Judgment : 1. The defendant who suffered a decree before the Court below has filed the above second appeal. .2. The appellant/defendant borrowed 2000 Singapore dollars from one R.S. Sundaram at Singapore on 11. 1975 promising to repay the same on demand to him or to his order with interest at 18% per annum and executed a promissory note therefor under Ex.A5. The said Sundaram filed a case before the District and Magistrate Court, Singapore against the defendant but it was struck off. According to the plaintiff/respondent, the defendant continues to reside in Singapore and on 7. 1979, under Ex.A1 the said promissory note was assigned in favour of the plaintiff, and the plaintiff issued a notice on 17. 1979 intimating the said assignment in his favour and demanding the payment of the entire dues to him, from the defendant. Since the amount was not paid, the plaintiff filed the suit in O.S.No. 8 of 1980 on the file of the Sub-Court, Devakottai, which was re-transferred to the District Munsif Court, Devakottai and numbered as O.S.No. 37 of 1984, for recovery of the sum of Rs. 13, 885.75 with subsequent interest on the principal sum of Rs. 6, 700. It is stated in the plaint that since the defendant has been and is absent from India, the whole of the period has to be excluded in computing limitation as provided for in Section 15(5) of the Indian Limitation Act read with Section 11 thereof with the result that the suit instituted is well within time. It is also stated that Ariyakudi is the permanent place of residence of the defendant, which is situated within the limits of the jurisdiction of District Munsif Court, Devakottai in which the suit was filed. 3. The appellant/defendant contested the suit by filing written statement. The defendant denied the said borrowing of 2000 dollars from one R.S. Sundaram at Singapore and so the suit document was not supported by consideration. It is also stated by the appellant that the benefits given under the Tamil Nadu Act 4 of 1938 or Act 40 of 1979, and at the time of the assignment of the said promissory note dated 7. 1979, it was barred by limitation and so the same could not be assigned and could not be enforced. According to the defendant. 1979, it was barred by limitation and so the same could not be assigned and could not be enforced. According to the defendant. Section 15(5) of the Indian Limitation Act is not applicable to the facts of this case. 4. The trial Court, after considering the oral and documentary evidence, decreed the suit. On Appeal by the defendant in A.S.No. 19 of 1987 on the file of the Sub-Court, Devakottai, the lower appellate Court confirmed the judgment and decree of the lower Court and dismissed the appeal. Hence, the defendant has filed the above second appeal. .5. Both the Courts below have found that the appellant/defendant has borrowed the said 2000 Singapore dollars from the said Sundaram, that the assignment was valid, that the suit is maintainable in law, and that in view of Section 15(5) of the Indian Limitation Act, the suit is filed well within the period of limitation. 6. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant/defendant has submitted that in view of the proceedings taken by the said Sundaram in Singapore to enforce the said promissory note the respondent/plaintiff is estopped from filing the present suit. In the plaint, the plaintiff has come forward with the specific plea that the said Sundaram filed DC Summons 1980 of 1975 against the defendant in the District and Magistrate Court, Singapore, but it is struck off. Quoting certain provisions, it is stated that there is no bar to file fresh suit. When the plaintiff has come forward with such specific plea, the defendant has not established that the said suit was dismissed on merits, and so the said Sundaram cannot assign the said promissory note in favour of the plaintiff so as to enable the plaintiff to file the present suit. The Courts below have factually found on the basis of Exs.A15 and A 15 that the plaintiff is not barred from prosecuting the suit. In view of the said concurrent findings and also in the absence of any other material to come to a different conclusion, I am not interfering with the said findings. 7. The next question to be decided in the present appeal is, can the plaintiff take advantage of Section 15(5) of the Indian Limitation Act so as to enable him to file the suit against the defendant. In this case, the suit promissory note Ex.A5 was executed as early as on 11. 7. The next question to be decided in the present appeal is, can the plaintiff take advantage of Section 15(5) of the Indian Limitation Act so as to enable him to file the suit against the defendant. In this case, the suit promissory note Ex.A5 was executed as early as on 11. 1973 and it was assigned under Ex.A1 dated 7. 1979. The suit was filed on 210. 1979. Admittedly, the suit can be sustained only if the protection given under Section 15(5) of the Limitation Act applies to this case. 8. According to the plaintiff, the defendant is residing in Singapore and continues to reside in Singapore, but his permanent place of residence is Ariyakudi which lies within the jurisdiction of the District Munsif Court, Devakottai. On the basis of this background, the abovesaid question has to be answered. 9. Section 15(5) of the Limitation Act reads as follows: “15(5) In computing the period of limitation for any suit the time during which the defendant has been absent from India and from the territories outside India under the administration of Central Government shall be excluded.” 10. Wherever the cause of action might have arisen or wherever the contract has been made in respect of an act, the Courts in a country have jurisdiction to entertain action in personam provided that at the commencement of the action, the defendant was resident or present in that country. There cannot be any doubt that the law of the country in which the proceedings have been taken will apply to such proceedings. Law of limitation is always considered to be statute relating to procedure. The law of limitation is the law which bars the remedy and does not destroy the right. So, only law of limitation of the country in which the proceedings have been taken will be applicable, and not the law of the country in which the cause of action had arisen or the contract. 11. In the present case though the promissory note was executed in Singapore, the plaintiff filed the suit in India on the basis of the assignment made and on the basis of the permanent residence of the defendant. .12. 11. In the present case though the promissory note was executed in Singapore, the plaintiff filed the suit in India on the basis of the assignment made and on the basis of the permanent residence of the defendant. .12. With respect to the sustainability of the suit in India on the basis of the cause of action that had arisen outside India, the same has been decided in the Full Bench decision of this Court, in Muthukannai Mudaliar v. Andappa Pillai, 1954 (II) M.L.J. 731 , which has been approved by the Apex Court in Muthu Chettiar v. Shanmugham, A.I.R. 1969 S.C., 552. Similarly, even in T.M. & Co. v. H.I, Trust Ltd., AIR 1972 S.C., 1311, the similar view has been taken. The Full Bench of this Court in Muthukannai Mudaliar v. Andappa Pillai, 1954 (II) M.L.J. 731 , following various judgments, has found as follows: .“The result of the authorities can be summed up briefly thus: (1) A suit can be instituted for personal relief against a defendant in a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the defendant is residing or carrying on business on the date of the institution of the suit, wherever the cause of action for the suit had arisen; (2) In such a suit, the provisions of the Statute of Limitation in force in the country of the forum, i.e. the lex fori would apply.” .13. So, now it cannot be said that merely because the promissory note was executed in Singapore, the present suit cannot be sustained. By relying on Section 15(5) of the Indian Limitation Act, the plaintiff can exclude the time during which the defendant was absent from India or from the territories outside India under the administration of Central Government, from computation of the period of limitation applicable to the case, namely, three years. Such a construction may lead to very inconvenient result. A person may reside outside India for years, and, according to the law of limitation of the country in which he resides, the remedy against him in respect of a cause of action of the nature of a personal action may be lost, yet on his coming to India, it will revive. This is the intention of the legislature. To come to such conclusion. I seek support from Mahomed Museeh-Ood-Deen v. Clara Tone Museeh-Ood-Deen, 1870 (2) N.W.P.H.C.R. 173. .14. This is the intention of the legislature. To come to such conclusion. I seek support from Mahomed Museeh-Ood-Deen v. Clara Tone Museeh-Ood-Deen, 1870 (2) N.W.P.H.C.R. 173. .14. What is the scope of the word ‘absent’ has been decided in Atul Kristo Bose v. Lyon & Co, 1887 I.L.R. 14 Cal. 457. It was submitted that the word ‘absent’ should be understood as applicable only to such persons as having been present or would ordinarily be present or may be expected to return. But while construing the scope of Sec. 13 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1887, the Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court in the said case has held that “but the section in question is not intended to define the persons for or against whom limitation shall run but to direct the mode of computing time. And if we were to attempt to restrict the meaning of ‘absent’ in such ways as are contended for, there is probably no limit to the number of suggestions that might be made and, as far as we can see, no reason for accepting one suggestion in preference to another”. Relying on various judgments on the issue, it has further held as follows: .“It was pointed out in argument that, according to the construction which we place upon the Act, a man who was in England when a cause of action against him accrued, and has remained there ever since, may be liable after an indefinite time to be sued in a Calcutta Court. And it was contended that this was something absured, something that the Legislature could not have intended, and that we ought to adopt some construction which would avoid it. The answer given by the Privy Council to a somewhat similar objections in the case already cited in sufficient . The words of the section are express, and the case is within them. Moreover there is no more hardship than in the converse case of a man resident in Calcutta, who there incurs a liability to another person resident in Calcutta, who remains in Calcutta long enough for any suit against him to be barred by the law prevailing in Calcutta, as well as ordinarily in England, who then goes to England and finds himself liable to be sued there any time within six years. and this is exactly what happened under the Statute of Anna in Williams v. Jones, 13 East., 439. 15. So, it has to be decided whether the plaintiff can sustain the suit, though the defendant had not returned to India on the date of filing of the suit. In the present case, admittedly, the cause of action had arises in foreign country when the defendant was in Singapore. Even according to the plaintiff, the defendant was in Singapore on the date of filing of the suit. The plaintiff himself has given the Singapore address of the defendant in the plaint. The Full Bench of this Court in Muthukannai Mudaliar v. Andappa Pillai, 1954 (II) M.L.J. 731 has found in this regard that “the Courts in a country have jurisdiction to entertain action in personam in respect of any cause of action or relating to any contract wherever cause of action might have arisen or wherever the contract has been made provided that at the commencement of the action the defendant was resident or present in that country ” . (Italics is mine). Again in the conclusion, the same has been insisted by the Full Bench of this Court. Moreover, the words used in Section 15(5) of the Limitation Act themselves suggest that the defendant should be present in India on the date of filing of the suit. Otherwise, the question of computing the period of limitation taking into consideration of the defendant’s absence would not arise. If the defendant continues to be absent such a calculation is impossible for the purpose of limitation. Moreover, the temporary visit to India also cannot be taken for the purpose of calculating the limitation. As held by the Apex Court in T.M. & Co. v. H.L Trust Ltd., AIR 1972 S.C. 1311 Section 15(5) presupposes that defendant was at one time present in India and later he has been absent from India, and, a person who was never in India cannot be considered as having been absent from India. 16. In view of the above, the respondent/plaintiff cannot take advantage of the provisions of Section 15(5) of the Limitation Act, 1963 for the purpose of computing the period of limitation, and to say that the suit is not barred by limitation. 17. For the reasons stated above, this second appeal is allowed, and the judgments and decrees of the Courts below are set aside. 17. For the reasons stated above, this second appeal is allowed, and the judgments and decrees of the Courts below are set aside. No costs.