( 1 ) THIS revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil procedure, is directed against the order dated 10. 9. 1997 passed by 3rd Civil judge Class-II, Jagdalpur in Civil Suit No. 174-A/1996. ( 2 ) IT appears that the trial Court has rejected the preliminary objection filed by the applicants-defendants that the suit, as framed and filed, was beyond the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in view of Section 64 of the M. P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 (henceforth the Act') read with Section 82 (c)thereof. In order to appreciate the controversy between the parties, it is necessary to give the facts stated in the plaint filed by the non-applicant plaintiff. It appears that the non-applicant filed a suit in respect of sheet No. 106 plot No. 7/2 (a) and 7/2 (b) Lay out No. 39 Area 1500 Sq. Ft. situate at santoshi ward, Jagdalpur, purchased by him from the defendant No. 1 by a registered sale-deed dated 23. 12. 1987. It was claimed by the non-applicant that this sale-deed was executed by the dependent No. 1. Tusharkanti Bose who was at that time the President of Nagrik Grih Nirman Sahkari Samiti, jagdalpur. The sale-deed was executed by him in the capacity of the President of the aforesaid Samiti. It was. thereafter, registered as a sale-deed. The consideration was Rs. 13. 000/- (Rupees Thirteen Thousand ). It was also asserted that even after the execution of the sale-deed, the defendant No. 1, tusharkanti Bose did not tell the non-applicant where the plot is situate and he did not know about the nature of the suit property. It was further stated that after allotment, the non-applicant contacted the defendant No. 1, tusharkanti Bose several times orally, but he did not know anything about the nature of his property and he also did not remember the dates on which he contacted Tusharkanti Bose and the members of the aforesaid Samiti. Nor did the non-applicant was given the map of the plot and, therefore, he could not make any construction on the plot transferred to him. Thereafter, it appears that the defendant No. 1 executed another sale-deed in favour of shakil Ahmed Khan who was arrayed as defendant No. 2 in the suit. The sale-deed was executed for and on behalf of the Samiti on 31. 10. 1991 in respect of the suit plot. Thereafter, it appears that the defendant No. 1 executed another sale-deed in favour of shakil Ahmed Khan who was arrayed as defendant No. 2 in the suit. The sale-deed was executed for and on behalf of the Samiti on 31. 10. 1991 in respect of the suit plot. ( 3 ) THE grievance of the non-applicant in the suit was that even after execution of the sale-deed dated 23. 12. 1987, he could not get the map of the plot through the defendant No. 4, its existing President who was subsequently added as a party to the suit along with the defendant No. 3. the Samiti. The applicant No. 2. Shakil Ahamad Khan, who was arrayed as defendant No. 2. obtained the possession of the suit plot and he has constructed a house and is living in that house. The record of the Nazul land was also accordingly made in favour of defendant No. 2 by virtue of the sale-deed dated 31. 10. 1991. ( 4 ) IT is specifically alleged in paragraph 7 that the subsequent transfer of the suit plot was on account of the fraud committed by Tusharkanti Bose, the then President who joined hands with the defendant No. 2 for depriving the non-applicant-plaintiff from the suit plot. It was alleged in paragraph 9 that the non-applicant is filing the documents in support of his suit. In the prayer clause, it has been stated that the ale-deed dated 23. 12. 1987 was validly executed and the subsequent sale-deed dated 31. 10. 1991 was not executed validly. It was also claimed that the non-applicant be placed in possession of the suit property and a decree for permanent injunction be issued against all the defendants for not interfering with his possession on the suit plot. Upon notice to the defendant Nos. 2 and 3. an objection was raised that the suit, as framed and filed, cannot proceed as the Registrar, M. P. Co-operative Societies has jurisdiction to try this case. ( 5 ) IN this revision, therefore, has to be determined if the trial Court was right in rejecting the objection that the plaint was not liable to be returned for proper presentation before, the Court under Order VII, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure. ( 5 ) IN this revision, therefore, has to be determined if the trial Court was right in rejecting the objection that the plaint was not liable to be returned for proper presentation before, the Court under Order VII, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure. ( 6 ) RULE 10 of Order VII of the Code of Civil Procedure clothes a Court the power to return the plaint at any stage for its presentation to proper Court and it has been made clear that this power can be exercised by the Court even by a Court of appeal or revision. This power is subject to Rule 10-A of Order vii of the Code of Civil Procedure. ( 7 ) THE question of return of plain has to be decided at the earliest. It is not necessary to await filing of the written statement if the Court can, on the allegations made in the plaint itself, come to the conclusion that the Court has no jurisdiction to try the case. In the opinion of the Court, if necessary, if it can be done, then power to return the plaint has to be exercised at the earliest without causing any delay. It is necessary for the trial court at the time of filing to examine the plaint with a view to find out if it has jurisdiction to try a suit or not. The Court can suo motu exercise its power to return the plaint because it has full competence to determine its own jurisdiction and has power not only to return the plaint, but it is also duty bound to do so. Therefore, when an objection was raised initially by learned counsel for the applicants by pointing out to the court that the plaint, as framed and filed, was without jurisdiction, the trial Court rightly decided the question of jurisdiction on the basis of allegations made in the plaint. ( 8 ) THE moot question, however, is whether the conclusion of the trial court is correct. It is contended on behalf of the counsel for the applicants that the question raised in the plaint covered the dispute mentioned in Section 64 of the Act. It has been argued that the dispute raised by the non-applicant in the suit is a dispute touching the business of the Co-operative Society. It is contended on behalf of the counsel for the applicants that the question raised in the plaint covered the dispute mentioned in Section 64 of the Act. It has been argued that the dispute raised by the non-applicant in the suit is a dispute touching the business of the Co-operative Society. It has also been urged that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to try such a dispute. That dispute is required to be referred to the Registrar or any other officer who is entitled to exercise the power of the Registrar under the Act. It cannot be decided by any Civil or Revenue Court. Learned counsel for the applicants while arguing this point placed reliance on a decision in the case of Madhavrao Kulkarni v. 9th Additional District Judge, Indore and others, reported in 1991 Revenue Nirnay 1981. ( 9 ) THE contention of learned counsel for the non-applicant is that the dispute is not covered by any of the provisions of Section 64 of the Act and consequently, the Civil Court had jurisdiction to try the suit. It was contended by learned counsel for the non-applicant that once the sale-deed was executed on 23. 12. 1987. The dispute went out of the business of the Co-operative society, the applicant No. 1. It was contended further that if the non-applicant had questioned the allotment alone, the dispute could be covered by Section 64 of the Act. Once a sale-deed is executed, the dispute does not remain part of the business of the Co-operative Society and, therefore, the Civil Court had jurisdiction to decide this case and the conclusion of the trial Court is right. For this purpose, learned counsel for the non-applicant relied on a decision of this Court in the case of Madhyam Vargiya Grih Nirman Sahakari Sanstha v. Vasantrao and another, AIR 1988 MP 1994 and on another decision in the case of Kuswn S. Verma and another v. Pritam Singh Gidati and another, reported in 1998 (1) MPLJ 578 ( 10 ) IT is, therefore, necessary to consider the scope of Sections 64 and 82 of the Act read with Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure. ( 11 ) IT is well established that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court cannot be readily ousted unless and until this Court definitely comes to conclusion that the Civil Court is not competent to try it and some other Court or Tribunal has jurisdiction to try it. Bearing this principle in mind, this Court must decide if Section 64 of th act read with Section 82, thereof bars a Civil Suit filed by the non-applicant. ( 12 ) IT is. therefore, necessary to reproduce Sections 64 and 82 of the act, as follows : section 64 :"disputes. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, [any dispute touching the constitution, management or business, terms and conditions of employment of a society or the liquidation of a society shall be referred to the Registrar] by any of the parties to the dispute if the parties thereto are among the following: (a) a society, its committee, any past committee, any past or present officer, any past or present agent, any past or present servant or a nominee, heirs or legal representatives of any deceased agent or deceased servant of the society, or the liquidator of the society; (b) a member, past member or a person claiming through a member, past member or deceased member of a society or of a society which is a member of the society; (c) a person other than a member of the society who has been granted a loan by the society or with whom the society has or had business transactions and any person claiming through such a person; (d) a surety of a member, past member or deceased member or a person other than a member who has been granted a loan by the society, whether such a surety is or is not a member of the society; (e) any other society or the liquidator of such a society; and (f) a creditor of a society. 2 For the purposes of sub-section (1), a dispute shall include (i) a claim by a society for any debt or demand due to it from a member, past member or the nominee, heir or legal representative of a deceased member, whether such debt or demand be admitted or not; (ii) a claim by a surety against the principal debtor where the society has recovered from the surety any amount in respect of any debt or demand due to it from the principal debtor as a result of the default of the principal debtor, whether such debt or demand be admitted or not; (iii) a claim by a society for any loss caused to it by a member, past member or deceased member, any officer, past officer or deceased officer, any agent, past agent or deceased agent, or any servant, past servant or deceased servant, or its committee, past or present, whether such loss be admitted or not; (iv) a question regarding rights, etc. , including tenancy rights between a housing society and its tenants or members; and [ (v) any dispute arises in connection with the election of any officer of the society or representative of the society or of composite society; provided that the Registrar shall not entertain any dispute under this clause during the period commencing from the announcement of the election programme till the declaration of the results], (3) If any question arising whether a dispute referred to the Registrar is a dispute, the decision thereon of the Registrar shall be final and shall not be called in question in any Court. " section 82. "bar of Jurisdiction of Courts. (1) Save as provided in this Act, no civil or revenue Court shall have any jurisdiction in respect of (a) the registration of a society or of bye-laws or of an amendment of a bye-law; (b) the removal of a committee and the management of the society after such removal; (c) any dispute, required to be referred to the Registrar or his nominee or board of nominees; (d) any matter concerning the winding up and the dissolution of a society. (2) While a society is being wound up, no suit or other legal proceedings relating to the business of such society shall be proceeded with, or instituted against, the liquidator as such or against the society or any member thereof, except by leave of the Registrar and subject to such terms as he may impose. (3) Save as provided in this Act, no order, decision or award made under this Act shall be questioned in any Court on any ground whatsoever. " ( 13 ) IT is clear from the allegations made in the plaint that the foundation of the rights of the non-applicant arose from the allotment of a plot of which the non-applicant No. 2 was a member. After allotment the then President tusharkanti Bose executed the sale-deed dated 23. 12. 1987 which was subsequently registered. It is obvious that the non-applicant is required to plead and prove in order to succeed in the suit the execution as well as registration of the sale-deed after the allotment so that he could claim all the rights or the title to the suit land. As against that, it is alleged in the plaint that same plot is being sold by the Co-operative society to the defendant No. 2 by registered sale-deed dated 31. 10. 1991. It is not in dispute before, this court that it is alleged in the plaint that Tusharkanti Bose executed the sale-deed dated 23. 12. 1987 for a consideration of Rs. 13. 000/- in the capacity of the President of the Co-operative society. It is also not dispute before, me that the Housing Co-operative society did the business of allotting a plot and subsequently transferring it by the sale in favour of its members. Therefore, in order to succeed, the non-applicant must plead and prove that the sale-deed was executed in his favour in the capacity of a member of the society and that this execution of the sale-deed was done by the then President of the society for and on behalf of the society. In the opinion of this Court the very fact that such an allegation was required to be pleaded and proved would indicate that the dispute is regarding the business of the society. It can safely be said that it touches the business of the society. In the opinion of this Court the very fact that such an allegation was required to be pleaded and proved would indicate that the dispute is regarding the business of the society. It can safely be said that it touches the business of the society. That apart, the dispute shall also be covered by Clause (iv) of sub-Section (2) of Section 64 of the Act. i. e. a question regarding the rights etc. including tenancy right between housing society and tenants and members. The sub-section (2) of Section 64 of the Act shows that for the purpose of sub-section (1) a dispute shall include a question regarding the rights between the housing society and its members including the tenancy rights. In the opinion of this Court, the-word a question of right etc. is wide enough to include even a dispute regarding title. The word right is wide enough and the subsequent clause is only an illustration. Apart from this, there are further allegations in the plaint to the effect that the Tusharkanti Bose and the society did-not supply him map of the suit plot despite several attempt on the part of the non-applicant plaintiff. This fact is also touching the business of the society. It was the duty of the Co-operative society to supply the allottee a map after execution of the sale-deed and also disclose to him the location of the plot sold by the registered sale-deed dated 23. 12. 1987 so that he could make a construction of this plot. The main thrust of the plaint is that violation on the part of the defendant No. 1 and the Co-operative society to provide him with the information regarding the location of the plot resulted in non-construction and, therefore, the subsequent sale-deed executed in favour of defendant No. 2, Shakil Ahmed Khan for a consideration of Rs. 15. 000/-was bad. Further allegation in paragraph 6 is that Tusharkanti Bose was in hand and glove with the defendant No. 2, Shakil Ahmed Khan and had played fraud with the non-applicant plaintiff. The cannot be disputed that tusharkanti Bose had executed the sale-deed in favour of the non-applicant in the capacity of the President and, therefore, the fraud Le. alleged to have been played by him can only be in that capacity and no other. The cannot be disputed that tusharkanti Bose had executed the sale-deed in favour of the non-applicant in the capacity of the President and, therefore, the fraud Le. alleged to have been played by him can only be in that capacity and no other. It is difficult to hold that the allegations made in the plaint, do not touch the business of the society which is a very wide term. Under the Act, a housing Co-operative society is formed for acquiring the land for the purpose of allotment to it members and the allotment of the plot is definitely the business of the society and the learned counsel for the applicants does not dispute this proposition. In the case of Madhavrao Kulkcorni, 1991 Revenue Nirnaya 81 (supra), a division Bench of this Court held that a civil suit will be barred where a dispute is regarding touching the business of the society when a dispute is raised regarding the question of allotment. The non-applicant is definitely challenging allotment and execution of the sale-deed to defendant No. 2, Shakil Ahmed khan. The question that has been raised is that after the execution of the sale-deed dated 23. 12. 1987 the society could not allot and execute a sale-deed in favour of Shakil Ahmed Khan. Therefore, the decision of the Division Bench in the case of Madhavrao Kulkcarni, 1991 Revenue Nirnaya 81 (supra) is appropriate and is applicable to the facts of this case. Learned counsel for the non-applicant, however, sought to distinguish this case on the ground that in that case there was merely a question of allotment and no sale-deed was executed. This is distinction without any difference because the sale-deed could be executed only after there is a valid allotment. In any case, the allotment to Shakil Ahmed Khan and the consequent sale-deed dated 31. 10. 1991 is claimed to be invalid. This is definitely questioning the allotment and it touched the business of the society, apart from Section 64 (2) (iv) of the act. In the opinion of this Court, the Division Bench's decision in the case of madhavrao Kulkarni, 1991 Revenue Nirnaya 81 (supra) is binding on this court. Reliance has been placed on the decision in the case of Madhyam vargiya Grih Nirman Sahakari Sanstha, AIR 1988 MP 1994 (supra ). In the opinion of this Court, the Division Bench's decision in the case of madhavrao Kulkarni, 1991 Revenue Nirnaya 81 (supra) is binding on this court. Reliance has been placed on the decision in the case of Madhyam vargiya Grih Nirman Sahakari Sanstha, AIR 1988 MP 1994 (supra ). The ratio of this case is that the plaint could not be rejected under Order VII, Rule 11 (d)of the Code of Civil Procedure if provisions of Rules 2 and 3 of Order XIV of the Code of Civil Procedure are attracted. Therefore, any observation made by learned single Judge could only be obiter and do not form ratio decidendi of the case. This case is, therefore, distinguishable. In the case of Kusum S. Verma and another, 1998 (1) MPLJ. 578 (supra), there are observations which no doubt tend some support to the contention of learned counsel for the non-applicant. These observations are made in paragraph 22 of the report. It appears from the fact stated in that case, the plaintiff non-applicant had filed a suit claiming to be the owner of plot No. 13 by virtue of sale-deed dated 19. 2. 1991 executed by housing Co-operative society. It was duly registered and signed by the President. The plaintiff had filed the suit claiming that he is the owner and was in possession of the plot in dispute and it was said that the Co- operative society had no right to enter or challenge his right conferred upon him by virtue of that sale-deed. It was also claimed that a permanent injunction be issued restraining the society from transferring or alienating the plot to any member of the society and further not to cancel it during the pendency of the suit. It appears that during the pendency of the suit, a subsequent sale was made. Here the allegations made in the plaint themselves show that the dispute was not regarding the business of the society as laid in the plaint because the plaintiff had prayed therein that he had become owner and the co-operative society could not interfere with his' possession unless the sale-deed is set aside. Subsequently, transfer of the sale-deed during the. pendency of the suit was also challenged. Subsequently, transfer of the sale-deed during the. pendency of the suit was also challenged. The frame of the suit showed that the cause of action arose because the society was trying to interfere with the possession of the owner of the plot No. 30 by virtue of the sale-deed dated 19. 6. 1981. Therefore, it was also claimed that the society was not entitled to cancel the sale-deed and also a prohibitory injunction was sought. These facts do not indicate that dispute touched the business of the society. Neither the society had power to interfere with the possession of the person who claimed to have acquired title by validly registered sale-deed nor does the Co-operative society possess a right to cancel sale-deed already executed. In these circumstances, the frame of suit indicated that it was not touching the business of society. That case is. therefore, distinguishable. However, certain observations made in paragraph 22 also took note of subsequent events i. e. execution of the sale-deed in favour of Kusum S. Verma, the applicant in that revision. However, that does not make any difference regarding the jurisdiction of the civil Court. The Court had clearly held that the plaint could be filed restraining the Co-operative society from interfering with the possession of the person who claimed to be the owner of the plot by virtue of a registered sale-deed and also that to the effect that unless and until the sale-deed is set aside or canceled the society was not competent to alienate it. This is altogether different matter and differs from the facts stated in the plaint filed by the non-applicant plaintiff. Therefore, that case is distinguishable. Learned counsel for the non-applicant also referred to a decision in the case of Usha ronjan Bhattacharjee and others v. Abinash Chandra Chakraborty and others, reported in (1977) 10 SCC 344. This case is not germane to the matter in question. The case requited the interpretation of Sections 69 and 70 of the west Bengal Co-operative Societies Act, 1983. It appears that when a person died, Co-operative society nominated a person to be the holder of the plot held by the deceased. However, the persons entitled to inherit the property raised an objection regarding the nomination made by the co-operative society. The case requited the interpretation of Sections 69 and 70 of the west Bengal Co-operative Societies Act, 1983. It appears that when a person died, Co-operative society nominated a person to be the holder of the plot held by the deceased. However, the persons entitled to inherit the property raised an objection regarding the nomination made by the co-operative society. The matter went- up to the Co-operative Tribunal which held that on the basis of that it had jurisdiction to decide whether the nomination made by the Co-operative society is valid, but it had no jurisdiction to decide that as a consequence to the death of original holder who inherited the property. It was held that the question of title could not be decided by the Co-operative Societies Tribunal. The matter went-up to the High Court of Calcutta by way of a writ petition. A learned single Judge of that Court held, that once the Co-operative society nominated a person, he acquired a title to the plot and this decision of the learned single Judge was upheld by the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court. In appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Calcutta High Court and said that merely because there is a power to decide the question of nomination, it cannot be held that question of title can be decided by the co-operative Societies Tribunal which was consequent to the death of the original holder. Firstly, this decision was rendered on the interpretation of the words of Sections 69 and 70 of the West Bengal Co-operative Societies Act. 1983, which are not before, this Court. Secondly, it is obvious that the question of nomination to the effect that who should be of a member of the Co-operative society after the death is altogether different from the question of inheritance and succession. The latter is definitely within the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. It raises a question of title, the jurisdiction of the co-operauve Societies Tribunal was limited to decide the question if the co-operative society had validly nominated the person named by it. Under these circumstances, the case too is distinguishable. ( 14 ) THE result is that this revision succeeds and is allowed. The order passed by the Court below dated 10,9. Under these circumstances, the case too is distinguishable. ( 14 ) THE result is that this revision succeeds and is allowed. The order passed by the Court below dated 10,9. 1997 is hereby see aside and it is directed that the trial Court shall return the plaint to the non-applicant for its presentation to the proper Court. This is being done in exercise of power under Order 7 Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The applicants shall be entitled to take the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act. In case, they file the case before, the Registrar of the Co-operative Societies, he shall decide it expeditiously. No costs. Revision allowed. .