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1999 DIGILAW 825 (RAJ)

Union of India v. Ram Moorti

1999-07-08

M.A.A.KHAN

body1999
JUDGMENT 1. :- This is an application under section 439(2) Cr.P.C. for cancellation of bail granted on 16.8.97 to Ram Moorti, non-applicant under section 439 Cr.P.C. by the Special Judge (Dacoity Affected Area), Karauli, in Crime No. 27/97 under section 8/8, 8/20 and 8/25 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act ('NDPS Act'). 2. On the basis of a secret information in their possession, the officers of the Central Bureau of Narcotics at Kota, searched on 12.7.97, a house at Hindaun City in possession_of Bhagat Singh co-accused and seized opium weighing 83.500 Kg. and Charas weighing 150 Kgs. Bhagat Singh co-accused was arrested on the spot. 3. On being interrogated, Bhagat Singh stated that the premises in question belonged to Ram Moorti, non-applicant and that they both were the partners in the business of storage and sale of drugs and narcotic substances without possessing a licence to carry on such business activities. On the basis of such statement of Bhagat Singh, Ram Moorti non-applicant was also arrested on 16.7.97. After his arrest, the non-petitioner applied for bail under section 439 Cr.P.C. in the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, Hindaun City. But since the Presiding Officer of that Court was on leave on that day, the application was put up for hearing before the Special Judge (Dacoity Affected Area) and Additional Sessions Judge at Karauli. The learned Judge, after hearing the parties, granted bail and ordered release of the non-petitioner Ram Moorti on his furnishing two sureties in the amount of Rs. 50,000/- each with personal bond in the amount of Rs. 1,00,000/- vide order dated 16.8.97. 4. Mr. Bhanwar Bagri, the learned counsel for Union of India, vehemently argued that while granting bail to non-applicant Ram Mo, 'ti, the learned Special Judge did not take into consideration the provisions con: fined in Section 37 of the Narcotic Drugs And Psychotropic Substances Act and seems to have been influenced by the allerigd illness and advanced age of the accused. Mr. Bagri submitted that the general provisions contained in Sections 437/439 Cr.P.C. are required to be read as subject to the express and special provisions of Section 37 of the Narcotic Drugs And Psychotropic Substances Act and if that would have been done, the learned judge had no good grounds to show misplaced sympathy to the accused. Mr. Mr. Bagri submitted that the general provisions contained in Sections 437/439 Cr.P.C. are required to be read as subject to the express and special provisions of Section 37 of the Narcotic Drugs And Psychotropic Substances Act and if that would have been done, the learned judge had no good grounds to show misplaced sympathy to the accused. Mr. Bagri led me through the material available on the case diary and highlighted that there was sufficient evidence to, prima facie, show that the non-applicant was actively engaged in carrying on unlawful business in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, at a large scale. Mr. Bagri emphasised that the gravity of the offence was a relevant factor in releasing an accused on bail in such cases and looking to the threat caused to the health of the national economy and of the people at large by such nefarious activities bail should not be granted to offenders of the Narcotic Drugs And Psychotropic Substances Act. In support of his arguments, Mr. Bagri heavily relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Narcotics Control Bureau V. Kishan Lal and others AIR 1991 SC 558 . 5. On the other hand, Mr. Muninder Singh, the learned counsel for the non-petitioner submitted that since there was no iota of incriminating evidence against Ram Moorti non-applicant showing his complicity in the commission of the offences in the present case, bail was rightly granted to him by the learned Special Judge. The learned counsel further submitted that simply because the non-applicant happened to be the landlord of the tenated premises, he could not have been burdened with any vicarious criminal liability in this case. Mr. Singh further submitted that before granting bail to the non-applicant the learned Judge had taken into account the provisions contained in Section 7 of the Narcotic Drugs And Psychotropic Substances Act and it was after such consideration that he had exercised his discretion in most judicial manner. It was emphasised that after his release on bail the non-applicant had not abused or misused the concession granted to him by way of bail and that no ground justifying cancellation of bail was existing in the present case. 6. I have given due consideration to the arguments advanced on behalf of the parties and have also gone through the relevant material. 7. 6. I have given due consideration to the arguments advanced on behalf of the parties and have also gone through the relevant material. 7. In the case of Kishan Lal (supra) the Apex Court has ruled that the power of the High Court (court of Sessions for the purposes of the instant case) to grant bail under section 439 Cr.P.C. are subject to the limitations contained in amended Section 37 of the Narcotic Drugs And Psychotropic Substances Act and the restriction placed on the powers of the court under that Section are applicable to the High Court also in the matter of grant of bail. Section 7 of the Narcotic Drugs And Psychotropic Substances Act lays down two restrictions on the power of the Court to grant bail in the cases under the Narcotic Drugs And Psychotropic Substances Act. Those restrictions are (i) the Public Prosecutor must have been given an opportunity to oppose the application for release on bail, and (ii) where the Public Prosecutor has opposed such application, the Court has to satisfy itself, before ordering the release of the accused on bail, that there are no reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that after his release the accused was not likely to commit any offence while on bail. These restrictions are in addition to the restrictions laid down in the general provisions for bail under section 437/439 Cr.P.C. 8. If despite the abovementioned restrictions bail in a non-bailable case has been granted under section 437/439 Cr.P.C. such bail should not ordinarily be cancelled unis the grounds laid down in Sections 437(5) and 439(2) are existing in a given case. Broadly speaking, the grounds germane to the cancellation of bail are that the accused, after his release on bail has abused the liberty granted to him by, inter alia, interfering or attempting to interfere with the due course of administration of justice or has evaded or attempted to evade the course of justice Bashir V. State of Haryana, AIR 1978 SC 55 . 9. In State Delhi Administration V. Sanjay Gandhi AIR 1978 SC 961 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed that "rejection of bail when bail is applied for is one thing; cancellation of bail already granted is quite another. 9. In State Delhi Administration V. Sanjay Gandhi AIR 1978 SC 961 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed that "rejection of bail when bail is applied for is one thing; cancellation of bail already granted is quite another. It is easier to grant a bail application in a non-bailable case than to cancel a bail already granted. In such a case, cancellation of bail necessarily involves the review of a decision already made and can by and large be permitted only if by reason of supervening circumstances, it would be no longer conducive to a fair trial to allow the accused to retain his freedom during the trial". That is because cancellation of bail interferes with the liberty already secured by the accused either on the exercise of discretion by the Court or by the thrust of law. The power to take back in custody an accused has to be exercised with care and circumspection. That does not however, mean that the power though extraordinary in character must not be exercised even if the ends of justice so demand. The paramount consideration must be to balance the need to safeguard individual liberty and to protect the interest of administration of justice so as to prevent its failure. Bhagirath Singh Judeja V. State of Gujarat, AIR 1984 SC 372 . 10. In Aslam Babalal Desai V. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1993 SC 1 , K. Ramaswamy J. agreeing with Ahmadi J. spoke thus in para 40 of the report:- "The purpose of interpretation is to sustain the law. The Court must interpret the words or the language in the statute to promote public good and misuse of power is interdicted. Criminal law primarily concerns with social protection and prescribes rules of behaviour to be observed by all. Law punishes for deviance, transgression, violation or omission. Liberty of the individual and security and order in the society or public order are delicate and yet paramount considerations. Undue emphasis on either would impede harmony and hamper public good as well as disturb social weal and peace. To keep the weal balanced, must be the prime duty of the Judiciary." 11. The learned Judge further observed that:- "For cancellation of the bail after filing of the charge sheet the factum of dismissal of the bail on the earlier occasion is not relevant. To keep the weal balanced, must be the prime duty of the Judiciary." 11. The learned Judge further observed that:- "For cancellation of the bail after filing of the charge sheet the factum of dismissal of the bail on the earlier occasion is not relevant. But during investigation some strong prima facie evidence and gravity and magnitude of the crime or the manner in which the crime was committed and other attending circumstances may be relevant as prima facie grounds to have a fresh look to cancel the bail. The grounds for cancellation of the bail in Chapter XXXIII are, dehors the merits in the matter, namely, necessity due to the conduct of the accused and abuse of liberty i.e. obstruction of the smooth investigation or suborning witnesses or attempting to tamper the evidence, threatening the witnesses with dire consequences or making or attempting to remove himself beyond the reach of the Court to hamper the smooth trial, etc. are independent of the merits in the matter. Cancellation of the bail would be necessitated by the conduct of the accused himself after the release". 12. It is thus well settled in law that the power of cancellation of a bail already granted to an accused in a non-bailable case is an extraordinary power of the High Court or the Court of Sessions and should be exercised with great care and circumspection. In the exercise of such power, the paramount consideration should be to balance the need to safeguard the individual liberty of the accused and to protect the interest of administration of justice so as to prevent its failure. Cancellation of bail necessarily involves some sort of review or revision of the decision already made. Such review or revision can be permissible only if by reason of supervening circumstances it is considered that the release of the accused was not conducive to a fair trial. In that behalf, the facts and circumstances existing at the time when the order of bail was made and those existing at the time when and under which cancellation of bail is prayed for may be taken into consideration. During investigation, some strong prima facie evidence showing the gravity and magnitude of the crime or the manner in which the crime was committed and other attending circumstances might have surfaced. During investigation, some strong prima facie evidence showing the gravity and magnitude of the crime or the manner in which the crime was committed and other attending circumstances might have surfaced. The grounds for cancellation of bail are dehors the merits of the matter and such grounds may make the supervening circumstances, which may include collection of strong prima-facie incriminating evidence against the accused during the investigation or which may be inferred from the subsequent conduct of the accused, and justify the cancellation of bail in order to maintain the balance between individual liberty and the interest of administration of justice. 13. Judged in the light of the principles stated above, we find in the instant case, that opium weighing 83.500 Kg. and Charas weighing 150 Kgs. was seized on 12.7.97 from a three room house which was owned by the non-applicant Ram Moorti; Ram Moorti was arrested on 16.7.97 and was released on bail on 16.8.97 on the ground of his age being about 65 years and allegedly failing health and also there being no incriminating evidence against him showing his complicity in the commission of crime except that he was the owner of the premises in question which he had rented out to Bhagat Singh allegedly on a monthly rent of Rs. 100/- which was subsequently raised to Rs. 300/- p.m. and then to Rs. 1000/- p.m. within a span of two or three years and that too, at a small town like Hindaun City; that no rent note could be made available to the officers of the Narcotics Department; that the prima facie evidence collected by the officers on interrogation of other persons including the co-accused revealed that Jyoti Prasad, Shyam Bihari, Nihal Singh, Jitender Singh, Mukesh, Samey Singh, Bhagat Singh and Ram Moorti (non-applicant) were jointly carrying on the business in purchase and sale of Ganja and Bhang; that the 'Theka' was obtained in the (?) of Ganja Bhang on their business they were also carrying on the business of purchase and sale of Opium and Charas (Hashish) at large scale in the cities of Hindaun and Gangapur; that at the premises in question opium and charas was purchased in large quantity from various persons namely Prithvi Singh, Baloo Singh R/o Jhalawar Distt. Radhey Shyam of Neemuch (MP), Shiv Singh r/o Kharata, Sher Singh, Devi Sharma, Kazi, Ramnath, Gopinath, Balak Ram; that opium and Charas was being sold in small packets prepared at the houses of Bishambhar Shastri and Ram Moorti non-applicant, that the code names given to Opium was "Dawai" and to Charas was "Chet Ram"; that no rent was being paid to Ram Moorti for the premises used as office and storage place, that he was given a share of profit of the illicit business of Charas, that the partners had duplicate keys of the locks placed on the business. These incriminating facts were either not brought to the notice of the learned Special Judge at the time of grant of bail by him to the non-applicant Ram Moorti or escaped from his consideration of the bail application to which the provisions contained in Section 7 Narcotic Drugs And Psychotropic Substances Act were applicable. In my considered opinion, the learned Judge did not approach the prayer of bail, made by Ram Moorti non-applicant at that stage of the proceedings, with reference to the attending circumstances in the case and restrictions laid down by Section 7 Narcotic Drugs And Psychotropic Substances Act, on grant of bail to Ram Moorti, in the instant case. The balance between claim for continuance of individual liberty and the demand and imperatives of interest of administration of justice can be, in my opinion, maintained by cancelling the bail granted to Ram Moorti non-applicant by the learned Special Judge vide his order dated 16.8.97. The period of his remaining on bail should not, I think, be allowed to tilt such balance in favour of the non-applicant in the nature of the gravity of offence and fact and circumstances of the case. 14. In the result, the bail granted to Ram Moorti non-applicant vide Special judge's order dated 16.8.97 in NDPS Case No. 27/97 under section 8/18, 8120, 8/25 Narcotic Drugs And Psychotropic Substances Act is hereby cancelled and it is directed that Ram Moorti aforesaid shall be arrested and committed to custody.The application is allowed.Application Allowed. *******