ORDER S.P. Khare, J. This is a second appeal u/s 100, Civil Procedure Code. Arguments on the question of admission heard. The plaintiff, a registered Public Trust, exempted from the provisions of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961, determined the lease of the defendant by a notice to quit from 30-6-1988; accepted the rent from 27-10-1987 to 31-5-1990 and filed the suit for eviction on 11-6-1990. The trial Court and the first Appellate Court concurrently held that the acceptance of rent accruing after the notice amounts to waiver of the notice to quit and dismissed the suit. It is argued on behalf of the appellant that mere acceptance of rent does not constitute waiver. This plea is not acceptable. Section 113 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 provides that a notice given u/s 111, Clause (h), is waived, with the express or implied consent of the person to whom it is given, by any act on the part of the person giving it showing an intention to treat the lease as subsisting. Illustration (a) to this section states: A, the lessor, gives B, the lessee, notice to quit the property leased. The notice expires. B tenders, and A accepts, rent which has become due in respect of the property since the expiration of the notice. The notice is waived. An illustration to the section is part of the section and helps to elucidate the principle of the section -- Dr. Mahesh Chand Sharma Vs. Smt. Raj Kumar Sharma and others, . In AIR 1949 124 (Federal Court) the Federal Court held that if the landlord accepts the rent from a tenant at sufferance a new tenancy comes into existence as is contemplated by section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act. The case of acceptance of rent from a statutory tenant stands on a different footing and in that case there would no creation of fresh tenancy. This case of the Federal Court has been referred in the decision of this Court in Nagar Palika Nigam Vs. Rajeshwar Dayal, . Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act lays down that if a lessee of property remains in possession thereof after the determination of the lease granted to the lessee, and the lessor accepts rent from the lessee, the lease is, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, renewed. Rajeshwar Dayal, . Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act lays down that if a lessee of property remains in possession thereof after the determination of the lease granted to the lessee, and the lessor accepts rent from the lessee, the lease is, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, renewed. The tenant at sufferance becomes a "tenant holding over", if he continues with the consent of the lessor. The assent of the landlord to the continuance of possession will create a new tenancy. The assent can be expressed by acceptance of rent -- Bhawanji Lakhamshi and Others Vs. Himatlal Jamnadas Dani and Others, . Again in R.V. Bhupal Prasad Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and others, , the Supreme Court has explained the distinction between "tenant at sufferance" and "tenant holding over" and held that the assent of the landlord to the continuance of tenancy (e.g. by acceptance of rent) after the determination of the tenancy would create a new tenancy. In the present case the rent which has been accepted by the plaintiff was for the period after the notice. Illustration (a) to section 113 is squarely attracted showing an intention on the part of the plaintiff to treat the lease as subsisting. There is consensus ad idem to continue the old contractual tenancy inspite of the notice. In C.P. Syndicate vs. State of M.P., 1972 MPLJ 699 on which reliance has been placed by the first Appellate Court, it has been held that in order that the acceptance of rent may amount to waiver of the notice to quit, the rent accepted must be for a period after the notice. In the present case the rent accepted is for the period which became due after the determination of the lease. Dalchand vs. Ram Narainlal Saini, 1975 MPLJ 101 does not apply to the present case. That was a case under the provisions of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 and where a notice of demand for arrears of rent,was issued by the landlord for availing the ground for eviction u/s 12(1)(a) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961. Therefore, it was held that mere acceptance of rent remitted by the tenant does not amount to waiver. That is in conformity with the principle laid down by the Federal Court in the case referred above. Therefore, it was held that mere acceptance of rent remitted by the tenant does not amount to waiver. That is in conformity with the principle laid down by the Federal Court in the case referred above. As already stated the case of statutory tenant stands on a different pedestal. The question of law which arose in the present has been settled in view of the judicial precedents referred above and the decision of the first Appellate Court is consistent with the principle laid down therein. Therefore, as held recently in Kondiba Dagadu Kadam Vs. Savitribai Sopan Gujar and Others, , it is no,longer a substantial question of law and the second appeal cannot be entertained. It is dismissed in limine. Final Result : Dismissed