JUDGMENT R.P. Gupta, J. This Second Appeal is directed against the judgment dated 31st March, 1989 of IVth Additional District Judge, Bilaspur, in Civil Appeal No. 10-A/88, whereby the learned Additional District Judge confirmed the order dated 3rd September, 1986 passed by Civil Judge, Class-I, Sakti, in Civil Suit No. 77-A/1986; by that order the learned Civil Judge had rejected the plaint of the plaintiffs and also an application for amendment of the plaint under Order 6, Rule 16, CPC and an application for temporary injunction was also consequently rejected. The plaint was rejected under the provisions of Order 7, Rule 11, Part (d), CPC on the ground that the suit was barred by provisions of sections 32 and 33 of the Arbitration Act as there was already an arbitration award passed in the year 1961 between the parties regarding partition of the suit land and although the award was not registered on proper stamp paper nor acted upon for 25 years, the only remedy of challenging the legality or existence of that award was by objections under sections 30 and 33 Arbitration Act, 1940, and a suit for declaration of the title to land or declaration of right to get it partitioned, amounted to challenging that award in a civil suit in a circuitous way which cannot be permitted because of bar created by sections 32 and 33 Arbitration Act. The plaintiffs predecessor Bhopal Singh and defendant Dhebar Singh are real brothers and Chakradhar is the son of defendant Dhebar Singh. They had joint agriculture land in two villages; Latesara (63.28 acres) as described in schedule-A and village Regda. These were jointly owned and possessed lands of Bhopal Singh and Dhebar Singh. The Plaintiffs had pleaded that under some family arrangement, Dhebar Singh had given some land to Bhopal Singh out of joint lands, for cultivation. However, later Dhebar Singh sold land of village Regda and from the proceeds of those lands he purchased additional land in village Latesara which are mentioned in Schedule-B to the plaint. He, however, purchased them in the name of his son Chakradhar, defendant No. 2. The defendant No. 1 initiated proceedings for partition of these lands in the Court of Naib Tahsildar, Dabhra, urging that the land in Schedule-A had been partitioned as far back as 1954. He, however, purchased them in the name of his son Chakradhar, defendant No. 2. The defendant No. 1 initiated proceedings for partition of these lands in the Court of Naib Tahsildar, Dabhra, urging that the land in Schedule-A had been partitioned as far back as 1954. In that petition, the plaintiffs objected to these assertions and urged that the lands of Schedule-A were not partitioned, in fact, those lands, always remained in possession of Bhopal Singh. On this, the Naib Tahsildar directed both the parties to get their ownership rights declared from Civil Court. It was also urged in the plaint that there was movable property consisting of cash money, gold and silver obtained by the defendant Dhebar Singh from his father Atmaram, in which the deceased Bhopal Singh was entitled to get half share and the plaintiffs are entitled to get half of that movable property also after the same is declared by defendant No. 1. Hence, the prayer for declaration that the parties were joint owners in possession of the suit land described in Schedule-A and B attached to the plaint. The defendants filed a preliminary objection to the suit on 29-7-1986, urging that there was a PANCH FAISLA between Bhopal Singh and Dhebar Singh regarding partition of lands. It was in writing and so this suit could not be instituted nor could be proceeded with and that the plaintiffs know about that PANCH FAISLA. It was also urged that the order dated 22-6-1986 passed by the Naib Tahsildar, directing parties to civil suit remedy, had been challenged by the defendants in revision before the Collector which is pending. It is urged that a petition before the Naib Tahsildar was also filed for mutation of names on the basis of old partition resultant from the PANCH FAISLA. In these circumstances, the Naib Tahsildar could not direct that ownership rights be got declared through Civil Court. It was also pleaded that the daughters of Bhopal Singh namely Chandrika Bai, Netkunwar, Gyanmati and Ambika Bai also succeeded to his share of land and were necessary parties to the suit. It was also urged that there was no cause of action about the lands mentioned in the Schedule-B. The defendants filed a photocopy of alleged PANCH FAISLA between Dhebar Singh and Bhopal Singh purported to be signed by 17 persons as PANCHAS. It was also urged that there was no cause of action about the lands mentioned in the Schedule-B. The defendants filed a photocopy of alleged PANCH FAISLA between Dhebar Singh and Bhopal Singh purported to be signed by 17 persons as PANCHAS. It purports to be dated 8-3-1961, purported to be recorded by Pandit Liladhar Singh. The Trial Court, by order dated 3-9-1986, while deciding the application under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2, CPC moved by the plaintiff to obtain stay of proceedings pending before the Naib Tahsildar regarding these lands, rejected that application on prima facie ground on the basis of affidavits of the parties and certain documents purporting to be copies of PANCH FAISLA about these lands between the two brothers, also directed that the suit could not lie before a Civil Court and was liable to be dismissed. It was found that the suit was barred by provision of sections 32 and 33 Arbitration Act and so cognizance could not be taken by Civil Court. The Appellate Court confirmed that the plaint was liable to be rejected under Order 7, Rule 11, Clauses (a) and (d), Civil Procedure Code. It was held that there was a PANCH FAISLA between the parties which amounted to an award by Arbitrators and if the plaintiffs wanted to avoid it, their only remedy was to move the Court u/s 33 Arbitration Act and the present suit amounted to, in effect, avoiding the Arbitration award between the parties. The plaintiffs appellants have urged that the findings of the Courts-below were totally against law. The paintiffs had never admitted that there was any award about partition of the suit land between the parties. Mere one sided assertion of the parties in this respect could not non-suit the plaintiffs. It was also asserted that the suit would not be rejected without plea having been raised by a regular written statement by the defendants which was never filed and at worst if the Court felt that there was possibility of award between the parties, and the plaintiffs were challenging that award by the suit, it should have treated the plaint as a petition u/s 14(2) of the Arbitration Act and should have directed the parties to act accordingly. The Second Appeal was admitted on the following substantial question of law: Whether the Court was justified in rejecting the plaint under Order 7, Rule 11(D), CPC and not treating the same as the one u/s 14(2) of the Arbitration Act on his own finding directing the plaintiffs to amend the plaint suitably? The contention of learned counsel for the appellants is that there is no material on record to show that the matter of dispute regarding jointness or partition of the lands was referred to the Arbitrator and the Arbitrator passed an award. Only the defence made such as averment in a preliminary objection to the plaint, no regular written statement was filed and the plaintiff was not called upon to file a replication or rejoinder to the same, nor the plaintiffs, were ever asked to admit or deny any agreement for Arbitration or any arbitration award. The alleged award is said to be in the year 1961 so far as the preliminary objection is concerned. The plea was that the PANCH FAISLA in writing was reached between Bhopal Singh and Dhebar Singh about partition of these lands and that PANCH FAISLA was binding on the plaintiffs. In the plaint the plaintiffs never admitted existence, never referred to any reference of dispute to arbitration or that any number of arbitrators decided the dispute at any time. There is no reference whatsoever to any PANCHES or PANCH FAISLA. This reference and pleadings arose in the preliminary objection raised by defendant without filing a regular written statement. The plaintiffs were never asked to rebut or accept, they were not confronted with any documents nor asked to admit those documents or deny them and the trial Court reaches its decision while deciding application under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2, CPC and dismissed the suit itself. The Appellate Court found it as a rejection of plaint and confirmed it. In the appellate judgment the Appellate Court has nowhere stated that the plaintiffs at any stage admitted reference to PANCHES or that PANCHES gave an Arbitration award. The Arbitration agreement and award was filed by defendant before the Appellate Court. Before the Trial Court only photocopies have been filed. In the appellate judgment the Appellate Court has nowhere stated that the plaintiffs at any stage admitted reference to PANCHES or that PANCHES gave an Arbitration award. The Arbitration agreement and award was filed by defendant before the Appellate Court. Before the Trial Court only photocopies have been filed. The Appellate Court has proceeded on the assumption that as soon as the defendant pleads that there is a PANCH FAISLA between the parties on the basis of some reference, the plaintiffs suit becomes barred by sections 32, 33 of the Arbitration Act. The Appellate Court conceded the preposition that for rejecting a plaint under Order 7, Rule 11, Civil Procedure Code, the pleadings of the plaint alone have to be looked into and also that in the instant suit the plaint contains no pleadings about arbitration agreement or award and the suit is not one to set aside or modify or to challenge the validity of arbitration award. At the same time the Court said that a party cannot be permitted by dexterous pleadings to avoid the bar imposed by sections 32 or 33 of the Arbitration Act. The Court observed that the pleadings must be examined to see if the suit is one to enforce the award or to challenge the existence of award. So the Court said that the plaintiffs must have pleaded the arbitration award, as the material placed by the defendant on record in the shape of arbitration agreement and award as well as affidavits of the arbitrator show prima facie existence of the arbitration agreement and award. It was on this reasoning that the Appellate Court held that the suit was barred by sections 32 and 33 Arbitration Act. A perusal of the Appellate Court's judgment shows that the parties commented on the documents produced by defence as arbitration agreement and award, looking at face of those documents and plaintiffs' counsel has also argued on that basis that the award was unregistered and should have no effect of partition and even otherwise partition of agriculture lands could not be made by an arbitration and had to be made by revenue authority. The Appellate Court said that these objections could be raised under sections 32 and 33 Arbitration Act. The Appellate Court said that these objections could be raised under sections 32 and 33 Arbitration Act. Thus, in fact, the Courts have found that the suit was barred by sections 32 and 33 of the Arbitration Act because the defendant pleaded so and not because averments in the plaint barred it by those provisions. This was an impermissible procedure; firstly the Court should have insisted on complete written statement by the defendant. The Court had to be satisfied about what lands the arbitration agreement or award were being pleaded. The plaintiffs plea was certain joint lands were sold by defendant unauthorizedly and from the proceeds from the same, certain other lands were purchased which were to be deemed as joint between the parties. There is nothing to suggest in the preliminary objection of the defendant that even that land was subject matter of arbitration award between the parties. About the land so purchased or allegedly purchased in the name of defendant No. 2 Chakradhar who is son of Dhebar Singh, it was never the case of the defendant that Chakradhar was party to the arbitration agreement. It is a case where the plaintiffs were approaching the Court with simple averment that the lands were joint of the parties with half share each, and should be so declared and the plaintiffs were entitled to have their shares separated. In the preliminary objection to the suit, the defendants simply said that there was a PANCH FAISLA and never set up that any particular land had fallen to the share of defendants or Dhebar Singh in the PANCH FAISLA, and particular land in favour of the plaintiffs predecessor Bhopal Singh. The contention of the PANCH FAISLA was never pleaded, even the effect of PANCH FAISLA on the joint status of the land was never pleaded in this preliminary objection. Only the word 'existence' of PANCH FAISLA was used as if it was a magical word by use of which in the written statement, the plaintiff can be non-suited. The Court was duty bound to put the defence to plead regarding status of the land whether it remained joint or not and if not which land allotted to which share holder and also whether the lands purchased in the name of Chakradhar were purchased from proceeds of joint land and what was the effect. The Court was duty bound to put the defence to plead regarding status of the land whether it remained joint or not and if not which land allotted to which share holder and also whether the lands purchased in the name of Chakradhar were purchased from proceeds of joint land and what was the effect. The Court did not ask the defence to plead properly. The procedure adopted by the two Courts were totally illegal. The Appellate Court in the impugned judgment has put reliance on the principles enunciated by this Court in a judgment cited at 1982 MPLJ 28 titled Kailasha Bai vs. Jhadin Bai. The Appellate Court has totally mis-read the ratio of this judgment. It is undisputed preposition of law that a plaint can be rejected only when on reading of the plaint itself, either it does not disclose a cause of action or it appears to be barred by some law. The Courts are not entitled to travel beyond the pleadings of the plaint. If the defendants plead that the suit is barred by some law because of some additional factors pleaded by him, then he has to establish these factors. It is not as if a defendant were saying that a dispute is referable to arbitration and therefore, he will plead no more and that the suit should be stayed u/s 34 of the Arbitration Act is decided. Section 32 of the Arbitration Act is in the following terms: 32. Bar to suits contesting arbitration agreement or award. - Notwithstanding any law for the time being in force, no suit shall lie on any ground whatsoever for a decision upon the existence, effect or validity of an arbitration agreement or award, nor shall any arbitration agreement or award be enforced, set aside, amended, modified or in any way affected otherwise than as provided in this Act. The wording shows that the suit which was barred should be challenging existence, effect or validity of an arbitration agreement or award to enforce it. There is no averment about arbitration agreement or award in the plaint in our case. The Supreme Court in case cited at Orient Transport Co. Gulabra and Another Vs. Jaya Bharat Credit and Investment Co. The wording shows that the suit which was barred should be challenging existence, effect or validity of an arbitration agreement or award to enforce it. There is no averment about arbitration agreement or award in the plaint in our case. The Supreme Court in case cited at Orient Transport Co. Gulabra and Another Vs. Jaya Bharat Credit and Investment Co. Ltd. and Another, has observed that section 32 of the Arbitration Act does not contemplate the case of a suit challenging the validity of a contract merely because it contains an arbitration clause. It was observed that sections 32 and 33 of the Arbitration Act have a very limited application namely; where the existence or validity of an arbitration agreement is challenged and not the contract itself containing the arbitration agreement is challenged. So a suit for declaration that there was never any contract or the contract was void, is not barred. In the present case, the suit is for partition of joint lands, the defendants have not pleaded that these lands had already been partitioned. Even if they had pleaded that the lands had been partitioned by the award, they could establish it. The defendants could not control pleadings of the plaintiffs in any suit. They have raised their defence and have to prove the defence. So the defendants have to prove the existence of an award which has effected partition between the parties which establishes that the disputed lands no longer remained joint between the parties. It might prove a good defence and plaintiffs may be debarred from challenging the award except in a manner required by sections 32 and 33 of the Arbitration Act. The genuineness of an arbitration agreement or award cannot be presumed by mere plea of defence. Further, it cannot be assumed that a particular agreement or award covered suit lands. All those questions of facts are to be decided on proof after the pleadings of the defendants. But, the pleadings were not obtained in this case. It appears that the Appellate Court looked at the award and the agreement for arbitration which was filed by the defendants and the trial Court looked at their photocopies to reach their conclusions. The plaintiffs have nowhere pleaded any fact about these agreements or award. But, the pleadings were not obtained in this case. It appears that the Appellate Court looked at the award and the agreement for arbitration which was filed by the defendants and the trial Court looked at their photocopies to reach their conclusions. The plaintiffs have nowhere pleaded any fact about these agreements or award. The copies of the alleged agreements for reference, which were signed separately by the two parties, referred to the names of Bhoopdeo and Jugruram and to the names of 11 persons as PANCHES. However the deciding PANCH FAISLA purporting to be dated 8-3-1961, purports to be signed by 17 persons as PANCHES and scribed by Liladhar. It does not bear signatures of at least two persons named in the alleged agreement of reference; these persons are Muchkundram and Maqsoodan. So, the men to whom there was no reference have signed the so-called PANCH FAISLA and some who were named as PANCHES did not sign it. It purports to be signed by both the parties; Dhebar Singh and Bhopal Singh, of course. So it may be a compromise or a settlement between the parties with the mediation of these persons; or whether it was an award, are questions which have to be decided after proper pleadings of the defence had been put in. This is so on the face of these documents which were looked into by both the Courts-below without asking the plaintiffs if they were parties to this. Such a course was impermissible to both the Courts-below. It is apparent that the Courts-below have proceeded totally in an illegal and impermissible manner in deciding the suit, rejecting the plaint on the plea of defendants as a preliminary plea without even going into the merits of the plea. The impugned judgments are liable to be set aside. This appeal is accepted and the orders of the Court-below are set aside. The case is remanded back to the trial Court for decision on merits. The Courts shall give opportunity to the defendants to put in detailed pleadings by way of written statement and after framing issues, will proceed to decide the case. The Court will not be precluded from framing any or all issues which may arise from the pleadings of the parties including preliminary issues, if any and to decide them on their merits including the issues regarding the award or agreement. Order accordingly.