JUDGMENT 1. - These four Special Appeals under section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 are directed against the common judgment and order dated 15.5.1998 by which a learned Single Judge of this Court dismissed the writ petitions of the appellants. In their writ petitions, the appellants had challenged the legality and validity of the actions of the respondents in carrying out 'NO CONFIDENCE MOTION' against them and removing them from the offices of Chair Persons/Vice Chair Person, which they were legally holding in their respective Municipal Boards/Councils at the relevant time. 2. We heard all the four appeals together and now decide them by this common order. This order shall be placed on the record of D.B. Civil Appeal (Writs) No. 794/98 - Yogesh Chandra Saini v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. , and a copy thereof shall be placed on the record of each of the remaining three appeals. 3. Shorn of unnecessary and avoidable details, the facts relevant to and sufficient for the disposal of these appeals, may be shortly stated as under:- [1] D.B. CIVIL SPECIAL APPEAL NO. 794/98 4. Yogesh Chandra Saini, the appellant in this appeal, had been holding the office of and working as the duly elected Chairperson (President) of the Municipal Council, Alwar, since 1994. A `Motion of No Confidence' was made against him and passed by two- third majority of the whole number of members of the Council at its meeting held on 12.4.1997. He challenged the relevant Resolution of the Council dated 12.4.1997 on the ground, inter alia, that notice of the meeting, convened for the purpose by the Collector, Alwar, was not given to "every member" of the council, as required by sub-rule (2) of R. 3 of the Rajasthan Municipalities (Motion of No Confidence against Chairman or Vice Chairman) Rules, 1974 (hereinafter referred to as `the No Confidence Motion Rules') r/w Section 9 of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 1959 (for short `the Act of 1959') and, Art. 243-R of the Constitution of India (hereinafter, `the Constitution'). 5. 5. In main, his contention was that notice of the afore-mentioned meeting dated 12.4.1997 was not given to the Members of the Rajasthan Legislative Assembly (M.L.As.) and the Members of the House of People (M.Ps.), who were representing in the Municipal Council, Alwar, their respective constituencies, which comprised, wholly or partly, the area of such Municipal Council.[2] D.B. CIVIL SPECIAL APPEAL NO. 799/98 and [4] D.B. CIVIL SPECIAL APPEAL NO. 801/98 6. Both these appeals arise out of the same facts. They are, therefore, taken together for narration of the relevant facts. 7. Prakash Chand Saini (appellant in D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 799/98) and Smt. Laxmi Devi (appellant in D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 801/98) were the duly elected Chairperson and Vice Chairperson respectively of the Municipal Board, Kotputli in Jaipur District. By adopting two separate `No Confidence Motions' against them in its meetings, convened for the purpose on 23rd and 24th days of September 1997, the Municipal Board required them to vacate their respective offices. By filing almost identically worded separate writ petitions u/Art. 226 of the Constitution before this Court, the two appellants challenged the relevant `No Confidence Motions' passed against them, on the grounds, inter alia, that the notice of the meetings was not given to the M.L.As. and the M.Ps. representing the relevant areas of the Municipal Board, Kotputli in their respective constituencies and hence, the resolutions adopted against them were illegal and ineffective qua their rights to hold their respective statutory offices.[3] D.B. CIVIL SPECIAL APPEAL NO. 800/98 8. The facts of this appeal are a bit different from those in the three other appeals, though the question of law which was considered and adjudicated upon by the learned Single Judge was very much the same as it was there in the other three matters. 9. In this appeal, Radhey Shyam (appellant) was the duly elected Chair Person and Shri C.M. Akodia was the duly elected Vice Chair Person of the Municipal Board, Bandi Kui in District Dausa. On 5.11.1996 meeting of the members of the Board was convened by the Collector, Dausa to consider a 'No Confidence Motion' against the appellant. Shri C.M. Akodia, the Vice Chair Person of the Board was also there in the meeting to cast his vote on the motion. On 5.11.1996 meeting of the members of the Board was convened by the Collector, Dausa to consider a 'No Confidence Motion' against the appellant. Shri C.M. Akodia, the Vice Chair Person of the Board was also there in the meeting to cast his vote on the motion. The appellant raised an objection to the effect that since Shri C.M. Akodia had already resigned from the office of Vice Chair Person and also from the membership of the Board, vide his letter of resignation dated 3.9.1996, accepted by the appellant with effect from 26.9.1996, he was not legally eligible to participate in the meeting and cast his vote on the `No Confidence Motion' against the appellant. The SDM declined to accept the objection and put the motion to voting by members. Shri Akodia also cast his vote against the appellant. It was a Board of 15 elected members inclusive of the appellant and Shri Akodia. The motion was although carried out by ten members (including Shri Akodia) but the SDM, instead of declaring the motion as carried out, deferred the pronouncement of the result of voting and referred the objection of the appellant, against the eligibility of Shri Akodia to participate in the meeting and cast his vote on the Motion of No Confidence, to the State Government. 10. The State Government by its letter dated 14.11.1996 (Annex. 8) informed the Collector, Dausa that the resignation of Shri Akodia was ineffective as per provisions contained in Sections 62 & 65(12) of the Act of 1959 and advised him to proceed in the matter according to the provisions contained in the Act of 1959. 11. It was at that point of time that the appellant approached this Court by way of S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 5596/96 with the request that the authorities concerned be restrained from proceeding further in the matter in pursuance of the letter of the State Government dated 14.11.1996 (Ex. 8). This Court issued notices on 18.11.1996 to the authorities concerned directing them at the same time not to pass further orders in the matter in pursuance of the aforesaid letter of the State Government for a period of 8 weeks next. 8). This Court issued notices on 18.11.1996 to the authorities concerned directing them at the same time not to pass further orders in the matter in pursuance of the aforesaid letter of the State Government for a period of 8 weeks next. It was alleged that the order of this Court had although been served upon the author ities concerned but they convened a meeting on 18.11.1996 and carried out the `No Confidence Motion' against the petitioner in terms and in continuation of the earlier `No Confidence Motion' against the appellant dated 5.11.1996. However, the delivery of the charge from appellant to Shri C.M. Akodia, the Vice-Chair Person of the Board, was postponed. 12. Subsequently, the stay order as made by this Court on 18.11.1996 was vacated. Fresh election to the office of Chair Person of the Board was proposed to be held on 19.2.1997. By its order dated 17.2.1997 this Court allowed the election to take place. The appellant was also allowed to contest the election, if he was otherwise eligible to do so but the result of the election was made subject to the decision of the Court on the writ petition filed by the appellant. 13. The election to the office of the Chair Person of the Board was held on 19.2.1997. Shri Pooran Mal Sharma (respondent No. 7 in the present appeal) was elected as Chair Person of the Board. On 31.3.1997, the earlier writ petition was withdrawn with liberty to file a fresh writ petition. 14. The appellant filed the present writ petition on 9.4.1997, alleging therein, inter alia, that notices of the meetings held on 5.11.1996 and 18.11.1996, wherein No Confidence Motion was moved and voted and ultimately considered to have been passed, were not given to the MLA representing the constituency which comprised, wholly or partly, the area of the Municipal Board, Bandi Kui. It was thus submitted that the No Confidence Motion passed against him being invalid illegal and ineffective qua his right to hold the office of Chairperson Bandi Kui (Dausa) the election of Sh. Pooran Mal Sharma (respondent No. 7) as the Chair Person of the Board was bad in law and ineffective qua petitioners rights. 15. It was thus submitted that the No Confidence Motion passed against him being invalid illegal and ineffective qua his right to hold the office of Chairperson Bandi Kui (Dausa) the election of Sh. Pooran Mal Sharma (respondent No. 7) as the Chair Person of the Board was bad in law and ineffective qua petitioners rights. 15. On 25.9.1997, the learned single Judge passed an ad interim order directing, inter alia, that although a prima facie case existed in favour of the appellant, but either the petitioner nor any other candidate who might have been elected as Chairperson of the Board after passing of the `No Confidence Motion', could be allowed to function as such and any emergency decision or direction which was required to be taken or given for functioning of the Municipality should be taken and given by the Collector of the District. 16. The order made by the learned Single Judge on 25.9.1997 was challenged by the State of Rajasthan in D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 1312/97 which was dismissed vide order dated 23.9.1997 on the ground that the impugned order was in the nature of an interim order simply making an interim arrangement. 17. In their writ petitions, all the four appellants had challenged the legality and validity of the `No Confidence Motions' as passed against them, on facts as well as in law. On facts, they had given detailed account of the procedural irregularities allegedly committed by the authorities concerned in the process of their removal from their offices/posts as Chair Persons/Vice Chair Persons through the mode of passing `No Confidence Motion' against them. 18. The learned Single Judge, however, noted that the facts stated by the appellants and as were attending on the adoption of the `No Confidence Motions' against them, constituted disputed questions of fact which could not be gone into and decided in the writ jurisdiction of the Court. The learned Single Judge, therefore, declined, and rightly so to our mind, to enter into any investigation or enquiry into the disputed facts. We are in respectful agreement with the view of the learned Single Judge that disputed questions of facts, necessitating investigation or enquiry for their existence, establishment, acceptance or rejection, do not make the subject-matter of the judicial review by this Court in its writ jurisdiction u/Art. 226 of the Constitution. We are in respectful agreement with the view of the learned Single Judge that disputed questions of facts, necessitating investigation or enquiry for their existence, establishment, acceptance or rejection, do not make the subject-matter of the judicial review by this Court in its writ jurisdiction u/Art. 226 of the Constitution. At our stage also, we did not permit the learned counsel to re-agitate such disputed questions of facts as were not entertained-or were not found undisputed by the learned Single Judge. We have, therefore, confined our consideration, discussion and decision on the limited common question which was considered, discussed and decided by the learned Single Judge in the instant matters. 19. The question of law, which was common to all the writ petitions and which was canvassed by the learned counsel for the parties before and formulated by the learned Single Judge was - "whether the Member of the Legislative Assembly (MLA) and Member of Parliament (MP) representing a Council can be treated as full fledged member of the Municipal Council, so as to participate and vote in the proceedings of No Confidence Motion for removing the Chairman or Vice Chairman of the Municipal Council and hence, were required to be given a notice of the meeting for carrying out the Motion of No Confidence." 20. The learned counsel for the present appellants urged before the learned Single Judge that vide Constitution (Seventy Fourth Amendment) Act, 1992, (henceforth the Constitution Amendment Act of 1992) which came into force w.e.f 1.6.1993, provisions relating to the composition of Municipalities were incorporated in Part IX-A by which it was, inter alia, provided that apart from filling all the seats in a Municipality by persons chosen by direct election from the territorial constituencies in the Municipal area and for which purpose each Municipal area shall be divided into territorial constituencies to be known as `Wards', the Legislature of a State may by law, provide for the representation in the Municipality of (i) persons having special knowledge or experience in Municipal Administration and (ii) the Members of the House of the People and the Members of the Legislative Assembly of the State representing constituencies which comprise, wholly or partly, the Municipal area; that in view of the aforesaid amendment of the Constitution, the State of Rajasthan also introduced the necessary amendment in the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 1959 vide the Rajasthan Municipalities (2nd Amendment) Act, 1994 (for short `the Municipalities Amendment Act of 1994'), bringing thereby the relevant provisions of the Act of 1959, particularly Section 9 thereof, in conformity with the provisions contained in Part IX-A of the Constitution and, further, vide its Circular dated 6.3.1995 (placed on the record of S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 5410/97 as Annex. 6) enjoined upon all the Commissioners, Executive. 6) enjoined upon all the Commissioners, Executive. Officers, Municipal Corporations, Boards, Municipalities in Rajasthan State to comply with the provisions of Section 9 of the Act of 1959 in the matter of composition of the Boards, Councils and Corporations under the said Act; that such being the legal position at the relevant times, the MLAs and/or, as the case may be, the MPs representing the constituencies which comprised, wholly or partly, the areas of the Boards/Councils under consideration, were the members of the Boards/Councils, presided over by the appellants as Chair Persons/Vice Chair Person thereof, on the dates on which the `No Confidence Motions' were passed against them; that since Section 72 of the Act of 1959 read with the No Confidence Motion Rules made thereunder, statutorily required that a notice of the meeting convened by the Collector for the consideration of the `No Confidence Motion' against a Chairman or Vice Chairman of a Board/Council shall be sent by registered post, to every member of the Board/Council and that since such motions, in order to have the effect of vacation of their respective officers by the appellants as Chairman and/or Vice Chairman of their respective Boards/Councils, were necessarily required to be passed by a two-third majority of the "whole number of members" of such Board/Council but no notice of the meetings, convened for the said purpose was undisputedly, given to either the MLAs or the MPs in the case of any of the appellants, the `No Confidence Motions' carried against them were illegal, in-operative and in-effective qua their rights to hold their respective offices in their Boards/Councils. It was further argued on behalf of the appellants that in conformity with the Constitutional mandate contained in the proviso u/Art. 243-R(2) of the Constitution, right to vote in the meeting of the Municipality has been denied under proviso to Section 9(1)(a) of the Act of 1959, to only the persons mentioned in sub-cl. (1) of Cl. (a), namely, the persons having special knowledge or experience in municipal administration, that such denial of right to vote can not be extended by implication to the other category of persons mentioned in sub-cls. (ii) of Cl. (a) of Section 9(1), namely, the MLAs and the MPs, who are representing in the Board/Councils their respective constituencies, comprising, wholly or partly, the area of such Boards/Councils. 21. (ii) of Cl. (a) of Section 9(1), namely, the MLAs and the MPs, who are representing in the Board/Councils their respective constituencies, comprising, wholly or partly, the area of such Boards/Councils. 21. The learned Single Judge did not accept the above arguments of the learned counsel for the appellants. Instead, she agreed with the learned Advocate General, appearing for the State of Rajasthan and the counsel for the other respondents who advocated that as per definition of the term given in Section 3(18) of the Act of 1959, a "member" means a person who is lawfully a member on the Board of a Municipality; that a person lawfully a member on the Board is one who takes oath under section 61 of the Act of 1959 of the office of a member and, in case he fails to take such oath of that office within the specified time, he becomes liable to loose his seat in the Board; that an MLA or an MP, does neither take oath under section 61 nor does he, in the case of his not taking oath of the office of a member of the Municipality, render himself liable to loose any seat in the Board/Council; that Section 78 of the Rajasthan Municipalities (Election) Rules, 1994 contemplates membership in the Municipality only of an elected member and of no other person; that a person who is not an elected member of a Municipality like a co-opted member or an MLAor an MP, has a right to vote neither in the election of a Chair Person and/or Vice Chair Person of the Board/Council nor in the proceedings of a 'No Confidence Motion' against him/them and consequently the non-delivery of the notices to the MLAs/MPs of the meeting, convened for the consideration of the No Confidence Motions against the appellants, did not affect the legality and validity of the No Confidence Motions passed against them. 22. In approving the arguments of the respondents, the learned Single Judge examined at length the rules of construction of statutes and a number of decisions relating thereto and applying the rule of literal construction finally held that the appellant- petitioner appeared to be attracting the principle of "casus omissus" for their benefit in as much as that they were attempting to exclude the MLAs and the MPs from the application of the Proviso under section 9(1)(a) of the Act of 1959. In the opinion of the learned Singe Judge the prohibitive provisions of the Proviso were though, on the language used therein, applicable to the class of person mentioned in Cl. (a)(i) of Section 9(1), yet they were equally applicable to persons mentioned in Cl. (a)(ii) and Cl. (b) of Section 9(1) i.e. the MLAs and the MPs respectively who were also not the elected members of the Boards/Councils. Holding thus the learned Single judge dismissed the writ petitions of all the present appellants. Hence these appeals. 23. The learned counsel for the parties advanced the same arguments before us as were advanced by them before the learned Single Judge. We would however, like to add that after having argued the case for the State at length, the learned Advocate General was fair enough to bring to our notice the Full Bench decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Rajpal Chabra v. State of Haryana, 1998(3) Indian Civil Cases 600 , wherein their Lordships have held that if a State Legislature has not, by law made by it, specifically denied to the MLAs and the MPs the right to vote on the No Confidence Motion against the Chairperson and/or Vice-Chairperson, the notice of a meeting called for the purpose shall have to be mandatorily given to them and that their such right to notice of the meeting cannot be taken away from them by impliedly applying the provisions contained in the Proviso u/Art. 243 R. (2) or under similar provision made by a State in that behalf and restricing the application of such Proviso to the one or the other class of persons only. 24. At the very outset, we would like to observe that we fully subscribe to the principles of interpretation and construction of a Statute stated and referred to by the learned Single Judged and also pressed into service by the learned counsel for the parties before us through a catena of case law. The object of construction of the language in a statute is to see as to what is the intention expressed by the words used or language employed therein. The object of construction of the language in a statute is to see as to what is the intention expressed by the words used or language employed therein. If the words used or language employed are plain, simple and clear in their commonsense meanings and purport, admitting of no ambiguity in the message sought or intended to be conveyed by them, no necessity or occasion, should ordinarily arise for making an exercise of interpreting and construing them. It is only there, where from the imperfection of language it some times become impossible to know the intention of the Legislature without enquiring further and seeing what the circumstances were with reference to which and what was the object appearing from those circumstances, which the person using had them in view, that the necessity or occasion to make such an exercise may arise. 25. Salmond, in his Jurisprudence at page 152(11th Edition) says that - "the essence of the law lies in its spirit, not in its letters, for the letter is significant only as being the external manifestation of the intention that underlines it. Nevertheless, in all ordinary cases the Courts must be content to accept the litera legis as the exclusive and conclusive evidence of the "sententia legis". They must, in general, take it absolutely for granted that the Legislature has said what it meant, and meant what it has said. "Ita seriptuinest" is the first principle of interpretation. Judges are not at liberty to add to or take from or modify the letter of the law simply because they have reason to believe that the true "sententia legis" is not completely or correctly expressed by it. That is to say, in all ordinary case grammatical interpretation is the sole form allowable." 26. The learned author further goes on to say - "There are two cases in which the "litera legis" need not be taken as conclusive, and in which the "sentenita legis" may be sought from other indications. The first of these cases is that in which the letter of law is "logically defective", that is to say, when it fails to express some single, definite, coherent and complete idea. The second case is that in which the text leads to a result so unreasonable that it is self-evident that the Legislature could not have meant what it has said. The second case is that in which the text leads to a result so unreasonable that it is self-evident that the Legislature could not have meant what it has said. For example, there may be some obvious clerical error in the text, such as a reference to a section by the wrong number or the omission of a negative in some passage in which it is clearly required." 27. Hidayatullah, J. (as his Lordship then was) agreeing with Salmond observed in the case of Moti Lal v. I.T. Commissioner, AIR 1951 Nag. 224 , that - "it is an elementary rule of construction of statute that the judicature in their interpretation have to discover and act upon the mens or sententia legis" - but further added that - "normally Courts do not look beyond the litera legis". 28. Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes (PP 1, 2) stated that - "a statute is the will of Legislature and the fundamental rule of interpretation, to which all other are subordinate, is that a statute is to be expounded, according to them that made it." 29. In New Piece Goods Bazar Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay, AIR 1950 SC 165 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed that - "it is the elementary duty of the Court to give effect to the intention of the Legislature as expressed in the words used by it and no outside consideration can be called in aid to find that intention". 30. Explaining the same principle in Navin Chand v. Commissioner of Income Tax, 1955(1) SCR 829 , the Apex Court observed that - "the cardinal rule of interpretation, however, is that words should be read in their ordinary, natural, and grammatical meanings subject to this rider that in construing words in a constitutional enactment conferring legislative power the most liberal construction should be put upon the words so that the same may have effect in their widest amplitude". 31. Reiterating the same principle in Jugal Kishore v. Raw Cotton Co. Ltd., AIR 1955 SC 376 , it was observed by their Lordships that - "the cardinal rule of construction of statutes is to read the statute literally, that is, by giving to the words used by the Legislature their ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning. 31. Reiterating the same principle in Jugal Kishore v. Raw Cotton Co. Ltd., AIR 1955 SC 376 , it was observed by their Lordships that - "the cardinal rule of construction of statutes is to read the statute literally, that is, by giving to the words used by the Legislature their ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning. If, however, such a reading leads to absurdity and the words are susceptible of another meaning, the Court may adopt the same. But if no alternative construction is possible, the Court must adopt the ordinary rule of literal interpretation." 32. But in Amar Singhji v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1955 SC 504 , their Lordships cautioned by observing that - "recourse to rules of construction would be necessary only when a statute is capable of two interpretations, where the language is clear and the meaning plain, effect must be given to it". 33. To sum up, the generally accepted and well established principles of interpretation and construction of statute are; the language of the statute should be read as it is, avoiding addition or substitution or rejection of words thereto; application of the rule of "casus omissus" i.e. reading a matter which should have been but has not been provided for in a statute, should be avoided; rule of literal construction approving the understanding of the words and language of the statute in their ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning and preferring exact meaning to loose meaning should generally be adopted; the rules of harmonious and purposive construction should be adhered to in order to avoid hardship, inconvenience, injustice, absurdity, anomaly, inconsistency and repugnancy, so as to make the provision of the statute effective and workable; a statute must be read as a whole in its context; taxing and penal laws, imposing fiscal and/or penal liability on the subject should be strictly interpreted and construed, and the constitutional provisions, conferring legislative powers, particularly in the field of progressive legislation, should be liberally constructed. 34. The whole controversy in these appeals centres around the amended provisions of Section 9 of the Act of 1959. 34. The whole controversy in these appeals centres around the amended provisions of Section 9 of the Act of 1959. In the contest of the right of the MLAs and the MPs, representing in Municipalities their constituencies, which comprise, wholly or partly, of the area of such Municipality, to participate and vote in the proceedings of `No Confidence Motion' made against the Chair Person or, as the case may be, Vice Chair Person, of such Municipality. However, before we proceed to resolve such controversy, we would like to make a brief reference to the position of the law in force prior to the amendment of Section 9 of the Act of 1959 by the Second Amendment Act of 1994. 35. Sections 9 and 10 of the un-amended Act of 1959, provided as under:- "9. Composition of Boards.-(1) Subject to the provisions contained in the succeeding sub-sections, every board shall consist of such number of seats as may4e fixed by the State Government from time to time by notification in the official Gazette. (2) In so fixing the total number of seats for a Board, the State Government shall specify the number respectively of general seats and of seats reserved for members of the Scheduled Castes or for members of the Scheduled Tribes or for both as the State Government may in each case determine. (3) The number of seats reserved, as aforesaid shall, in relation to the total number of seats fixed for a board, bear the same proportion as the population of the Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes in the Municipality bears to the total population thereof and such reservation shall be operative until the provisions of the Constitution relating to the reservation of seats for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in the State Legislative Assembly cease to have effect. (4) All the seats fixed for a board, general as well as reserved, shall be filled up by election held in the manner provided for by and in the order made under section 29. (5) To every board there shall be appointed by co-option in the manner provided for by order published in the Official Gazette, (i) two persons belonging to the female sex, if no such person has been returned to the board by election referred to in sub-sec. (5) To every board there shall be appointed by co-option in the manner provided for by order published in the Official Gazette, (i) two persons belonging to the female sex, if no such person has been returned to the board by election referred to in sub-sec. (4), or (ii) one person belonging to the female sex, if only one such person has been returned to the board by such election and such co-opted person or persons being treated for all purposes of this Act as elected member or members of the board, and the number of seats fixed for that board under sub-sec. (1) being deemed to be increased accordingly. 10. Composition to boards in certain exceptional cases.-(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 9, in a municipality not being a city which is an educational center or a hill station or to which, owing to the smallness thereof or the backwards state or indifference or its inhabitants or for other exceptional reason, the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, apply the provisions of this section, the board shall consist of members, partly elected and partly nominated, or, as the State Government may determine, wholly nominated and such nominated members shall be appointed by the State Government in such a manner and subject to such conditions, as it shall think fit to prescribe. (2) It shall be competent for the State Government at any time to alter or rescind any notification issued by it under sub- sec. (1) and, in the event of any such notification being rescinded, the board affected thereby shall, from a date to be fixed in this behalf by the State Government, be constituted in accordance with Section 9.,, 36. A combined reading of the above provisions of the un-amended Act informs us that ordinarily a Municipality used to be composed of two main categories of members, namely, those elected by the electorates or voter and those `co-opted' by the elected members (S. 9). In exceptional cases only a Board could have been composed of partly elected and partly nominated or, as the State Government might have determined, wholly of nominated members (S. 10). Thus there were three recognised sources for bringing in members in a Municipality for its composition namely (1) by direct election, (ii) by co-option and (iii) by nomination. 37. In exceptional cases only a Board could have been composed of partly elected and partly nominated or, as the State Government might have determined, wholly of nominated members (S. 10). Thus there were three recognised sources for bringing in members in a Municipality for its composition namely (1) by direct election, (ii) by co-option and (iii) by nomination. 37. In so far as the elected members were concerned, their election, as members in the Municipality, used to be governed by the provisions contained in the Act of 1959, as is also the position now. The provisions contained in Section 26 (disqualification) and Section 34 (election petition) were applicable to their cases. 38. In so far as the co-opted members were concerned, their election or co-option used to be governed by the Rajasthan Municipalities (Appointment of Members/Councillors by Co-option) Order, 1959. Process of election was no doubt involved in their co-option but as they were not directly elected by the voters, the provisions contained in Sections 26 & 34 were not applicable to them (Pabu Singh v. Returning Officer, RLW 1984 Page 31) , They were to be elected or co-opted by the already directly elected members in the Board. Although, an the time of casting their votes in the co-option proceedings, the elected members may be said to be performing a duty under section 61 of the Act of 1959 but, at that point of time they were performing such duty as elected `members in the Board' and were not acting `as a Board' which was still in the process of composition. Co-option of members was a step towards the composition of the Board, (as a corporate body) under section 9 of the Act of 1959. The composition of the Board was to be completed after the co-opted members were brought in the board by co- option. (Manak Chand & Ann v. State of Rajasthan, 1961 (11) ILR 61) . 39. In so far as the nominated members were concerned, their nomination in the Board used to be governed earlier by Section 9 of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 1951. But such nomination was not to remain effective after the coming into force of the Act of 1959 unless the same was protected by the provisions of the Rajasthan Municipalities (Transitory Provisions) Order, 1959. But such nomination was not to remain effective after the coming into force of the Act of 1959 unless the same was protected by the provisions of the Rajasthan Municipalities (Transitory Provisions) Order, 1959. Nomination of a person as member in the Board was dependent on the discretion of the State Government which was exercised through its representative in a district i.e. the Collector. 40. The concept of reservation was though also relevant to the composition of the Municipalities/Boards yet it was related more to seats than to persons as such. It was a specified Class of persons or a particular section of society that was given representation in a Board through the mode of reservation of seats. Such representation, in due course of time, came to be regulated by the Rajasthan Municipalities (Fixation of Seats for Women, Scheduled Castes/ Scheduled Tribes and Determination of Wards for Women) Rules, 1993 (since repealed). 41. Any way, the composition of a Municipality/Board having been made and completed under section 9 in the manner stated above, the business of the Board used to be conducted in accordance with the provisions contained in the Rajasthan Municipalities (Conduct of Business) Rules, 1974. In order to carry on such business the election of Chairman and Vice Chairman or President and Vice President, to preside over the meetings of the Board, for constitution of various committees and for the conduct of business by such Committees were mandatorily required. Therefore, the Rajasthan Municipalities (Election of Chairman, Vice Chairman, President and Vice-President) Rules, 1959 and Rajasthan Municipalities Order, 1960 (since both repealed) were made. Similarly, the Rajasthan Municipalities (Constitution of Committees by Boards) Rules, 1974 (since repealed and substituted by the Rajasthan Municipalities (Constitution of Committees) Rules, 1996 and the Rajasthan Municipalities (Conduct of Business of Committees) Rules, 1974, were also made. 42. Section 63 of the Act of 1959 laid down the procedure for removal of the member of a Board. The removal of the Chairman or, as the case may be, of the Vice-Chairman of the Board used to be regulated by Section 72, which, as substituted by Section 19 of the Rajasthan Municipalities (Amendment) Rules, 1974, ran as under : "Section 72 : Motion of No-Confidence against Chairman : Motion expressing no confidence in the Chairman or the Vice Chairman shall be made and considered in the manner prescribed." 43. Presently, the above section is contained in the same language, in the newly amended sub-sec. (1) of Section 72. 44. The provisions contained in Section 72 (old) or Section 72(1) (new) are mandatory as held by this Court in Radhey Shyam v. Vijay Singh, WLN 1972 Part-I page 772 . 45. The State Government, in exercise of its powers under section 297 r/w Section 72 of the Act of 1959, made the No Confidence Motion Rules prescribing the procedure for removal of the Chairperson or Vice- Chairperson from a Board and such rules governed the entire subject which is presently in controversy in these appeals. While making the above-mentioned Rules from time to time, the rule making authority used two expressions namely "member" and "whole number or total number of members" of the Board. For conducting the business of the Board in terms of the Conduct of Business Rules, the expression "whole number of members" was used in the language of R. 9 in the following manner : "No business shall be transacted at a meeting unless there be present at least one third of the whole number of the members of the Board." [Emphasis supplied] 46. Similarly, in R. 3(1) of the No Confidence Motion Rules it was stated that a written notice of intention to make motion of no confidence in the Chairman or Vice Chairman signed by one third members shall be sent to the Collector. In sub-rule (2) of R. 3 it was made obligatory for the Collector to send by registered post a notice of meeting to "every member" of the Board. In sub-rule (5) it was inter alia, provided that one third of the "whole number of members shall form the quorum". In sub-rule (8) it was provided that if the motion was not carried by a ⅔majority of the "whole number of members" the motion shall be deemed to have been lost. Again in sub-rule (9) the same expression "whole number of members" was used for the purpose of carrying out the motion. 47. A Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court ruled in the case of Mahesh Chand & Ann v. Tara Chand, AIR 1958 All 374 , wherein analogous rules fell for the consideration of their Lordships, that the procedure which has been provided by the rules to call and convene a meeting to consider the vote of confidence is mandatory. 47. A Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court ruled in the case of Mahesh Chand & Ann v. Tara Chand, AIR 1958 All 374 , wherein analogous rules fell for the consideration of their Lordships, that the procedure which has been provided by the rules to call and convene a meeting to consider the vote of confidence is mandatory. On examining the procedure laid down in the No Confidence Motion Rules, made under section 72 of the Act of 1959 Tyagi J. (as his Lordship then was) agreeing with their Lordships of Allahabad High Court held in Radhey Shyam's case (supra) that Section 72 and the procedure laid down in No Confidence Rules, made thereunder, were mandatory. This position of law is not changed after coming into force of the Rajasthan Municipalities Second Amend- ment Act, 1994. 48. In the same context a reference may also be made to R. 3 of the Rajasthan Municipalities (Interpellation of Chairman/President) Rules, 1959 which provided inter alia, that any question connected with the business of the Board might be asked at a meeting of the Municipality/Board by any member/councillor subject to certain conditions and restrictions, as specified in the said rules. The conditions and restrictions did not relate to members. They related to the subject-matter of question. 49. Here it may be pointed out that in order to make its intention clear the Legislature had defined the term "total number" or "whole number" in the definitive Cl. (36) of Section 3 of the Act of 1959 itself in the following words : "Section 3.-Definitions.-In this Act, unless the context other- wise requires : (36). `whole number' or `total number', when used with reference to the members of a board, means the total number of members holding office at the time." 50. It was in the above meaning of the term that the words "total number" of the members were used in the various rules particularly the Conduct of Business Rules and the No Confidence Motion Rules. 51. To sum up, the above study of the rules clearly discloses that every member of the Board, whether brought in it by direct election or by co-option or by nomination had a right to take part in the conduct of the business of the Board. 51. To sum up, the above study of the rules clearly discloses that every member of the Board, whether brought in it by direct election or by co-option or by nomination had a right to take part in the conduct of the business of the Board. The matter of removal of the Chairperson or, as the case may be, the Vice- Chairperson was specifically governed by the No Confidence Motion Rules according to which it was obligatory on the part of the Collector to send by registered post a notice in writing of the date of the meeting, convened by him for the purpose, to every member of the Board. Such motion could have been carried out only by ⅔rd majority of the whole number of members which expression included such members also who were representatives in the Municipality otherwise than as "directly elected members." 52. On the above position of law relating to removal of Chairperson or vice-Chairperson of a Board, existing just prior to the coming into force of the Rajasthan Municipalities (Second Amendment) Act, 1994, and which position exists till date as the No Confidence Motion Rules are still in force, it is reasonable to hold that once the composition of a Municipality was completed in the manner prescribed by Section 9 or, as the case may be, by Section 10 of the un-amended Act of 1959 there was no material distinction amongst the various categories of members coming in the Board from different sources in so far as the conduct of the business of the Board was concerned. All the sources, after completion of the composition of the Municipality, had blended into one stream for the purposes of conducting the business of the Municipality in general and for removal of the Chairperson or Vice-Chairperson thereof in particular. 53. Now before we proceed to examine the nature and extent of amendment made by the Rajasthan Municipalities (Second Amendment) Act 1994 in the above position of law it would be appropriate to make a brief reference to the background of the circumstances attending on such amendment. 54. It may be recalled that during the British rule in India, the demand for right to self governance of the country became stronger and stronger with the growing sense of independent amongst the people. 54. It may be recalled that during the British rule in India, the demand for right to self governance of the country became stronger and stronger with the growing sense of independent amongst the people. Village Panchayats were no doubt the units of local administration since the early British days, but they had to work under the control of British Government. On our leaders pressing for local autonomy at the national level, the foreign rulers offered concession at the lowest level, at the initial stage, by giving powers to Panchayats in rural areas and to the Municipalities in the urban areas and relevant enactments were made by several States. In the Government of India Act, 1935, the power to enact legislation had specifically been given to the Provincial Legislatures by Entry 12 of the Provincial Legislative List. By virtue of that power, new Acts were enacted by many other States, vesting power of administration in the hands of the Panchayats. 55. However, notwithstanding the relevant legislations enacted by the States for the purpose, and the working of the local bodies, as institutions of popular Government under such legislations, did not meet the satisfaction of the makers of the Constitution of Independent India. Therefore, a Directive was included in the Constitution of 1949 in Art. 40 to the following effect But despite the above Directive, not much attention was given to develop the local units as units of representative democracy in the country as a whole by holding elections in those units. It was during the prime-ministerial regime of Late Shri Rajiv Gandhi that it was considered necessary to further the organisations of these local units by inserting specific provisions in the Constitution itself on the basis of which the Legislatures of various States might enact laws according to the guidelines provided by the Constitution. The idea so conceived culminated in passing the 73rd and 74th Amendment Acts of 1992, effective from 1.6.1993 and inserting Part IX and Part IX-A in the Constitution. Part IX, containing Arts. 243 to 243-0 relates to Panchayats and Part IX-A containing Arts. 243-P to 243-ZG, for Municipalities. Thus, these self-Government institutions at the lowest levels, at the initial stages, came to get a Constitutional existence. 56. Part IX, containing Arts. 243 to 243-0 relates to Panchayats and Part IX-A containing Arts. 243-P to 243-ZG, for Municipalities. Thus, these self-Government institutions at the lowest levels, at the initial stages, came to get a Constitutional existence. 56. Local Government, including self-government institutions in both urban and rural areas is an exclusive States subject under Entry 5 of List II of the 7th Schedule, so that the Union cannot enact any law to create rights and liabilities relating to these subjects. Therefore, what the Parliament has done by inserting Part IX and Part IX-A in the Constitution is to outline the scheme which would be implemented by the several States by making laws, or amending their own existing laws to bring them in conformity with the provisions of the 73rd and 74th Constitution (Amendment) Acts. The provisions contained in Arts. 243 to 243-ZG in Part IX and Part IX-A, therefore, are in the nature of basic provisions which are to be supplemented by laws already made or to be made by State Legislatures which laws will define the details as to the powers and functions of the various organs, contemplated therein. 57. At this stage, we think, it would be proper to make a brief study of the relevant provisions contained in Part IX-A of the Constitution. This part comprises of Arts. 243-P to Art. 243-ZG. Article 243-P defines certain terms, relating to the establishment of Municipalities and Art. 243-Q speaks of the Constitution of Municipalities. It mandates that in every State - (i) a Nagar Panchayat for a transitional area i.e. an area in transition from a rural area to an urban area; (ii) a Municipal Council for a smaller urban area, and a Municipal Corporation for a larger urban area, shall be constituted in accordance with the provisions of this Part. 58. Article 243-R, which is relevant for our purpose, provides for composition of Municipalities to be constituted as per Art. 243-Q. It runs as under:- "243-R. Composition of Municipalities.-(1) Save as provided in Cl. (2), all the seats in a Municipality shall be filled by persons chosen by direct election from the territorial constituencies in the Municipal area and for this purpose each Municipal area shall be divided into territorial constituencies to be known as wards. (2), all the seats in a Municipality shall be filled by persons chosen by direct election from the territorial constituencies in the Municipal area and for this purpose each Municipal area shall be divided into territorial constituencies to be known as wards. (2) The Legislature of a State may, by law, provide- (a) for the representation in a Municipality of (i) persons having special knowledge or experience in local administration; (ii) the members of the House of People and the members of the Legislative Assembly of the State representing constituencies which comprise wholly or partly the Municipal area; (iii) the members of the Council of States and the members of the Legislative Council of the State registered as electors within the Municipal area; (iv) the Chairpersons of the Committees constitute, u/cl. (5) of Art. 243-S: Provided that the persons referred to in paragraph (i) shall not have the right to vote in the meetings of the Municipality; (b) the manner of election of the Chairperson of a Municipality." 59. It may be noted that Art. 243-R is in two parts viz. Art. 243-R(1) and Art. 243-R(2). The first part speaks of representation of persons chosen by direct election from the territorial constituencies in the Municipal area known as `wards'. By virtue of the constitutional mandate contained in this part, a Municipality has to be necessarily composed of persons chosen by direct election from the territorial constituencies in the Municipal area. For carrying out the mandate contained in this part, the Municipal area is required to be divided into territorial constituencies, to be known as `wards'. Such wards make "seats" for representation in the Municipality of persons to be chosen by direct election. All such seats are to be filled by directly elected persons and by no others. In other words, the idea of basic democratic set up in the country at the lowest level, in the initial stage, is enshrined in Art. 243-R(1) and thus, has a relation to the preamble of the Constitution. Democracy makes the basic feature of our Constitution and, therefore, in view of the constitutional mandate contained therein, Art. 243-R(1) is mandatory in nature and character. 60. Article 243-R(2) makes provisions for further representation in the Municipality by persons other than those spoken of in Art. 243-R(1). It is divided in two parts viz. Cl. (a) and Cl. (b). Democracy makes the basic feature of our Constitution and, therefore, in view of the constitutional mandate contained therein, Art. 243-R(1) is mandatory in nature and character. 60. Article 243-R(2) makes provisions for further representation in the Municipality by persons other than those spoken of in Art. 243-R(1). It is divided in two parts viz. Cl. (a) and Cl. (b). Clause (a) lays down four categories of persons who may be inducted for representation in a Municipality. Such persons include - (i) persons having special knowledge or experience in local administration, (ii) the members of the House of People and the members of the Legislative Assembly of the State representing constituencies which comprise wholly or partly the Municipal area, (iii) the members of the Council of States and the members of the Legislative Council of the State registered as electors within the Municipal area and, (iv) the chair persons of the committees constituted u/Cl. (5) of Art. 243-S. 61. There is a proviso below Cl. (2) of Art. 243-R which provides that the persons referred to in (i) above shall not have the right to vote in the meetings of the Municipality. It needs to be taken note of that by virtue of the saving clause used in the language of Art. 243-R(1), the persons who may be brought in the Municipality for further representation in it u/Art. 243-R(2)(a) would also go to make `composition of the Municipality' though none of them would be filling any seat in the Municipality as all the seats therein shall be filled only by the persons chosen by direct election from the wards. But, at the same time, the persons categorised in Art. 243-R(2)(a), if brought in the Municipality by a State, by a law made by its Legislature in that behalf, shall be representing in the Municipality. It means that the Constitution intended that a Municipality may be composed of two categories of persons - one of those who are necessarily to be chosen by direct election from the ward in the Municipal area and the other of those who are not so chosen. It means that the Constitution intended that a Municipality may be composed of two categories of persons - one of those who are necessarily to be chosen by direct election from the ward in the Municipal area and the other of those who are not so chosen. Whereas by making express and mandatory provision in Art. 243-R(1) for representation in the Municipality for its composition by the elected persons from the wards in the Municipal area, the further representation in it by the categories of persons mentioned in Art. 243-R(2) was left to the discretion of the States concerned, which discretion a State may or may not like to exercise. In enacting the provisions of Art. 243-R in that manner the intention of the Legislature seems to be that in so far as the functional composition of a Municipality as a unit of self Government institution at the lowest level, in the initial stage, was concerned, the persons directly elected from the wards in a Municipal area would complete such composition for the purposes of running the democratic administration of the Municipality. But, at the same time, such a unit of self-governance, at the lowest level and in the initial stage, may necessitate the advice of persons having special knowledge of and experience in local administration. Further, the representation on its Board by such other persons who represent the electorate from the same or part of the same territorial area or areas in higher elected democratic bodies or institutions like State Assemblies, Legislative Councils, House of People, may also render useful advice/service in various matters especially in the matter of removal or non-removal of the elected members holding the highest elected offices in the Board. But such necessity or requirement for further representation on the Board may depend upon the socioeconomic conditions, politico-legal awareness, culturo-geographical background etc. etc., varying from area to area of which the State concerned may be the best judge. Therefore, the additional representation in a Municipality by persons other than those mentioned in Art. 243-R(1) was left to the discretion of the States concerned, which, by laws enacted by their legislatures, may provide for such additional representation as they may deem proper, in the conditions prevailing in their respective territories. Therefore, the additional representation in a Municipality by persons other than those mentioned in Art. 243-R(1) was left to the discretion of the States concerned, which, by laws enacted by their legislatures, may provide for such additional representation as they may deem proper, in the conditions prevailing in their respective territories. Therefore, whereas representation in a Municipality by persons directly elected from the wards in the Municipal area is a constitutional requirement, further representation in it from some other source or sources, as specified in Art. 243-R(2)(a) is not such a requirement. Representation by such other sources may become statutory requirement only in the Legislature of a State has, by law made by it, so provided. The provisions made in Art. 243-R(2)(a) are in the nature of outlines or guidelines, provided by the Constitution to the State Legislatures. They contain no mandate for and cast no constitutional obligation upon the States to necessarily make enactment on the subject of additional or further representations in the Municipalities. The provisions contained in Art. 243-R(2)(9) are therefore, directory in nature. But once a State has, by law enacted by its Legislature, provided for representation by persons of one or more categories mentioned in Art. 243-R(2) such enactment would supplement the mandate contained in Art. 243-R(1). This, position is clear from the mandate contained in the expression "save as provided in Cl. (2)" used in the very beginning of the language of Art. 243- R(1). It means that the law enacted by the State would provide a supplemental component for the composition of the Municipality u/Art. 243-R(1) of the Constitution. 62. The proviso u/Cl. (a) of Art. 243-R(1) which has been reproduced in the amended Section 9 of the Act of 1959 and which makes the very kernel of all the controversy in these appeals, needs a critical study. It says that the persons referred to in paragraph (1) i.e. the persons having special knowledge or experience in local administration brought in for representation in a Municipality, shall not have the right to vote in the meetings of the Municipality. The anguage used is quite simple and the mandate conveyed is unambiguous. The restriction imposed by the Proviso relates to paragraph (1) only and to no other f the three remaining paragraphs. The anguage used is quite simple and the mandate conveyed is unambiguous. The restriction imposed by the Proviso relates to paragraph (1) only and to no other f the three remaining paragraphs. It means that in the exercise of its law-making power, if a State opts to exercise its such power it is mandatory for it not to offer voting power upon such persons. It is altogether a different matter that State by a law made by it, may or may not confer such right of voting upon ne or the other class of persons, categorised in paragraphs (ii), (iii) or (iv) of Cl. ), of Art. 243-R(2), if those or any of those clauses of persons are also given presentation in the Municipalities. But once a State, in exercise of its discriminary power conferred upto it by Art. 243-R(2), makes a law giving representation in the Municipalities to persons other than those who are directly elected per provisions of Art. 243-R(1), it has to make such law within the parameter provided by and guide-lines laid down in Art. 243-R(2). For, the law to be so ad by a State goes to supplement the mandate contained in Art. 243-R(1). In view of the use of the expression "save as provided in Cl. (2)" in the language of 243-R(1), the effect and consequence of the law made by the State would be add to the composition of a Municipality as contemplated in Art. 243-R(1)ever fore, the law to be made by the State has to be in conformity with the tunes laid down in Art. 243-R(2). Such outlines are to be read alongwith any Restriction/or prohibition placed on the law-making power of the State u/Art. 3-R(2) of the Constitution on the principle that if a statute directs thing (sic) be done in a certain way, that thing shall, not even if there be no negative (Sic), be done in any other way, Jaipur Girah Nirman Sehhari Samiti Association v. State of Rajasthan, 1992(2) WLC (Raj.) 386. 63. As a sequel to the discussion made hereinabove it would be appropriate another equally relevant and material provision contained in Part IX A be .en note of at this stage. 63. As a sequel to the discussion made hereinabove it would be appropriate another equally relevant and material provision contained in Part IX A be .en note of at this stage. Article 243-ZF(1), as is relevant for our purpose, (Sic) as under : "Article 243-ZF : Continuance of existing laws and Municipalities.-Notwithstanding anything in this Part, any provision of any law relating to Municipalities in force in a State immediately before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventy-fourth Amendment) Act, 1992, which is inconsistent with the provisions of this Part, shall continue to be in force until amended or repealed by a competent Legislature or other competent authority or until the expiration of one year from such commencement, whichever is earlier : Provided that all the Municipalities existing immediately before such commencement shall "continue till the expiration of their duration, unless sooner dissolved by a resolution passed to that effect by the Legislative Assembly of that State or, in the case of a State having a Legislative Council, by each House of the Legislature of that State." 64. It may be noted that Art. 243-ZF(1) permits the continuance, for specified period, of the provisions of any law, relating to Municipalities, in fort in a State immediately before the commencement of the 74th Constitution Amendment Act, 1992, even if any provision of such a law is in consistent wit the provisions contained in the newly inserted Part IX-A of the Constitution. In an earlier part of this order we have referred to the position of the law relating to Municipalities in force in the State of Rajasthan immediately before the commencement of the 74th Constitution Amendment Act, 1992 w.e.f 1.6.199 Keeping such position of law in mind we should see as to what changes were brought about in that position of law by the Rajasthan Municipalities (2nd Amendment) Act, 1994. 65. On reading the amended provisions relating to composition of Municipalities we find that in so far as the composition of Municipalities was concern Section 10 was omitted and Section 9 was widely amended. Section 9, as is relearn for our purposes, now reads as under : "9. 65. On reading the amended provisions relating to composition of Municipalities we find that in so far as the composition of Municipalities was concern Section 10 was omitted and Section 9 was widely amended. Section 9, as is relearn for our purposes, now reads as under : "9. Composition of Boards.-(1) Subject to the provisions contained in the succeeding sub-sections, but save as provided in the following provisions of this sub-section, all seats in a municipality shall be filled by persons chosen by direct election from the territorial constituencies known as wards, the number of such seats, not being less than thirteen, being fixed by the State Government from time to time by notification in the Official Gazette (a) the following viz:- (i) three persons or ten percent of the number of elected members of a Municipality, whichever is less, with special knowledge or experience in municipal administration as co-opted by the elected members of the Municipality; and (ii) a member of the Rajasthan Legislative Assembly representing a constituency which comprises wholly or partly the area of a municipality, shall be represented on the Board, Council or Corporation of such a municipality : Provided that the persons referred to in sub-cl. (i) shall not have the right to vote in the meetings of the municipality; and (b) a member of the House of the People representing a constituency which comprise wholly or partly the area of a municipality with a municipal council on, as the case may be, a municipal corporation shall be represented on the council or corporation of such municipality." 66. A bare reading of the main sub-sec. (1) makes it clear that the mandate contained therein, with regard to the composition of the Municipalities, shall be object not only to the provisions contained in sub-secs. (1-A), (2), (3), 3(A) to D) and (4) relating to determination and reservation of the seats in a Municipality, but shall also be subject to the provisions made in Cls. (a) & (b) of sub-sec. of Section 9. The main sub-sec. (1) substantially contains the Constitutional candidate given in Art. 243-R(1). The provisions in Cls. (a) & (b), in substance, late to the law made by the State in exercise of the discretionary power referred upon it by Art. 243-R(2) r/w Entry 5 of the List II of the 7th Schedule the Constitution. of Section 9. The main sub-sec. (1) substantially contains the Constitutional candidate given in Art. 243-R(1). The provisions in Cls. (a) & (b), in substance, late to the law made by the State in exercise of the discretionary power referred upon it by Art. 243-R(2) r/w Entry 5 of the List II of the 7th Schedule the Constitution. In the exercise of such powers the State Legislature has in discretion, made provision for representation in a Municipality, of persons m two out of the four categories of persons, as were classified in Art. 243-R(2). sub-cl. (i) of Cl. (a) representation has been provided to persons having special Knowledge and experience in Municipality administration. This sub-clause is informity with the provisions contained in Art. 243-R(2)(a)(i). 67. Sub-clause (ii) of Cl. (a) and Cl. (b) of Section 9(1) contain the subject-mat- of Art. 243-R(2)(a)(ii). In other words the State Legislature thought it propitiate to make law on the guidelines or outlines provided in Art. 243 )(9)(ii) in two different Sub-clauses of Cl. (a) of Section 9(1) in view of the presentations to be given on the Boards, Councils and Corporations of the. principalities in the State of Rajasthan. The law so made by the State Legislate- is in conformity with the said constitutional provisions. 68. It may further be noted that in making its law on the subject in that earner the State Legislature has followed the prohibitory mandate contained e Proviso below Art. 243-R(2) by providing a similar Proviso (couched in same language) u/Cl. (a) of Section 9(1) and restricting the application and station thereof to the class of persons specified in Section 9(1)(a)(i) only, as done t. 243-R(2)(a)(i). The mandate contained in the Proviso is not made cable to other categories of persons specified in Section 9(1)(a)(ii) (the MLAs) r Section 9(1)(b) (the MPs), as was the position in Art. 243-R(2)(a) also. The o made by the State Legislature thus suffers from no vice either of excess station or of legislation in contravention of its law-making power u/Art. (2). 69. The question, that now remains for consideration is, whether in being Section 9(1), in the manner stated above, the State Legislature omitted to act which it was obliged to do or failed to do what it ought to have done giving representation in Municipalities to the Class of persons specified Sec. (a)(ii) & (b) of Section 9(1). 69. The question, that now remains for consideration is, whether in being Section 9(1), in the manner stated above, the State Legislature omitted to act which it was obliged to do or failed to do what it ought to have done giving representation in Municipalities to the Class of persons specified Sec. (a)(ii) & (b) of Section 9(1). In other words, should the State have, while g law in exercise of its discretionary power u/Art. 243-R(2), imposed the same prohibition. on the right of voting of the persons of other categories also namely the persons specified in Section 9(1)(a)(ii) and 9(1)(b), as it had done in the cases of persons specified in Section 9(1)(a)(i) of the Act of 1959? Was the State obliged to do so? Or, is it a case of inadvertent omission? If so, can the mandate contained in the Proviso under section 9(1)(a) be legitimately extended, by implication, t the persons categorised in Cl. (a)(ii) and Cl. (b) of Section 9(1)? Is it really a case for application of the principle of "Cacus Omissus"? Should this Court read a lacuna omission or ambiguity in the language of Section 9(1) and try to fill up the suppose gap? Let us examine. 70. However, before we make an effort to answer the above questions it we think, pertinent to point out that prior to coming into force of the Municipalities Second Amendment Act, 1994, election to the office of Chairman, Vide Chairman, President or Vice President used to be governed by the Rajasthan Municipalities (Election of Chairman, Vice Chairman, President and V President) Rules, 1959, read with the Rajasthan Municipalities Election Order 1960, which gave a right to voting to all the members, whether elected co-opted or nominated in the Municipality, in the election of the Chairman, Vide Chairman, President or Vice President of a Board/Council/Corporation. A opted member was to be treated for all purposes of the Act of 1959 as an election member and as such had a right to vote in the meetings of the Board/Court Nirmala Devi v. Election Tribunal, 1965 RLW 1551 , The right to vote avail to the co-opted members has now been taken away. 71. A opted member was to be treated for all purposes of the Act of 1959 as an election member and as such had a right to vote in the meetings of the Board/Court Nirmala Devi v. Election Tribunal, 1965 RLW 1551 , The right to vote avail to the co-opted members has now been taken away. 71. The Rules of 1959 and the Order of 1960, aforementioned, however, repealed by R. 98 of the Rajasthan Municipalities (Election) Rule 1994 which came into force w.e.f 16.8.1994 and the election to the Chair President and Vice Chairperson came to be governed by the provisions contained Chapter IV of the afore-mentioned new Rules of 1994. Rule 78 of these R defines the term "member" in the following words : "Rule 78: Definition of Member.-For the purpose of this Chapter, the term `member' shall mean elected member of the Municipality." 72. In view of the above definition of the term `member' only elemembers can now take part in the election of the Chairperson or Vice Chairperson of the Municipality. But in so far as other matters like conduct business of the Municipality including the calling of ordinary or special me of the Board and the right of the members to make request for the calling o meetings and their further rights to get notice of and, to put questions in meetings and their right to make motion of no confidence in the Chairperson Vice Chairperson, were concerned the relevant rules, governing such in were not amended, repealed or substituted by other rules. Thus the Raj Municipalities (Conduct of Business) Rules, 1974, which gave a right to member of the Board to get a notice of an ordinary meeting (R. 4), or t member of the one third of the whole number of members of the Board purpose of calling a special meeting (R. 6) or to be a member of the quoa one third of the whole number of members of the Board for the purpose transacting business (R. 9) or to be a member of two third of the whole of the members of the Board to participate in the proceedings relation modification or cancellation of decisions already taken (R. 13) or to obtain information and have access to the record of the Municipality were not adversely effected by the Municipalities Second Amendment, 1994. Similarly, a member's right under the Rajasthan Municipalities (Interpellation of Chairman/Present) Rules, 1959 to ask a question, connected with Municipal Administration . 3) or to put a supplementary question (R. 8) in the meeting of the Board remained un-affected by the aforesaid Second Amendment Rules, 1994, more particularly the No Confidence Motion Rules which gave a right to every ember to receive a notice of the meeting, convened for the purpose of consing a no confidence motion against Chairperson or Vice Chairperson of the order/Council/Corporation [Rule 3(2)] : to be a member of the whole number of embers required to make quorum of the meeting [R. 3(5)] and also to be a member of the whole number of members for carrying out such no confidence motion [R. 3(8) and (9)] were left as they were in operation prior to the coming to force of the Second Amendment Act, 1994, despite the fact that Section 72 of the Act of 1959, under which those Rules were framed, was amended by the said amendment Act of 1994. 73. It may be noted that since all those rules were not inconsistent, or even some of them were in consistent, with any provision contained in Part IX A of Constitution, their continuance and remaining in force was protected by the press provisions contained in Art. 243-ZF for the period prescribed therein. e Rajasthan Municipalities (Appointment of Members/Councillors by Co-op ) Order, 1960 had already outlived its utility and any law made or to be made a State, relating to appointment of a member/councillor in a Municipality by option i.e. representation by persons with special knowledge or experience municipality by co-option, has to conform with the guidelines furnished by . 243(2)(a)(i) of the Constitution. Therefore, Art. 243(2)(a)(i), or for that (Sic) Section 9(1)(a)(i), shall have to be read alongwith the Proviso thereunder. 74. A `Proviso', as is well settled in law, is something engrafted on Proceeding enactment and follows the enacting part of a section. It can only ate to deal with a case which but for it would have fallen within the ambit e Section to which it is proviso. It does not enlarge the Section, instead it (Sic) or takes out or cuts down something from the ambit of the main Provision. It can only ate to deal with a case which but for it would have fallen within the ambit e Section to which it is proviso. It does not enlarge the Section, instead it (Sic) or takes out or cuts down something from the ambit of the main Provision. Its appropriate function is to restrain or modify the enacting clause, receding matter and it should be confined to what precedes unless the section that it shall apply to some other matter is apparent. If the language e main enactment is clear and unambiguous, it can have no repercussion e interpretation of the main enactment, so as to exclude from it by (Sic) what clearly falls within its express terms. Therefore, the duty of court must be to give to the proviso, as far as possible, a meaning so evicted as to bring it within the ambit and purview of the section itself. If, ever, it is capable of a wider connotation as well as of narrower connotation, the narrower connotation brings it within the purview of the Section, then Court must prefer the narrower connotation rather than the wider cannon of the two possible interpretations. 75. Bindra in his `Interpretation of Statutes' (Eight Edition) at page 78 s Holroyd J. in R. v. Newark Inhabitants, 3 B & C at page 71 , observing order : "the question whether a proviso in the whole or in part relates to and qualities, restrains or operates upon the immediately preceding pro- vision only of the statute or whether it must be taken to extend in the whole or in part to all the preceding matters contained in the Statute, must depend, I think, upon its words and impart, and not upon the division into sections that may be made for convenience of reference in the printed copies of the statute." [Emphasis supplied] 76. In our view Holroyd J. has correctly laid down the law on the subject and we find ourselves in respectful agreement with the learned Judge. 77. In Kedarnath Jute Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. C.T. Officer, AIR 1969 SC 12 , Subha Rao, J. observed : "The effect of an excepting or qualifying proviso, according to the ordinary rule of construction is to except out of the preceding portion of the enactment, or to qualify something enacted therein, which, but for the proviso, would be within it." 78. Ltd. v. C.T. Officer, AIR 1969 SC 12 , Subha Rao, J. observed : "The effect of an excepting or qualifying proviso, according to the ordinary rule of construction is to except out of the preceding portion of the enactment, or to qualify something enacted therein, which, but for the proviso, would be within it." 78. Similar views were expressed by the Apex Court in the cases of Dwar, Pd. v. Dwarda Dass Suraj, (1976) 1 SCC 128 , S. Sunda Ram vs. V. Pattabhiraman, AIR 1985 SC 582 , A.N. Sehgal v. . Raja Ram Sheo Ram, A 1991 SC 1406 , Rajender Pd. Yadav & Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1996) SCC 678 , relied upon by the parties before us. 79. In Hindustan Ideal Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporate of India, AIR 1963 SC 1083 , their Lordships of the Apex Court observed t where the main provision is clear, its effect cannot be cut down by the prove But their Lordships further added, where it is not clear, the proviso while cannot be presumed to be a superlusage, can properly be looked into to ascert the meaning and scope of the main provision. 80. In the case of Durga Dutt Sharma v. N.P. Laboratories, AIR 1965 980 , Ayyanger, J. of the Apex Court observed that it would not be reason, construction of any statute to say that a proviso which in terms purport create an exception and seeks to confer certain special rights on a partic class of cases included in it should be held otiose and to have achieved not merely because of the word "distinctiveness" used in it which has been used where also. 81. To sum up, a proviso is required to be strictly construed and it i be restricted to the scope reasonably conveyed by the words used therein. not open to the Court to add words to a proviso with a view to enlarge its s Its application must be considered in relation to the principal matter to it stands as a proviso. A proviso cannot, by construction, be permitted to d the basic intent expressed by the Legislature in the substantive provisio. 82. Now coming to the merits of the controversy in these appeals were that in enacting the proviso u/Cl. A proviso cannot, by construction, be permitted to d the basic intent expressed by the Legislature in the substantive provisio. 82. Now coming to the merits of the controversy in these appeals were that in enacting the proviso u/Cl. (a) of Section 9(1) of the Act of 1959 the Legislature has, in simple, clear and unambiguous words, mandated the persons referred to in sub- cls. (i), namely the specified number of person special knowledge or experience in Municipal Administration, shall not the right to vote in the meetings of the Municipality. We have already p out that this mandate of the Legislature is in para material and fully con with the constitutional mandate contained in paragraph (i) of Art. 243-R(2)(a) the Constitution. In Cl. (a) of Art. 243-R(2) there were four categories of persons who qualified for representation in a Municipality under a law to be ade by a State for the purpose. It was left to the discretion of the State to give chapter representation to the persons of one or more categories or to none. However, the State, by law, provides to give representation to persons of more than one theories and such representation includes persons falling in paragraph (i), en such representation can be given subject to the mandate contained in the proviso. No doubt the State may, by law made by it, apply the restriction laid win in the Proviso, to the persons falling in other paragraph or categories also. t the State is not obliged to provide so in respect to the persons falling under her categories. Where an authority, much less a State Legislature, is vested with a discretion in the matter of exercising its power to do a lawful act in more an one ways and such authority, in the exercise of such discretionary power, is to act in one or the other of the legally permissible way, it cannot be blamed r not having acted in a particular way or to have acted similarly in all other gaily permissible ways. Nor can its such act be assailed on the ground of permission to do what it could have legally done but omitted to do. 83. In enacting Section 9(1)(a), in the manner it did the State Legislature had od reasons, for not applying the Proviso u/Cl. (a) to the persons mentioned in sub-cl. (ii) i.e. the MLAs, and Cl. Nor can its such act be assailed on the ground of permission to do what it could have legally done but omitted to do. 83. In enacting Section 9(1)(a), in the manner it did the State Legislature had od reasons, for not applying the Proviso u/Cl. (a) to the persons mentioned in sub-cl. (ii) i.e. the MLAs, and Cl. (b) i.e. the MPs. The enacting provisions related the composition and functioning of self Government institutions in the mesocratic set up in the country. Representation in such institutions by persons (Sic) through democratic process is the main and essential requirement for (Sic) composition. Co-option no doubt involves some sort of the process of Section but such process of election does not bring in peoples' representatives r representation in a Municipality Persons' coming for representation in a municipality by co- option, as mentioned in sub-cl. (i) of Cl. (a) of Section 9(1), this eked the very characteristics of being peoples representatives. Initially the -opted members also had a right to vote in the meetings of the Boards/Council, t that that position was subsequently changed (See Moti Lal Kothari v. collector, 1962 RLW 100) , Under such circumstances the Legislature could have asonably intended not to confer the right of voting upon the persons specified sub-cl. (i) of Cl. (a). The qualification required of those persons was their special knowledge of and experience in municipal administration. As against it e qualification required for making representation from the categories under b-cl. (ii) of Cl. (a) i.e. the MLAs and Cl. (b) of sub-sec. (1) of Section 9 i.e. the MPs, es in their representing a constituency which comprises, wholly or partly, the (Sic) of the municipality in question. They are thus the representatives of the (Sic) of the area or part of the area of the Municipality though in another if Government institution at higher pedestal. They would be eligible for presentation in a Municipality only if and when they have become members such other democratic institutions namely Legislative Assembly of the State d/or house of People. They are thus the representatives of the (Sic) of the area or part of the area of the Municipality though in another if Government institution at higher pedestal. They would be eligible for presentation in a Municipality only if and when they have become members such other democratic institutions namely Legislative Assembly of the State d/or house of People. In order to become members of such other institutions afore- mentioned they have to be not only duly elected representatives of the (Sic) of the area or part of area of the Municipality as per provisions of e Peoples Representatives Act but also have to take oath of their office in Form-A under Entry VII (MLAs) and Form-B under Entry III of the Third Schedule of the Constitution. There would, therefore, be no necessity of the taking oath afresh under the provisions of the Act of 1959 as they become members in a Municipality not on the basis of their direct election from a se or ward in the Municipality, but on the basis of their having already become t members of the State Legislative Assembly or, as the case may be, of the Hou of People. 84. It may further be noted that whereas the number of persons to who representation in Municipality may be given under sub-cl. (i) of Cl. (a) of S 9(1) has been clearly specified, the number of persons to be brought in for suction representation under sub-cl. (ii) of Cl. (a) and/or u/Cl. (b) of Section 9(1) has n been so specified. The reason for this is obvious. The Constituency represent by such persons may comprise of the whole area of a Municipality or of only part thereof. That all would dependent upon the number of electorates falling in the area of a Municipality. A Municipality, in the case of a corporation, m comprise of one or more constituencies of a Legislative Assembly or of the Hou of People. In other case the area of a Municipality may simply be a part of sub constituencies. Therefore, the number of persons representing in a Municipal as per sub-cl. (ii) of Cl. (a) or as per Cl. (b) of Section 9(1) would differ from case case. There were, thus, sufficient grounds for making classification between t classes of persons namely under sub-cl. (i) of Cl. (a) on the one hand and tho under sub-cl. (ii) of Cl. Therefore, the number of persons representing in a Municipal as per sub-cl. (ii) of Cl. (a) or as per Cl. (b) of Section 9(1) would differ from case case. There were, thus, sufficient grounds for making classification between t classes of persons namely under sub-cl. (i) of Cl. (a) on the one hand and tho under sub-cl. (ii) of Cl. (a) and of Cl. (b) of Section 9(1) on the other, in the matt of making representation in a Municipality and conferring different types powers upon them. Such a classification between two categories of persons w quite reasonable and justified also in the wake of the object and purpose of t Act of 1959. 85. Having examined the scope and extent of the applicability oft . Proviso under section 9(1)(a) of the Act of 1959. We are of the considered view that it denied the right of voting in the meetings of the Municipality, to be more specified, a meeting convened for consideration of a No Confidence Motion against Chairperson and/or Vice Chairperson, only to the persons mentioned in sub-cl. (i) Cl. (a) of Section 9, namely the co- opted members and not to the persons mention in sub-cl. (ii) of Cl. (a) (the MLAs) and in Cl. (b) (the MPs) of Section 9(1). Since sue an intention has clearly been expressed by the Legislature by using simply ordinary and common sense words in the language of the proviso, there absolutely no room for applying the maxim "Casus Ominous" in these matter We fail to notice any defect, doubt or ambiguity in the language employed i Section 9(1) as a whole. Nor do we notice any omission, lacuna or gap therein whit maybe required to be filled in by the law of logic or skill of construction so as t give effect to any assumed intention of the Legislature. Nor do we find any (Sic) for applying the maxim "Expressio unis est exclusio aterius" so as to read in th exclusion of the co-opted members from meetings of the Municipality, mandated in the Proviso, the exclusion of MLAs and MPs also. Nor do we find any (Sic) for applying the maxim "Expressio unis est exclusio aterius" so as to read in th exclusion of the co-opted members from meetings of the Municipality, mandated in the Proviso, the exclusion of MLAs and MPs also. Instead, we g by the well settled rules of construction of a Statute that a Legislature does not commit mistakes; it does not waste its words; it knows the rules of gramma and the State Legislature is to be presumed to have informed itself as to the State of the law, judicial decisions etc. etc. on the subject of self governance the lowest level. In the initial stage, when it undertook to legislate on the subject. In its discretion vested in it by Art. 243-R(2), the State Legislatur thought it proper to restrict the application of the Proviso to Cl. a(i) of Sec. only and to no other Clauses of that sub-section of Section 9 of Act of 1959. In fact, we have no basis at all the proceed on the assumption that the State Legislature intended to do what it could not do due to some over sight, omission, or mistake of fact or law and that it ought to have done that we may think it should have, but it did not do. On the other hand we have, in the context of the back-ground, purpose and object of the enactment of Section 9(1)(a) "the State Legislature, found sufficient basis to proceed on the assumption that the State Legislature, being an ideal person, enacted what it meant and it meant what it enacted. [Government of Rajasthan v. Sangram Singh, AIR 1963 Raj. 43 (F.B.)] . 86. To conclude, we hold that notwithstanding the legal position that an MLA and an MP are not the "elected members" in a municipality for the purposes of the Rajasthan Municipalities (Election) Rules, 1994, but for the purpose of the "No Confidence Motion Rules" they had within the purview of the term `every member' used in R. 3(2), and the expression "whole number of embers", as is defined in Section 3(36) of the Act of 1956 and has been used in Rr. 5), (8) & (9) of the said Rules. The provisions of Section 72 of the Act of 1959 and hose contained in Rr. 5), (8) & (9) of the said Rules. The provisions of Section 72 of the Act of 1959 and hose contained in Rr. 3(2), (5), (8) & (9) of the No Confidence Motion Rules, ade thereunder, being mandatory in character the MLPAs in the case of Boards and the MLAs and the MPs, in the case of Councils had a right to vote n the meeting of these Municipalities convened for the purpose of consideration f a No Confidence Motion against the Chairperson/Vice Chairpersons of the municipalises. Since such a right to vote such meetings was denied to them in he instant cases by not issuing to them the mandatory notice u/B. 3(2) of the o Confidence Motion Rules, for the meetings convened by Collectors, Alwar, ausa and Jaipur, the No Confidence Motions carried out against them at the elevant meetings of the Boards/Council, they were Chairperson/Vice- Chair person of on the relevant dates, were bad in law, non-est and in-effective qua eir rights to hold the office(s) of the Chairpersons/Vice-Chairperson of such oards/Councils. The appellants shall, therefore, not be considered or deemed have vacated their aforesaid respective offices for the purposes of R. 9 of the o Confidence Motion Rules, under the questioned No Confidence Motions. 87. In the result : (i) the impugned judgment and order dated 15.5.1998 are hereby set aside. (ii) the No Confidence Motion passed against Yogesh Chand Saini, appellant in D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 794/98, by Municipal Council, Alwar, in its meeting dated 12.4.1997 and all subsequent proceedings taken in pursuance of the afore-mentioned No Confidence Motion are quashed; (iii) the No Confidence Motion passed against Prakash Chand Saini, appellant. In D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 799/98 and Smt. Laxmi Devi appellant in D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 801/98 by the Municipal Board Kotputli (Distt. In D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 799/98 and Smt. Laxmi Devi appellant in D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 801/98 by the Municipal Board Kotputli (Distt. Jaipur) in its meeting dated 23.9.1997 and 24.9.1997 respectively requiring them to vacate their offices of Chairperson and Vice Chairperson respectively and all proceedings taken subsequently in pursuance of afore- mentioned No Confidence Motions are quashed; (iv) the No Confidence Motion carried out on 5.11.1998 and finally passed on 18.11.1998 by the Municipal Board, Bandi Kui (Dausa) against Radhey Shyam (D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 800/98) and all subsequent proceedings carried on in pursuance of the above-mentioned No Confidence Motions including election of Pooran Chand Sharma (Respondent No. 7) as Chairperson of Municipal board, Bandi Kui, which is already subject to the decision of the appeal, are hereby quashed; (v) Yogesh Chand Saini, Prakash Chand Saini and Radhey Shyam Benuparia shall not be considered or deemed to have vacated their offices as Chairperson of Municipal Council, Alwar and Municipal Boards Kotputli (Jaipur) and Bandi Kui (Dausa) respectively under the No Confidence Motions, as referred to above, passed against them; (vi) Smt. Laxmi Devi shall not be considered or deemed to have vacated her office as Vice-Chairperson of Municipal Board Kotputli (Jaipur) under the No Confidence Motion dated 24.9.1997, as passed against her by that Board. (vii) the Respondents shall stand prohibited from giving effect to the No Confidence Motions, as referred to above, against Yogesh Chand Saini, Prakash Chand Saini, Radhey Shyam Benuparia and Smt. Laxmi Devi, appellant; (viii) Collector, Dausa, shall cease to make directions and decisions in respect to emergent business of Municipal Board, Bandikui, as was directed under Order dated 25.9.1997 by this Court in D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 800/98. (ix) the Writ Petitions as well as the appeals preferred by the appellants in all the four appeals shall stand allowed; (x) Costs in all the appeals shall be on parties throughout. Writ Petitions and appeal allowed. *******