Honble CHAUHAN, J.–The instant writ petition has been filed for seeking direction to the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan to re-determine vacancies of direct recruitment quota in the Cadre of Rajasthan Higher Judicial Service (for Short, RHJS)and in case it is found to be more than eleven and petitioner is found entitled to appointment, his case be recommended to the Governor for appoint- ment to RHJS cadre. (2). The facts and circumstances giving rise to this case are that petitioners candidature was considered against eleven vacancies for the post of RHJS in pursuance of the Advertisement dated 21.12.96 under the Rajasthan Higher Judicial Service Rules, 1969. (for short, ``the Rules, 1969). The said eleven vacancies stood filled-up and petitioner could not succeed therein. Petitioners grievance is that vacancies of direct recruitment quota of RHJS had not been worked-out properly and if the same are re-determined, there is a possibility that the same would be more than eleven and if it is so, petitioner may get a chance to be recommended for appointment on the said post as he claims to be just below the last selected candidate in the merit list. (3). In Gujrat State Deputy Executive Engineers Association vs. State of Gujrat & Ors. (1), the Honble Supreme Court quashed the appointments made over and above the vacancies advertised holding that such an action was neither permissible nor desirable for the reason that it would amount to ``improper exercise of power and only in a rare and exceptional circumstance and in emergent situation, this rule can be deviated from and it can be done only after adopting policy decision based on some rational as the authority cannot fill up more posts than advertised as a matter of course. This view has consistently been reiterated by the Apex Court as is evident from the following judgments. (4). In Prem Singh &ors. vs. Haryana State Electricity Board & Ors. (2), the Apex Court observed as under:- ``The selection process by way of requisition and advertisement can be started from clear vacancies and also for anticipated vacancies but not for future vacancies. (4). In Prem Singh &ors. vs. Haryana State Electricity Board & Ors. (2), the Apex Court observed as under:- ``The selection process by way of requisition and advertisement can be started from clear vacancies and also for anticipated vacancies but not for future vacancies. If the requisition and advertisement are for a certain number of posts only, the State cannot make more appointments than the number of posts advertised .........The State can deviate from the advertisement and make appointments on the posts falling vacant thereafter in exceptional circumstances only or in an emergent situation and that too by taking a policy decision in that behalf. (5). In Union of India and others vs. Ishwar Singh Khatri and others (3) the Court held that selected candidates have right to appointment only against ``vacancies notified and that too during the life of the select list as the panel of selected candidates cannot be valid for indefinite period. Moreover, impaneled candidates ``in any event cannot have a right against future vacancies In State of Bihar & ors. vs. The Secretariat, Assistant S.E. Union 1986 and others (4), the Apex Court held that ``a person who is selected does not, on account of being impanelled alone, acquire any indefeasible right of appointment. Empanelment is at the best a condition of eligibility for purposes of appointment, and by itself does not amount to selection or create a vested right to be appointed unless relevant service rules says to the contrary. In the said case as the selection process was completed in five years after the publication of the advertisement, the contention was raised that the empanelled candidates deserved to be appointed over and above the vacancies notified. The Honble Supreme Court rejected the contention by observing that call- ousness of Competent Authority in not completing the selection process and issuing any fresh advertisement in between, may not be justified but offering the posts in such a manner would adversely prejudice the cause of those candidates who achieved eligibility in the meantime. (6). In Surinder Singh & ors. vs. State of Punjab & Ors. (5), the Apex Court observed as under:- ``A waiting list,prepared in an examination conducted by the Commission does not furnish a source of recruitment. (6). In Surinder Singh & ors. vs. State of Punjab & Ors. (5), the Apex Court observed as under:- ``A waiting list,prepared in an examination conducted by the Commission does not furnish a source of recruitment. It is operative only for the contingency that if any of the selected candidates does not join then the persons from the waiting list may be pushed up and be appointed in the vacancy so caused or if there is some extreme exigency the Government may as a matter of policy decision pick up persons in order of merit from the waiting list. But the view taken by the High Court that since the vacancies have not been worked out properly, therefore, the candidates from the waiting list were liable to be appointed does not appear to be sound. This practice, may result in depriving those candidates who became eligible for competing for the vacancies available in future. If the waiting list in one examination was to operate as infinite stock for appointment, there is danger that the State may resort to the device of not holding the examination for years together and pick -up candidates from the waiting list as and when required. The constitutional discipline requires that this Court should not permit such improper exercise of power which may result in creating a vested interest and perpetuatin the waiting list for the candidates of one examination at the cost of entire set of fresh candidates either from the open or even from service.. .Exercise of such power has to be tested on the touch stone of reasonableness ....It is not as a matter of course that the authority can fill-up more posts than advertised . (7). The said judgment has been approved by the Apex Court in Kamlesh Kumar Sharma vs. Yogesh Kumar Gupta & Ors. (6). (8). Thus, it is abundant clear that even if the vacancies have not properly been worked out prior to issuing the advertisement, it would not confer any right on a candidate whose name appears in the select/ waiting list and Court cannot issue direction to fill-up such vacancies from the unexhausted list. (9). Similar controversy was raised before this Courts in Tara Chand Bhati vs. State of Rajasthan and others (7), which was in respect of direct recruitment on posts in Rajasthan Judicial Service. (9). Similar controversy was raised before this Courts in Tara Chand Bhati vs. State of Rajasthan and others (7), which was in respect of direct recruitment on posts in Rajasthan Judicial Service. The Court placed reliance on a large number of Judgment of the Supreme Court and dismissed the petition on the ground that there was no occasion for filling-up the posts more than advertised, for the reason that the High Court had not taken any decision to fill-up the posts beyond the number of posts advertised, considering the urgency and exigency of service. However, it was categorically held that even if vacancies have wrongly been determined, a candidate does not have a right to ask for redetermination of vacan- cies. This view also stands fortified by the judgments of the Honble Supreme Court in A.N.D.`Silva vs. Union of India (8); and State of Haryana vs. Subhash Chander Marwaha (9). (10). In Jatinder Kumar & ors. vs. State of Punjab, & Ors. (10), the Honble Apex Court referred to and relied upon the aforesaid judgments in A.N.D Silva and Subh- ash Chander Marwaha (supra) and held as under:- ``The Government also cannot appoint a person whose name does not appear in the list. But it is open to the Government to decide how many appointment will be made. The process for selection and selection for purpose of recruitment against anticipated vacancies does not create a right to be appointed to the post which can be enforced by a mandamus. (11). Thus, in view of the above, the inescapable conclusion which one may reach is that the select list is prepared as per the number of posts advertised. The select list does not remain operative for ever as immortal; as soon as selection process is complete and appointments are made, all candidates, who are offered appointments, join the posts, the select list does not survive for the reason that the recruitment process itself stands exhausted. No person has any legally enforceable right resort to writ jurisdiction for his appointment simply because his name appea- red below the number of vacancies advertised. There can be no controversy to the legal position that a person, whose name appeared in the select list, cannot claim appointment as a matter of right. No person has any legally enforceable right resort to writ jurisdiction for his appointment simply because his name appea- red below the number of vacancies advertised. There can be no controversy to the legal position that a person, whose name appeared in the select list, cannot claim appointment as a matter of right. I am at complete loss to understand, how in such circumstances, petitioner has resorted to extraordinary writ jurisdiction claiming such relief and that too at such a belated stage. (12). In the instant case, petitioner had applied in pursuance of the advertisement dated 21.12.96 wherein eleven vacancies had been advertised and he had never objected to the number of vacancies advertised-even at the time when he came to know first time that he is not amongst the first eleven candidates in the select list. Advertisement is not under challenge even now. It is the High Court whi- ch has to determine the number of vacancies and issue advertisement to initiate the recruitment process. It is not the right of the candidate to get the direction from the High Court in writ jurisdiction for his appointment without challenging the advertisement in question. What to talk of challenging the advertisement, petitioner did not even consider it proper to place the advertisement on record. It is not clear as what terms had been incorporated in the advertisement. (13). It is settled principle of law that a party has to plead the case and produce/ adduce sufficient evidence to substantiate his submissions made in the petition and in case of no-proper pleadings, the Court is under no obligation to entertain the petition. In Bharat Singh & ors. vs. State of Haryana & Ors. (11); the Honble Supreme Court has observed as under :- ``In our opinion, when a point, which is ostensibly a point of law is required to be substantiate by facts, the party raising the point, if he is the writ petitioner, must plead and prove such facts by evidence which must appear from the writ petition and if he is the respondent, from the counter-affidavit. If the facts are not pleaded or the evidence in support of such facts is not annexed to the writ petition or the counter-affidavit, as the case may be, the Court will not entertain the point ... If the facts are not pleaded or the evidence in support of such facts is not annexed to the writ petition or the counter-affidavit, as the case may be, the Court will not entertain the point ... there is a distinction between a pleading under the Code of Civil Procedure and a writ petition or a counter-affidavit. While in a pleading, that is, a plaint or a written statement, the facts and not the evidence are required to be pleaded in a writ petition or in the counter affidavit, not only the facts but also the evidence in proof of such facts have to be pleaded and annexed to it.. (14). Similar view has been reiterated in Larsen & Toubro Ltd. vs. State of Guj- arat & Ors. (12); National Buildings Construction Corporation vs. S. Raghunathan and others (13); and Ram Narain Arora vs. Asha Rani and others (14). (15). Working out of vacancies being admittedly an administrative action, cannot be subjected to judicial scrutiny unless averments of arbitrariness, irrationality or malafides are specifically pleaded. Even assuming that vacancies had not properly been worked out giving correct interpretation to the provisions of Rules 1969, the bonafide mistake on the part of the High Court cannot be equated with arbitrariness. Moreso, in order to attract the provisions of Art. 14 of the Constitution, error in States action should be alleged to have been committed ``consciously and should not arise out of ``over sight. (Vide Constitution Bench judgment of the Supreme Court in Ramnath Verma & Ors. vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (15). (16). There is another aspect of the matter. There may be some eligible persons who did not apply considering the chances of success very grim because of lessor number of vacancies. Had large number of vacancies been advertised, they might have also applied and thus redermination of vacancies would definitely cause prejudice to such persons. (17). Petitioner has clearly stated in the petition that available vacancies have been determined and an advertisement is likely to be issued in a day or so for initiation of fresh selection. Earlier selection had been held long back and appoint- ments have been made. Details of those appointments have not been furnished by petitioner as when select list was declared and appointments were offered. Earlier selection had been held long back and appoint- ments have been made. Details of those appointments have not been furnished by petitioner as when select list was declared and appointments were offered. It has been mentioned that the last appointment was made in April, 1999, without explaining as under what circumstances the last appointed candidate could not be offered appointment earlier. If petitioner is aware of the date of appointment of the last selected candidate, he may also be aware that all other posts have been filled-up long back and one post could not be filled-up because of the interim order of this Court and it was filled-up at a belated stage only after delivery of the judgment of the Constitution Bench in Ganga Ram Moolchandani & Ors. vs. HIgh Court of Judicature for Rajasthan (16). Thus it is not a proper explanation of delay and laches on his part. (18). Petitioner has tried to explain delay and laches contending that a Division Bench of this Court delivered the judgment in Kumari Veena Verma vs. State of Rajasthan and others (17), wherein the Court issued certain directions to re-determine the vacancies in respect of the selections made in pursuance of the adverti- sement issued in 1994 and as soon as petitioner came to know about the said judgment, he approached the Court without any delay. It is settled proposition of law that a person cannot be permitted to take impetus from the judgment of the Court given in some other case. In State of Karnataka and others vs. S.M. Kotrayya and Others (18), the Honble Supreme Court rejected the contention that a petition should be considered ignoring the delay and laches on the ground that he filed the petition just after coming to know of the relief granted by the Court in a similar case as the same cannot furnish a proper explanation for delay and laches. The Court observed that such a plea is wholly unjustified and cannot furnish any ground for ignoring delay and laches. (19). Same view has been reiterated by the Supreme Court in Jagdish Lal and others vs. State of Haryana and others (19), wherein the Honble Supreme Court observed as under:- ``Suffice it to state that appellants may be sleeping over their rights for long and elected to wake-up when they had impetus from Veerpal Chauhan and Ajit Singhs ratio.... (19). Same view has been reiterated by the Supreme Court in Jagdish Lal and others vs. State of Haryana and others (19), wherein the Honble Supreme Court observed as under:- ``Suffice it to state that appellants may be sleeping over their rights for long and elected to wake-up when they had impetus from Veerpal Chauhan and Ajit Singhs ratio.... desparate attempts of the appellants to re-do the seniority, held by them in various cadre.... are not ameanable to judicial review at this belated stage. The High Court, therefore, has rightly dismissed the writ petition on the ground of delay as well. (20). It is also settled proposition of law that once the selection process stood completed and all the posts, which had been advertised, stood filled-up, no relief can be granted to the petitioner even if his averments have some merit. (Vide J.Ashok Kumar vs. State of Andhra Pradesh (20); State of Bihar and others vs. Md. Kalimuddin & Ors. (21); State of U.P. & ors. vs. Harish Chandra and others (22); Dr. Surinder Singh Jamwal and Anr. vs. State of J & K & Ors. (23); and Sushma Suri vs. Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi & Ors. (24). (21). The case of Veena Verma has been decided and certain directions have been issued therein by this Court on the facts of that case. This Court is bound by the law laid down even by a Co-ordinate Bench, what to talk of a Division Bench. But the question does arise whether the judgment in Veena Verma (supra) can be said to be of binding nature in this case, even when the issues referred to above, have not been raised/ considered therein. It is settled proposition of law that an issue, which has not been considered by the Court while delivering a judgment, cannot be said to be binding as `a decision of the Court takes its colour from the questions involved in the case in which it is rendered and while applying the decision to a later case, the Courts must carefully try to ascertain the true principle laid down by the decision of the Court. (Vide H.H. Maharajadhiraja Madhav Rao Jivaji Rao Scindia Bahadur & Ors. vs. Union of India (25); M/s. Amar Nath Om Prakash & Ors. vs. State of Punjab & Ors. (Vide H.H. Maharajadhiraja Madhav Rao Jivaji Rao Scindia Bahadur & Ors. vs. Union of India (25); M/s. Amar Nath Om Prakash & Ors. vs. State of Punjab & Ors. (26); Rajpur Rude Meha vs. State of Gujarat (27); Sarva Shramik Sangh, Bombay vs. Indian Hume Pipe Co. Ltd. & Anr. (28); and C.I.T. vs. Sun Engineering Works (P) Ltd. (29). (22). As issues whether a person can claim to be considered for appointment beyond the number of vacancies advertised; whether a candidate can ask the Writ Court to issue a direction to re- determine the vacancies as the same had not been worked out properly at the time of selection; whether a person can ask the Court to issue a direction to re-determine the vacancies without challenging the advertisement itself; and whether a petitioner can take impetus from the judgment in other case for explaining delay etc., had not been dealt with by the Court in Veena Verma (supra). Therefore, the ratio of the said judgment cannot be said to be of binding nature so far as these issues are concerned. (23). Thus, in view of the above, the facts and circumstances of this case do not present special features, which may warrant the Court to probe whether vacancies had been worked out under the statutory provisions of Rules 1969. The petition is accordingly dismissed.