference may also be made to some recent decisions of this Court on the point. They are Rakesh Kumar Vats v. District Judge, Saharanpur and others, 1999 (1) ARC 457; mool Chand Gupta. v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer and others, 1999 (1) ARC 515 and the decision dated 13. 5. 1999 in Civil Misc. Writ No, 569 of 1999, Hari Shankar Rastogi v. Rent control and Eviction Officer, Allahabad and others. ( 12 ) A close reading of Sections 11, 13 and 31 of the Act with reference to the decisions referred to above, unequivocally makes it clear that letting of a building is controlled by the provisions of the Act only and no one is allowed to occupy the premises without allotment or release order. Section 13 of the Act lays down, in unerring terms, that no person shall occupy the building otherwise than under an order of allotment or release under Section 16 and if he does so, he shall be deemed to be an unauthorized occupant of such building which shall be deemed to be vacant. ( 13 ) A faint suggestion was made on behalf of the petitioner that the petitioner is entitled to the same treatment as has been extended to one Piyush Narain Dubey who was also an occupant in a portion of the chopra Bhavan and in respect of whom a vacancy dated 15. 12. 1998 has been declared. It was urged that on ground of parity similar order, as has been passed on 24. 2. 1999. in ciuil Misc. Writ No. 51722 of 1999, Piyush Narain Dubey v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer, be passed in favour of the present petitioner. There are more than one reasons why the petitioner is not entitled to the parity of the order dated 24. 2. 1999. in ciuil Misc. Writ No. 51722 of 1999, Piyush Narain Dubey v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer, be passed in favour of the present petitioner. There are more than one reasons why the petitioner is not entitled to the parity of the order dated 24. 2. 1999. Admittedly, Piyush Narain Dubey, a practising Advocate was in occupation of the tenanted accommodation in pursuance of an order of allotment. In his case, a deemed vacancy came to be declared on account of the fact that he had shifted to another house-H. I. G. 28. 3 Circular Road, Allahabad. In that case, the petitioner piyush Narain Dubey had asserted that he continued to be in occupation of the tenanted accommodation and he had shifted to a part of Circular Road House temporarily on account of ailment of his wife and that he was maintaining his office as well as residence in the allotted house in respect of which the vacancy was declared. The case of the petitioner is on an entirely different footing. As said above, he has not come in possession of the disputed accommodation on the strength of an order of allotment. His possession also does not stand regularized, as claimed by him, under Section 14 of the Act. Initially the entry of the petitioner was unauthorized and the status of the petitioner is undoubtedly that of an unauthorized occupant without an order of allotment. The case of the petitioner, therefore, falls within the ambit of the prohibitions contained in Sections 11 and 13 of the Act. ( 14 ) IN the conspectus of the above facts, I have no hesitation in coming to an irresistible conclusion that the possession of the petitioner does not stand regularized or protected under section 14 of the Act. The petitioner is an unauthorized occupant and since he has made a forcible entry without an order of allotment, a deemed vacancy has come into existence. The impugned order dated 15. 12. 1998 passed by the R. C. E. O, declaring the vacancy of the accommodation in the occupation of the petitioner is well founded and suffers from no illegality. It is, therefore, not a case fit enough to warrant intervention under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. ( 15 ) IN the result, the writ petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. .