JUDGMENT 1. - The petitioners, who are husband and wife, have assailed their termination orders in the instant writ petitions. Since questions involve in the writ petitions are identical in nature they were heard analogously and are being disposed of by a common order. 2. The petitioner Anil K. Goyal, became a physically handicapped person on May 7, 1985 after suffering the agony of injury which he had suffered in an accident held in 1978. His left leg above knee was amputated on account of gangrene and the petitioner is able to walk with a Jaipur Foot. The petitioner had applied for post of Manager in King Edward VII Memorial (Rest House) Society, Ajmer, (respondent No. 2) (in short KEM) and was selected in the year 1986. The petitioner Mrs. Renu Goyal, who is wife of the petitioner Anil K. Goyal, had also experience of working as House Keeper it. the Hotel Management Course. She had also applied for the post of Manager but the selection committee recommended her of the post of House Keeper and both the petitioners were appointed as Manager and House Keeper. Shri Ram Narain Meena, IAS, respondent No. 3, joined as Collector Ajmer on June 16, 1987. From the facts averred in the writ petition it appears that at to the behest of Shri Ram Narain Meena, respondent No. 3, the petitioners were served with the orders dated September 9, 1987 whereby their services were terminated. Both the petitioners have assailed the aforesaid orders of termination in the instant writ petitions.2A. A preliminary objection was raised on behalf of the respondent No. 2 that KEM is neither a State nor any other authority within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India and is not amenable to writ jurisdiction. It was canvassed that KEM was built in 1912- 13 in the memory of King Edward VII. This memorial was built by donation. The primary object of construction of this Rest House was to provide accommodation to the people corning to City of Ajmer. It was neither a body created under the Statute nor registered under any Act. From 1912-13 onwards, the management of the KEM was being run by a managing committee. This position continued till 1976 when it was decided to form a Society and to get it registered under the Rajasthan Societies Registration Act, 1958. It was neither a body created under the Statute nor registered under any Act. From 1912-13 onwards, the management of the KEM was being run by a managing committee. This position continued till 1976 when it was decided to form a Society and to get it registered under the Rajasthan Societies Registration Act, 1958. Accordingly, an application was made before the Registrar, Societies, Rajasthan in 1974 and it was registered vide registration No. 132/75-76 as "KING EDWARD VII MEMORIAL (PEST HOUSE) SOCIETY". In the process of registration some District authorities also participated. The society's area of operation was confined to the municipal limits of Ajmer City as is indicated in para 4 of the Memorandum of Association. The aims and objects of the society are set out in para 5 of the Memorandum of Association. Except for the purpose of registration of the KEM (society) no Government Official has any role to play. The Government does not give any financial aid to KEM. KEM does not act as an agency or instrumentality of the Government. It is a private body and the Rest House is being managed on no profit no loss basis. Merely because the Collector or the other functionaries of the district administration are made members or office bearers of KEM, does not acquire the character of State or other authority so as to be amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The Collector Ajmer or any functionaries of the district administration do not act in their official capacity. The Collector merely acted as President of the Society. Reliance was placed on Chander Mohan Khanna v. National Council of Educational Research and Training and others (1991) 4 SCC page 578 . 3. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners canvassed that the petitioners were selected by the selection committee consisting of Shri T. Srinivasan, Collector Ajmer, Shri O.P. Srivastava, Administrator, Municipal Council Ajmer and Mrs. M. Panwar S.D.M. Ajmer and the services of the petitioners were terminated at the behest of Shri Ram Narain Meena. Collector Ajmer. KEM is an agency and instrumentality of the Government as it was or is under the Control of the District Administration Ajmer. Reliance was placed on Purker M. Sudan v. State of Rajasthan and others, P.B. Civil Writ Petition Nos. Collector Ajmer. KEM is an agency and instrumentality of the Government as it was or is under the Control of the District Administration Ajmer. Reliance was placed on Purker M. Sudan v. State of Rajasthan and others, P.B. Civil Writ Petition Nos. 1664/1986 & 2129/1986, decided on September 5, 1988 by the division Bench comprising of Hon'ble Mr. Justice S.C. Agrawal and Hon'ble Mr. Justice P.C. Jain), wherein the writ petitions were filed against KEM and argument in respect of maintainability of writ petitions in view of Article 12 was raised. Though the Division Bench did not go in detail in respect of argument advanced before it but made following observations : "We do not want to go in details to consider whether the Society is a State or not, as we are satisfied that presently it is being managed by the Collector, SDO and Treasury Officer who are State functionaries to and they are functioning in contravention of the provisions of Rules of the Society and are also not dischating their functions as the office-bearers of the Society under the provisions of the Rajasthan Registration of Societies Act, 1958...." "It is also not disputed that the Government officers are allowed to stay for months together and this Rest House is being treated as a part of the Circuit House or Dak Bungalow. Since those officers who do not find any place in the Circuit House or Oak Bungalow are accommodated here..........." "In the instant case, as the affairs of the Society are being managed by the Collector, the SDO and the Treasury Officer, who are Government functionaries and are meddling in the affairs of the Society against the Articles of Association and the Rules framed thereunder " 4. The Division Bench in the aforesaid case entertained the Writ petitions against KEM and writ petition No. 1664/1986 was partly allowed and the Collector Ajmer was directed to take appropriate action for constituting the General Committee and Managing Committee in accordance with the Rules. 5. In view of the aforesaid directions of the Division Bench I cannot take different view after 12 years of the institution of the writ petitions. In my considered opinion the petitioners cannot be rendered remedy less on the basis of technical objection raised by the respondent No. 2 after a lapse of 12 years. 5. In view of the aforesaid directions of the Division Bench I cannot take different view after 12 years of the institution of the writ petitions. In my considered opinion the petitioners cannot be rendered remedy less on the basis of technical objection raised by the respondent No. 2 after a lapse of 12 years. Following the directions of the Division Bench in Purker M. Sudan v. State of Rajasthan and others (supra) I hold that KEM is an authority under Article 12 of the Constitution of India and is amenable to writ jurisdiction. In view of the direct decision of the Division Bench it is not necessary for me to examine the case law cited before me by the learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 2. 6. Now I proceed to examine the merits of the case. Rule 3 of the King Edward VII Memorial Rest House Society Ajmer Service Conditions Rules, provides thus : "3. Termination of Services of an employee may take place - (i) during or at the end of probationary period, in accordance with the terms of appointment; (ii) In accordance with the terms and conditions offered by the Management and accepted by him, or (iii) in accordance with the terms of the agreement of such employment." 7. It is not disputed that there was no agreement except the appointment order and even according to the terms contained in the appointment order the petitioners could not be subjected to the termination merely by saying that their services are no more required. The appointment of both the petitioners was on a probation period of three months after which their performance was to be reviewed and further decision was to be taken. After expiry of three months probation period, no order was passed against the petitioners therefore it will be presumed that their services were automatically confirmed and they were allowed to continue after 3 months only because their work had been found to be satisfactory. No person can be kept on probation indefinitely. In June 1987 the salary of petitioner And K. Goyal was raised from Rs. 1000/- to Rs. 1250/- which clearly shows that there was nothing against him till that time. No person can be kept on probation indefinitely. In June 1987 the salary of petitioner And K. Goyal was raised from Rs. 1000/- to Rs. 1250/- which clearly shows that there was nothing against him till that time. A look at the material on record demonstrates that period of three months expired in August 1986 and to meeting of the Management Committee of KEM was held on July 16, 1986 and vide Resolution No. 10 the question with regard to increase in the salaries of manager and house keeper was considered it was resolved as under : "10. INCREASE IN THE SALARIES OF MANAGER AND HOUSEKEEPER - Seeing the improvement in the working of KEM during the last one and half months, the Chairman proposed to increase the aviaries of the Manager and the Housekeeper by fixing them in the grade vide revised pay scale (No. 19) 1000-30-1300-40-1500-50-1800-60-1860 and Sr. Receptionists revised pay scale No. 14 520-925 respectively. The members agreed to discuss and implement the same in the next meeting after one month. The Dearness Allowances will be applicable as per KEM Rules." 8. The petitioners had worked continuously to the satisfaction of all concerned and there was no material on the basis of which an opinion could be formed that their services are no more required. The allegations of malafide have been made against Shri Ram Narain Meena, Collector Ajmer, responder; No. 3. Respondent No. 3 did not choose to file reply to the writ petition but a counter affidavit has been tiled by him. 9. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 2 contended that principles of natural justice have no application in the instant cases because it is a case of termination simplicitor on the basis of the performance of the petitioners. The petitioners performance had been found to be unsatisfactory therefore their services had been terminated. The impugned orders of termination are not by way of punishment nor do they suffer from any malice of fact and malice in law. Reliance was placed on Dr. Amritlal Dharshibhai Jhakhria v. State of Gujarat and another (1998) 8 SCC 767 . Director Ministry of Coal and others v. Bimlendu Kumar (1997) 2 SCC page 217 , The Director Panchayat Raj UP and another v. Babu Singh Gaur, AIR 1972 SC 420 , and S. Sukhbans Singh v. The State of Punjab, AIR 1962 SC page 1711 . Amritlal Dharshibhai Jhakhria v. State of Gujarat and another (1998) 8 SCC 767 . Director Ministry of Coal and others v. Bimlendu Kumar (1997) 2 SCC page 217 , The Director Panchayat Raj UP and another v. Babu Singh Gaur, AIR 1972 SC 420 , and S. Sukhbans Singh v. The State of Punjab, AIR 1962 SC page 1711 . 10. Sum and substance of the contention of the learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 2 is that probation does not end automatically unless an order of confirmation is issued. In Dr. Amrit Lal Dharshibhai Jhankharia v. State of Gujarat and another (supra), the services of the employee were terminated on the ground of unsatisfactory performance during probation period. No material was produced either before the High Court or before the Supreme Court to show that the employee had been confirmed or there was automatic confirmation after so completion of two years probation. Under these circumstances their Lordships of the Supreme Court indicated that services could be terminated after completion of two years probationary period. The other authorities cited before me are also distinguishable. In the instate cases the appointment of the petitioners was for a period of three months after which a review of their performance had to be made and further decision had to be taken. As already stated after appointment of the petitioners meeting of the Managing Committee was held on July 16, 1986 and vide Resolution No. 10 the salaries of the petitioners were increased. in view of Rule 3 of the King Edward II Memorial Rest House Society Ajmer Service Conditions Rules as stated here-in-above, the services of the petitioners could have been terminated during or at the end of the probationary period in accordance with the terms of the appointment, or in accordance with the terms and conditions offered by the management and accepted by the employee or in accordance with the terms of the agreement of such employment. Undeniably, there was no agreement except the appointment order and even according to the terms contained in the appointment orders, the petitioners could not be subjected to termination merely by saying that their services are no more required. Undeniably, there was no agreement except the appointment order and even according to the terms contained in the appointment orders, the petitioners could not be subjected to termination merely by saying that their services are no more required. In my considered opinion the impugned orders dated September 9, 1987 have been passed without following the principles of natural justice and flouting the provisions contained in Rule 3 of the King Edward VII Memorial Rest House Society Ajmer Service Conditions Rules in an arbitrary manner and without any lawful justification. The same is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 11. Consequently I allow the writ petitions and set aside the impugned orders dated September 9, 1987. The respondents are directed to reinstate the petitioners forthwith with all consequential benefits as if the orders had not been passed against them. The petitioners shall also be entitled to the costs of the writ petitions.Writ petition allowed with costs. *******