JUDGMENT 1. - The instant writ petition has been filed by the petitioners for quashing the enquiry report of the disciplinary proceedings contained in Annexurc-2 to the petition, the order dated 30-11-95 (Annexure-3) passed by the Competent Authority removing the petitioners from service and order dated 14-10-96 passed by the Appellate Authority dismissing their appeal. 2. The facts and circumstances giving rise to this case are that while petitioners were working as Constables, a Criminal Case No. 11/1992 was registered against them on 29-2-1992 and they were put on trial. However, at the same time, disciplinary proceedings were initiated against them by issuing a charge-sheet on 16-5-1992 under Rule 16 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as "the Rules" and they were asked to file their reply within a period of fifteen days. Instead of filing reply to the charge-sheet, petitioner No. 1 filed S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 4503/1992 before this Court on 17-8-1992. That writ petition was heard first time on 28-8-1992 and notices were issued. However, there was no interim order restraining the respondents to proceed with the departmental enquiry. The said writ petition was disposed of finally by the judgment and order dated 19-11-1992, by which the respondents were directed not to proceed with the enquiry till the criminal trial in respect of FIR No. 11/1992 is concluded. As the petitioners neither filed any reply to the charge-sheet nor co-operated with enquiry nor there was any interim order of the Court restraining the respondents to proceed with enquiry, the Enquiry Officer passed the order to proceed ex parte and the enquiry report (Annexure-2) was submitted on 18-12-1992, by which the charges of "Maarpeet" etc. were found proved against them. There are no pleadings by the petitioners that they had ever submitted the copy of the judgment and order of this Court dated 19-11-92 before the Competent Authority or Enquiry Officer before submission of the enquiry report on 18- 12-1992. The Disciplinary Authority did not act on the enquiry report dated 18-12-1992 as it had received the copy of the judgment of this Court dated 19-11-92 and as the criminal trial stood concluded vide judgment and order dated 12- 12-94 (Annexure-5) in which the petitioners had been acquitted. The Disciplinary Authority did not act on the enquiry report dated 18-12-1992 as it had received the copy of the judgment of this Court dated 19-11-92 and as the criminal trial stood concluded vide judgment and order dated 12- 12-94 (Annexure-5) in which the petitioners had been acquitted. Petitioners were served with a copy of the enquiry report and were given a fair opportunity to file objections against the said enquiry report on 11-10-1995 and they filed their objections on 13-10-95 and 25-10-95 respectively. The Competent Authority applied its mind and passed a detailed order dated 30-11-95 (Annexure-3) agreeing with the Enquiry Officer and imposed the punishment of removal from service. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied from the order dated 30-11-95, petitioners preferred an appeal before the Deputy Inspector General of Police (respondent No. 2), which has been dismissed by a speaking and reasoned order dated 14-10-96 (Annexure-4), against which the petitioners, instead of filing a review application before the higher authority under Rule 34 of the Rules, preferred S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 2688/1997 before this Court, which was dismissed as withdrawn with liberty to file fresh writ petition vide order dated 27-4-98 and the instant writ petition has been filed on 6-10-98. 3. Heard Mr. R. K. Soni, learned counsel for the petitioners and Mr. Ashok Chhangani, learned counsel for the respondents. 4. The main grievance of the petitioners is that once this Court, vide judgment and order dated 19-11-1992, had restrained the respondents to proceed further with the departmental enquiry, the Authority should not have proceeded at all. As soon as respondent No. 3 the Disciplinary Authority received the order of this Court, it did not act upon the enquiry report dated 18-12-92 and waited till the result of criminal trial was available to him and as the criminal trial stood concluded and petitioners had been acquitted by the judgment and order dated 12-12-94, the Disciplinary Authority acted upon the enquiry report hence there is no substance in the submission made by the petitioners that the Authority had acted in contravention of the order passed by this Court earlier. 5. It has most vociferously been submitted that the order dated 30-11-1996 removing the petitioners from service, stood vitiated as the enquiry report was not made available to them and they were not given the opportunity to submit their objections and it has seriously prejudiced their cause. 5. It has most vociferously been submitted that the order dated 30-11-1996 removing the petitioners from service, stood vitiated as the enquiry report was not made available to them and they were not given the opportunity to submit their objections and it has seriously prejudiced their cause. There is a complete fallacy in the submission as the impugned order dated 30-11-95 itself makes it clear that the petitioners had been furnished with a copy of the enquiry report and given opportunity to file objections and both the petitioners had filed their objections in response of the said notice on 14-10-95 and 25-10-95, the argument is preposterous and thus, not tenable. 6. Sri Soni has submitted that once the petitioners have been acquitted in the criminal case, there was no occasion for the respondents to proceed with the enquiry and pass the order of punishment. In support of his submission, reliance has been placed by Mr. Soni on the judgment of the Supreme Court in R.P. Kapoor v. Union of India, AIR 1964 SC 787 , wherein it has been held that the usual practice is that where a public servant is being tried on a criminal charge, the Government await the result of criminal trial and the departmental proceedings follow on the result of criminal trial. The issue involved in that case was whether it would be appropriate to continue with the departmental enquiry during the criminal trial for the reason that if the delinquent employee is forced to disclose his defence in the departmental enquiry, it may prejudice his cause in the criminal trial and may be violative of Art. 21 of the Constitution of India as the accused is not supposed to disclose his defence prior to closure of the prosecution case and until the time of recording his statement under S. 313, Cr. P.C. It certainly does not lay down that if a person has been acquitted by the criminal Court, he cannot be punished in the departmental enquiry. P.C. It certainly does not lay down that if a person has been acquitted by the criminal Court, he cannot be punished in the departmental enquiry. Even the issue of holding departmental enquiry during pendency of the criminal trial, has been considered by this Court in D.R. Calla v. State of Rajasthan, (1998) 1 Raj LW 19 , and after placing reliance on a large number of judgments, particularly, Kusheshwar Dubey v. M/s. Bharat Cooking Coal Ltd., AIR 1988 SC 2118 , R. P. Kapoor (supra); Delhi Cloth General Mills v. Kusha Bhan, AIR 1960 SC 806 ; Uttar Pradesh Rajya Krishi Utpadan Mandi Parishad v. Sanjeev Rajan, (1993) 2 JT (SC) 550 ; State of Orissa v. B.K. Mohanty (1994) 2 JT (SC) 51 : ( AIR 1994 SC 2296 ) ; State of Rajasthan v. B. K. Meena, (1996) 6 SCC 417 ; and Secretary to Government, Prohibition and Excise Department v. L. Srinivasan, (1996) 3 SCC 157 it has been held therein that the departmental enquiry can also simultaneously proceed with the criminal trial. 7. It is settled proposition of law that even if an employee has been acquitted by the criminal Court, the Disciplinary Authority can initiate departmental enquiry after acquittal and if it comes to the conclusion that the delinquent employee is guilty of the charges, there is no embargo in law to impose punishment for the reason that the standard of proof in a criminal case is of very strict nature as the prosecution therein has to prove the case beyond reasonable manner of doubt while in a departmental proceedings, being domestic enquiry, the standard of proof is not of the same magnitude and the punishment may be imposed on preponderance of probabilities. 8. In Nelson Motis v. Union of India, (1992) 4 SCC 711 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under:- "So far as the first point is concerned, namely, whether the disciplinary proceedings should have been continued in the face of acquittal of the appellant in criminal case, the plea has no substance whatsoever and does not merit a detailed consideration. The nature and scope of a criminal case are very different from those of disciplinary proceedings and an order of acquittal, therefore, cannot conclude the departmental proceedings." 9. The nature and scope of a criminal case are very different from those of disciplinary proceedings and an order of acquittal, therefore, cannot conclude the departmental proceedings." 9. Similar view has been taken by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Karnataka v. T. Venketa Ramannappa, (1996) 6 SCC 455 , wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court set aside the judgment and order of the Tribunal and observed as under:- "It was, thus, beyond the ken of the Tribunal to scuttle the departmental proceedings against the respondent on the footing that such question of bigamy should not normally be taken-up for decision in departmental enquiry as the decision of the competent Court tending to be a decision in rem would stand at the highest pedestal. There was a clear fallacy in such a view because for the purpose of Rule 28, such strict standard, as would warrant a conviction for bigamy under S. 494, IPC, may not, to begin with be necessary." 10. In Senior Superintendent of Post Office, Pathanamthitta v. A. Gopalan, (1997) 11 SCC 239 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court approved and followed the law laid down in Nelson Motis (1992 Lab IC 2037) (SC) (supra) and reiterated that the nature and scope of criminal case are very different from those of the disciplinary proceedings and an order of acquittal, therefore, cannot conclude the departmental proceedings. This is so because in a criminal case the charge is to be proved by standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt while in departmental proceedings, for proving the charge the standard of proof is preponderance of probabilities and, thus, the Hon'ble Supreme Court set aside the judgment and order of the Tribunal holding it to be erroneous as the Tribunal had quashed the order of punishment imposed in the disciplinary proceedings only on the ground that the delinquent employee therein stood acquitted in the criminal Court of the charges, on the basis of which the punishment had been imposed in the departmental proceedings. 11. In view of the above, there is no.substance in the petition and being devoid of any merit, it is accordingly dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.Petition dismissed. *******