B. A. KHAN, J. ( 1 ) APPELLANTS are aggrieved of second time summary dismissal of their F. A. No. 263/96 unsupported by any reasons. This is their second LPA on the issue. Their first LPA No. 103/97 was disposed off by us by consent order dt. 28-1-1998 requesting the First Appellate Court to re-examine the merit of the issues involved in their first appeal and to dispose it off in accordance with law. But that Court ignoring our request again summarily dismissed their first appeal by recording agreement with the trial Court without giving any reasons and by placing reliance on O. 41, R. 11 (4) of C. P. C. Therefore, all that remained to be seen was whether First Appellate Court could give a short shrift to the appeal in this manner overlooking the order of the D. B. and whether O. 41, R. 11 (4) authorised such a course? ( 2 ) THE controversy arises out of the sale of suit land by appellants allegedly belonging to the temple. Respondent No. 1 filed suit No. 8-A/81 to set aside this sale which was decreed by Additional District Judge, Rajgarh, on 27-9-1996. Appellants took F. A. No. 263/96 against this which was summarily dismissed by First Appellate Court by order dt. 11-4-1997. They then filed L. P. A. No. 103/97 to assail this which was disposed off by consent order dt. 28-1-1998 requesting the First Appellate Court to reconsider the matter and examine the issues involved on merit. Pursuant thereto First Appellate Court issued notice to respondents and after hearing the parties dismissed the appeal again summarily without re-examining the merit of issues involved therein and by placing reliance on O. 41, R. 11 (4 ). ( 3 ) THE second summary dismissal was liable to be set aside straightway because of wrong reliance placed by First Appellate Court on O. 41, R. 11 (4 ). It must be clarified at the very outset that O. 41, R. 11 deals with the power of the Appellate Court to dismiss the appeal summarily without sending notice to the respondent or his pleader and without admitting it to hearing. But in the present case First Appellate Court had issued notices to the respondents and had heard parties before dismissing the appeal summarily. But in the present case First Appellate Court had issued notices to the respondents and had heard parties before dismissing the appeal summarily. Therefore, instead of O. 41, R. 11, it would be R. 31 which would come into play and which required that the judgment of the Appellate Court shall state the points of determination and the decision thereon and the reasons for decision. In this view of the matter First Appellate Court should have supported the impugned dismissal by reasons and it was not enough to record a mere agreement with the judgment of the trial Court. But that apart it would be still worthwhile and interesting to examine whether O. 41, R. 11 (4) authorised High Court to summarily dismiss the first appeal without recording any reason. This order which assumes crucial importance in the matter is extracted hereunder :-"power to dismiss appeal without sending notice to lower Court.- (1) The Appellate Court are sending for record if it thinks fit so to do, and after fixing a day for hearing the appellant or his pleader and hearing him accordingly if he appears on that day, may dismiss the appeal without sending notice to the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred and without serving notice on the respondent or his pleader. (2) If on the day fixed or any other day to which the hearing may be adjourned the appellant does not appear when the appeal is called on for hearing, the Court may make an order that the appeal be dismissed. (3) The dismissal of an appeal under this rule shall be notified to the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred. (4) Where an Appellate Court, not being the High Court, dismisses an appeal under sub-rule (1), It shall deliver a judgment, recording in brief its grounds for doing so, and a decree shall be drawn up in accordance with the judgment. " ( 4 ) A perusal of this order shows that it empowers the Appellate Court to dismiss an appeal without sending notice to the Court from whose decree the appeal was preferred and without serving notice to the respondent or his pleader. Sub-rule (4) of R. 11 provided that where such appeal was dismissed by an Appellate Court, "other than the High Court" it was to deliver a judgment recording in brief its grounds for doing so. Sub-rule (4) of R. 11 provided that where such appeal was dismissed by an Appellate Court, "other than the High Court" it was to deliver a judgment recording in brief its grounds for doing so. ( 5 ) IT appears that expression "not being the High Court" was being read and interpreted to relieve the High Court of its otherwise inherent obligation to support its order/s by reasons. But that was not so and any such view would not only impinge upon all cannons of justice but would also render such orders wholly arbitrary. ( 6 ) AFTER all, the right to file the appeal under O. 41 is a valuable right and it can't be allowed to be dealt with casually and mechanically. An appellant was entitled to know how his/her claim was dealt with and why it was rejected and why contentions raised were found unacceptable. This was all the more necessitated in the first appeal wherein findings of fact assumed finality and were required to be arrived at on careful appraisal of evidence on record, determination of points of dispute and the law governing the subject. If such appeal was allowed to be rejected summarily without assigning reasons briefly, it would seal the fate of appellant and confront him with concurrent findings of fact in the absence of any effort or application of mind by the First Appellate Court to reappraise the evidence on record to ascertain whether trial Court determination was sustainable. Above all it would deprive him of his valuable right to know the basis for rejection of the appeal. ( 7 ) IT may as well be construed that Legislature had excluded the High Court from requirement of briefly stating the grounds for preliminary rejection of an appeal by using the expression "not being the High Court" in Rule 11 (4), but it cannot be overlooked that such dismissal order passed was consequentially as much a judgment on which a decree was to be drawn and which finally decided the right and liabilities of the parties. ( 8 ) IT is well settled by now that the reasoning constituted the heart and soul of a Court judgment or for that matter any judicial order. A Court had an inherent obligation to support its action by reasons, otherwise all its judgments/orders would tantamount to a dictate and a fiat. ( 8 ) IT is well settled by now that the reasoning constituted the heart and soul of a Court judgment or for that matter any judicial order. A Court had an inherent obligation to support its action by reasons, otherwise all its judgments/orders would tantamount to a dictate and a fiat. It was immaterial whether a judgment/order was by a higher Court or a lower one, because all such Courts were to function judicially and in conformity with the norms of justice. Therefore, nothing, much less a construed legislative exemption could relieve the High Court of its fundamental obligation of supporting its order or judgment by reasons. There may be cases, frivolous or petty, where one line dismissal order could be justified. But that would not hold true where rights and liabilities of the parties were to be decided for good. ( 9 ) VIEWED thus, the expression "not being the High Court " occurring in R. 11 (4) was required to be read down and not interpreted rigidly to empower the High Court to pass one word summary dismissal orders, moreso in civil first appeals which required a reappreciation and reappraisal of the evidence on record and redetermination of the points in dispute. It could not be so interpreted to relieve the High Court of its basic obligation to pass order/judgment in tune with the elementary cannons of justice. Moreover the Rule was only a procedural one and could not be overstretched to pose a hurdle in the stream of justice and to facilitate telegraphic summary dismissal of appeals by the High Court. Even if it was to be construed technically, still it was to be ignored by the High Court to eliminate possibility of any arbitrariness and to conform to the basic tenets of justice. ( 10 ) WE accordingly hold that Rule 11 (4) of O. 41, CPC could not be construed to stop or prevent the High Court from supporting its summary dismissal order in appeals by reasons. The High Court was otherwise expected to pass reasoned orders to ensure that justice was not only done but appeared to be done and this Rule did not do away with its basic obligation of doing justice in deciding the rights and liabilities of the contesting parties. The High Court was otherwise expected to pass reasoned orders to ensure that justice was not only done but appeared to be done and this Rule did not do away with its basic obligation of doing justice in deciding the rights and liabilities of the contesting parties. ( 11 ) IT pains us to notice that First Appellate Court should have ignored our request, if not direction, contained in order dt. 28-1-1998 passed in first LPA No. 103/97 to dispose off F. A. No. 263/96 by examining the issues involved on merit. Needless to emphasise that the order passed by the Division Bench was binding on that Court and ought to have been carried out in that spirit. After all our judicial system functions in a prescribed methodical order and manner. Therefore all those engaged in this endeavour were expected to observe the rules of the game or else it would throw judicial propriety and discipline overboard and breed judicial malfunctioning, if not chaos. ( 12 ) THIS appeal accordingly succeeds and order impugned dt. 20-7-1998 passed in F. A. No. 263/96 is set aside. First Appellate Court is once again requested to dispose of the appeal on merits and by a reasoned judgment. Appeal allowed. .