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1999 DIGILAW 867 (PAT)

Nand Lal Prasad v. Ajay Prasad

1999-09-06

S.N.JHA

body1999
ORDER 1. This civil revision by the defendant is directed against the order dated 19.11.98 in Accounts Suit No 98 of 1998 holding, the suit to be maintainable. 2. The plaintiffs-opposite party have filed the aforementioned suit in the court of 1st, Subordinate Judge, Bettiah for settlement of accounts of the firm Shri Mahavir Straw Board at Ramnagar in the district of West Champaran, vis-a-vis the defendant-petitioner, and for realisation of their shares with interest, damage and cost. 3. Shortly stated, their case is that at the instance of defendant no.1 and, later, mother of defendant no.1, Ram Dulari Devi, they entered into a partnership agreement for doing business in the name of the said Shri Mahavir Straw Board. Initially the partnership was between the plaintiff, defendant no.1 and said Ram Dulari Devi on the basis of agreement dated 2.4.91. Later Ram Dulari Devi retired and in her place her son defendant no.2 was inducted. A fresh partnership agreement was executed on 1.4.93. The plaintiffs invested a huge amount in the business. The investment and the hard labour put in by them paid handsome dividends and the firm was able to pay Rs. 18 lacs to the Bihar State Financial Corporation between 1991 and 1996, besides accumulated profit deposited in the joint Account of the partners. The defendant nos. 1 and 2 however, misappropriated the plaintiffs' share of profit/income for which the plaintiffs have filed complaint case No.555C/98 before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bettiah against them. Since despite requests and notices, the money has not been paid to the plaintiffs, they instituted the suit for the aforementioned reliefs. 4. The plaintiffs filed application for appointment of receiver with respect to the income of the firm. The defendant objected to the very maintainability of the suit. According to them no part of cause of action arose within the territorial jurisdiction of the Bettiah Court and therefore, the court has no territorial jurisdiction over the same. Secondly, the partnership firm being unregistered, the suit was barred in view of the provisions of Section 69 of the Indian Partnership Act. The court below, as noted at the very outset, rejected both the pleas and held the suit to be maintainable. 5. I do not find any substance in the first objection regarding lack of territorial jurisdiction. Secondly, the partnership firm being unregistered, the suit was barred in view of the provisions of Section 69 of the Indian Partnership Act. The court below, as noted at the very outset, rejected both the pleas and held the suit to be maintainable. 5. I do not find any substance in the first objection regarding lack of territorial jurisdiction. It is well known that the nature of suit or its maintainability has to be decided, at the threshold" stage, on the basis of the averments made in the plaint and not on the basis of what the defendant may say in his written statement. Amongst other things, in paragraph 4 of the plaint, there is clear averment that both the partnership deeds dated 2.4.91 and 1.4.93 were executed at Bettiah. Part of cause of action on the plaintiffs case thus arose at Bettiah and the suit cannot be said to be maintainable there. 6. The second objection however, is not without substance. Section 69 of the Partnership Act bars suits to enforce a right arising from a contract or conferred by the Act by or on behalf of any person suing as a partner in a firm against the firm or any person alleged to be or to have been a partner in the firm unless the firm is registered and the persons suing is or has been shown in the Register of firms as a partner in the firm. There is however, an exception clause contained in Sub-section (3) which is really in the nature of proviso, and runs as follows :- "(3) .... .... ...., but shall not affect (a) the enforcement of any right to sue for the dissolution of a firm or for accounts of a dissolved firm, or any right or power to realise the property of a dissolved firm, or (b) .... .... ...." It would appear thus, that the barring provision is not applicable to suits (i) for dissolution of a firm, (ii) for accounts, and (iii) for realisation of the property of a dissolved firm. 7. Now let us see what the present suit is about. As indicated at the outset, the suit has been filed for settlement of accounts between the plaintiffs and the defendant, and for realisation of the plaintiffs share. 7. Now let us see what the present suit is about. As indicated at the outset, the suit has been filed for settlement of accounts between the plaintiffs and the defendant, and for realisation of the plaintiffs share. From the plain reading of the plaint, it is evident that the relief does not come in either of the three categories (i), (ii) or (iii) mentioned above. It is neither suit of dissolution of the firm nor suit for accounts nor a suit of realisation of the property of a dissolved firm. But this is not the end-all of the matter. It is well known that true nature of the suit is to be gathered from the reading of the plaint as a whole i.e. taking into account the averments or the pleadings as well. In para-9 of the plaint there is clear averment that the partnership has not been determined as yet i.e. it has not been dissolved. It is to be kept in mind that the suit has not been filed for dissolution so as to fall in category (i). In paragraphs 10, 11 and 12 of the plaint, there are averments relating to a misappropriation or defalcation. There is also reference to the criminal case in respect of misappropriation. There is further reference to notice for settlement of accounts. In para-13 there are averments regarding plaintiffs' loss and injury. Now under categories (ii) and (iii) suit for accounts and realisation of profit is maintainable but it must be in respect of a dissolved firm. The firm however, is admittedly not dissolved nor there is any prayer for dissolution which could bring the case under category (i) as noted above. To cap it all in paragraph-14 there is clear statement that "the basis of the suit is the right of the plaintiffs as partners". Section 69 of the said Act bars the suit by a partner unless the firm is registered. None of the exception clauses being applicable and the firm being undisputedly not registered, the conclusion is irresistable that the suit is barred under Section 69 of the Partnership Act. 8. In the above premises, the impugned order holding the suit to be maintainable is set aside and this civil revision is allowed accordingly. 9. None of the exception clauses being applicable and the firm being undisputedly not registered, the conclusion is irresistable that the suit is barred under Section 69 of the Partnership Act. 8. In the above premises, the impugned order holding the suit to be maintainable is set aside and this civil revision is allowed accordingly. 9. It is clarified that this order or any consequential order of the court below will not bar a fresh suit by the plaintiffs in accordance with law.