Judgment G.P. Mathur, J.-This writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution has been filed by way of public interest litigation, by Sakshi, which is an organisation to provide legal, medical, residential, psychological or any other help, assistance or charitable support for women, in particular those who are victims of any kind of sexual abuse and/or harassment, violence or any kind of atrocity or violation and is a violence intervention centre. The respondents arrayed in the writ petition are (1) Union of India; (2) Ministry of Law and Justice; and (3) Commissioner of Police, New Delhi. The main reliefs claimed in the writ petition are as under: ­ (A) Issue a writ in the nature of a declaration or any other appropriate writ or direction declaring inter alia that “sexual intercourse” as contained in section 375 of the Indian Penal Code shall include all forms of penetration such as penile/vaginal penetration, penile/oral penetration, penile/anal penetration, finger/vaginal and finger/anal penetration and object/vaginal penetration; (B) Consequently, issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of a direction to the respondents and its servants and agents to register all such cases found to be truly on investigation, offences falling within the broadened interpretation of “sexual intercourse” set out in prayer (A) aforesaid as offences under Section 375, 376 and 376A to 376D of the Indian Penal Code, 1860; (C) Issue such other writ, order or direction as this Hon’ble Court may deem appropriate in the present facts and circumstances. The petition is thus restricted to a declaratory­ relief and consequential directions. 2. It is set out in the writ petition that the petitioner has noticed with growing concern the dramatic increase of violence, in particular sexual violence against women and children as well as the implementation of the provisions of Indian Penal Code namely Sections 377, 375/376 and 354 by the respondent authorities. The existing trend of the respondent authorities has been to treat sexual violence, other than penile/vaginal penetration, as lesser offences falling under either Section 377 or 354 of the IPC and not as a sexual offence under Section 375/376 IPC. The existing trend of the respondent authorities has been to treat sexual violence, other than penile/vaginal penetration, as lesser offences falling under either Section 377 or 354 of the IPC and not as a sexual offence under Section 375/376 IPC. It has been found that offences such as sexual abuse of minor children and women by penetration other than penile/vaginal penetration, which would take any other form and could also be through use of objects whose impact on the victims is in no manner less than the trauma of penile/vaginal penetration as traditionally understood under Section 375/376, have been treated as offences falling under Section 354 of the IPC as outraging the modesty of a women or under Section 377 IPC as unnatural offenses. 3. The petitioner through the present petition contends that the narrow understanding and application of rape under Section 375/376 IPC only to the cases of penile/vaginal penetration runs contrary to the existing contemporary understanding of rape as an intent to humiliate, violate and degrade a woman or child sexually and, therefore, adversely affects the sexual integrity and autonomy of women and children in violation of Article 21 of the Constitution. 4. The petitioner submits that a plain reading of Section 375 would make it apparent that the term “sexual intercourse” has not been defined and is, therefore, subject to and is capable of judicial interpretation. Further the explanation to Section 375 IPC does not in any way limit the term penetration to mean penile/vaginal penetration. The definition of the term rape as contained in the Code is extremely wide and takes within its sweep various forms of sexual offenses. Limiting the understanding of “rape” to abuse by penile/vaginal penetration only, runs contrary to the contemporary understanding of sexual abuse law and denies majority of women and children access to adequate redress in violation of Article 14 and 21 of the Constitution. Statistics and figures indicate that sexual abuse of children, particularly minor girl children by means and manner other than penile/vaginal penetration is common and may take the form of penile/anal penetration, penile/oral penetration, finger/vaginal penetration or object/vaginal penetration. It is submitted that by treating such forms of abuse as offenses falling under Section 354 IPC or 377 IPC, the very intent of the amendment of Section 376 IPC by incorporating sub-section 2(f) therein is defeated. It is submitted that by treating such forms of abuse as offenses falling under Section 354 IPC or 377 IPC, the very intent of the amendment of Section 376 IPC by incorporating sub-section 2(f) therein is defeated. The said interpretation is also contrary to the contemporary understanding of sexual abuse and violence all over the world. 5. The petitioner submits that there has for some time now been a growing body of feminist legal theory and jurisprudence which has clearly established rape as an experience of humiliation, degradation and violation rather than an outdated notion of penile/vaginal penetration. Restricting an understanding of rape in terms sought to be done by he respondent authorities and its agents reaffirms the view that rapists treat rape as sex and not violence and thereby condone such behaviour especially when it comes to sexual abuse of children. 6. In this regard, reference is invited to the observations of a renowned expert on the issue of sexual abuse: “....in rape ..... the intent is not merely to “take”, but to humiliate and degrade.... Sexual assault in our day and age is hardly restricted to forced genital copulation, nor is it exclusively a male-on-female offence. Tradition and biologic opportunity have rendered vaginal rape a particular political crime with a particular political history, but the invasion may occur through the mouth or the rectum as well. And while the penis may remain the rapist’s favourite weapon, his prime instrument of vengeance.... it is not in fact his only tool. Sticks, bottles and even fingers are often substituted for the “natural” thing. And as men may invade women through other orifices, so too, do they invade other men. Who is to say that the sexual humiliation suffered through forced oral or rectal penetration is a lesser violation of the personal, private inner space, a lesser injury to mind, spirit and sense of self?” (Susan Brownmiller, Agait st Our Will 1986). 7. The petitioner further submits that the respondent authorities and their agents have failed to take into consideration the legislative purpose of Section 377 IPC. Reference has also been made to The Law Commission of India Report (No.42) of 1971 pp. 281. While considering whether or not to retain Section 377 IPC, the Commission found as under: “There are, however, a few sound reasons for retaining the existing law in India. Reference has also been made to The Law Commission of India Report (No.42) of 1971 pp. 281. While considering whether or not to retain Section 377 IPC, the Commission found as under: “There are, however, a few sound reasons for retaining the existing law in India. First, it cannot be disputed that homosexual acts and tendencies on the part of one spouse may affect the married life and happiness of the other spouse, and from this point of view, making the acts punishable by law has social justification. Secondly, even assuming that acts done in private with consent do not in themselves constitute a serious evil, there is a risk involved in repealing legislation which has been in force for a long time.... Ultimately, the answer to the question whether homosexual acts ought to be punished depends on the view one takes of the relationship of criminal law to morals. .... We are inclined to think that Indian society, by and large, disapproves of homosexuality and this disapproval is strong enough to justify it being treated as a criminal offence even where adults indulge in it in private.” In view of the Commission’s conclusions regarding the purview of Section 377 IPC, the said section was clearly intended to punish certain forms of private sexual relations perceived as immoral. Despite the same, the petitioner submits, the respondent authorities have, without any justification, registered those cases of sexual violence which would otherwise fall within the scope and ambit of Section 375/376 IPC, as cases of moral turpitude under Section 377 IPC. It is submitted that the respondent authorities and their agents have wrongly strained the language of Section 377 IPC intended to punish “homosexual” behaviour to punish more serious cases of sexual violence against women and children when the same ought to be dealt with as sexual offences within the meaning of Section 375/376 IPC in violation of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India. 8. It is submitted that Article 15(3) of the Constitution of India allows for the State to make special provision for women and children. It follows that “special provision” necessarily implies “adequate” provision. 8. It is submitted that Article 15(3) of the Constitution of India allows for the State to make special provision for women and children. It follows that “special provision” necessarily implies “adequate” provision. Further, that the arbitrary and narrow interpretation sought to be placed by the respondent authorities and their agents on Section 375/376 renders the effectiveness of redress under the said Sections and in particular under Section 376(2)(f) meaningless in violation of Article 15(3) of the Constitution of India. The petitioner has also ­referred to the U.N. Right of Child Convention ratified by the respondent No.1 on 11th December, 1993 as well as the U.N. Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women which was ratified in August 1993. In view of the ratification, the respondent No.1 has created a legitimate expectation that it shall adhere to its International commitments as set out under the respective Conventions. In the present case, however, the existing interpretation of rape sought to be imposed by the respondent authorities and their agents is in complete violation of such International commitments as have been upheld by this Court. 9. By an order passed on 3.11.2000 the parties were directed to formulate issues which arise for consideration. Accordingly, the petitioner has submitted the following issues and legal propositions which require consideration by the Court: (a) Given that modern feminist legal theory and jurisprudence look at rape as an experience of humiliation, degradation and violation rather than an outdated notion of penile/vaginal penetration, whether the term “rape” should today be understood to include not only forcible penile/vaginal penetration but all forms of forcible penetration including penile/oral penetration, penile/anal penetration, object or finger/vaginal and object or finger/anal penetration. (b) Whether all forms of non-consensual penetration should not be subsumed under Section 375 of the Indian Penal Code and the same should not be limited to penile vaginal penetration only. (b) Whether all forms of non-consensual penetration should not be subsumed under Section 375 of the Indian Penal Code and the same should not be limited to penile vaginal penetration only. (c) In particular, given the widespread prevalence of child sexual abuse and bearing in mind the provisions of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1983 which specifically inserted Section 376(2)(f) envisaging the offence of “rape” of a girl child howsoever young below 12 years of age, whether the expression “sexual intercourse” as contained in Section 375 of the Indian Penal Code should correspondingly include all forms of penetration such as penile/vaginal penetration, penile/oral penetration, penile/anal penetration, finger/vagina and finger/anal penetration and object/vaginal penetration; and whether the expression “penetration” should not be so clarified in the Explanation to section 375 of the Indian Penal Code. (d) Whether a restrictive interpretation of “penetration” in the Explanation to Section 375 (rape) defeats the very purpose and intent of the provision for punishment for rape under Section 376(2)(f) “Whosoever commits rape on a woman when she is under twelve years of age.” (e) Whether, penetration abuse of a child below the age of 12 should no longer be arbitrarily classified according to the ‘type’ of penetration (ignoring the ‘impact’ on such child) either as an “unnatural offence” under Section 377 IPC for penile/oral penetration and penile/anal penetration or otherwise as “outraging the modesty of a woman” under Section 354 for finger penetration or penetration with an inanimate object. (f) Whether non-consensual penetration of a child under the age of 12 should continue to be considered as offences under Section 377 (“Unnatural Offences”) on par with certain forms of consensual penetration (such as consensual homosexual sex) where a consenting party can be held liable as an abettor or otherwise. (g) Whether a purposive/teleological interpretation of “rape” under Section 375/376 requires taking into account the historical disadvantage faced by a particular group (in the present case, women and children) to show that the existing restrictive interpretation worsens that disadvantage and for that reason fails the test of equality within the meaning of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. (h) Whether the present narrow interpretation treating only cases of penile/vaginal penetration as rape, adversely affects the sexual integrity and autonomy of women and children in violation of Article 21 of Constitution of India. 10. (h) Whether the present narrow interpretation treating only cases of penile/vaginal penetration as rape, adversely affects the sexual integrity and autonomy of women and children in violation of Article 21 of Constitution of India. 10. Counter affidavit on behalf of respondents No.1 and 2 has been filed by Mrs. G. Mukherjee, Director in the Ministry of Home Affairs. It is stated therein that Sections 375 and 376 have been substantially changed by the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1983. The same Act has also introduced several new Sections viz. 376A, 376B, 376C and 376D IPC. These sections have been inserted with a view to provide special/adequate provisions for women and children. The term “rape” has been clearly defined under Section 375 IPC. Penetration other than penile/vaginal penetration are unnatural sexual offences. Stringent punishments are provided for such unnatural offences under Section 377. The punishment provided under Section 377 is imprisonment for life or imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to 10 years and shall also be liable to fine. Section 377 deals with unnatural offences and provides for a punishment as severe as that provided for rape in Section 376. Section 354 and 506 have been framed with a view to punish lesser offence of criminal assault in the form of outraging the modesty of a women, whereas Sections 376 and 377 provide stringent punishment for sexual offences. The types of several offences as mentioned by the petitioner i.e. penile/anus penetration, penile/oral penetration, finger/anile penetration, finger/vaginal penetration or object/vaginal penetration are serious sexual offences of unnatural nature and are to be covered under Section 377 which provides stringent punishment. Therefore, the plea of petitioner that offences under Section 377 are treated as lesser offences is incorrect. It is also submitted in the counter affidavit that penetration of the vagina, anus or urethra of any person with any part of the body of another person other than penile penetration is considered to be unnatural and has to be dealt with under Section 377 IPC. Section 376(2)(f) provides stringent punishment for committing rape on a woman when she is under the age of 12 years. Child sexual abuse of any nature, other than penile penetration, is obviously unnatural and are to be dealt with under Section 377 IPC. Section 376(2)(f) provides stringent punishment for committing rape on a woman when she is under the age of 12 years. Child sexual abuse of any nature, other than penile penetration, is obviously unnatural and are to be dealt with under Section 377 IPC. It is further submitted that Section 354 IPC provides for punishment for assault or criminal force to woman to outrage her modesty. Unnatural sexual offences can not be brought under the ambit of this Section. Rape defined under Section 375 is penile/vaginal penetration and all other sorts of penetration are considered to be unnatural sexual offences. Section 377 provides stringent punishment for such offences. It is denied that provisions of Sections 375, 376 and 377 are violative of fundamental rights under Articles 14, 15(3) and 21 of the Constitution of India. Sexual penetration as penile/anal penetration, finger/vaginal and finger/anal penetration and object and vaginal penetration are most unnatural forms of perverted sexual behaviour for which Section 377 provides stringent punishment. 11. Ms. Meenakshi Arora, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that Indian Penal Code has to be interpreted in the light of the problems of present day and a purposive interpretation has to be given. She has submitted that Section 375 IPC should be interpreted in the current scenario, especially in regard to the fact that child abuse has assumed alarming proportion in recent times. Learned counsel has stressed that the words “sexual intercourse” in Section 375 IPC should be interpreted to mean all kinds of sexual penetration of any type of any orifice of the body and not the intercourse understood in the traditional sense. The words “sexual intercourse” having not been defined in the Penal Code, there is no impediment in the way of the Court to give it a wider meaning so that the various types of child abuse may come within its ambit and the conviction of an offender may be possible under Section 376 IPC. The words “sexual intercourse” having not been defined in the Penal Code, there is no impediment in the way of the Court to give it a wider meaning so that the various types of child abuse may come within its ambit and the conviction of an offender may be possible under Section 376 IPC. In this connection, she has referred to United Nations Convention On The Elimination Of All Forms Of Discrimination Against Women, 1979 and also Convention On The Rights Of The Child adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 20th February, 1989 and especially to Articles 17(e) and 19 thereof, which read as under: Article 17 States Parties recognise the important function performed by the mass media and shall ensure that the child has access to information and material from a diversity of national and international sources, especially those aimed at the promotion of his or her social, spiritual and moral well-being and physical and mental health. To this end, States Parties shall - (a) .............. (Omitted as not relevant) (e) Encourage the development of appropriate guidelines for the protection of the child from information and material injurious to his or her well-being, bearing in mind the provisions of articles 13 and 18. Article 19 1. States Parties shall take all appropriate legislative, administrative, social and educational measures to protect the child from all forms of physical and mental violence, ­injury or abuse, neglect or negligent treatment, maltreatment or exploitation including sexual abuse, while in the care of parent(s), legal guardian(s) or any other persons who has the care of the child. 2. Such protective measures should, as appropriate, include effective procedures for the establishment of social programmes to provide necessary support for the child and for those who have the care of the child, as well as for other forms of preventive and for identification, reporting, referral, investigation, treatment and follow-up of instances of child maltreatment described heretofore, and, as appropriate, for judicial involvement. 12. In support of her submission, learned counsel has referred to following passage of statutory interpretation by F.A.R. Bennion (Butterworths - 1984) at page 355-357: “While it remains law, an Act is to be treated as always speaking. 12. In support of her submission, learned counsel has referred to following passage of statutory interpretation by F.A.R. Bennion (Butterworths - 1984) at page 355-357: “While it remains law, an Act is to be treated as always speaking. In its application on any date, the language of the Act, though necessarily embedded in its own time, is nevertheless to be construed in accordance with the need to treat it as current law. It is presumed that Parliament intends the Court to apply to an ongoing Act a construction that continuously updates its wording to allow for changes since the Act was initially framed. In particular where, owing to developments occurring since the original passing of an enactment, a counter-mischief comes into existence or increases, it is presumed that Parliament intends the Court so to construe the enactment as to minimise the adverse effects of the counter-mischief. The ongoing Act. In construing an ongoing Act, the interpreter is to presume that Parliament intended the Act to be applied at any future time in such a way as to give effect to the true original intention. Accordingly, the interpreter is to make allowances for any relevant changes that have occurred, since the Act’s passing, in law, social, conditions, technology, the meaning of words, and other matters. An enactment of former days is thus to be read today, in the light of dynamic processing received over the years, with such modification of the current meaning of its language as will now give effect to the original legislative intention. The reality and effect of dynamic processing provides the gradual adjustment. It is constituted by judicial interpretation, year in and year out. It also comprises processing by executive officials.” In this connection, she has also referred to S. Gopal Reddy v. State of A.P. 1996 (4) SCC 596 where the Court referred to the following words of Lord Denning in Seaford Court Estates Ltd. v. Asher (1949) 2 All ER 155: “.......It would certainly save the Judges trouble if Acts of Parliament were drafted with divine prescience and perfect clarity. In the absence of it, when a defect appears a Judge cannot simply fold his hands and blame the draftsman. In the absence of it, when a defect appears a Judge cannot simply fold his hands and blame the draftsman. He must set to work on the constructive task of finding the intention of Parliament, and he must do this not only from the language of the statute, but also from a consideration of the social conditions which gave rise to it and of the mischief which it was passed to remedy, and then he must supplement the written word so as to give `force and life’ to the intention of the legislature......A Judge should ask himself the question how, if the makers of the Act had themselves come across this ruck in the texture of it, they would have straightened it out? He must then do as they would have done. A Judge must not alter the material of which the Act is woven, but he can and should iron out the creases.” And held that it is a well known rule of interpretation of Statutes that the text and the context of the entire Act must be looked into while interpreting any of the expressions used in a Statute and that the Courts must look to the object which the Statute seeks to achieve while interpreting any of the provisions of the Act and a purposive approach is necessary. Accordingly, the words “at or before or after the marriage as consideration for the marriage” occurring in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act were interpreted to mean demand of dowry at the “negotiation stage” as a consideration for proposed marriage and “marriage” was held to include the “proposed marriage” that may not have taken place. Reference is also made to Directorate of Enforcement v. Deepak Mahajan & Anr. 1994 (3) SCC 440 , wherein it was held that a mere mechanical interpretation of the words devoid of concept or purpose will reduce most of legislation to futility and that it is a salutary rule, well established, that the intention of the legislature must be found by reading the Statute as a whole. Accordingly, certain provisions of FERA and Customs Act were interpreted keeping in mind that the said enactments were enacted for the economic development of the country and augmentation of revenue. Accordingly, certain provisions of FERA and Customs Act were interpreted keeping in mind that the said enactments were enacted for the economic development of the country and augmentation of revenue. The Court did not accept the literal interpretation suggested by the respondent therein and held that sub-section (1) and (2) of Section 167 Cr.P.C. are squarely applicable with regard to the production and detention of a person arrested under the provisions of Section 35 of FERA and Section 104 of Customs Act and that a Magistrate has jurisdiction under Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. to authorise detention of a person arrested by an authorised officer of the Enforcement Directorate under FERA and taken to the Magistrate in compliance of Section 35(2) of FERA. 13. Ms. Meenakshi Arora has submitted that this purposive approach is being adopted in some of other countries so that the criminals do not go unscathed on mere technicality of law. She has placed strong reliance on some decisions of House of Lords to substantiate her contentions and the most notable being R v. R (1991) 4 All ER 481 where it was held as under: ­ “The rule that a husband cannot be criminally liable for raping his wife if he has sexual intercourse with her without her consent no longer forms part of the law of England since a husband and wife are now to be regarded as equal partners in marriage and it is unacceptable that by marriage the wife submits herself irrevocably to sexual intercourse in all circumstances or that it is an incident of modern marriage that the wife consents to intercourse in all circumstances, including sexual intercourse obtained only by force. In Section 1(1) of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act, 1976, which defines rape as having `unlawful’ intercourse with a woman without her consent, the word `unlawful’ is to be treated as mere surplusage and not as meaning `outside marriage’, since it is clearly unlawful to have sexual intercourse with any woman without her consent.” The other decision cited by learned counsel is Regina v. Burstow and Regina v. Ireland 1997 (4) All ER 74 where a person accused of repeated silent telephone calls accompanied on occasions by heavy breathing to women was held guilty of causing psychiatric injury amounting to bodily harm under Section 42 of Offences against the Person Act, 1861. In the course of the discussion, Lord Steyn observed that the criminal law has moved on in the light of a developing understanding of the link between the body and psychiatric injury and as a matter of current usage, the contextual interpretation of “inflict” can embrace the idea of one person inflicting psychiatric injury on another. It was further observed that the interpretation and approach should, so far as possible, be adopted which treats the ladder of offences as a coherent body of law. Learned counsel has laid emphasis on the following passage in the judgment: “The proposition that the Victorian legislator when enacting sections 18, 20 and 47 of the Act 1861, would not have had in mind psychiatric illness is no doubt correct. Psychiatry was in its infancy in 1861. But the subjective intention of the draftsman is immaterial. The only relevant enquiry is as to the sense of the words in the context in which they are used. Moreover the Act of 1861 is a statute of the “always speaking” type : the statute must be interpreted in the light of the best current scientific appreciation of the link between the body and psychiatric injury.” It has thus been contended that the words “sexual intercourse” occurring in Section 375 IPC must be given a larger meaning than as traditionally understood having regard to the monstrous proportion in which the cases of child abuse have increased in recent times. She has also referred to a decision of Constitutional Court of South Africa in the National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality & Ors. v. The Minister of Home Affairs and Ors. - Case CCT 10/99 wherein it was held that Section 25(5) of the Aliens Control Act 96 of 1991, by omitting to confer on persons, who are partners in permanent same sex life partnerships, the benefits it extends to spouses, unfairly discriminates, on the grounds of their sexual orientation and marital status, against partners in such same-sex partnerships who are permanently and lawfully resident in the Republic. Such unfair discrimination limits the equality rights of such partners guaranteed to them by section 9 of the Constitution and their right to dignity under Section 10. It was further held that it would not be an appropriate remedy to declare the whole of section 25(5) invalid. Such unfair discrimination limits the equality rights of such partners guaranteed to them by section 9 of the Constitution and their right to dignity under Section 10. It was further held that it would not be an appropriate remedy to declare the whole of section 25(5) invalid. Instead, it would be appropriate to read in, after the word “spouse” in the section, the words “or partner, in a permanent same sex-life partnership”. 14. Ms. Meenakshi Arora has also placed before the Court the judgments rendered on 10th December, 1998 and 22nd February, 2001 by the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991. Under Article 5 of the Statute of the International Tribunal, rape is a crime against humanity. Rape may also amount to a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions, a violation of the laws or customs of the war or an act of genocide, if the requisite elements are met, and may be prosecuted accordingly. The Trial Chamber after taking note of the fact that no definition of rape can be found in international law, proceeded on the following basis: “Thus, the Trial Chamber finds that the following may be accepted as the objective elements of rape : (i) the sexual penetration, however slight: (a) of the vagina or anus of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator or any other object used by the perpetrator; or (b) of a mouth of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator; (ii) by coercion or force or threat of force against the victim or a third person.” In the second judgment of the Trial Chamber dated 22nd February, 2001, the interpretation which focussed on serious violations of a sexual autonomy was accepted. 15. Shri R.N. Trivedi, learned Additional Solicitor General, appearing for the respondents, has submitted that International Treaties ratified by India can be taken into account for framing guidelines in respect of enforcement of fundamental rights but only in absence of municipal laws as held in Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan 1997 (6) SCC 241 and Lakshmi Kant Pandey v. Union of India 1984 (2) SCC 244 . When laws are already existing, subsequent ratification of International Treaties would not render existing municipal laws ultra vires of Treaties in case of inconsistency. When laws are already existing, subsequent ratification of International Treaties would not render existing municipal laws ultra vires of Treaties in case of inconsistency. In such an event the State through its legislative wing can modify the law to bring it in accord with Treaty obligations. Such matters are in the realm of State policy and are, therefore, not enforceable in a Court of law. He has further submitted that in International law, ratified Treaties can be deemed interpreted in customary law unless the former are inconsistent with the domestic laws or decisions of its judicial Tribunals. The decision of the International Tribunal for the Crimes committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia cannot be used for interpretation of Section 354 and 375 IPC and other provisions. Even decisions of International Court of Justice are binding only on the parties to a dispute or intervenors in view of Articles 92, 93 and 94 of the UN Charter and Articles 59 and 63 of the IJC Statutes. Learned counsel has also submitted that no writ of mandamus can be issued to the Parliament to amend any law or to bring it in accord with Treaty obligations. He has also submitted that Sections 354 and 375 IPC have been interpreted in innumerable decisions of various High Courts and also of the Supreme Court and the consistent view is that to hold a person guilty of rape, penile penetration is essential. The law on the point is similar both in England and USA. In State of Punjab v. Major Singh 1966 (Supp) SCR 266 it was held that if the hymen is ruptured by inserting a finger, it would not amount to rape. Lastly, it has been submitted that a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution would not lie for reversing earlier decisions of the Court on the supposed ground that a restrictive interpretation has been given to certain provisions of a Statute. 16. In support of his submission Shri Trivedi has placed reliance on Volume 11(1) of Halsbury’s Laws of England para 514 (Butterworths - 1990) wherein unlawful sexual intercourse with woman without her consent has been held to be an essential ingredient of rape. 16. In support of his submission Shri Trivedi has placed reliance on Volume 11(1) of Halsbury’s Laws of England para 514 (Butterworths - 1990) wherein unlawful sexual intercourse with woman without her consent has been held to be an essential ingredient of rape. Reference has also been made to Volume 75 Corpus Juris Secundum para 10, wherein it is stated that sexual penetration of a female is a necessary element of the crime of rape, but the slightest penetration of the body of the female by the sexual organ of the male is sufficient. Learned counsel has also referred to Principles Of Public International Law by Ian Bronwnlie, where the learned author, after referring to some decisions of English Courts has expressed an opinion that the clear words of a Statute bind the Court even if the provisions are contrary to international law and that there is no such thing as a standard of international law extraneous to the domestic law by a Kingdom and that international law as such can confer no rights cognizable in the municipal courts. Learned counsel has also referred to Dicey and Morris on The Conflict of Laws wherein in the Chapter on the enforcement of foreign law, following Rule has been stated: “English Courts will not enforce or recognise a right, power, capacity, disability or legal relationship arising under the law of a foreign country, if the enforcement or recognition of such right, power, capacity, disability or legal relationship would be inconsistent with the fundamental public policy of English law.” With regard to penal law, it has been stated as under: “The common law considers crimes as altogether local, and congnisable and punishable exclusively in the country where they are committed.... Chief Justice Marshall, in delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court, said: `The Courts of no country execute the penal laws of another’.” 17. This Court on 13.1.1998 referred the matter to the Law Commission of India for its opinion on the main issue raised by the petitioner, namely, whether all forms of penetration would come within the ambit of Section 375 IPC or whether any change in statutory provisions need to be made, and if so, in what respect? This Court on 13.1.1998 referred the matter to the Law Commission of India for its opinion on the main issue raised by the petitioner, namely, whether all forms of penetration would come within the ambit of Section 375 IPC or whether any change in statutory provisions need to be made, and if so, in what respect? The Law Commission had considered some of the matters in its 156th Report and the relevant extracts of the recommendation made by it in the said Report, concerning the issue involved, were placed before the Court. Para 9.59 of the Report reads as under: “9.59 Sexual-child abuse may be committed in various forms such as sexual intercourse, carnal intercourse and sexual assaults. The cases involving penile penetration into vagina are covered under Section 375 of the IPC. If there is any case of penile oral penetration and penile penetration into anus, Section 377 IPC dealing with unnatural offences, i.e., carnal intercourse against the order of nature with any man, woman or animal, adequately takes care of them. If acts such as penetration of finger or any inanimate object into vagina or anus are committed against woman or a female child, the provisions of the proposed Section 354 IPC whereunder a more severe punishment is also prescribed can be invoked and as regards the male child, the penal provisions of the IPC concerning `hurt’, `criminal force’ or `assault’ as the case may be, would be attracted. A distinction has to be naturally maintained between sexual assault/use of criminal force falling under Section 354, sexual offences falling under Section 375 and unnatural offences falling under Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code. It may not be appropriate to bring unnatural offences punishable under Section 377 IPC or mere sexual assault or mere sexual use of criminal force which may attract Section 354 IPC within the ambit of `rape’ which is a distinct and graver offence with a definite connotation. It is needless to mention that any attempt to commit any of these offences is also punishable by virtue of Section 511 IPC. It is needless to mention that any attempt to commit any of these offences is also punishable by virtue of Section 511 IPC. Therefore, any other or more changes regarding this law may not be necessary.” Regarding Section 377 IPC, the Law Commission recommended that in view of the ongoing instances of sexual abuse in the country where unnatural offences is committed on a person under age of eighteen years, there should be a minimum mandatory sentence of imprisonment for a term not less than two years but may extend to seven years and fine, with a proviso that for adequate and special reasons to be recorded in the judgment, a sentence of less than two years may be imposed. The petitioner submitted the response on the recommendations of the Law Commission. On 10/18.2.2000, this Court again requested the Law Commission to consider the comments of representative organisations (viz. SAKSHI, IFSHA and AIDWA). 18. The main question which requires consideration is whether by a process of judicial interpretation the provisions of Section 375 IPC can be so altered so as to include all forms of penetration such as penile/vaginal penetration, penile/oral penetration, penile/anal penetration, finger/vagina and finger/anal penetration and object/vaginal penetration within its ambit. Section 375 uses the expression “sexual intercourse” but the said expression has not been defined. The dictionary meaning of the word “sexual intercourse” is hetrosexual intercourse involving penetration of the vagina by the penis. The Indian Penal Code was drafted by the First Indian Law Commission of which Lord Mecaulay was the President. It was presented to the Legislative Council in 1856 and was passed on October 6, 1860. The Penal Code has undergone very few changes in the last more than 140 years. Except for clause sixthly of Section 375 regarding the age of the woman (which in view of Section 10 denotes a female human being of any age) no major amendment has been made in the said provision. Sub-section (2) of Section 376 and Sections 376A to 376D were inserted by Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1983 but sub-section (2) of Section 376 merely deals with special types of situations and provides for a minimum sentence of 10 years. It does not in any manner alter the definition of `rape’ as given in Section 375 IPC. Sub-section (2) of Section 376 and Sections 376A to 376D were inserted by Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1983 but sub-section (2) of Section 376 merely deals with special types of situations and provides for a minimum sentence of 10 years. It does not in any manner alter the definition of `rape’ as given in Section 375 IPC. Similarly, Section 354 which deals with assault or criminal force to woman with intent to outrage her modesty and Section 377 which deals with unnatural offences have not undergone any major amendment. 19. It is well settled principle that the intention of the Legislature is primarily to be gathered from the language used, which means that attention should be paid to what has been said as also to what has not been said. As a consequence a construction which requires for its support addition or substitution of words or which results in rejection of words as meaningless has to be avoided. It is contrary to all rules of construction to read words into an Act unless it is absolutely necessary to do so. Similarly it is wrong and dangerous to proceed by substituting some other words for words of the statute. It is equally well settled that a statute enacting an offence or imposing a penalty is strictly construed. The fact that an enactment is a penal provision is in itself a reason for hesitating before ascribing to phrases used in it a meaning broader than that they would ordinarily bear. (Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh p. 58 and 751 Ninth Edition). 20. Sections 354, 375 and 377 IPC have come up for consideration before the superior courts of the country on innumerable occasions in a period of almost one and a half century. Only sexual intercourse, namely, hetrosexual intercourse involving penetration of the vagina by the penis coupled with the explanation that penetration is sufficient to constitute the sexual intercourse necessary for the offence of rape has been held to come within the purview of Section 375 IPC. The wide definition which the petitioner wants to be given to “rape” as defined in Section 375 IPC so that the same may become an offence punishable under Section 376 IPC has neither been considered nor accepted by any Court in India so far. The wide definition which the petitioner wants to be given to “rape” as defined in Section 375 IPC so that the same may become an offence punishable under Section 376 IPC has neither been considered nor accepted by any Court in India so far. Prosecution of an accused for an offence under section 376 IPC on radically enlarged meaning of section 375 IPC as suggested by the petitioner may violate the guarantee enshrined in Article 20(1) of the Constitution which says that no person shall be convicted of any offence except for violation of a law in force at the time of the commission of the act charged as an offence, nor be subjected to a penalty greater than that which might have been inflicted under the law in force at the time of the commission of the offence. 21. The decision of Constitutional Court of South Africa cited by learned counsel for the petitioner does not commend to us as the Court there treated “Gays and Lesbian in permanent same sex life partnerships” at par with “spouses” and took upon itself the task of Parliament in holding that in section 25(5) of the Aliens Control Act, after the word “spouse”, the words “or partner in a permanent same sex life partnership” should be read. The decision of House of Lords in R. v. R. was given on its own facts which deserve notice. Here the wife had left her matrimonial home with her son on 21st October, 1989 and went to live with her parents. She had consulted solicitors about matrimonial problems and had left a letter for the husband informing him that she intended to petition for divorce. On 23rd October, 1989 the husband spoke to his wife on telephone indicating that it was his intention also to seek divorce. In the night of 12th November, 1989 the husband force his way into the house of his wife’s parents, who were out at that time and attempted to have sexual intercourse with her against her will. In the course of doing so he assaulted her by squeezing her neck with both the hands. On the facts of the case the conviction of the husband may not be illegal. It is very doubtful whether the principle laid down can be of universal application. In the course of doing so he assaulted her by squeezing her neck with both the hands. On the facts of the case the conviction of the husband may not be illegal. It is very doubtful whether the principle laid down can be of universal application. In Regina v. Burstow psychiatric injury was held to be bodily harm under section 20, having regard to the meaning of the word in the usage of the present day. In our opinion the judgment of the International Tribunal can have no application here as Tribunal itself noted that no definition of rape can be found in International law and it was dealing with prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations of International Humanitarian Law committed in the Territory of former Yugoslavia. The judgment is not at all concerned with interpretation of any provision of domestic law in peace time conditions. The decisions cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner, therefore, do not persuade us to enlarge the definition of rape as given in section 375 IPC, which has been consistently so understood for over a century through out the country. 22. It may be noted that ours is a vast and big country of over 100 crore people. Normally, the first reaction of a victim of crime is to report the incident at the police station and it is the police personnel who register a case under the appropriate Sections of the Penal Code. Such police personnel are invariably not highly educated people but they have studied the basic provisions of the Indian Penal Code and after registering the case under the appropriate sections, further action is taken by them as provided in Code of Criminal Procedure. Indian Penal Code is a part of the curriculum in the law degree and it is the existing definition of “rape” as contained in Section 375 IPC which is taught to every student of law. A criminal case is initially handled by a Magistrate and thereafter such cases as are exclusively triable by Court of Session are committed the Court of Session. The entire legal fraternity of India, lawyers or Judges, have the definition as contained in Section 375 IPC engrained in their mind and the cases are decided on the said basis. The first and foremost requirement in criminal law is that it should be absolutely certain and clear. The entire legal fraternity of India, lawyers or Judges, have the definition as contained in Section 375 IPC engrained in their mind and the cases are decided on the said basis. The first and foremost requirement in criminal law is that it should be absolutely certain and clear. An exercise to ­alter the definition of rape, as contained in Section 375 IPC, by a process of judicial interpre­tation, and that too when there is no ambiguity in the provisions of the enactment, is bound to result in good deal of chaos and confusion, and will not be in the interest of society at large. 23. Stare decisis is a well known doctrine in legal jurisprudence. The doctrine of stare decisis, meaning to stand by decided cases, rests upon the principle that law by which men are governed should be fixed, definite and known, and that, when the law is declared by court of competent jurisdiction authorised to construe it, such declaration, in absence of palpable mistake or error, is itself evidence of the law until changed by competent authority. It requires that rules of law when clearly announced and established by a Court of last resort should not be lightly disregarded and set aside but should be adhered to and followed. What it precludes is that where a principle of law has become established by a series of decisions, it is binding on the Courts and should be followed in similar cases. It is a wholesome doctrine which gives certainty to law and guides the people to mould their affairs in future. 24. In Mishri Lal v. Dhierendra Nath 1999 (4) SCC 11 importance of this doctrine was emphasised for the purpose of avoiding uncertainty and confusion and paras 14, 15, 16 and 21 of the Reports read as under: “14. It is a wholesome doctrine which gives certainty to law and guides the people to mould their affairs in future. 24. In Mishri Lal v. Dhierendra Nath 1999 (4) SCC 11 importance of this doctrine was emphasised for the purpose of avoiding uncertainty and confusion and paras 14, 15, 16 and 21 of the Reports read as under: “14. This Court in Muktul v. Manbhari AIR 1958 SC 918 explained the scope of the doctrine of stare decisis with reference to Haralsbury’s Laws of England and Corpus Juris Secundum in the following manner : “The principle of stare decisis is thus stated in Halsbury’s Laws of England, 2nd Edn.: “Apart from any question as to the courts being of coordinate jurisdiction, a decision which has been followed for a long period of time, and has been acted upon by persons in the formation of contracts or in the disposition of their property, or in the general conduct of affairs, or in legal procedure or in other ways, will generally be followed by courts of higher authority than the court establishing the rule, even though the court before whom the matter arises afterwards might not have given the same decision had the question come before it originally. But the Supreme Appellate Court will not shrink from overruling a decision, or series of decisions, which establish a doctrine plainly outside the statute and outside the common law, when no title and no contract will be shaken, no persons can complain, and no general course of dealing be altered by the remedy of a mistake.” The same doctrine is thus explained in Corpus Juris Secundum - ‘Under the stare decisis rule, a principle of law which has become settled by a series of decisions generally is binding on the courts and should be followed in similar cases. This rule is based on expediency and public policy, and, although generally it should be strictly adhered to by the courts, it is not universally applicable.’” 15. Be it noted however that Corpus Juris Secundum adds a rider that “previous decisions should not be followed to the extent that grievous wrong may result; and, accordingly, the courts ordinarily will not adhere to a rule of principle established by previous decisions which they are convinced is erroneous. Be it noted however that Corpus Juris Secundum adds a rider that “previous decisions should not be followed to the extent that grievous wrong may result; and, accordingly, the courts ordinarily will not adhere to a rule of principle established by previous decisions which they are convinced is erroneous. The rule of stare decisis is not so imperative or inflexible as to preclude a departure therefrom in any case, but its application must be determined in each case by the discretion of the court, and previous decisions should not be followed to the extent that error may be perpetuated and grievous wrong may result.” 16. The statement though deserves serious consideration in the event of a definite finding as to the perpetration of a grave wrong but that by itself does not denude the time-tested doctrine of stare decisis of its efficacy. Taking recourse to the doctrine would be an imperative necessity to avoid uncertainty and confusion. The basic feature of law is its certainty and in the event of there being uncertainty as regards the state of law - the society would be in utter confusion the resultant effect of which would bring about a situation of chaos - a situation which ought always to be avoided. 21. In this context reference may also be made to two English decisions: (a) in Admiralty Commrs V. Valverda (Owners) 1938 AC 173 (AC at p.194) wherein the House of Lords observed that even long established conveyancing practice, although not as authoritative as a judicial decision, will cause the House of Lords to hesitate before declaring it wrong, and (b) in Button v. Director of Public Prosecution 1966 AC 591 the House of Lords observed: “In Corpus Juris Secundum, a contemporary statement of American Law, the stare decisis rule has been stated to be a principle of law which has become settled by a series of decisions generally, is binding on the courts and should be followed in similar cases. It has been stated that this rule is based on expediency and public policy and should be strictly adhered to by the courts. Under this rule courts are bound to follow the common law as it has been judicially declared in previously adjudicated cases and rules of substantive law should be reasonably interpreted and administered. It has been stated that this rule is based on expediency and public policy and should be strictly adhered to by the courts. Under this rule courts are bound to follow the common law as it has been judicially declared in previously adjudicated cases and rules of substantive law should be reasonably interpreted and administered. This rule has to preserve the harmony and stability of the law and to make as steadfast as possible judicially declared principles affecting the rights of property, it being indispensable to the due administration of justice, especially by a court of last resort, that a question once deliberately examined and declared should be considered as settled and closed to further argument. It is a salutary rule, entitled to great weight and ordinarily should be strictly adhered to by the courts. The courts are slow to interfere with the principle announced by the decision, and it may be upheld even though they would decide otherwise were the question a new one, or equitable considerations might suggest a different result and although it has been erroneously applied in a particular case. The rule represents an element of continuity in law and is rooted in the psychologic need to satisfy reasonable expectations, but it is a principle of policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision however recent and questionable when such adherence involves collision with a prior doctrine more embracing in its scope, intrinsically sounder and verified by experience.” 25. It may be noticed that on July 26, 1966, the House of Lords made a departure from its past practice when a statement was made to the following effect: “Their lordships regard the use of precedent as an indispensable foundation upon which to decide what is the law and its application to individual cases. It provides at least some degree of certainty upon which individuals can rely in the conduct of their affairs, as well as a basis for orderly development of legal rules. Their lordships nevertheless recognise that too rigid adherence to precedent may lead to injustice in a particular case and also unduly restrict the proper development of the law. They propose therefore to modify their present practice and, while treating former decisions of this House as normally binding, to depart from a previous decision when it appears right to do so. Their lordships nevertheless recognise that too rigid adherence to precedent may lead to injustice in a particular case and also unduly restrict the proper development of the law. They propose therefore to modify their present practice and, while treating former decisions of this House as normally binding, to depart from a previous decision when it appears right to do so. In this connection they will bear in mind the danger of disturbing retrospectively the basis on which contracts, settlements of property and fiscal arrangements have been entered into and also the especial need for certainty as to the criminal law. This announcement is not intended to affect the use of precedent elsewhere than in this House.” 26. While making the above statement a rule of caution was sounded that while departing from a previous decision when it appears right to do so, the especial need for certainty as to criminal law shall be borne in mind. There is absolutely no doubt or confusion regarding the interpretation of provisions of Section 375 IPC and the law is very well settled. The inquiry before the Courts relate only to the factual aspect of the matter which depends upon the evidence available on the record and not on the legal aspect. Accepting the contention of the writ petitioner and giving a wider meaning to Section 375 IPC will lead to a serious confusion in the minds of prosecuting agency and the Courts which instead of achieving the object of expeditiously bringing a criminal to book may unnecessarily prolong the legal proceedings and would have an adverse impact on the society as a whole. We are, therefore, of the opinion that it will not be in the larger interest of the State or the people to alter the definition of “rape” as contained in Section 375 IPC by a process of judicial interpretation as is sought to be done by means of the present writ petition. 27. The other aspect which has been highlighted and needs consideration relates to providing protection to a victim of sexual abuse at the time of recording his statement in court. The main suggestions made by the petitioner are for incorporating special provisions in child sexual abuse cases to the following effect : (i) permitting use of a videotaped interview of the child’s statement by the judge (in the presence of a child support person). The main suggestions made by the petitioner are for incorporating special provisions in child sexual abuse cases to the following effect : (i) permitting use of a videotaped interview of the child’s statement by the judge (in the presence of a child support person). (ii) allow a child to testify via closed circuit television or from behind a screen to obtain a full and candid account of the acts complained of. (iii) The cross examination of a minor should only be carried out by the judge based on written questions submitted by the defense upon perusal of the testimony of the minor (iv) Whenever a child is required to give testimony, sufficient breaks should be given as and when required by the child. 28. The Law Commission, in its response, did not accept the said request in view of Section 273 Cr.P.C. as in its opinion the principle of the said Section which is founded upon natural justice, cannot be done away in trials and inquiries concerning sexual offences. The Commission, however, observed that in an appropriate case it may be open to the prosecution to request the Court to provide a screen in such a manner that the victim does not see the accused while at the same time provide an opportunity to the accused to listen to the testimony of the victim and give appropriate instructions to his counsel for an effective cross-examination. The Law Commission suggested that with a view to allay any apprehensions on this score, a proviso can be placed above the Explanation to section 273 of the Criminal Procedure Code to the following effect: “Provided that where the evidence of a person below sixteen years who is alleged to have been subjected to sexual assault or any other sexual offence, is to be recorded, the Court may, take appropriate measures to ensure that such person is not confronted by the accused while at the same time ensuring the right of cross-examination of the accused.”. 29. Ms. Meenakshi Arora has referred to a decision of the Canadian Supreme Court in Her Majesty The Queen, Appellant v. D.O.L., Respondent and the Attorney General of Canada, etc. (1993) 4 SCR 419, wherein the constitutional validity of Section 715.1 of the Criminal Code was examined. 29. Ms. Meenakshi Arora has referred to a decision of the Canadian Supreme Court in Her Majesty The Queen, Appellant v. D.O.L., Respondent and the Attorney General of Canada, etc. (1993) 4 SCR 419, wherein the constitutional validity of Section 715.1 of the Criminal Code was examined. This section provides that in any proceeding relating to certain sexual offences in which the complainant was under age of eighteen years at the time the offence is alleged to have been committed, a videotape made within a reasonable time after the alleged offence in which the complainant describes the act complained of, is admissible in evidence, if the complainant while testifying adopts the contents of the videotape. The Court of Appeal had declared Section 715.1 unconstitutional on the ground that the same contravened Sections 7 and 11(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and could not be sustained under Section 1. The Supreme Court took note of some glaring features in such type of cases viz. the innate power imbalance which exists between abuser and the abused child; a failure to recognise that the occurrence of child sexual abuse is one intertwined with the sexual abuse of all women, regardless of age; and that the Court cannot disregard the propensity of victims of sexual abuse to fail to report the abuse in order to conceal their plight from institutions without the criminal justice system which hold stereotypical and biased views about the victimisation of women. The Court accordingly held that the procedures set out in Section 715.1 are designed to diminish the stress and trauma suffered by child complainants as a byproduct of their role in the criminal justice system. The “system induced trauma” often ultimately serves to revictimise the young complainant. The Section was intended to preserve the evidence of the child and to remove the need for them to repeat their story many times. It is often repetition of the story that results in the infliction of trauma and stress upon a child who is made to believe that she is not being believed and that her experiences are not validated. The benefits such a provision would have in limiting the strain imposed on child witness who are required to provide detailed testimony about confusing, embarrassing and frightful incidents of abuse in an intimidating, confrontational and often hostile court room atmosphere. The benefits such a provision would have in limiting the strain imposed on child witness who are required to provide detailed testimony about confusing, embarrassing and frightful incidents of abuse in an intimidating, confrontational and often hostile court room atmosphere. Another advantage afforded by the Section is the opportunity for the child to answer delicate questions about the abuse in a more controlled, less stressful and less hostile environment, a factor which according to social science research, may drastically increase the likelihood of eliciting the truth about the events at hand. The videotape testimony enables the Court to hear a more accurate account of what the child was saying about the incident at the time it first came to light and the videotape of an early interview if used in evidence can supplement the evidence of a child who is inarticulate or forgetful at the trial. The Section also acts to remove the pressure placed on a child victim of sexual assault when the attainment of “truth” depends entirely on her ability to control her fear, her shame and the horror of being face to face with the accused when she must describe her abuse in a compelling and coherent manner. The Court also observed that the rules of evidence have not been constitutionalised into unaltered principles of fundamental justice. Neither should they be interpreted in a restrictive manner which may essentially defeat their purpose of seeking truth and justice. Rules of evidence, as much as the law itself, are not cast in stone and will evolve with time. The Court accordingly reversed the judgment of Court of Appeal and upheld the constitutionality of section 715.1. 30. We will briefly refer to the statutory provisions governing the situation. Section 273 Cr.P.C. lays down that except as otherwise expressly provided, all evidence taken in the course of the trial or other proceedings shall be taken in the presence of the accused, or when his personal attendance is dispensed with, in the presence of his pleader. Sub-section (1) of Section 327 Cr.P.C. lays down that any Criminal Court enquiring into or trying any offence shall be deemed to be open Court to which the public generally may have access, so far as the same can conveniently contain them. Sub-section (1) of Section 327 Cr.P.C. lays down that any Criminal Court enquiring into or trying any offence shall be deemed to be open Court to which the public generally may have access, so far as the same can conveniently contain them. Sub-section (2) of the same Sections says that notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) the inquiry into the trial of rape or an offence under Section 376, Section 376-A, Section 376-B, Section 376-C or Section 376-D of the Indian Penal Code shall be conducted in camera. Under the proviso to this sub-section the Presiding Judge may, if he thinks fit, or on an application made by either of the parties, allow any particular person to have access to, or be or remain in, the room or building used by the court. It is rather surprising that the legislature while incorporating sub-­section (2) to Section 327 by amending Act 43 of 1983 failed to take note of offences under Section 354 and 377 IPC and omitted to mention the aforesaid provisions. Deposition of the victims of offences under Section 354 and 377 IPC can at times be very embarrassing to them. 31. The whole inquiry before a Court being to elicit the truth, it is absolutely, necessary that the victim or the witnesses are able to depose about the entire incident in a free atmosphere without any embarrassment. Section 273 Cr.P.C. merely requires the evidence to be taken in the presence of the accused. The Section, however, does not say that the evidence should be recorded in such a manner that the accused should have full view of the victim or the witnesses. Recording of evidence by way of video conferencing vis-a-vis Section 273 Cr.P.C. has been held to be permissible in a recent decision of this Court in State of Maharashtra v. Dr. Praful B Desai 2003 (4) SCC 601 . There is major difference between substantive provisions defining crimes and providing punishment for the same and procedural enactment laying down the procedure of trial of such offences. Rules of procedure are hand-maiden of justice and are meant to advance and not to obstruct the cause of justice. It is, therefore, permissible for the Court to expand or enlarge the meanings of such provisions in order to elicit the truth and do justice with the parties. 32. Rules of procedure are hand-maiden of justice and are meant to advance and not to obstruct the cause of justice. It is, therefore, permissible for the Court to expand or enlarge the meanings of such provisions in order to elicit the truth and do justice with the parties. 32. The mere sight of the accused may induce an element of extreme fear in the mind of the victim or the witnesses or can put them in a state of shock. In such a situation he or she may not be able to give full details of the incident which may result in miscarriage of justice. Therefore, a screen or some such arrangement can be made where the victim or witnesses do not have to undergo the trauma of seeing the body or the face of the accused. Often the questions put in cross-examination are purposely designed to embarrass or confuse the victims of rape and child abuse. The object is that out of the feeling of shame or embarrassment, the victim may not speak out or give details of certain acts committed by the accused. It will, therefore, be better if the questions to be put by the accused in cross-examination are given in writing to the Presiding Officer of the Court, who may put the same to the victim or witnesses in a language which is not embarrassing. There can hardly be any objection to the other suggestion given by the petitioner that whenever a child or victim of rape is required to give testimony, sufficient breaks should be given as and when required. The provisions of sub-section (2) of section 327 Cr.P.C. should also apply in inquiry or trial of offences under Section 354 and 377 IPC. 33. In State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh 1996 (2) SCC 384 this Court had highlighted the importance of provisions of Section 327 (2) and (3) Cr.P.C. and a direction was issued not to ignore the mandate of the aforesaid provisions and to hold the trial of rape cases in camera. 33. In State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh 1996 (2) SCC 384 this Court had highlighted the importance of provisions of Section 327 (2) and (3) Cr.P.C. and a direction was issued not to ignore the mandate of the aforesaid provisions and to hold the trial of rape cases in camera. It was also pointed out that such a trial in camera would enable the victim of crime to be a little comfortable and answer the questions with greater case and thereby improve the quality of evidence of a prosecutrix because there she would not be so hesitant or bashful to depose frankly as she may be in an open court, under the gaze of the public. It was further directed that as far as possible trial of such cases may be conducted by lady Judges wherever available so that the prosecutrix can make a statement with greater ease and assist the court to properly discharge their duties, without allowing the truth to be sacrificed at the altar of rigid technicalities. 34. The writ petition is accordingly disposed of with the following directions: (1) The provisions of sub-section (2) of section 327 Cr.P.C. shall, in addition to the offences mentioned in the sub-section, would also apply in inquiry or trial of offences under sections 354 and 377 IPC. (2) In holding trial of child sex abuse or rape: (i) a screen or some such arrangements may be made where the victim or witnesses (who may be equally vulnerable like the victim) do not see the body or face of the accused; (ii) the questions put in cross-examination on behalf of the accused, in so far as they relate directly to the incident, should be given in writing to the Presiding Officer of the Court who may put them to the victim or witnesses in a language which is clear and is not embarrassing; (iii) the victim of child abuse or rape, while giving testimony in court, should be allowed sufficient breaks as and when required. These directions are in addition to those given in State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh. 35. The suggestions made by the petitioners will advance the cause of justice and are in the larger interest of society. The cases of child abuse and rape are increasing at alarming speed and appropriate legislation in this regard is, therefore, urgently required. These directions are in addition to those given in State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh. 35. The suggestions made by the petitioners will advance the cause of justice and are in the larger interest of society. The cases of child abuse and rape are increasing at alarming speed and appropriate legislation in this regard is, therefore, urgently required. We hope and trust that the Parliament will give serious attention to the points highlighted by the ­petitioner and make appropriate legislation with all the promptness which it deserves. 36. Before parting with the case, we must place it on record that Ms. Meenakshi Arora put in lot of efforts and hard labour in placing the relevant material before the Court and argued the matter with commendable ability. G.P. Mathur, J.-For the reasons given in WP (Crl.) No.33 of 1997 decided today, Special Leave Petitions are dismissed. Writ Petition disposed of accordingly. *************** $ 2004(5) Supreme 87 Supreme Court of India (From Gujarat High Court) S. Rajendra Babu & G.P. Mathur, JJ. State of Gujarat and Ors. -Appellants versus Akhil Gujarat Pravasi V.S. Mahamandal and Ors. -Respondents Civil Appeal Nos. 6462-6464 of 2001 With W.P. (C) Nos. 249 and 252 of 2002 Decided on 8-4-2004 Bombay Motor Vehicles Tax Act, 1958-Sections 3A(1) and (2)-Bombay Motor Vehicles Tax Rules, 1959-Rule 5 made vide notification dated 6.2.2001-Levy of tax on all omnibuses which are used or kept for use in the State exclusively as contract carriages-Validity challenged-Writ petitions filed on the ground that Section 3A of the Act is violative of Articles 14, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the Constitution-High Court struck down Section 3A(1) and (2) of the Act and also Rule 5-Writ of mandamus issued to State authorities not to recover any tax from the vehicles of respondents which were kept but were not being used-After the decision of the High Court, Bombay Motor Vehicles Tax Act was amended by Gujarat Act No.2 of 2001-Whether view taken by the High Court is correct-(No)-Section 3A and Rule 5 of the Rules are intra vires and are perfectly valid. Held : A perusal of the Act would show that Section 3 is the general charging Section which provides for levy of tax on all motor vehicles used or kept for use in the State and the rate of tax for different categories of vehicles is given in the schedule appended to the Act. Held : A perusal of the Act would show that Section 3 is the general charging Section which provides for levy of tax on all motor vehicles used or kept for use in the State and the rate of tax for different categories of vehicles is given in the schedule appended to the Act. However, Section 3A is a special provision with regard to the “designated omnibuses” and prescribes the annual rate of tax for ordinary, luxury or tourist designated omnibuses having regard to their passenger carrying capacity which are used or kept for use in the State. The challenge here is to Section 3A and, therefore, we will confine to the said provision. Sub-section (2)(a) of Section 3A enjoins that the tax shall be paid in advance by every registered owner or any person having possession or control of the designated omnibuses either annually or in monthly instalments. Sub-section (5)(a) of Section 3A provides for refund of the tax already paid in advance where the registered owner or any person having possession or control of a designated omnibus satisfies the Taxation Authority that the vehicle had not been used or kept for use for a continuous period of not less than one month. Sub-section (5)(b) contains a similar provision of refund where the vehicle has not been used or kept for use for continuous period of not less than one month but exceeding three months in a year. But here the power of refund has been conferred upon the State Government or such officer not below the rank of the Director of Transport, as may, by notification in the official gazette, be authorised in this behalf by the State Government. Rule 5 shows that for claiming refund of the advance tax already paid a declaration in Form NT has to be made to the Taxation Authority before the commencement of the period for which the refund of tax is to be claimed in case it is intended not to use or keep any such vehicle in the State. However, where the vehicle becomes incapable of being used or kept for use on account of any accident, mechanical defect or any other sufficient cause, which makes it impossible to give advance declaration, then such declaration has to be given within a period of seven days from the date of occurrence of such accident or mechanical defect or other cause. However, where the vehicle becomes incapable of being used or kept for use on account of any accident, mechanical defect or any other sufficient cause, which makes it impossible to give advance declaration, then such declaration has to be given within a period of seven days from the date of occurrence of such accident or mechanical defect or other cause. (Para 4) The main ground of challenge of the writ petitioners is that Section 3A mandates payment of tax in advance even though the vehicle may not at all be used. It may be noticed that Section 3A of the Act lays down that there shall be levied and collected on all omnibuses which are used or kept for use in the State exclusively as contract carriages a tax at the rates specified in the table. The incidence of tax is, therefore, on omnibuses which are “used or kept for use in the State”. (Para 14) The language used in Section 3A - all omnibuses which are used or kept for use in the State exclusively as contract carriages - is in conformity with Entry 57 of List II. The consistent view taken by this Court is that if a vehicle is “used” or is “kept for use” in the State, it becomes liable for payment of tax and the actual use or quantum of use is not material. The fact that the statute provides for refund of the tax, if the authority is satisfied that the vehicle has not been used, does not mean that the legislature can only make a provision for levy of tax which is limited for the period of actual use or that no tax can be levied during the period the vehicle is not put to use in the State. The provision for the refund has been made only for the advantage of the operator so that he may be relieved of the burden of tax when he is not getting any income from the vehicle on account of its non-use but it has no relevance to the competence or authority of the State to enact a law providing for imposition of a tax on vehicles which are used or are kept for use in the State. (Para 18) Nothing new has been pointed out to challenge Gujarat Act No.9 of 2002 by which the Bombay Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, as adopted in the State of Gujarat with up to date amendments, was further amended after the decision of the High Court which was rendered on 17th August, 2001. In fact, the main argument of the learned counsel for the writ petitioners is that the said amending Act merely rearranged the Sections and ­suffered from the same infirmity as the previous Act. Since we are of the opinion that the view taken by the High Court is not correct and Section 3A and Rule 5 of the Rules, as incorporated vide notification dated 6.2.2001 are intra vires and are perfectly valid, the challenge made to Gujarat Act No.9 of 2002 has no substance and must fail. (Para 23) Result : Appeal allowed. Cases referred : 1. Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Shri Laxmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Shri Shirur Mutt, AIR 1954 SC 284 : Relied on. (Para 11) 2. Sreenivas General Traders v. State of A.P., AIR 1983 SC 1246 . (Para 12) 3. Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Moh. Yasin, AIR 1983 SC 617 . (Para 12) 4. B.S.E. Brokers’ Forum v. Securities and Exchange Board of India, 2001 (3) SCC 482 . (Para 12) 5. Travancore Tea Co. v. State of Kerala, AIR 1980 SC 1547 : Relied on. (Para 14) 6. State of Karnataka v. K. Gopalakrishna Shenoy, AIR 1987 SC 1911 . (Para 15) 7. Chief General Manager, Jagannath Area v. State of Orissa, 1996 (10) SCC 676 . (Para 16) 8. State of Kerala v. Arvind Ramakant Modawdakar, 1999 (7) SCC 400 . (Para 17) 9. Mahakoshal Tourist v. State of M.P., 2002 (7) SCC 245 . (Para 17) 10. Bolani Ores Ltd. v. State of Orissa, AIR 1975 SC 17 . (Para 19) 11. State of Mysore v. Sundaram Motors Pvt. Ltd., AIR 1980 SC 148 . (Para 20) 12. State of Gujarat v. Kaushikbhai K. Patel, AIR 2000 SC 2175 . (Para 20) 13. G.K. Krishnan v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1975 SC 583 . (Para 22) 14. Malwa Bus Service v. State of Punjab, AIR 1983 SC 634 . (Para 22) Counsel for the Parties : For the Appellants/Petitioners : K.N. Raval, Solicitor General,­ L.N. Rao, Additional Solicitor General, Ms. Hemantika Wahi, Ms. (Para 20) 13. G.K. Krishnan v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1975 SC 583 . (Para 22) 14. Malwa Bus Service v. State of Punjab, AIR 1983 SC 634 . (Para 22) Counsel for the Parties : For the Appellants/Petitioners : K.N. Raval, Solicitor General,­ L.N. Rao, Additional Solicitor General, Ms. Hemantika Wahi, Ms. Archna Palkar, Malvik Nanavati, Advocates.­ For the Respondent in Appeal and Petitioner in W.P.No. 249/2002 and W.P.No. 252/2002 : Vinod Bobde, Sr. Advocate, Prashant Desai, Mahesh Agrawal, Rishi Agrawal, E.C. Agrawala, R.B. Dave, Manu Krishnan, Advocates. Important point Section 3A of the Bombay Motor Vehicles Tax Act, 1958 and also Rule 5 of the Rules made vide notification dated 6-2-2001 are intra vires and perfectly valid. Judgment G.P. Mathur, J.-Civil Appeal Nos. 6462-6464 of 2001 have been preferred by State of Gujarat against the judgment and order dated 17.8.2001 of a Division Bench of the High Court, whereby Section 3A (1) and (2) of Bombay Motor Vehicles Tax Act, 1958 and also Rule 5 of Bombay Motor Vehicles Tax Rules, 1959 made vide notification dated 6.2.2001 were struck down and a writ of mandamus was issued to the State authorities not to recover any tax in pursuance thereto from the vehicles of the respondents herein (writ petitioners in the High Court) which were kept but were not being used. A further direction was issued to the respondent State to grant refund of the tax already recovered from the respondents within three months from the date of receipt of copy of the judgment after examining their case regarding non-use of the vehicles. After the decision of the High Court, the Bombay Motor Vehicles Tax Act was amended by Gujarat Act No.9 of 2002 in order to validate the imposition and collection of tax on designated omnibuses, which was published in the Gazette on 31.3.2002. Writ Petition Nos. 249 and 252 of 2002 have been filed in this Court challenging the amendments made by the aforesaid amending Act. 2. It will be convenient to reproduce relevant provisions of the statute which was subject matter of challenge before the Gujarat High Court. The Bombay Motor Vehicles Tax Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) was made applicable to the State of Gujarat by the Gujarat Adoption of Laws (State and Concurrent Subjects) Order, 1960. 2. It will be convenient to reproduce relevant provisions of the statute which was subject matter of challenge before the Gujarat High Court. The Bombay Motor Vehicles Tax Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) was made applicable to the State of Gujarat by the Gujarat Adoption of Laws (State and Concurrent Subjects) Order, 1960. The Act was amended several times and lastly on 6.2.2001 by Gujarat Act No. 2 of 2001. Section 2 of this Act gives the definitions and Sub-section (1) defines “certificate of taxation” and it means a certificate, issued under Section 5, indicating therein the rate at which the tax is leviable, and the periods for which the tax has been paid, Sub-section (5) defines “registered owner” and it means the person in whose name a motor vehicle is registered under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (or, as the case may be, the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988) and Sub-section (7) defines “Taxation Authority” or “Authority” and it means such officer or authority as the State Government may by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint to be the Taxation Authority for the whole State or for any area or areas for the purposes of the Act, and the State Government may appoint more than one officer or authority as Taxation Authority for the whole State or for any area. The controversy here relates to Sections 3 and 3A of the Act and the relevant part thereof are being reproduced below: Section 3. (1) Subject to the other provisions of this Act, on and from the 1st day of April, 1958, there shall be levied and collected on all motor vehicles used or kept for use in the State, a tax at the rates fixed by the State Government, by notification in the Office Gazette, [but not exceeding the maximum rates specified in the [First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Schedules]: Provided..........[Omitted as not relevant] Provided further............[Omitted as not relevant] (2) Except, during any period for which the Taxation Authority has, in the ­prescribed manner, certified that a motor vehicle was not used or kept for use in the State, the registered owner, or any person having possession or control, of a motor vehicle of which the certificate of registration is current, shall, for the purposes of this Act, be deemed to use or keep such vehicle for use in the State. (3) No tax shall be leviable under sub-section (1) on motor vehicles on which tax is leviable under sub-section (1) of section 3A. Section 3A. (1) On and from the 1st day of April, 1991, there shall be levied and collected on all omnibuses which are used or kept for use in the State exclusively as contract carriages (hereinafter in this section and sub-section (1A) of Section 4 referred to as “the designated omnibuses”) a tax at the rates specified in the table below:- Table Description of Designated omnibuses 1.(a) Ordinary designated omnibuses permitted to be carried not more than twenty passengers. (b) Ordinary designated omnibuses permitted to be carried more than twenty passengers. 2.(a) Luxury or tourist designated omnibuses permitted to be carried not more than twenty passengers. (b) Luxury or tourist designated omnibuses permitted to be carried more than twenty passengers. Annual rate of tax (Rs. 2,700) per passenger permitted to be carried. (Rs. 4,050) per passenger permitted to be carried. (Rs. 4,050) per passenger permitted to be carried. (Rs. 6,000) per passenger permitted to be carried. Provided that in the case of the designated omnibuses used solely for the purpose of transporting students of educational institutions in the State in connection with any of the activities of such educational institutions a tax shall be levied and collected under sub-section (1) of section 3, and not under this sub-section. (2) (a) The tax leviable under sub-section (1) shall be paid in advance by every registered owner or any person having possession or control of the designated omnibuses either annually at the annual rate specified in the Table appearing in sub-section (1) or in monthly instalments of one-twelfth of the annual rate. (b) The annual payment of tax or the payment of monthly instalment of tax shall be made within such period and in such manner as may be prescribed. (3) ............. [Omitted as not relevant] (4) ............. (b) The annual payment of tax or the payment of monthly instalment of tax shall be made within such period and in such manner as may be prescribed. (3) ............. [Omitted as not relevant] (4) ............. [Omitted as not relevant] (5) (a) Where the registered owner or any person having possession or control of a designated omnibus who has paid tax under this section proves to the satisfaction of the Taxation Authority that the designated omnibus in respect of which the tax has been paid has not been used or kept for use for a continuous period of not less than one month, he shall be entitled to the refund of an amount equal to one-twelfth of the annual rate of tax paid in respect of such omnibus for each complete month of the period for which the tax has been paid so however that, except as otherwise provided in clause (b) the total amount of a refund in a year shall not exceed- (i) six hundred seventyfive rupees per passenger permitted to be carried, in the case of an ordinary designated omnibus permitted to be carried not more than twenty passengers. (ii) one thousand twelve rupees per passenger permitted to be carried, in the case of an ordinary designated omnibus permitted to be carried more than twenty passengers. (iii) one thousand one hundred twenty-five rupees per passenger permitted to be carried, in the case of a luxury or tourist designated omnibus permitted to be carried not more than twenty passengers. (iv) one thousand five hundred rupees per passenger permitted to be carried, in the case of a luxury or tourist designated omnibus permitted to be carried more than twenty passengers. Provided that for the purpose of determining the amount of refund under this clause, only such of the period in which a designated omnibus has not been used or kept for use shall be taken into account as comprises of complete months. Provided that for the purpose of determining the amount of refund under this clause, only such of the period in which a designated omnibus has not been used or kept for use shall be taken into account as comprises of complete months. (b) Where a registered owner or a person having possession or control of a designated omnibus, who has paid tax under this section proves to the satisfaction of the State Government or such officer not below the rank of the Director of Transport, Gujarat State, as may, by notification in the Official Gazette, be authorised in this behalf by the State Government that the designated omnibus in respect of which tax has been paid, has not been used or kept for use for a continuous period of not less than one month but exceeding three months in a year, he shall be entitled to the refund of an amount equal to one-twelfth of the annual rate of the tax paid in respect of such omnibus for each complete month of the period of which the tax has been paid : Provided that for the purpose of determining the amount of refund under this clause only such of the period in which a designated omnibus has not been used or kept for use shall be taken into account as comprises of complete months. (6) .....[Omitted as not relevant] Section 4(1) provides that the tax leviable under Section 3 in respect of a motor vehicle specified in the First Schedule shall be paid in advance by every registered owner, or any person having possession or control, of such motor vehicles to which sub-section (IAA) does not apply. 3. (6) .....[Omitted as not relevant] Section 4(1) provides that the tax leviable under Section 3 in respect of a motor vehicle specified in the First Schedule shall be paid in advance by every registered owner, or any person having possession or control, of such motor vehicles to which sub-section (IAA) does not apply. 3. The Bombay Motor Vehicle Rules, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Rules’) were amended by Bombay Motor Vehicles Tax (Gujarat Amendment) Rules, 2001 vide notification dated 6.2.2001 and after amendment Rule 5 reads as under: “(1) A registered owner or any person who has possession or control of a motor vehicle in respect of which tax is paid in advance, not intending to use or keep for use such vehicle in the State and desiring to claim refund of tax on that account shall before the commencement of the period for which the refund of tax is to be claimed, make a declaration in form NT for any specified period not exceeding beyond the period for which the tax is paid in advance to the Taxation Authority in whose jurisdiction such vehicle is to be kept under non-use along with the certificate of taxation as well as certificate of fitness in case of transport vehicles and a fee of rupees ten. Provided that where a vehicle is rendered incapable of being used or kept for use on account of an accident, mechanical defect or any other sufficient cause, which make it impossible to give an advance declaration as aforesaid then such declaration shall be given within a period of seven days from the date of occurrence of such accident, mechanical defect or such other cause, either in person or by registered post acknowledgement due; (2) If the Taxation Authority is satisfied that the motor vehicle, in respect of which a declaration in Form “NT” has been made, has not been used, or kept for use for the whole or part of the period mentioned in the declaration and it shall certify that the motor vehicle has not been used or kept for use for the whole or part of such period as the case may be by making an endorsement in the certificate of taxation to that effect. Provided that nothing contained in this sub-rule shall effect the right of the Taxation Authority to recover the tax and penalty due for the period of non-use so certified if, at any time, it is found that the vehicle was actually used or kept for use in the State during such period. (3) The declaration in Form ‘NT’ given under the proviso to sub-rule (1) shall be accompanied by the certificate of Taxation and documentary evidence if any, or any other proof evidencing such non-use of the vehicle and the period thereof. Where the appropriate Taxation Autho­rity, on considering the evidence adduced, if any, and on making such inquires as it deems fit, refuses to admit the declaration of non-use or to certify the period of non-use, it shall record in writing its reasons therefor and communicate to the applicant.” 4. A perusal of the Act would show that Section 3 is the general charging Section which provides for levy of tax on all motor vehicles used or kept for use in the State and the rate of tax for different categories of vehicles is given in the schedule appended to the Act. However, Section 3A is a special provision with regard to the “designated omnibuses” and prescribes the annual rate of tax for ordinary, luxury or tourist designated omnibuses having regard to their passenger carrying capacity which are used or kept for use in the State. The challenge here is to Section 3A and, therefore, we will confine to the said provision. Sub-section (2)(a) of Section 3A enjoins that the tax shall be paid in advance by every registered owner or any person having possession or control of the designated omnibuses either annually or in monthly instalments. Sub-section (5)(a) of Section 3A provides for refund of the tax already paid in advance where the registered owner or any person having possession or control of a designated omnibus satisfies the Taxation Authority that the vehicle had not been used or kept for use for a continuous period of not less than one month. Sub-section (5)(b) contains a similar provision of refund where the vehicle has not been used or kept for use for continuous period of not less than one month but exceeding three months in a year. Sub-section (5)(b) contains a similar provision of refund where the vehicle has not been used or kept for use for continuous period of not less than one month but exceeding three months in a year. But here the power of refund has been conferred upon the State Government or such officer not below the rank of the Director of Transport, as may, by notification in the official gazette, be authorised in this behalf by the State Government. Rule 5 shows that for claiming refund of the advance tax already paid a declaration in Form NT has to be made to the Taxation Authority before the commencement of the period for which the refund of tax is to be claimed in case it is intended not to use or keep any such vehicle in the State. However, where the vehicle becomes incapable of being used or kept for use on account of any accident, mechanical defect or any other sufficient cause, which makes it impossible to give advance declaration, then such declaration has to be given within a period of seven days from the date of occurrence of such accident or mechanical defect or other cause. 5. The writ petitions were filed in the High Court on the ground, inter alia, that Section 3A of the Act is violative of Articles 14, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300 A of the Constitution as designated omnibuses which are in fact contract carriages are discriminated against from other vehicles like stage carriages, ordinary vehicles and goods vehicles and a very high rate of tax was imposed upon them without there being any reasonable classification and thus the impugned provision was wholly arbitrary and discriminatory. It was submitted that if the vehicle is “not used” or “kept for use” or “passengers are not carried to the full capacity” no tax could be levied and consequently the provisions of Section 3A had been enacted without any legislative competence having regard to the fact that the Act had been made with reference to Entry 56 and 57 of List II of Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. In this connection it was also submitted that the provision was bad inasmuch as the amount of annual rate of tax was fixed not as per the capacity of the vehicle or the distance actually covered or number of days of actual use but on a fixed rate basis. In this connection it was also submitted that the provision was bad inasmuch as the amount of annual rate of tax was fixed not as per the capacity of the vehicle or the distance actually covered or number of days of actual use but on a fixed rate basis. Whether the vehicle covered only one kilometer or thousand kilometers, the same amount of tax had to be paid. Another submission made was that tax had to be paid for the whole month even though the actual use of the vehicle may have been for a much shorter period. Lastly, it was submitted that the provision for depositing tax in advance and thereafter claiming a refund was wholly illusory and in fact the authorities had not made any such refund even though applications in that regard were pending for a long period. The High Court has held that the impugned tax was a composite tax and not on passengers alone; the demand of advance tax on passengers for one month was beyond the legislative competence as Entries 56 and 57 of List II of Seventh Schedule of the Constitution do not authorise levy of advance tax; similarly the demand of advance tax on vehicles which are not put on road or which are kept away from use was also beyond the legislative competence and the provision for payment of advance tax and Rule 5 were without any authority of law. The High Court further held that the mere fact that there was a provision for refund of the advance tax paid, could not save the enactment as the levy of advance tax itself was without any authority of law. On these findings, the writ petitions were allowed and Section 3A (1) and (2) of the Act and Rule 5 of the Rules as inserted vide notification dated 6.2.2001 and also a subsequent circular dated 8.2.2001 were struck down. 6. On these findings, the writ petitions were allowed and Section 3A (1) and (2) of the Act and Rule 5 of the Rules as inserted vide notification dated 6.2.2001 and also a subsequent circular dated 8.2.2001 were struck down. 6. Learned counsel for the writ petitioners (here as well as before the High Court - operators of vehicles) have submitted that the tax is essentially a tax on passengers since rate of tax is fixed having regard to the number of passengers permitted to be carried and on a plain reading of the Statute it is clear that the enactment has been made with reference to Entry 56 List II of Seventh Schedule of the Constitution whereunder tax can be levied on passengers actually carried. But under this Entry, no tax can be levied unless a passenger actually travels in the vehicle and since the tax is levied on the basis of seating capacity, it is beyond the legislative competence of the State legislature. It is submitted that the plea of the State before the High Court was that it is a composite tax i.e. a tax on passengers and a tax on motor vehicles which is also evident from the speech given by the Hon’ble Minister in the legislature and also from the counter affidavit filed before the High Court. Therefore, in such a case, the requirement of both the Entries 56 and 57 have to be satisfied. The impugned tax does not satisfy the requirements of Entry 57 because even if the vehicle is not intended to be used or kept for use, the entire tax has to be paid. Learned counsel has further submitted that the provision for refund of the tax is wholly illusory as the refund is allowed only if the vehicle is not used for the entire period of one month and the use of the vehicle even for a single day creates a liability for payment of tax for the whole month. Learned counsel has also assailed the provision of Rule 5 which lays down the criteria for determining as to whether a vehicle has not been used or has not been kept for use. 7. Learned counsel has also assailed the provision of Rule 5 which lays down the criteria for determining as to whether a vehicle has not been used or has not been kept for use. 7. Countering the submission made by learned counsel for the writ petitioners, Shri Kirit N. Raval, learned Solicitor General appearing for the State of Gujarat, has submitted that the owner of designated omnibus has to first apply for a certificate of registration under the provisions of Motor Vehicles Act and such a certificate gives rise to a presumption that the vehicle in question is meant for use on roads in the State. The taxable event occurs when the vehicle in question is ready for use and the liability to pay tax immediately arises when the vehicle becomes usable. Once the certificate of registration has been given and the taxable event occurs, it is perfectly open to levy advance tax on motor vehicles and the High Court was in error in holding that advance tax cannot be levied. This is irrespective of the fact whether the tax in question is levied under Entry 56 or 57. Learned counsel has further submitted that if income tax can be levied on income and there are provisions in the Income Tax Act for levy of advance tax even when the income in question has not been earned, with a machinery for refund, there is no reason why even under Entry 56 or 57, the tax cannot be levied when the presumption of the vehicle being made for use of passengers arises and taxable event has taken place. Learned Solicitor General has also submitted that the contention that the contract carriages have been levied a higher tax ignores the accepted position that contract carriages are a class by themselves and a higher tax on such category of vehicles has been specifically held to be permissible. The mere fact that the tax falls heavily on one category is wholly irrelevant and the possibility of better classification for imposition of tax in question is no ground for striking down the levy. 8. The relevant entries with reference to which the impugned enactment has been made are Entries 56 and 57 of List II of Seventh Schedule of the Constitution which read as under: Entry 56 - Taxes on goods and passengers carried by road or on inland waterways. 8. The relevant entries with reference to which the impugned enactment has been made are Entries 56 and 57 of List II of Seventh Schedule of the Constitution which read as under: Entry 56 - Taxes on goods and passengers carried by road or on inland waterways. Entry 57 - Taxes on vehicles, whether mechanically propelled or not, suitable for use on roads, including tramcars subject to the provisions of entry 35 of List III. Entry 35 of List III - Mechanically propelled vehicles including the principles on which taxes on such vehicles are to be levied. 9. Before examining the contentions raised at the Bar it is necessary to bear in mind certain fundamental principles which are too well settled. The necessity for the same arises on account of the fact that they have been lost sight of in the contentions raised on behalf of the operators of designated omnibuses both here and also in the High Court. 10. In interpreting the scope of various entries in the legislative lists in Seventh Schedule, widest possible amplitude must be given to the words used and each general word must be held to extend to ancillary or subsidiary matters which can fairly be said to be comprehended in it. The entries should, thus be given a broad and comprehensive interpretation. In order to see whether a particular legislative provision falls within the jurisdiction of the legislature which has passed it, the Court must consider what constitutes in pith and substance the true subject matter of the legislation and whether such subject matter is covered by the topics enumerated in the legislative list pertaining to that legislature. 11. The enactment under question is a taxing statute. The indicia of tax was explained by a bench of seven judges in Commission, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Shri Laxmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Shri Shirur Mutt AIR 1954 SC 284 which has since been consistently followed and it is as under. A tax is a compulsory exaction of money by public authority for public purposes enforceable by law and is not payment “for services rendered”. This definition brings out the essential characteristics of a tax as distinguished from other forms of imposition which, in a general sense, are included within it. A tax is a compulsory exaction of money by public authority for public purposes enforceable by law and is not payment “for services rendered”. This definition brings out the essential characteristics of a tax as distinguished from other forms of imposition which, in a general sense, are included within it. The essence of taxation is compulsion that is to say, it is imposed under statutory power without the tax-payers consent and the payment is enforced by law. The second characteristic of tax is that it is an imposition made for public purpose without reference to any special benefit to be conferred on the payer of the tax. This is expressed by saying that the levy of tax is for the purposes of general revenue, which when collected forms part of the public revenues of the State. As the object of a tax is not to confer any special benefit upon any particular individual there is no element of `quid pro quo’ between the tax payer and the public authority. Another feature of taxation is that as it is a part of the common burden, the quantum of imposition upon the tax-payer depends generally upon his capacity to pay. 12. A fee is generally defined to be a charge for a special service rendered to individuals by some governmental agency. But the traditional view that there must be actual quid pro quo has undergone a sea change with the passage of time. Corelationship between the levy and the services rendered/expected is one of general character and not of mathematical exactitude. All that is necessary is that there should be a “reasonable relationship” between the levy of the fee and the services rendered. It is increasingly realized that the element of quid pro quo in the strict sense is not a sine qua non for a fee. (See Sreenivas General Traders­ v. State of A.P. AIR 1983 SC 1246 , Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Moh. Yasin AIR 1983 SC 617 and B.S.E. Brokers’ Forum v. Securities and Exchange Board of India 2001 (3) SCC 482 ) 13. Entry 56 authorises a tax, the incidence of which is on goods and passengers carried by road or on inland waterways. Yasin AIR 1983 SC 617 and B.S.E. Brokers’ Forum v. Securities and Exchange Board of India 2001 (3) SCC 482 ) 13. Entry 56 authorises a tax, the incidence of which is on goods and passengers carried by road or on inland waterways. Even though the amount of the tax may be measured by the fares or by the distance travelled, the Entry does not specify who should be the assessee and, therefore, it is open to enact a law to recover the tax from the owners or operators of the vehicles. The tax imposed under this Entry is of regulatory and compensatory character. The tax under Entry 57 is leviable by the State legislature on all vehicles “suitable for use on roads” which are kept in the State. The tax is compensatory in nature and, therefore, must have some nexus with the vehicles using the public roads of the State. The words “suitable for use” signify the kind of vehicles meaning thereby that the vehicles should be such type which are normally capable of running on the road. The entry does not indicate in any manner that tax would be leviable only for the period when the vehicle is actually using the road and not otherwise and, therefore, it has no corelation with the actual period of use. Naturally the State has to maintain the roads and to keep them in proper condition for all those who own vehicles suitable for use on roads. This is irrespective of the fact whether they use it or not or use it occasionally or for short duration only. It being a tax and not a fee (as understood in the conservative sense) the actual use of the public roads of the State cannot be insisted upon for incurring the liability. 14. The main ground of challenge of the writ petitioners is that Section 3A mandates payment of tax in advance even though the vehicle may not at all be used. It may be noticed that Section 3A of the Act lays down that there shall be levied and collected on all omnibuses which are used or kept for use in the State exclusively as contract carriages a tax at the rates specified in the table. The incidence of tax is, therefore, on omnibuses which are “used or kept for use in the State”. A similar controversy was examined in Travancore Tea Co. The incidence of tax is, therefore, on omnibuses which are “used or kept for use in the State”. A similar controversy was examined in Travancore Tea Co. v. State of Kerala AIR 1980 SC 1547 . Here the company alleged that the vehicles were purchased by it solely and exclusively for use in the tea estates and intended to be used only for agricultural purposes and were not used nor kept for use in the State, as contemplated by Section 3 of Kerala Motor Vehicles Taxation Act. It was further alleged by the company that for the purpose of plantation it was maintaining the roads, fit for vehicular traffic, in the eight estates covering a length of 131 miles. Paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of the Reports which are relevant are being reproduced below: “4. The question that falls for decision is whether on the assumption that the motor vehicles are used or kept for use within the estate, and not intended to be used on public roads of the State; the tax is leviable? In order to appreciate the question raised, it is necessary to refer to the relevant entry in the Constitution, the provisions of the Act and the Motor Vehicles Act and the decision relating to the question rendered by this Court. Entry 57 in List II of the Constitution relates to taxes on vehicles, whether mechanically propelled or not, suitable for use on roads, including tramcars subject to the provisions of entry 35 of List III. This entry enables the State Government to levy a tax on all vehicles whether mechanically propelled or not, suitable for use on roads. There is no dispute that the vehicles are mechanically propelled and suitable for use on roads. 5. Section 3 of the impugned Act (Kerala Motor Vehicles Taxation Act (Act 24 of 1963) provides that a tax “shall be levied on all motor vehicles used or kept for use in the State.” The levy is within the competence of the State legislature as entry 57 in List II authorises levy on vehicles suitable for use on roads. 5. Section 3 of the impugned Act (Kerala Motor Vehicles Taxation Act (Act 24 of 1963) provides that a tax “shall be levied on all motor vehicles used or kept for use in the State.” The levy is within the competence of the State legislature as entry 57 in List II authorises levy on vehicles suitable for use on roads. It has been laid down by this Court in Bolani Ores Ltd. v. State of Orissa (1975) 2 SCR 138 at p.155; ( AIR 1975 SC 17 ) that under Entry 57 of List II, the power of taxation cannot exceed compensatory nature which must have some nexus with the vehicles using the roads i.e. public roads. If the vehicles do not use the roads, notwithstanding that they are ­registered under the Act, they cannot be taxed. 6. If the words ‘used or kept for use in the State’ are construed as used or kept for use on the public roads of the State, the Act would be in conformity with the powers conferred on the State legislature under Entry 57 of List II. If the vehicles are suitable for use on public roads they are liable to be taxed. In order to levy a tax on vehicles used or kept for use on public roads of the State and at the same time to avoid evasion of tax the legislature has prescribed the procedure....” (emphasis supplied) After laying down the above principle of law the question whether estate roads are public roads was left for investigation and decision by R.T.O. 15. The validity of payment of advance tax was examined in State of Karnataka v. K. Gopalakrishna Shenoy AIR 1987 SC 1911 , with reference to Mysore Motor Vehicles Tax Act, Section 3(1) whereof provided for levy of tax on all motor vehicles suitable for use on roads, kept in the State of Mysore. The explanation appended to Sub-section (1) of Section 3 laid down that a motor vehicle of which certificate of registration is current shall, for the purpose of the Act, be deemed to be a vehicle suitable for use on roads. Section 4 provided that the tax under Section 3 shall be paid in advance by the registered owner or person having possession or control of the motor vehicle. Section 4 provided that the tax under Section 3 shall be paid in advance by the registered owner or person having possession or control of the motor vehicle. Section 7 provided for refund of tax if it was proved to the satisfaction of the prescribed authority that the vehicle had not been used during the whole of the period for which tax had been paid or a continuous part thereof not being less than one calendar month, a refund shall be made of such portion of the tax and subject to such conditions as may be prescribed. In paras 6 and 7 of the Reports, it was held as under: “6........On a reading of Sections 3 and 4 it may be seen that they make the registered owner or person having possession or control of a motor vehicle kept in the State absolutely liable to pay tax in advance at the rates specified in part A of the Schedule thereto for a quarter, half-year or year at his choice. The Motor Vehicle Taxation Acts in all the States of the Indian Union follow a uniform pattern. Entry 57 of List II of Schedule VII of the Constitution is the Legislative Entry conferring power on the States to levy the tax. It has been observed by this Court in Automobile Transport Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan (1963) 1 SCR 491 : ( AIR 1962 SC 1406 ) that the tax on motor vehicles is a compensatory tax levied for the use of the roads and it is not a tax on ownership or possession of motor vehicles. The object of the Act is achieved by charging to tax all motor vehicles suitable for use on roads kept in the State, the registered owner or person having possession or control being held liable to pay the tax in advance and then providing for grant of refund for non-user subject to prescribed conditions. 7. What falls for consideration now is whether the owner or person having the possession or control of a motor vehicle is not bound to pay the tax under Section 3(1) of the Act because the vehicle was in a state of repair and was not put to use on the road and furthermore the Certificate of Fitness of the vehicle had not been kept current even though the Certificate of Registration was kept current. One factor which has to be borne in mind in interpreting Section 3(1) and its Explanation is the meaning to be given to the words “suitable for use on roads”, occurring in them as otherwise a misconception would arise. These very words occur in Entry 57 in the State List which reads as under:- “Taxes on vehicles, whether mechanically propelled or not, suitable for use on roads, including tram cars, subject to the provisions of Entry 35 of List III”. The words “suitable for use on roads” in the said Entry have been construed by Hidayatullah, J. as he then was, in Automobile Transport ( AIR 1962 SC 1406 ) case as under : “The words `suitable for use on roads’ describe the kinds of vehicle and not their condition. They exclude from the Entry, farm machinery, aeroplanes, railways etc. which though mechanically propelled are not suitable for use on roads. The inclusion of trams using tracks which may be on roads or off them, makes the distinction still more apparent.” It, therefore, follows that the same meaning should be given to those words occurring in Section 3(1) and the Explanation also. The resultant position that emerges is that Section 3(1) confers a right upon the State to levy a tax on all motor vehicles which are suitably designed for use on roads at prescribed rates without reference to the road worthy condition of the vehicle or otherwise. Section 4 enjoins every registered owner or person having possession or control of the motor vehicle to pay the tax in advance. The Explanation to Section 3(1) contains a deeming provision and its effect is that as long as the Certificate of Registration of a motor vehicle is current, it must be deemed to be a vehicle suitable for use on roads. The inevitable consequence of the Explanation would be that the owner or a person having control or possession of a motor vehicle is statutorily obliged to pay the tax in advance for the motor vehicle as long as the Certificate of Registration is current irrespective of the condition of the vehicle for use on the roads and irrespective of whether the vehicle had a Certificate of Fitness with current validity or not. The Act, however, takes care to see that the owner of a motor vehicle or a person having possession or control of it is not penalised by payment of tax in advance for a vehicle which had not been actually used during the whole of a period or part of a period for which tax had been paid by him........” After considering the provision for refund of the tax as contained in Section 7 of the Act, it was held as under in para 8 of the Report: “8. ........ The principle underlying the Taxation Act is that every motor vehicle issued Certificate of Registration is to be deemed a potential user of the roads all through the time the Certificate of Registration is current and therefore liable to pay tax under Section 3(1) read with Section 4. If, however, the vehicle had not made use of the roads because it could not be put on the roads due to repairs, even though the Certificate of Registration was current, the owner or person concerned has to seek for and obtain refund of the tax paid in advance after satisfying the Authorities about the truth of his claim. It is not for the Transport Authorities to justify the demand for tax by proving that the vehicle is in a fit condition and can be put to use on the roads or that it had plied on the roads without payment of tax. It would be absolutely impossible for the State to keep monitoring all the vehicles and prove that each and every registered vehicle is in a fit condition and would be making use of the roads and is therefore liable to pay the tax. For that reason, the State has made the payment of tax compulsory on every registered vehicle and that too in advance and has at the same time provided for the grant of refund of tax whenever the person paying the tax has not made use of the roads by plying the vehicle and substantiates his claim by proper proof. For that reason, the State has made the payment of tax compulsory on every registered vehicle and that too in advance and has at the same time provided for the grant of refund of tax whenever the person paying the tax has not made use of the roads by plying the vehicle and substantiates his claim by proper proof. Any view to the contrary would defeat the purpose and intent of the Taxation Act and would also afford scope and opportunity for some of the persons liable to pay the tax to ply the vehicle unlawfully without payment of tax and later on justify their non-payment by setting up a plea that the vehicle was in repair for a continuous period of over a month or the whole of a quarter, half-year or year as they choose to claim.” 16. In Chief General Manager, Jagannath Area v. State of Orissa 1996 (10) SCC 676 , the question for consideration was whether the dumpers belonging to the appellant which were being used within the mining areas were taxable under Orissa Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, Section 3 whereof laid down that a tax shall be levied on every motor vehicle used or kept for use within the State at the rates specified in the Schedule. Two contentions were raised before this Court and the second contention was that the tax on vehicles being compensatory in nature, levy of such tax can be sustained only on the ground that the vehicles used the roads for which the tax is levied and if the vehicle in question did not use the roads and yet tax is levied on the same, the said levy is liable to be struck down. Repelling the argument that in absence of actual use of the road, the tax would not be leviable, this Court held as under in para 11 of the Reports: “11. The tax imposed on the motor vehicles is basically a tax for the use of the roads within the State. It is no doubt a compensatory tax which facilitates trade, commerce and intercourse within the State by providing roads and maintaining roads in a good state of repairs. As has been held by this Court in Automobile Transport Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. It is no doubt a compensatory tax which facilitates trade, commerce and intercourse within the State by providing roads and maintaining roads in a good state of repairs. As has been held by this Court in Automobile Transport Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (1963) 1 SCR 491 , it would not be right to say that the tax is not compensatory because the precise or specific amount collected is not actually used in providing any facilities. If a statute fixes a charge for a convenience or service provided by the State or an agency of the State, and imposes it upon those who choose to avail themselves of the service or convenience, or who can use the services provided for, the imposition assumes the character of remuneration or consideration charged in respect of an advantage sought to received or advantage which can be received. The mere fact that any particular individual though can take advantage of the convenience of the services provided by the State but for some reason or the other chooses not to enjoy the services provided cannot escape the taxing liability on that score nor can the provision imposing the tax become invalid on that score....” 17. This view has been reiterated in several decisions of this Court. In State of Kerala v. Arvind Ramakant Modawdakar 1999 (7) SCC 400 , the Court ruled that it is a settled position in law that the actual user of the road by the vehicles which are covered by the requisite permits is not always a relevant factor since the taxable event under Section 3(1) of Kerala Motor Vehicles Taxation Act occurs when the vehicle is used or is kept for use in the State and once the vehicle becomes liable for payment of tax, the extent and quantity of use by the vehicle is not a decisive factor for the purpose of levy of tax. In Mahakoshal Tourist v. State of M.P. 2002 (7) SCC 245 the challenge made with regard to the absence of a machinery for assessment of tax for the vehicles plying in the State of Madhya Pradesh on the basis of All India Tourist permit and denying them refund of tax for the period they were not used or kept for use in the said State was considered. In view of the language used in Section 3 of the relevant Act which provided for levy of tax on every motor vehicle “used or kept for use in the State” at the rate specified in the schedule, it was held that the expression “used” or “kept for use” means, either the actual use of the vehicle on the roads of the State of Madhya Pradesh or keeping the vehicle (which is in condition and capable of being used) available for use in the State, if so desired. It was further held that while plying outside the State in connection with the contract, a vehicle will, nonetheless be within the import of “kept for use in the State” and it is immaterial for the purpose of Section 3 whether a vehicle is actually being used or is kept for use in the State. 18. The language used in Section 3A - all omnibuses which are used or kept for use in the State exclusively as contract carriages - is in conformity with Entry 57 of List II. The consistent view taken by this Court is that if a vehicle is “used” or is “kept for use” in the State, it becomes liable for payment of tax and the actual use or quantum of use is not material. The fact that the statute provides for refund of the tax, if the authority is satisfied that the vehicle has not been used, does not mean that the legislature can only make a provision for levy of tax which is limited for the period of actual use or that no tax can be levied during the period the vehicle is not put to use in the State. The provision for the refund has been made only for the advantage of the operator so that he may be relieved of the burden of tax when he is not getting any income from the vehicle on account of its non-use but it has no relevance to the competence or authority of the State to enact a law providing for imposition of a tax on vehicles which are used or are kept for use in the State. 19. 19. Learned counsel for the writ petitioners has laid great emphasis upon Bolani Ores Ltd. v. State of Orissa AIR 1975 SC 17 where having regard to Bihar and Orissa Motor Vehicles Taxation Act an observation was made that “it is not the purpose of the Taxation Act to levy taxes on vehicles which do not use the roads or in any way form part of the flow of traffic on the roads which is required to be regulated”. Another observation in the same judgment - “but Entry 57 of List II is subject to the limitation that the power of taxation thereunder cannot exceed the compensatory nature which must have some nexus with the vehicles using the roads, viz. public roads. If the vehicles do not use the roads, notwithstanding that they are registered under the Motor Vehicles Act, they cannot be taxed” has also been heavily relied upon for contending that tax can be levied only for the period when the vehicle is actually using the road and consequently Section 3A of the Act is invalid. In fact, the High Court has also taken support from the aforesaid observation for holding that for the period, the designated omnibuses are not using the roads and are merely standing, no tax is leviable. It is trite that any observation made during the course of reasoning in a judgment should not be read divorced from the context in which they were used. Bolani Ores Ltd. had filed a suit seeking a declaration that certain machineries like Shovels, Caterpillars, Bulldozers, Rockers, Dumpers and Tractors, etc. which were used in mining operation in the area leased out to them were not liable for registration under Section 22 of the Motor Vehicles Act and cannot be taxed under Section 6 of the Bihar Taxation Act. The observation aforesaid was made in the context of the machinery which was used for mining operation within the leased area which obviously did not form part of the flow of traffic on the roads. The Court was not called upon to answer the question posed here, namely, whether a normal motor vehicle cannot be taxed for the period during which it is kept for use but is actually not operating. The Court did not hold as a proposition of law that for the period a vehicle is not used on the roads, it cannot be taxed. 20. The Court did not hold as a proposition of law that for the period a vehicle is not used on the roads, it cannot be taxed. 20. The principle laid down in State of Mysore v. Sundaram Motors Pvt. Ltd. AIR 1980 SC 148 reliance on which has been placed by the High Court has also no application here. Section 3 of Mysore Motor Vehicles Taxation Act provided that a tax shall be levied on all motor vehicles suitable for use on roads, kept in the State of Mysore. M/s. Sundaram Motors were dealers in motor vehicles which were manufactured in Bombay and some of these vehicles passed through the territory of State of Mysore on way to their destination in another State (Tamil Nadu) and during the course of the journey, the vehicles halted for rest and food, etc. of the drivers. It was held that the short break taken during the course of journey could not fasten liability for tax as the words “kept” employed in Section 3 had an altogether different connotation, which has an element of stationariness. The principle laid down in this case can hardly have any application here. Similarly, the writ petitioners can derive no assistance from State of Gujarat v. Kaushikbhai K. Patel 2000 SC 2175, wherein the words “for reasons beyond the control of such owner or person” previously occurring in Section 3A (5)(b) were held to be beyond the legislative competence of the State. In this case the High Court had held that once the statute provided for refund of tax on account of non-use of the vehicle, the legislature could not have imposed a further condition to the effect “for reasons beyond the control of such owner or person” and the said expression was held to be beyond the legislative competence. The appeal preferred by the State of Gujarat was dismissed by this Court and the view taken by the High Court was affirmed. We would like to point out that the judgment does not show that the attention of the Bench was invited to any of the decisions which we have referred to above, wherein it has been held that actual user of the road is not material and mere keeping of the vehicle which is capable of being used is enough to attract liability of tax. 21. 21. Learned counsel for the writ petitioners has submitted that the purpose for which the Act was enacted was to augment the financial resources of the State to meet the huge expenditure on account of natural calamities etc. as has been mentioned in the Statement of Objects the Reasons. Therefore the Act is not a compensatory enactment which may have been passed for collecting revenue for the purpose of maintenance of roads and consequently the same is invalid. In our opinion, the contention raised has no substance. In G.K. Krishnan v. State of Tamil Nadu AIR 1975 SC 583 this Court has clearly ruled that if the State Legislature was competent to pass the Act, the question of motive with which the tax was imposed is immaterial and there can be no plea of a colourable exercise of power to tax if the Government had the power to impose the tax. It was further held that if the Government had an authority to impose a tax, the fact that it gave a wrong reason for exercising the power would not derogate from the validity of the tax. 22. Learned counsel for the writ petitioners has also submitted that only contract carriages which are designated as omnibuses and luxury or tourist designated omnibuses have been subjected to a very heavy tax under Section 3A of the Act, whilst all other vehicles are taxed under Section 3 of the Act and whereunder the quantum of tax is much lower as would be evident from First to Seventh Schedule of the Act. The submission is that these vehicles have been discriminated against in the matter of taxation and there is no lawful justification for meeting out such differential treatment to them. We are unable to accept the submission made. A similar contention was negatived in G.K. Krishnan v. State of Tamil Nadu AIR 1975 SC 583 on the ground that the classification of vehicles as Stage carriage and contract carriage for the purpose of imposing a higher tax on the latter is presumed to be reasonable having regard to the fact that it was based on local conditions of which the Government was fully cognizant and the differentiation thus made has reasonable relation to the purpose of the Act. A similar contention made in Malwa Bus Service v. State of Punjab AIR 1983 SC 634 was repelled and it was held as under: “.......There is no dispute that even a fiscal legislation is subject to Article 14 of the Constitution. But it is well settled that a legislature in order to tax some need not tax all. It can adopt a reasonable classification of persons and things in imposing tax liabilities. A law of taxation cannot be termed as being discriminatory because different rates of taxation are prescribed in respect of different items, provided it is possible to hold that the said items belong to distinct and separate groups and that there is a reasonable nexus between the classification and the object to be achieved by the imposition of different rates of taxation. The mere fact that a tax falls more heavily on certain goods or persons may not result in its invalidity......” It was further held that the Courts lean more readily in favour of upholding the constitutionality of taxing law in view of the complexities involved in the social and economic life of the community. Unless the fiscal law in question is manifestly discriminatory, the Court should refrain from striking it down on the ground of discrimination. This being the position of law, it is not possible to accept the contention of the writ petitioners that the tax imposed upon the designated omnibuses is discriminatory. 23. Nothing new has been pointed out to challenge Gujarat Act No.9 of 2002 by which the Bombay Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, as adopted in the State of Gujarat with up to date amendments, was further amended after the decision of the High Court which was rendered on 17th August, 2001. In fact, the main argument of the learned counsel for the writ petitioners is that the said amending Act merely rearranged the Sections and suffered from the same infirmity as the previous Act. Since we are of the opinion that the view taken by the High Court is not correct and Section 3A and Rule 5 of the Rules, as incorporated vide notification dated 6.2.2001 are intra vires and are perfectly valid, the challenge made to Gujarat Act No.9 of 2002 has no substance and must fail. 24. In the result, Civil Appeal Nos. 24. In the result, Civil Appeal Nos. 6462-6464 of 2001 filed by the State of Gujarat are allowed and the impugned judgment and order dated 17.8.2001 of the High Court is set aside. Writ Petition Nos. 249 and 252 of 2002 filed in this Court are dismissed. No costs. Appeal allowed.