JUDGMENT 1. - This appeal has been preferred by the defendants appellants Noor Mohd. and another against the Judgment and Decree dated 29.1.98 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, No. 3, Jaipur City, Jaipur in Civil Regular Appeal No. 157/1983, whereby the said appellate court while dismissing the appeal preferred by the appellants against the judgment and decree dated 20.9.83 passed by the learned Additional Munsif and Judicial Magistrate No. 4, Jaipur City, Jaipur in Civil Suit No. 283/1981, confirmed the same. 2. The brief facts which are relevant for deciding the present second appeal are that the plaintiff-respondent filed a civil suit for ejectment of the defendant-appellant from the suit shop in question situated at Surajpole Bazar, Jaipur city, Jaipur claiming (a) default in payment of rent (b) reasonable and bonafide personal necessity of the plaintiff landlord to occupy the suit premises in question for the purpose of carrying on business of general merchant in the shop premises as per section (1) (a) and 13(l) (h) (i) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). 3. The suit was contested by the defendants (appellants). It was pleaded by them in the written statement filed before the trial court that they had taken the shop on rent from the father of plaintiff-Shri Syam Sunder Sharma. The averment in respect of default in payment of rent was also denied. It was stated by the defendants that the rent was paid upto 20th August, 1978 to the plaintiffs father or his brother and thereafter the rent was refused inspite of the offer made by them and hence there was no default committed by the tenant as alleged by the plaintiff at all. 4. The defendants also denied the resonable and bonafide necessity of the plaintiff to occupy the suit shop premises inasmuch as the plaintiff had rented out another shop to one Nanagram, which showed that the plaintiff had no necessity to occupy the shop premises in dispute. The right of the plaintiff to file the suit was also challenged by the defendant-tenants. The learned trial court on the basis of the pleadings of the parties framed the following issues - (i) whether the defendant has already paid arrears of rent upto 28.2.1978 to the plaintiff? The right of the plaintiff to file the suit was also challenged by the defendant-tenants. The learned trial court on the basis of the pleadings of the parties framed the following issues - (i) whether the defendant has already paid arrears of rent upto 28.2.1978 to the plaintiff? (ii) whether the defendant has been paying rent regularly (sic) at intermittent intervals to the plaintiff and therefore has committed any default in payment of rent? (iii) whether the defendant has taken the suit shop premises on rent for the purpose of running his business and instead of continuing with his business has been living therein along with family and whether on this pleas he is entitled to get the shop premises evicted? (iv) whether the plaintiff is entitled to get the suit shop premises evicted from the tenant for his personal actual and bona fide need? (v) whether as a result of passing of the eviction decree, who would be put to greater hardship, whether the plaintiff and on the question of comparative hardship, whose hardship would be greater whether of the plaintiff or of the defendant? (vi) whether Shyam Sunder alone was entitled to present the plaint for relief? (vii)To what relief, if any, was the plaintiff entitled? 5. On the question of default in payment of arrears of rent, since during the course of hearing, the learned counsel representing the defendant had conceded, the same consequently the finding on the issue of default was recorded against the defendant and in favour of the plaintiff. 6. (vii)To what relief, if any, was the plaintiff entitled? 5. On the question of default in payment of arrears of rent, since during the course of hearing, the learned counsel representing the defendant had conceded, the same consequently the finding on the issue of default was recorded against the defendant and in favour of the plaintiff. 6. As regards issue No. 2, it was proved on the basis of the evidence recorded before the trial court that the defendant had set up a sham and illusory defence with regard to the payment of rent to one Shyam Sunder, brother of defendant since from the documentary evidence particularly the note-book which was in possession of the defendant and it was produced before the trial court, the relevant entries in the same established that the mode of payment of rent was always to plaintiff himself and not to his brother-Shyam Sunder as alleged and hence the contention of the appellant-defendant stood repelled by the entries made by himself in his Note book which proved that the rent was not paid by him to Shyam Sunder as alleged, but m fact was paid to the plaintiff alone who consequently was entitled to realise the rent as delight as a landlord of the shop premises in question. The trial court has further recorded a finding that the benefit of first default having already been extended by the trial court in view of the first default committed by the defendant/tenant on earlier occasion and once having availed the said benefit, he was not entitled to avail the me again on second occasion. 7. Consequently Issue Nos. 1 & 2 stood decided against the appellants-defendants and favour of the plaintiff-respondent. 8. On Issue No. 3, with regard to bonafide necessity of the plaintiff to occupy the tin shop premises for benefit of himself and for use and occupation by family members, it was held by the trial court that on the basis of evidence led before it, the plaintiff was in fact in bonafide need to occupy the same for carrying on the business and also for the use and occupation of his family. The trial court further recorded a finding that the defendants used to send the rent sometimes to the plaintiff and sometime to his brother Shyam Sunder who was entitled to realise the same on behalf plaintiff-landlord and since he has committed the default by not paying arrears of nil for a period of more than six months as on the date when the suit for eviction was filled, he had committed default. It was further held that once having taken the benefit first default by depositing the arrears of rent in the court as per the provisions of 13(3) and 13(4) of the Act, he had committed the second default and was not entitled protection thereof and his defence against eviction on this ground was rightly struck o as per section 13(b) of the Act. During the course of arguments, the plaintiff had admitted that as regards issue No. 3 the finding recorded by the trial Court was not pressed by the plaintiff, and hence this issue was decided in favour of the defendant and against the plaintiff as it was finding only on the aspect of the plaintiffs bonafide need to occupy the suit shop premises by converting its user as residential from commercial user and since he needed the shop for his personal bonafide necessity for inning his business. 9. As regards Issue No. 4, the plaintiff had in support of his contention to occupy the shop premises in question for his bonafide and personal necessity to run the business he examained four witnesses besides examining himself in evidence. Since he was not able to meet his family requirement out of a pittance of Rs. 200/- to Rs. 250/-, which he was earning by way of his salary from private employment, he was in great bonafide need to set up a business in the suit shop premises as a consequence of which he may improve his financial resources and earn his livelihood in a better manner. He had further stated that he had no other shop available to him except the suit shop premises, which was most suitable from all angles for setting up his business. Hence his bonafide need to occupy the same was quite genuine and reasonable and should not be doubted. He wanted to run business of general merchant in the said shop. He had further stated that he had no other shop available to him except the suit shop premises, which was most suitable from all angles for setting up his business. Hence his bonafide need to occupy the same was quite genuine and reasonable and should not be doubted. He wanted to run business of general merchant in the said shop. The trial court after taking over all view of the matter and on the basis of due appreciation of evidence led by the plaintiff in support of his bonafide necessity; consequently recorded a finding that the plaintiff was obviously in bonafide need to occupy the suit shop premises for setting up his business and his need was most reasonable and bonafide and could not be questioned. 10. On the question of comparative hardship of the parties, as regards Issue Nos. 5 and 6, the appellant court held that the plaintiff was in greater hardship and shall suffer irreparable loss if the decree of eviction is not passed in his favour as compared b the defendants, who would not be put to any such loss and consequently a finding was recorded on both issue Nos. 5 and 6 in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant. Hence in view of a positive finding recorded on the aspect of bonafide necessity in favour of the plaintiff, the trial court passed the decree of eviction against the defendants and decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiffs appellants as per section 13(1) (h) of the Act and the defendants were directed to vacate the shop premises and hand over its vacant possession to the plaintiff within two months from the date of passing of the decree along with arrears of rent as due from them. 11. Hence being aggrieved by the aforesaid Judgement and Decree dated 20.9.83 of the trial court which stood confirmed by the Judgment and Decree dated 29.2.98 passed by the first appellate court in Civil Regular Appeal No. 157/83, the instant appeal has been preferred. 12. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the material available on record as also examined the contentions advanced by the teamed counsel for the parties with reference to the legal position on the subject. 12. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the material available on record as also examined the contentions advanced by the teamed counsel for the parties with reference to the legal position on the subject. Prima facie I am of the considered view that, since the matter already stands concluded by concurrent findings recorded by both the courts below on due appreciation of evidence, no interference is called for. This view is based on settled legal position that unless and until there are justifiable reasons to take contrary view of the matter, interference by this court in second appeals, where the findings have been arrived at by the fast appellate court on due appreciation of evidence, should not lightly be interfered with; unless and until there are justifiable and sparing (sic) reasons for the departure and substantial questions of law which are involved for consideration of the court, which is a sine qua non for exercise of jurisdiction by this court u/s 100 CPC. In absence of substantial question of law, the jurisdiction of this Court in second appeals should be sparingly involved particularly when a matter already stands concluded by concurrent findings of two courts below. 13. In the instant case, the findings of the trial court on the question as regards bonafide necessity of the plaintiff to occupy the suit shop premises in question are that the plaintiff has no other alternative accommodation available to him at Jaipur for running his business except the suit shop, where he can run his business for the benefit of his family. The finding on this issue having been confirmed by the first appellant court on due appreciation of evidence. In my considered opinion does not call for any interference in exercise of jurisdiction in second appeal. There is apparently no impropriety mush less any jurisdictional error committed by the first appellate coup as regards appreciation of evidence on issues as recorded by the trial court. The finding of both the courts below are well reasoned after weighing the equities and it has been specifically recorded by the first appellate court that as regards the bonafide need of the plaintiff-landlord to occupy the suit shop premises on comparative hardship of the parties is much greater as compared to that of the tenant-defendant Hence, no interference is called for. My above observations are fortified by the judgment of this court in Smt. Laxmi Devi Sharma v. Mahesh Chandra Sharma (1997(1) WLC (Raj.) 63) as well as from the judgment of the Apex Court in the matter of Ram Prasad Rajak v. Nand Kumar and Another (1998 SAR (Civil) 701 SC) : [1998(2) Rent Law Reporter 80 (SC)] , wherein the Apex Court has held that unless substantial question of law arises, this court should not exercise its jurisdiction to entertain the second appeal by upsetting the findings recorded by the courts below on due appreciation of evidence. The Apex Court held that where the findings on facts by the lower appellate court as a final court on facts are based on appreciation of evidence, the same cannot be treated as perverse or based on no evidence, the High Court after re-appreciating the evidence and without finding that the conclusion reached by the lower appellate court were not based on the evidence could not reverse the conclusion on facts on the ground that the view taken by it was also a possible view on the facts. The High Court, it is well settled while exercising jurisdiction under Section 100, CPC, cannot reverse the findings of the lower appellate court another view merely on the ground that on the facts found by the lower appellate court another was possible. 14. As a result of the above discussion, I am of the view that the present Second Appeal preferred by the defendant-appellant against the Judgment and Decree dated 29.1.98 passed by the learned Additional District Judge No. 3 Jaipur City, Jaipur confirming the Judgment and Decree dated 29.9.83 passed by the learned Additional Munsif and Judicial Magistrate, No. 4, Jaipur City, is not maintainable. Consequently, the same is hereby dismissed. No costs.Appeal dismissed. *******