S. K. KESHOTE, J. ( 1 ) HEARD learned counsel for the parties. ( 2 ) THIS civil revision application is directed by the defendant-petitioner against the decision of the Extra Assistant Judge, Surat dated 9-8-93 partly allowing Civil Misc. Appeal No. 256/92 and setting aside the order passed by the 4th Joint Civil Judge (S. D.), Surat below application Ex. 5, dated 15-10-92 in Regular Civil Suit No. 1179/92 and directing the respondent, herein to deposit only 25% of the disputed bill within 15 days of the receipt of the order. ( 3 ) THE plaintiff-respondent filed Regular Civil Suit No. 1179/92 against the defendant-petitioner for a declaration and injunction to the effect that its electric power supply cut-off by the defendant petitioner on 23-9-92 be declared to be illegal and for a mandatory order seeking for restoration of the power supply with immediate effect. Along with the suit, the plaintiff respondent filed an application Ex. 5 seeking for interim mandatory order of the restoration of the cut-off electric supply. ( 4 ) THIS suit was resisted by the defendant- petitioner. Briefly stated the defendant-petitioner has come up with the case in defence that the plaintiff-respondent had taken power connection of 30 H. P. for business of weaving cloth and factory was running for 24 hours. On 23-9-92 the plaintiff-respondents installation was checked by the installation checking squad from the head office which had revealed tampering with the meter, the meter seals and theft of energy by making mischief with the figures indicating the consumption and that as authorised by the conditions of supply the power was disconnected and supplementary bill issued and that the plaintiff-respondent has come out with a false case and not with clean hands. The plaintiff-respondent has an alternative remedy under the conditions of the supply and that there is no case made out for grant of temporary injunction. Plaintiff-respondent and defendant-petitioner hereinafter referred to as the petitioner and respondent respectively. ( 5 ) THE application for grant of temporary injunction was came to be rejected under the order dated 15-10-92 by the Court, but on appeal the appellate Court has passed the impugned order. Hence this revision application before this Court. Plaintiff-respondent and defendant-petitioner hereinafter referred to as the petitioner and respondent respectively. ( 5 ) THE application for grant of temporary injunction was came to be rejected under the order dated 15-10-92 by the Court, but on appeal the appellate Court has passed the impugned order. Hence this revision application before this Court. ( 6 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner contended that it is a case of theft of electricity which has been found by the officers of the Board on inspection of installation of the plaintiff where the meters were tampered and further the mischief has been made with the figures indicating the actual consumption, the supplementary bill was issued and as such the learned first appellate Court should not have granted any interim injunction in the mandatory form in its favour. Carrying this contention further the learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the respondent has not come up with clean hands and further it is a case of theft of electricity the discretionary relief should have been granted in its favour. The grant of temporary injunction and moreso in a mandatory form is a discretionary relief and moreso it is an equitable jurisdiction also and as such where a bona fide, honest, a law abiding person approaches this Court then only the indulgence has to be granted but the Court should not protect the persons who had committed theft of electricity tampered with the meters and made the mischief with the figures of the consumption of electricity. It is submitted that the plaintiff- respondent has an alternative remedy under the Gujarat Electricity Board Conditions and Miscellaneous Charges for Supply of Electrical Energy and that has also not been availed of and on this ground the suit itself was not maintainable and when the suit itself is not maintainable, interim injunction could not have been granted. ( 7 ) THE learned counsel for the respondent contended that it is only the allegation made by the petitioner that the respondent has committed theft of electricity, tampered with the meters and made the mischief in the reading of the consumption. All these allegations have been seriously contested by the respondent and as such the disconnection of the power and issuance of the supplementary bill by the Board were not justified. All these allegations have been seriously contested by the respondent and as such the disconnection of the power and issuance of the supplementary bill by the Board were not justified. It is a case where by disconnection of the power supply and demand of the supplementary bill, the whole of the business of the respondent shall come to an end, which will cause manifold inconveniences, difficulties and hardships not only to it but to its employees, who are working in the factory. Merely because it is stated to be a case of theft of electricity it cannot be said and accepted moreso, when the plaintiff-respondent is disputing the same. In the appropriate case, the learned trial Court was justified to grant the temporary injunction in the mandatory form. The learned counsel for the plaintiff lastly contended that as per the conditions of the supply of electrical energy in case the plaintiff-respondent would have availed the remedy provided, under condition No. 34 thereof before the appellate authority it has had benefit of the reconnection of the power supply only on payment of 30% of the deposited bill. In case, where a consumer has chosen to file the suit the learned trial Court or the first appellate Court, as the case may be, could have passed an order of the interim relief in the mandatory form keeping in view the beneficial provisions as framed for the consumers under the provisions of supply of the electricity and at the most in all the circumstances the protection could have been given to the plaintiff-respondent subject to the conditions of the payment of maximum of 30% of the deposited bill. ( 8 ) I have given my thoughtful consideration to the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties. ( 9 ) DURING the course of the arguments Ms. Maya Desai, learned counsel for the Gujarat Electricity Board raised supplementary arguments that in such matters the jurisdiction of the civil Court is barred. She made a reference to a decision of this Court and a decision of the Apex Court. ( 10 ) I do not consider it to be necessary, appropriate and desirable in this case to go on and decide the question of the maintainability of the suit itself in the matter by the plaintiff-respondent. She made a reference to a decision of this Court and a decision of the Apex Court. ( 10 ) I do not consider it to be necessary, appropriate and desirable in this case to go on and decide the question of the maintainability of the suit itself in the matter by the plaintiff-respondent. That course I am not adopting nor precisely consider it to adopt as a suit out of which this civil revision application arises is pending in the trial Court and the defendant-petitioner has sufficient opportunity to raise this issue in the suit itself before the trial Court. ( 11 ) IN this civil revision application, I am only concerned with the order passed by the learned first appellate Court of granting interim mandatory injunction in favour of the plaintiff-respondent, in a case where the officer of the defendant-petitioner on inspection of the installation detected theft of electricity it could have been just, reasonable and equitable or in the interest of justice to protect the plaintiff-respondent by passing an order for the restoration of the power connection on deposit of 20% of the amount of the supplementary bill. So, the propriety, legality and correctness of the order of the first appellate Court impugned in this revision application is the only matter to be decided by this Court in this case with reference to the facts, which have been brought on record and the ground given in support of it by the first appellate Court. ( 12 ) IN the Gujarat Electricity Board Conditions and Miscellaneous Charges for Supply of Electrical Energy, I find that in the case of theft of the electricity or tampering with the meters or mischief made in reading of the consumption of electricity, a provision is there under condition No. 34 for filing of appeal before the appellate authority provided therein. Condition No. 34 makes a provision for payment for energy dishonestly used or abstracted or maliciously wasted or diverted. Condition No. 34 makes a provision for payment for energy dishonestly used or abstracted or maliciously wasted or diverted. This provision provides where it is established to the satisfaction of the Boards Officer that a consumer has dishonestly abstracted, used, consumed or maliciously caused energy to be wasted, or diverted, the value of the electrical energy thus abstracted, used, consumed, wasted or diverted shall be assessed by such officer for the past six months period or the actual period from the date of commencement of supply, whichever is less, in the manner specified and the value of energy so assessed shall be collected by including the same in the next bill or by a separate bill. Such amount shall always be deemed to be the arrears of electricity dues for all purposes. Proviso to this condition lays down that the value of the electricity energy so assessed to have been abstracted, used, consumed, wasted or diverted shall be subject to review by the Appellate Authority on the representation/appeal being filed by the consumer in the manner as provided therein. Proviso 2 of this condition No. 34 makes further provision for disconnection of the power supply of the consumer. This condition provides that when a consumer on first occasion is found wasting, directly using/abstracting/consuming energy dishonestly or maliciously, is aggrieved by the assessment made by the Boards Officer in respect of the monthly quantum of energy deemed to have been consumed and/or the period considered therefor, he shall pay an amount equivalent to 30% of the value of the energy so assessed before the supply is reconnected. However, the consumer on second or subsequent occasion is found wasting, directly using/abstracting/consuming energy dishonestly or maliciously he shall have to pay full amount of the energy so assessed before the supply is reconnected. Other provisions of the condition No. 34 of the Conditions and Miscellaneous Charges for Supply of Electrical Energy, I am not mentioning as the same are not relevant for the decision of this case. Other provisions of the condition No. 34 of the Conditions and Miscellaneous Charges for Supply of Electrical Energy, I am not mentioning as the same are not relevant for the decision of this case. ( 13 ) FROM this provision aforesaid I find that in the case of first wasting, directly using/abstracting/consuming energy dishonestly or maliciously by consumer where he/she/it felt aggrieved of the demand of the supplementary bill and the disconnection of the power connection prefers to file an appeal before the appellate authority, he/she/it will get a protection in the form of a temporary relief automatically, that is the reconnection of the electricity on the payment of 30% of the value of the energy assessed. He will get further relief in the form of interim relief automatically i. e. stay of the recovery of the 70% of the value of the supplementary bill. It is true that in a case where the consumer found dishonestly abstracting, using, consuming or maliciously causing energy to be wasted or diverted second time and where he/she/it decides to approach the appellate authority, under condition No. 34, no protection can be granted either of reconnection or stay of the amount of the supplementary bill. So far as the first case of theft of electricity is concerned the consumer has been found indulged in dishonestly abstracted, used, consumed or maliciously caused energy to be wasted or diverted where he/she/it has chosen to challenge that action of the Board of disconnection of the power supply and the demand of the amount of supplementary bill by filing an appeal before appellate authority he/she/it will get as of right the reconnection of the supply and stay of the balance amount of supplementary bill on deposit of 30% thereof. The learned counsel for the petitioner on being asked by the Court was unable to come out with any satisfactory reply of the question that the Board itself encourages by making such a provision to the consumers, may be one time programme of committing of theft, dishonestly abstracting, using, consuming or maliciously causing energy to be wasted or diverted. The learned counsel for the petitioner on being asked by the Court was unable to come out with any satisfactory reply of the question that the Board itself encourages by making such a provision to the consumers, may be one time programme of committing of theft, dishonestly abstracting, using, consuming or maliciously causing energy to be wasted or diverted. It is a licence which is given to the consumers to indulge in the activity of theft of the electricity and despite it has been given benefit to get the reconnection of the power and stay of the balance of the demand of the amount of the supplementary bill only on the payment of 30% of the amount thereof. ( 14 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner contended that this benefit is only available or given or extended to a consumer of the category, who committed a theft of the electricity only in an appeal he/she/it prefers under condition No. 34 before the appellate authority and no such interim relief can be granted by the civil Courts. I do not consider it necessary to go deep on this broad proposition as sought to be raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner because I am resisted myself from deciding the question of the jurisdiction of civil Court in this matter at this stage. However, the grant of temporary injunction and moreso in a mandatory form is certainly a discretion of the trial Court as well as of the appellate Court as the powers of the appellate Courts are co-existive with the powers of the trial Court. The discretion as conferred upon the courts in the matter of the grant of temporary injunction either under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 or Section 115 of Code of Civil Procedure in appropriate cases is a judicial discretion. In the matter of the grant of the temporary injunction, which is a discretionary relief the conduct of the litigant who is praying for the grant of the same in his/her/its favour is very relevant and important. In the matter of the grant of the temporary injunction, which is a discretionary relief the conduct of the litigant who is praying for the grant of the same in his/her/its favour is very relevant and important. It is not only a discretionary but equally an equitable relief and where the Court finds that a litigant, who has come before it for seeking under its discretionary and equitable power relief in the form of temporary injunction and in this case a mandatory temporary injunction, his/her/its conduct is free from any blame or fair, reasonable and free from all doubts and above all a law abiding citizen. This equitable and discretionary reliefs is not to be granted as a rule or as a matter of course in a case wherein the consumer of the electricity supply, who indulges in the activities of dishonestly abstracting, using, consuming or maliciously causing energy to be wasted or diverted. It is not out of the context to state that the Courts while dealing with the applications filed by the litigants for grant of temporary injunction should not be influenced by the fact that when a litigant has come up before it some relief has to be granted in the case. ( 15 ) IT is a decision of the Board and nothing more is expected or needs to be said by this Court in respect thereof. This Boards decision is not a guidelines moreso a binding guideline for the civil Courts. In this revision application I am not deciding and even I am not touching the question whether a suit filed by the plaintiff-respondent is maintainable in the civil Court or not. But in a case where a consumer of the electricity had chosen to approach the civil Court, the civil Court should not be influenced by these guidelines and may not felt contended or satisfied by granting the interim relief to the consumer in the line and consonance with the provisions as contained in condition No. 34. It may be a guideline for the appellate authority to which the consumer may approach but it cannot be taken to be a guideline and moreso as a rule by the civil Court. It may be a guideline for the appellate authority to which the consumer may approach but it cannot be taken to be a guideline and moreso as a rule by the civil Court. In such matters, the civil Court has to consider independently of the guidelines, whether it is a fit case where the consumer against whom there are serious allegation of committing of the theft of electricity, should be protected by granting temporary injunction. ( 16 ) IN this case, the learned trial Court has not considered it to be a fit case to grant the temporary injunction in favour of the plaintiff-respondent. From reading of the judgment of the first appellate Court. I find that it has protected by granting of temporary injunction to the plaintiff-respondent only on the ground that in case the injunction has not been granted it will have to suffer loss of business and rejection of the grant of temporary injunction is nothing but dismissal of the suit. So, the injunction has been granted by the learned first appellate Court in favour of the plaintiff-respondent not after accepting it to be a fit case for grant of temporary injunction, but on the consideration that when the litigant has approached to it some relief has to be granted to him/her/it. This case clearly exhibits an example how the first appellate Court has discarded the well settled principles to be followed before grant of temporary injunction in favour of the plaintiff and has felt contended to grant the temporary injunction on the ground which are altogether irrelevant and extraneous. The learned first appellate Court has framed a point for consideration, whether the order passed by the learned trial Court is capricious and against the facts and law? If yes, whether it requires to be set aside or modified?" From framing of this point for consideration it gives out that the learned first appellate Court was oblivious of the fact that the appellate Court in appeal filed under O. 43, R. 1 (r) of the Code of Civil Procedure in the matter of the grant of temporary injunction by the learned trial Court has very limited power of judicial review and though the principles have been understood correctly but in its application the learned first appellate Court has exhibited altogether indifferently. The order of the learned trial Court was accepted to be correct by the learned first appellate Court in this case. It is not gainsay that the learned first appellate Court has held that the learned first appellate Court has held that the learned trial Court has not wrongly dismissed the application of the plaintiff-respondent for grant of temporary injunction. So, the learned first appellate Court has not found any fault or error, what to say of a perversity, in passing the order by the learned trial Court, challenged before it. ( 17 ) THE grant of temporary injunction by learned trial Court under O. 39, Rr. 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure is solely discretionary in its equitable jurisdiction. When it is a discretionary relief in the equitable jurisdiction of the learned trial Court naturally, the first appellate Court may not have any wider jurisdiction while hearing the appeal against such an order of the final Court. The first appellate Court will not interfere with the exercise of discretion of the Court of first instance and substitute its own discretion except where that discretion has been shown to have been exercised arbitrarily or capriciously or perversely or where the Court has ignored the settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions. An appeal against exercise of discretion is an appeal on principle. The appellate Court will not reassess the material and seek to reach a conclusion different from the one reached by the Court below solely on the ground that if it had considered the matter at the trial stage it would have come to a contrary conclusion. If the discretion has been exercised by the trial Court reasonably in a judicial manner, the fact that the appellate Court would have taken a different view may not justify interference with the trial Courts exercise of discretion. In the case in hand, as stated earlier, the learned first appellate Court has not found any fault or error or exercise of jurisdiction arbitrarily or capriciously or perversely by the Court below. It is also not the case where the first appellate Court has found that the Court below had ignored the settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of interlocutory injunction. It is also not the case where the first appellate Court has found that the Court below had ignored the settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of interlocutory injunction. Not only this the learned first appellate Court has also not reassessed the material and reached to the conclusion or decision different to what the Court below has given. The first appellate Court has not found it to be a case where the trial Court has not exercised its discretion reasonably and in judicial manner. The law is settled that it is not permissible to the first appellate Court under O. 43, R. 1 (r) of the Code of Civil Procedure that it could have taken a different view, in case it would have been sitting as a trial Court, to interfere with the order of the learned trial Court on this ground. The learned first appellate Court in this case in fact concurred with the judgment of the learned trial Court. But its interference, in the matter, appears to have influenced by the fact that in case the plaintiff-respondent would have approached to the appellate authority as per the condition No. 34, that authority would have permitted the restoration of electricity connection to him on deposit of 30% of demanded amount. That is not the concern of the civil Courts. The other two considerations, which prevailed with the first appellate Court for grant of temporary injunction are that in case the application for grant of temporary injunction is rejected the plaintiff-respondent has to suffer a loss of business and secondly that it is nothing but the dismissal of the suit, are wholly irrelevant and extraneous. The approach of the learned first appellate Court in this case is not only erroneous but perverse. These are the extraneous considerations, which could not have been taken to the extent of protecting a consumer against whom there are very very serious allegations of committing theft of the electricity. The approach of the learned first appellate Court in this case is not only erroneous but perverse. These are the extraneous considerations, which could not have been taken to the extent of protecting a consumer against whom there are very very serious allegations of committing theft of the electricity. The allegations of the theft were prima facie are found to be correct by both the Courts but still in this case the interference has been made by the first appellate Court with a discretionary order passed by learned trial Court and moreso where it is not found any fault or illegality therein against the action of the Board of disconnecting the electricity connection and raising of the additional demand of the consumption of electricity. The plaintiff-respondent has a right of appeal before the appellate authority but the learned counsel for the respondent has failed to furnish any explanation for non-availing of this remedy. It is settled law that the grant of injunction is discretionary relief. The exercise thereof is subject to the Court satisfying that; (i) there is a serious disputed question to be tried in the suit and that an act, on the facts before the Court, there is probability of his being entitled to the relief asked for by the plaintiff, (ii) the Courts interference is necessary to protect party from the species of injury. In other words, irreparable injury or damage would ensue before the legal rights would be established at the trial, and (iii) that the comparative hardship or mischief or inconvenience which is likely to occur from withdrawing the injunction will be greater than that would be likely to arise from granting of it. The burden is on the plaintiff by evidence aliunde by affidavit or otherwise, that there is a prima facie case in his favour which needs adjudication at the trial. The existence of the prima facie right and infraction of the right is a condition for grant of temporary injunction. It is true that prima facie case is not to be confused with prima facie right which is to be established on evidence at the trial. It means a substantial question raised bona fide, which needs investigation and a decision on merits. But merely because the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case to the satisfaction of the Court by itself is not sufficient to grant the temporary injunction. It means a substantial question raised bona fide, which needs investigation and a decision on merits. But merely because the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case to the satisfaction of the Court by itself is not sufficient to grant the temporary injunction. The Court has to satisfy that non-interference by it would result in irreparable injury to the party seeking relief and that there is no other remedy available to the party except one to grant temporary injunction and he needs protection from the consequences of apprehended injury. Irreparable injury must be material one namely one that cannot adequately compensated by way of damages. The third condition is "that the balance of convenience" must be in favour of grant of injunction. The Court while granting or refusing to grant temporary injunction should exercise sound judicial discretion to find the amount of substantial mischief or the injury which is likely to be caused to the parties, if injunction is refused and compare it with that, which is likely to be caused to the other side if the injunction is granted. The Court has to weigh competing possibilities or possibilities of likelihood of injury to the parties to litigation and if the Court has considered that pending the suit, the injury likely to cause to the one side is more in comparison to the injury likely to cause to the opposite side, then only the temporary injunction can be granted and not otherwise. In the matter of grant of temporary injunction in addition to what the aforesaid has to be kept in mind by the Courts below, two other important ingredients to be also taken note of. Usually, the prayer for grant of an interlocutory injunction is at the stage when the existence of the legal right asserted by the plaintiff and its alleged violation are both contested and uncertain and remain uncertain till they are established at the trial on evidence. The Court, at this stage, acts on certain well settled principles of administration of this form of interlocutory remedy, which is both temporary and discretionary. The interlocutory remedy is intended to preserve the right of the parties, which may appear on a prima facie case. The Court, at this stage, acts on certain well settled principles of administration of this form of interlocutory remedy, which is both temporary and discretionary. The interlocutory remedy is intended to preserve the right of the parties, which may appear on a prima facie case. The Court should not be oblivious of the fact that in restraining the defendant from exercising what it considered its legal right is a very serious matter and before grant of temporary injunction the comparative mischief or loss or injury likely to be caused to other side has also to be considered. At this stage the Court has to consider that by way of temporary injunction it may not grant or it may not amount to grant of final relief to the plaintiff. The grant of the final relief in the form of interim relief is ordinarily not permissible to the Courts. The interim relief in substance giving the principal relief as prayed in the suit is also not a sound exercise of the discretionary powers of the Courts. It is not gainsay that the interim relief should not amount to overreach the main relief which ultimately may or may not be granted by the Court. The result of the grant of interim relief of the nature as prayed for in the present case is certainly will have effect of allowing the suit itself at this interlocutory stage where respective cases are pleaded by the parties to the litigation has to be adjourned. In such matters where there are serious allegations of theft of electricity and which prima facie Courts have found to be not perverse or baseless, to grant a temporary injunction in such matter certainly will amount to granting of final relief to the plaintiff-respondent. ( 18 ) A party is not entitled to the order of grant of temporary injunction as a matter of right or course. The Court grant such relief accordingly to legal principles ex debito justitiae. Before any such order is passed the Court must be satisfied that a strong prima facie case has been made out by the plaintiff including on the question of maintainability of the suit and the balance of convenience is in its favour and refusal of injunction would cause irreparable injury to him. Before any such order is passed the Court must be satisfied that a strong prima facie case has been made out by the plaintiff including on the question of maintainability of the suit and the balance of convenience is in its favour and refusal of injunction would cause irreparable injury to him. The Court should always willing to extend its hands to protect a citizen, who is being wronged or is being deprived to property without any authority to law or without following the procedure, which are fundamental and vital in the nature. But at the same time the judicial proceedings cannot be used to protect or to perpetuate wrong committed by a person who approaches the Court. The power to grant temporary injunction is extraordinary power vested in the Courts to be exercised taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the particular case. So, the conduct of the party praying for the grant of temporary injunction is very important and relevant in the given case. In case the plaintiff in his dealing with the persons against whom the relief is sought has acted in unfair or inequitable manner, he, she or it would not be entitled to grant of any temporary injunction. In the case in hand if the matter is considered from another aspect or angle it is no more in dispute that the learned first appellate Court affirmed the findings of the Court below and on merits also it was in agreement with the finding of the learned trial Court. It is not the case where the first appellate Court has disagreed with the finding recorded by the learned trial Court on the question of the prima facie case the irreparable injury and the balance of convenience. In this case, the first appellate Court has not held and found that the plaintiff has a prima facie case in its favour, the irreparable loss is caused in case the temporary injunction is declined and the balance of convenience is also in favour for the grant of the temporary injunction. In this case, the first appellate Court has not held and found that the plaintiff has a prima facie case in its favour, the irreparable loss is caused in case the temporary injunction is declined and the balance of convenience is also in favour for the grant of the temporary injunction. It is influenced only by the fact and the injunction has been granted, as stated earlier and borne out from the judgment, on the considerations, first that there is provision under the relevant condition as laid down by the Board to protect the consumer, in the first case of theft of electricity on payment of 30% of the amount of the revised bill. Second, in case the injunction is not granted it will affect the business of the plaintiff and thirdly, the suit itself will become infructuous. These are not the considerations, what to say relevant considerations for the grant of temporary injunction, which is an extraordinary discretionary relief in equitable jurisdiction. The temporary injunction could have been granted only where the first appellate Court could have found it to be a case where all the three ingredients are established to its satisfaction and further it would have found that the conduct of the plaintiff-respondent is fair and it is not the case where it has taken the benefits of its own wrong or it will perpetuate some wrong or illegality. It is a case where the learned first appellate Court has not found that the order passed by the learned trial Court is perverse or arbitrary or it is not considered relevant material facts before making it etc. The learned first appellate Court in this case has committed serious error of jurisdiction in interfering with the order of the learned trial Court. The interference made by the first appellate Court in the matter is capricious and based on irrelevant and extraneous considerations and its order cannot be allowed to stand. Moreover, leaving apart all other aspects I fail to see how any irreparable injury will cause to the plaintiff-respondent in case the interim relief, as prayed for is not granted in its favour. It is a case of a demand of the electricity charges of the theft thereof committed by the plaintiff-respondent. Moreover, leaving apart all other aspects I fail to see how any irreparable injury will cause to the plaintiff-respondent in case the interim relief, as prayed for is not granted in its favour. It is a case of a demand of the electricity charges of the theft thereof committed by the plaintiff-respondent. So, it is a money matter and if ultimately the plaintiff succeeds in the suit naturally the Court has all the powers to compensate reasonably to him for any injury and damage caused to him. Not only this the learned first appellate Court has taken altogether a contrary approach in the matter. It is protected the plaintiff-respondent so to approach the appellate authority and if that was the approach I fail to see what for it was necessary for it to protect him. It is not out of the context to state that appellate authority has its own power and if considers it to be a fit case to protect the petitioner-plaintiff-respondent it would have been protected. But this approach of the first appellate Court to give the direction to the plaintiff-respondent to approach the appellate authority and simultaneously protecting him by granting temporary injunction is wholly perverse. It is not the concern of the Court to give the advice to the party how it to act in the matter. The Court is only concerned with the case which has come up before it and where it is found nothing in favour of the plaintiff-respondent, the temporary injunction should not have been granted. It is not the concern of the Court to see that a consumer against whom there are serious allegations of theft should be protected by exercising of its discretionary powers in equitable jurisdiction. The Board is a statutory body and it is providing electricity facility to the citizens. In case unscrupulous consumers are being protected by the Court on the considerations as give out by the first appellate Court, then the huge amount of the Board will remain unpaid and it will ultimately affect the consumers as a whole. The consumers who committed the thefts are not the persons, who are coming up with clean hands before the Courts and any protection given to such persons, certainly it will amount to using of the judicial proceedings to protect or to perpetuate a wrong commitment by the litigant itself. The consumers who committed the thefts are not the persons, who are coming up with clean hands before the Courts and any protection given to such persons, certainly it will amount to using of the judicial proceedings to protect or to perpetuate a wrong commitment by the litigant itself. It is a different matter that the Board has laid down such conditions where that consumer, who committed theft of the electricity are being protected. But that is not the relevant and binding provision for the civil Courts. The civil Courts have to consider the matters independently and if it is considered that it is not a case where any protection should have been granted by passing interlocutory order to the plaintiff-respondent, it is perfectly legal and justified to decline to grant the interim relief. It is a case where the learned first appellate Court has given the protection to appellant-respondent who otherwise does not deserves to be given any protection whatsoever. Such class of the persons are to be severely dealt by the Court rather than to show any sympathy, mercy or concession to them. It is the case where the learned first appellate Court has failed to give out any good, bad or indifferent reason how in the case the plaintiff-respondent is not protected, it will suffer loss in business. Similarly, I fail to see nor I find any reason in support thereof in order of the first appellate Court that in case the injunction is not granted it will amount to dismissal of the suit. If this is to be taken to be a proposition of law then in all the suits temporary injunction has to be granted by the civil Courts. But that is not the law. This is absolutely a perverse approach of the first appellate Court. It is too difficult to accept this proposition in the matter. It is at the cost of repetition to be stated that these are the disputed matters and if ultimately the plaintiff-respondent succeeds in the suit, he can be compensated for the loss if any suffered by it. It is a demand of the electricity charges and on success of the suit, the Court would have passed the order for refund of the amount in favour of the plaintiff together with reasonable rate of interest. It is a demand of the electricity charges and on success of the suit, the Court would have passed the order for refund of the amount in favour of the plaintiff together with reasonable rate of interest. But by no stretch of imagination, it can be accepted that the grant of temporary injunction in this case will result in the loss of the business or the dismissal of the suit itself. ( 19 ) IT is a case where both the trial Court as well as the first appellate Court have not found that the petitioner has any prima facie case in its favour. But further it is totally failed to establish how any irreparable injury, which cannot be compensated in terms of money will cause to it in case the temporary injunction is not granted and the balance of convenience also favours the grant of temporary injunction. The learned first appellate Court has framed a point for consideration in this case and it is not found it to be a case where the order of the learned trial Court can be said to be perverse or capricious. The grant of indulgence to the plaintiff-respondent in this case by it, is nothing but only perverse, arbitrary and capricious. The plaintiff-respondent himself has chosen the remedy of the suit and in case he wanted to get the benefits of the reconnection of the electricity on deposit of 30% of the demand and non-recovery of 70% of the demand of the additional charges of the electricity, it should have approached the appellate authority. When it approached to the civil Court the matter has to be decided in accordance with law and not having influenced or effected by the condition No. 34 as well as other considerations as what have taken by the first appellate Court. The net result of the aforesaid discussion, is that the order of the learned Extra Assistant Judge, Surat dated 9-8-93 passed in Civil Misc. Appeal No. 256/92 cannot be allowed to stand. Accordingly this revision application succeeds and same is allowed and the order aforesaid is quashed and set aside with costs which is assessed to Rs. 2,000/ -. .