Judgment M.Y.Eqbal, J. 1. This appeal by the plaintiff-appellant is directed against the judgment of reversal passed by Additional Judicial Commissioner, Ranchi in Title Appeal No.9/87 reversing the judgment and decree passed by the Munsif, Ranchi in Title Suit No. 6/84, whereby the suit filed by plaintiff-appellant for a decree of eviction has been dismissed. 2. The appeal was admitted on the following substantial questions of law: "(i) Whether the learned Appellate Court below had applied the correct legal test to the fact found and/or adopt legal approach to a case white reversing the well reasoned judgment of the Trial Court on the point of personal necessity without meeting the reasonings assigned by the Trial Court? (ii) Whether the finding recorded by the lst Appellate Court on the point of default can be sustained in law?" 3. The plaintiff-appellant filed the aforementioned suit for eviction, inter alia, mainly on the ground that the defendant is in occupation of the suit premises on a monthly rent of Rs.175A beside Rs.20/- payable on account of electric charges. It is alleged that the defendant violated the terms of tenancy by using electric heater and other electric appliances. He also committed default in payment of rent from April, 81 to June, 81. It is further alleged that the plaintiff requires the suit premises for use and occupation of his sons, one room for Raj Kishore Solanki for re-storing materials and another room for younger son for installing photo copy machine after converting the same into dust proof air conditioner. 4. The defendant filed the written statement denying and disputing the allegation made by the plaintiff. The defendants case is that he has not defaulted in payment of rent for the months of April, 81 to June, 81. According to him, rent for the month of April, 81 was paid on 13th May, 81 in presence of Sri Chandra Sekhar Singh and rent for the month of May, 81 was paid on 11th June, 81 in presence of Sri Ishwar Dayal Singh and rent for the month of June, 81 was paid on 10th July, 81 in presence of Lal Chintamanl Nath Sahdeo. It is further stated that rent for the month of July, 81 was tendered to the plaintiff but he refused the same so rent was remitted through money order. It is further stated that rent for the month of July, 81 was tendered to the plaintiff but he refused the same so rent was remitted through money order. The defendant also denied and disputed the allegation that the suit premises which is in occupation of the defendant, is reasonably and bonafide required by the plaintiff. 5. The trial court decreed the suit holding that the defendant defaulted in payment of rent and the plaintiff requires the suit premises reasonably and in good faith for the occupation of his sons. The trial court disbelieved the case of the defendant that rent for the aforementiond three months were paid to the plaintiff and the reasons given by the trial court that the names of those persons in whose presence rent for the aforesaid three months was paid have not been disclosed in the written statement and it is an after-thought in order to get rid of the default. The appellate court, however, reversed the finding of the trial court and held that onus has been satisfactorily discharged by the defendant in proving that the rent for the aforesaid three months have been paid to the plaintiff. On the question of personal necessity the appellate court disbelieved the evidences adduced by the plaintiff on the issue of personal necessity and held that the requirement of the plaintiff is not bona fide. 6. Mr.Debi Prasad, learned Sr.counsel appearing for the appellant, assailed the impugned judgment and decree of the appellate court as being illegal and contrary to facts and evidence on record. Learned counsel firstly submitted that the appellate court while reversing the finding of the trial court has not at all met the reasonings given by the trial court and, therefore, such finding cannot be sustained in iaw. In this connection, learned counsel heavily relied on the decision of this Court in the case of Raj Nath Mahto and Ors. V/s. Sheo Dayal Mahto & Ors. ( 1986 BBCJ 301 ). Learned counsel further submitted that the appellate court without considering all the documentary evidences available on record has come to a different finding which also cannot be sustained in law. In this connection, he relied upon a decision in the case of Smt. Mehrunnisa and others V/s. Smt. Visham Kumari and others ( AIR 1998 S.C. 427 ). 7. Learned counsel further submitted that the appellate court without considering all the documentary evidences available on record has come to a different finding which also cannot be sustained in law. In this connection, he relied upon a decision in the case of Smt. Mehrunnisa and others V/s. Smt. Visham Kumari and others ( AIR 1998 S.C. 427 ). 7. On the other hand, Mr.Kameshwar Prasad, learned Sr.counsel appearing for the respondent, firstly submitted that the appellate court has discussed all the evidences both oral and documentary and has come to a finding on the question of default and personal necessity, such finding cannot be disturbed by this court in Second Appeal under section 100 C.P.C. Learned counsel further submitted that it is not a case where the appellate court has not considered the reasonings given by the trial court rather the appellate court is not supposed to meet all the reasonings while reversing the judgment of the trial court. In this connection learned counsel has relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of V.Ramachandra Ayyar and another V/s. Ramalingam Chettiar and another ( AIR 1963 SC 302 ) and in the case of Sheel Chand V/s. Prakash Chand reported in AIR 1998(6) S.C.C. 683 . 8. Before appreciating the rival contentions made by the learned counsel for the parties, I will first discuss some of the case laws decided by the Supreme Court and this court on the question involved in this appeal: In Rajnath Mahtos case (supra) the learned Single Judge of the court was considering the scope of section 100 CPC in the matter of reversal of a judgment of the trial court by the appellate court. His lordship found that the appellate court while reversing the judgment of the trial court had neither discussed the evidences adduced by the parties nor met the reasonings of the trial court. In that context his lordship held that the appellate court is bound to discuss the evidences and meet the reasonings of the trial court while reversing the judgment otherwise this court can interfere in second appeal under section 100 C.P.C. 9. In that context his lordship held that the appellate court is bound to discuss the evidences and meet the reasonings of the trial court while reversing the judgment otherwise this court can interfere in second appeal under section 100 C.P.C. 9. In Smt. Mehrunnisas case (supra) the matter involved was that in a suit for eviction filed on the ground of default and bonafide personal necessity, the trial court in its detailed judgment- after considering both oral and documentary evidences, came to a finding that the requirement of the landlady for starting business was bona fide and she was hot in possession of any other vacant shop of her own. The learned appellate court, after re-appreciating the pleadings and evidences, came to a definite conclusion about the bona fide requirement of landlady for starting business. Against the judgment and decree of the appellate court the landlady preferred second appeal in the High Court. The High Court, after going into the judgments of the courts below, found that the lower appellate court though entitled to re-appreciate the evidence and come to a different conclusion, failed to read the whole evidence and the documents exhibited in the trial court before reversing the finding of the trial court on the issue of bona fide requirement of the landlady. The High Court, accordingly, allowed the second appeal and decreed the suit. The defendant-tenant then preferred a civil appeal before the Apex Court. The Apex Court found that the lower appellate court, before reversing the judgment, failed to consider all the documentary evidence. Their lordships observed: "In the case on hand unfortunately the lower appellate court before reversing the finding of the trial court on the issue of bona fide requirement of the landlady for starting a cloth business failed to read the entire evidence and take into consideration all the documents placed before the trial court. Therefore, it was rightly contended by Dr. Ghosh, learned Sr. counsel for the respondent, that the High Court was justified in interfering with the finding of the first appellate court. A reading of the judgment of the lower appellate court leaves no doubt that it has looked into the contents of the first notice whereunder the landlady has stated that she required the premises for her husbands office and ignored the notice issued just before the filing of the suit. A reading of the judgment of the lower appellate court leaves no doubt that it has looked into the contents of the first notice whereunder the landlady has stated that she required the premises for her husbands office and ignored the notice issued just before the filing of the suit. The lower appellate Court has also failed to give due importance to the fact that the landlady has not taken any steps to file suit for eviction pursuant to the notice issued on two earlier occasions and the ground stated in the notice preceding the suit are relevant for the purpose of deciding the issue." 10. While deciding the issue their lordships further relied upon the principles laid down in its earlier judgment in the case of Dilbagrai Punjabi V/s. Sharad Chandra (1988 (Supp) SCC 710 : AIR 1988 SC 1858 ) which reads as follows:- "It is true that the High Court while hearing the appeal under S. 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure has no jurisdiction to reappraise the evidence and reverse the conclusion reached by the first appellate court, but at the same time its power to interfere with the finding cannot be denied if when the lower appellate court decides an issue of fact a substantial question of law arises. The Court is under a duty to examine the entire relevant evidence on record and if it refuses to consider important evidence having direct bearing on the disputed issue and the error which arises is of a magnitude that it gives birth to a substantial question of law, the High Court is fully authorised to set aside the finding." 11. In the case of V. Ramchandra Ayyar (supra) the Supreme Court had the occasion to consider the scope of the High Court in interfering with the judgment of reversal of the lower appellate court. Their lordships observed:- "Mr. Chatterjee, however, has purported to base his contentions on certain decision to which it is necessary to refer. In Rani Hemanta Kumari Devi v.Brojendra Kishore Roy Chowdhry, 17 Ind App 65 (PC) the dispute was in regard to the binding character of the compromise between the parties. The trial court had held that the compromise was binding and dismissed the suit. The District Judge reversed the decree on the ground that the compromise was not binding. In Rani Hemanta Kumari Devi v.Brojendra Kishore Roy Chowdhry, 17 Ind App 65 (PC) the dispute was in regard to the binding character of the compromise between the parties. The trial court had held that the compromise was binding and dismissed the suit. The District Judge reversed the decree on the ground that the compromise was not binding. The matter then went to the High Court in second appeal and the High Court held that the compromise was binding and restored the decree of the trial court. When it was urged before the Privy Council that the High Court had exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with lower appellate courts conclusion on a question of fact, the Privy council affirmed the decision of the High Court on the ground that the finding of the lower appellate court had been recorded without any evidence and so this decision merely shows that if a finding of fact has been recorded by the first appellate court without any evidence, that finding can be successfully challenged in second appeal because a finding of fact which is not supported by any evidence can be questioned under S. 100 and in that connection it may be said that the decree proceeding on such a finding discloses a substantial defect or error in procedure. It is true that in dealing with this point, Sir, Richard Couch has observed that "when the judgements came to be looked at, it appears that he (the first appellate court) has reversed the decree of the first court in the absence of any evidence-certainly in the absence of any evidence upon which he might reasonably come to the conclusion that the deed of compromise was not for the benefit of the adopted son". With respect we may point out that this observation should not be literally construed to mean that whereever he High Court thinks that the evidence accepted by the lower appellate court could not have been reasonably accepted, the High Court would be justified in interfering with the decision of the lower appellate court. All that the said observation means is that it should be a case where the evidence which is accepted by the lower appellate court, no reasonable person could have accepted and that really amounts to saying that there is no evidence at all. All that the said observation means is that it should be a case where the evidence which is accepted by the lower appellate court, no reasonable person could have accepted and that really amounts to saying that there is no evidence at all. It is in this sense that the said observation should be construed and then it would be consistent with the Privy Councils decision in the case of Mst.Durga Choudharain, 17 Ind App. 122 (PC). Therefore, we are inclined to treat this decision as supporting the proposition that the High Court can interfere with the conclusion of fact recorded by the lower appellate court if the said conclusion is not supported by any evidence." 12. Their lordships further observed as under:- "We must, therefore, hold that Mr.Chatterjee is not right in contending that because the judgment of the lower appellate court was not as elaborate as that of the trial Judge, or because some of the reasons given by the trial Judge had not been expressly reversed by the lower appellate court, the High Court was entitled to interfere with the conclusion of the lower appellate Court. The question which arose for the decision of the courts of fact, was a simple question of fact-Was the release deed executed by respondent no.2 in favour of the appellants justified by adequate consideration.? Had respondent no.2 independent advice at the time when he signed the said document? Did he act bona fide, or was he imposed upon?- these were the points which arose between the parties on their pleadings. It would be noticed that these points present pure question of fact and their decision depended in the present case on appreciating the oral evidence adduced in support of the rival contentions, documents produced by the parties, their conduct and surrounding circumstances. In other words what the court- of facts were called upon to consider and decide were questions of fact in the light of all relevant evidence. That being so, we do not think the High Court was justified in interfering with the finding of fact recorded by the lower appellate court in favour of the appellants." 13. In other words what the court- of facts were called upon to consider and decide were questions of fact in the light of all relevant evidence. That being so, we do not think the High Court was justified in interfering with the finding of fact recorded by the lower appellate court in favour of the appellants." 13. On the principle of law laid down by the Apex Court, as quoted above, it is clear that if the appellate court while reversing the judgment of the trial court has re-appreciated the evidence and come to a finding of fact, then this court in second appeal, is not supposed to interfere with the said finding of fact. The High Court can interfere with the conclusion of fact recorded by the lower appellate court if the conclusion is not supported by any evidence. 14. In the light of the aforesaid propositions of law now I will analyse the finding of facts arrived at by the lower appellate court. On the issue of default the lower appellate court has re-appreciated the entire evidence both oral and documentary and after making meticulous examination of those evidences, came to a conclusion that although the case of the plaintiff was that whenever rent was paid by the tenant, rent receipts were granted to him but no counter foil of the rent receipts have been produced. On the other hand, the defendant-tenant produced a diary marked exhibit K which he maintained in due course of business. In the said diary there are entries with regard to payment of rent and electric charges on the relevant dates. The appellate court found that the trial court has not given any weightage to the documentary evidence adduced by the defendant and non-filing of the counter foil of rent receipts by the plaintiff. The lower appellate court further discussed the oral evidence adduced by both the plaintiff and the defendant. It cannot, therefore, be said that the lower appellate court has not reappreciated the evidence adduced by the parties or failed to consider any of the evidences while reversing the judgement of trial court. The finding of the lower appellate court, therefore, cannot be said to be perverse in law or a prudent man cannot come to such a finding. 15. The finding of the lower appellate court, therefore, cannot be said to be perverse in law or a prudent man cannot come to such a finding. 15. Similarly, on the issue of personal necessity, the lower appellate court found that there are several shop premises in the ground floor of the building which are in occupation of the tenants. In the said ground floor the plaintiff is in occupation of one shop. The plaintiffs case is that he requires more space for the storage of goods and for providing some space to his younger son. The lower appellate court again discussed the evidence adduced by the plaintiff on the issue of personal requirement. The lower appellate court further discussed the documents, namely, exhibits 3 series and came to a finding that the younger son of the plaintiff neither purchased a photocopier machine nor started any business. The lower appellate court further found that the younger-son of the plaintiff for whose requirement the tenanted premises is needed, has not come forward to state on oath about his bona fide requirement. Admittedly, there are more than one shop in the ground floor of the building and the defendant-tenant is in occupation of the premises in the first floor of the building, it was also admitted that the tenants on the ground floor were paying lessor rent than the defendant. Taking into consideration ail these evidences the lower appellate court has come to a finding that the alleged requirement of the plaintiff is not bona fide. I do not find any reason to differ with the finding recorded by the lower appellate court. 16. It is reaily interesting to note here that the defendant-tenant is in occupation of a space in the first floor, white the plaintiff wants to expand his business carried on by his elder son and also to provide some space to his younger son. Instead of taking step for eviction of the tenants occupying the adjacent shops in the ground floor, the plaintiff sought eviction of the defendant who is in occupation of a space in the first floor. Instead of taking step for eviction of the tenants occupying the adjacent shops in the ground floor, the plaintiff sought eviction of the defendant who is in occupation of a space in the first floor. It is true that a landlord is free to choose a particular premises for his requirement and he is not guided by the tenant but at the same time a landlord has not unfettered right to re-enter into the premises of his own choice unless he proves that the available vacant premises is not suitable for his business. Had the case of the plaintiff regarding personal necessity for expanding the business of his son carried on in the ground floor been genuine, then the most suitable accommodation would have been in the ground floor itself and not in the first floor of the building. It is not the case of the plaintiff/appellant that the tenants in occupation of shops in the ground floor are on permanent lease or on the basis of fixed term lease which has not expired or there are other reasons for which they cannot be evicted on the ground of personal necessity. In the absence of that, I fully agree with the finding recorded by the lower appellate court regarding absence of bona fide requirement. The lower appellate court therefore, while reversing the judgment of the trial court has recorded finding of fact after reappreciating the entire evidences both oral and documentary and taking into consideration all other facts and circumstances of the case. I do not find any reason to interfere with the said finding recorded by the lower appellate court. 17. In the result, I find no merit in this appeal which is, accordingly, dismissed.