JUDGMENT - D.D. SINHA, J.:---Heard Shri A.P. Deshpande, learned Advocate for the petitioner, Shri R.K. Deshpande learned Advocate for respondent No. 2 and Shri T.R. Kankale, learned A.G.P. for respondents Nos. 1 and 4. 2. The writ petition is directed against the judgment and order dated 23-2-1989 passed by the Presiding Officer, School Tribunal in Appeal No. 45/88-A preferred by the respondent No. 2 which was allowed by the Tribunal. 3. The respondent No. 2 was initially appointed as Assistant Teacher w.e.f. 1-7-1968 in the school run by the petitioner. As per the seniority list published by petitioner-management, respondent No. 2 was the senior most teacher in category 'C' and respondent No. 3 was junior to respondent No. 2. One Shri Vithal Chintaman Gandhewar was appointed as the Headmaster of respondent school on 5-7-1968 and since then he worked as Head Master till 7-5-1968. After Shri Gandhewar was retired as Head Master, the petitioner management appointed respondent No. 3 as Head Master. The respondent No. 2 therefore filed appeal before the School Tribunal. The Tribunal allowed appeal and set aside the appointment of respondent No. 3 to the post of Head Master. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the Presiding Officer, School Tribunal, the petitioner management filed the instant writ petition. 4. Shri A.P. Deshpande, learned Counsel for the petitioner challenged the order of the School Tribunal mainly on two grounds. (i) The appeal preferred by the respondent No. 2 was barred by limitation and therefore, the same ought not to have been entertain by the Presiding Officer, School Tribunal; (ii) In views of the provisions of sub-rule (3) of Rule 3 as well as Explanation to Rule 3 of the M.E.P.S. (Conditions of Service) Rules, 1981 the appeal was liable to be dismissed. 5. The learned Counsel contended that sub-section (2) of section 9 takes into its ambit the contingency shown and described in sub-section (1)(a) and (1)(b) of section 9 of the Act. It is contended by the learned Counsel that though the sub-section (1)(b) of section 9 came to be inserted by way of amendment to section 9 in the year 1987, the aspect of supersession would fall within the ambit of sub-section (2) of section 9. It is contended by the learned Counsel that though the sub-section (1)(b) of section 9 came to be inserted by way of amendment to section 9 in the year 1987, the aspect of supersession would fall within the ambit of sub-section (2) of section 9. It is further contended that sub-section (2) of section 9 contemplates "such appeal shall be made by the employee to the Tribunal, within 30 days from the date of receipt by him of an order of dismissal, removal, otherwise termination of service or reduction in rank as the case may be". It is submitted that the word used in sub-section (2) of section 9 "such appeal" is referable to the contingencies mentioned in sub-section (1)(a) and (b) of section 9 and therefore the period of limitation is of 30 days in both the cases. It is further contended that there is only an omission on the part of the legislature to specifically include word "supersession" in the body of sub-section (2) of section 9 of the Act. However, the intention of the legislature is evident to include the act of supersession in the body of sub-section (2) of section 9 and, therefore, the words "such appeal" is inserted in sub-section (2) of section 9 of the Act. The learned Counsel therefore contend that the approach of the Tribunal in this regard is not proper. 6. Shri R.K. Deshpande, learned Counsel for the respondent supported the order passed by Tribunal. It is contended by the learned Counsel that the language of sub-section (2) of section 9 is absolutely clear and includes contingencies stipulated in sub-section 1(a) and excludes contingencies stipulated in sub-section (1)(b) of section 9 of the Act. Hence there is no limitation prescribed against the act of supersession by the management. 7. I have considered the contentions raised by the Counsel for the parties in this regard. Section 9 of the Act reads thus : "Section 9. Hence there is no limitation prescribed against the act of supersession by the management. 7. I have considered the contentions raised by the Counsel for the parties in this regard. Section 9 of the Act reads thus : "Section 9. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law or contract for the time being in force, any employee in a private school--- (a) who is dismissed or removed or whose services are otherwise terminated or who is reduced in rank by the order passed by the management; or (b) who is superseded by the management while making an appointment to any post by promotion and who is aggrieved, shall have a right of appeal and may appeal against any such order or supersession to the Tribunal constituted under section 8. Sub-section (2) of section 9 reads thus: "(2) Such appeal shall be made by the employee to the Tribunal, within thirty days from the date of receipt by him of the order of dismissal, removal, otherwise termination of service or reduction in rank, as the case may be:--- Provided that where such order was made before the appointed date, such appeal may be made within sixty days from the said date." Since the controversy in question pertains sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 9 of the Act remaining part of the section is not necessary for me to consider. Sub-section 1(a) read with sub-section (2) of section 9 of the Act contemplates that any employee in a private school who is dismissed, removed or whose services are otherwise terminated or who is reduced in rank by the order passed by the management shall be entitled to file the appeal before the School Tribunal within a period of 30 days from the date of receipt by him of an order of dismissal, removal, otherwise termination of services or reduction in rank as the case may be. 8. While interpreting the statute, it is necessary to consider certain basic principles of interpretation of statute. When the words of statute are clear, plain or unambiguous, i.e. they are reasonably susceptible to only one meaning, the courts are bound to give effect to that meaning irrespective of consequences. 8. While interpreting the statute, it is necessary to consider certain basic principles of interpretation of statute. When the words of statute are clear, plain or unambiguous, i.e. they are reasonably susceptible to only one meaning, the courts are bound to give effect to that meaning irrespective of consequences. It must also be borne in mind that if the words used are capable of one construction only, then it would note be open to courts to adopt any other hypothetical construction on the ground that such construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act. It is also necessary to take into consideration the intention of the legislature while construing the statute. The intention of the legislature is primarily to be gathered from the language used and scheme of the section. It is only when the language of the Act is not clear and ambiguous, one should resort to Preamble of the Act in order to find out the object or meaning of the enactment and not otherwise. 9. On the backdrop of the above referred principles of statutory interpretation, when we construct sub-section (2) of section 9, it is necessary to consider intention of the legislature, language used, object of the Act and scheme of this section. Initially sub-section 1(a) of section 9 made right of appeal available to the employee who is dismissed or removed or whose services are otherwise terminated or who is reduced in rank by the management. Sub-section (2) of section 9 provides limitation of thirty days for the purpose of filing appeal specifically in the cases of dismissal, removal, otherwise termination of service or reduction in rank of an employee by the management. The language used in sub-section (2) of section 9 is absolutely clear, unambiguous and capable of conveying the only intention of the legislature, i.e., to make sub-section (2) of section 9 applicable only in respect of cases of dismissal, removal, otherwise termination of service or reduction in rank of the employee by the management as contemplated in sub-section 1(a) of section 9. It is also clear that the legislature never intended to include cases of supersession by the management while making appointment to any post by promotion contemplated in sub-section 1(b) within the ambit of sub-section (2) of section 9. It is also clear that the legislature never intended to include cases of supersession by the management while making appointment to any post by promotion contemplated in sub-section 1(b) within the ambit of sub-section (2) of section 9. If the intention of the legislature was to include aspect of supersession contemplated in sub-section 1(b) within the ambit of sub-section (2) then the word "supersession" must have been used in the body of sub-section (2) of section 9 of the Act. In view of the intention of the legislature as well as clear and unambiguous language used in the statute, the words "such appeal" mentioned in sub-section (2) of section 9 can safely be construed to be referable only to contingencies mentioned in sub-section 1(a) of section 9. 10. Initially the right of appeal to Tribunal was not provided to the employee in case of supersession by the management while making appointment to any post by promotion. However, this right was made available to the employee in view of amendment to section 9, which came into force in the year 1987. It must be borne in mind that when an employee is eligible for promotion and legally entitled to be promoted to the higher post from a particular date, there is a legal right accrued in his favour to be promoted to the higher post. It is a continuing legal right and can come to an end only when it is considered by the appropriate authority/Tribunal/Court and cannot be taken away by putting a rider of limitation. Hence the legislature, has not included the case of supersession in the ambit of sub-section (2) of section 9 of the Act. 11. It is necessary to keep in mind while construing the statute that, nothing is to be added to or taken from a statute unless there are adequate grounds to justify the inference that the legislature intended something which it omitted to express. 11. It is necessary to keep in mind while construing the statute that, nothing is to be added to or taken from a statute unless there are adequate grounds to justify the inference that the legislature intended something which it omitted to express. While applying this analogy in regard to question in issue it is very difficult to infer without adequate grounds that the legislature inadvertently omitted to insert the word "supersession" in the body of sub-section (2) of section 9 of the Act, on the other hand, in view of language used, the scheme of the Act and object to be achieved there are adequate grounds to justify the inference that the legislature intended to extend application of sub-section (2) of section 9 only to cover the contingencies mentioned in sub-section (1)(a) and never intended to include cases of supersession within the scope of sub-section (2) of the section 9 of the Act. It is, therefore, difficult for me to accept the contention raised by learned Counsel for the petitioner. 12. Though there is no limitation prescribed under the statute for filing appeal to the Tribunal in case of supersession by the management while making appointment to any post by promotion, general doctrine of delay and laches would apply in this regard. It is the general rule that whenever limitation is not prescribed for filing appeal or revision, the aggrieved person is required to prefer the same within reasonable time. 13. The another contention raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that the appointment of respondent No. 3 to the post of Head Master by the management in view of sub-rule (3) of Rule 3 and Explanation to sub-rule (6) of Rule 3 was just and proper and the management was justified in ignoring the claim of the respondent No. 2 in view of the above Rules. The learned Counsel contended that in view of the above referred Rules seniority alone is not the criteria to be considered by the management at the time of appointing the Head Master of the institution. The management is also has to take into consideration the satisfactory record of service of the employee concerned. The learned Counsel contended that in view of the above referred Rules seniority alone is not the criteria to be considered by the management at the time of appointing the Head Master of the institution. The management is also has to take into consideration the satisfactory record of service of the employee concerned. It is submitted that in the instant case though the respondent No. 2 was the senior Assistant Teacher, his confidential reports for years 1983-1984, 1984-1985, 1985-1986, 1986-1987 were not satisfactory and therefore the management was justified in appointing respondent No. 3 to the post of Head Master. It is further contended that the Tribunal has not considered this aspect property and came to the wrong conclusion by passing the impugned order which according to the learned Counsel is not just and proper. 14. Shri R.K. Deshpande, learned Counsel for respondent No. 2 submitted that explanation to sub-rule (6) of Rule 3 contemplates, adverse remarks not duly communicated in writing to the teacher concerned, shall be disregarded for this purpose. It is submitted by the learned Counsel that in the instant case, the confidential remarks for the above referred period were not served on respondent No. 2 by the management, therefore, in view of explanation to sub-rule (6) of Rule 3, those remarks cannot be considered for the purposes of depriving the respondent No. 3 from his legitimate claim to the post of Head Master. The learned Counsel therefore contended that the action of petitioner management in superseding the respondent No. 2 by appointing respondent No. 3 as a Head Master of the school is not sustainable in law. 15. I have considered the contentions raised by learned Counsel for the parties and perused the above referred rules. 16. It is not in dispute that the respondent No. 2 at the relevant time was the senior most Assistant Teacher serving in the school run by the management and in view of sub-rule (3) of the M.E.P.S. Rules, 1981 the respondent No. 2 was eligible and entitled to be considered to the post of Head Master. 16. It is not in dispute that the respondent No. 2 at the relevant time was the senior most Assistant Teacher serving in the school run by the management and in view of sub-rule (3) of the M.E.P.S. Rules, 1981 the respondent No. 2 was eligible and entitled to be considered to the post of Head Master. The contention raised by the Counsel for the petitioner that the confidential reports of the respondent No. 2 for the above referred years were not satisfactory cannot be considered for the purposes of giving go-bye to the claim of the respondent No. 2 in view of explanation to sub-rule (6) of Rule 3 of the M.E.P.S. Rules, since those confidential reports were not served on the respondent No. 2. The Tribunal was right in holding that except the bare, word of the Class IV employee of the management school, there is nothing on record to show that the respondent No. 2 has in fact refused to accept the service of the above referred confidential report. The very fact that the management has not taken any action against respondent No. 3 for the above referred Act makes it difficult to accept that the respondent No. 2 has refused to accept the service of the above referred confidential reports. Be that as it may the fact remains that the confidential reports were not served upon the respondent and in view of explanation to sub-rule (6) of Rule 3 the management ought to have ignored those while considering the claim of respondent No. 2 to the post of Head Master. 17. For the reasons stated above in my opinion the impugned order in just and proper and does not require interference at the hands of this Court. The writ petition is dismissed. Rule is discharged. No orders as to costs. Writ petition dismissed. -----