Judgment 1. The order of the learned Single Judge dated 22.6.99 passed in C.W.J.C. no. 4423 of 1988 has been impugned by the appellant in this Appeal. 2. Factual backgrounds are necessary to be portrayed before appreciating the contentions made on behalf of the parties. 3. The Patna Regional Development Authority (hereinafter referred to as Authority) is the successor of the Patna Improvement Trust which ceased to exist with effect from 24.5.1975 by virtue of the Bihar Regional Development Ordinance and Act. The Patna Improvement Trust settled a vast area of land with brick manufacturing facilities in favour of the appellant in the year 1975 for certain period. The said lease came to an end in the early half of 1977 but settlement was extended for further period till June 30, 1981. The appellant even after expiry of the period of settlement did not vacate the land which necessitated for further extension of period of settlement. The Authority requested the appellant through notices to vacate the land but on appellants refusal instituted a proceeding under Section 85 of the Bihar Regional Development Authority Act, 1981 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) for the appellants ejectment from the land and also for the determination of damages payable by him for the period during which he occupied the land unauthorizedly. 4. The Vice-Chairman of the Authority, being the prescribed authority under the Act, heard the matter and by his order dated 25.4.1988 directed for the appellants ejectment within seven days from the date of that order and also to determine the amount of damages payable by him to the Authority. At this stage, it is necessary to bear in mind that initially against the notice issued to the appellant by the Vice-Chairman of the Authority he moved this Court in C.W.J.C. no. 5252 of 1987 but the same was not entertained by the Division Bench and with some observation the application was directed to be withdrawn by order dated 2.3.1987. The final order of the Vice-Chairman dated 25.4.1988 was challenged in C.W.J.C. no. 4423 of 1988 which was admitted on 12.7.1988 and operation of the order was stayed by this Court subject to the appellants depositing a sum of Rs. 50,000/- within one month from that order. Ultimately hearing was taken up in the year 1999. The final order of the Vice-Chairman dated 25.4.1988 was challenged in C.W.J.C. no. 4423 of 1988 which was admitted on 12.7.1988 and operation of the order was stayed by this Court subject to the appellants depositing a sum of Rs. 50,000/- within one month from that order. Ultimately hearing was taken up in the year 1999. The learned Single Judge after detailed discussion came to the conclusion that the submission made on behalf of the appellant had no force and thus dismissed the writ application directing the appellant tovacate the land within seven days from the date of that order failing which the Authority was given liberty to approach the Senior Superintendent of Police, Patna for taking forcible possession from the appellant. The Authority was directed to redetermine the amount of damage in terms of Section 82 (2) of the Act and to calculate the amount till the date on which the appellant hands over the possession of the land to the Authority. The writ petition was dismissed with costs of Rs. 3000/- which was to be paid to the Bihar Legal Services Authority. 5. Mr. Kanth, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant submitted that the provisions as contained in sub-sections (2) and (4) of Section 85 of the Act are ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution inasmuch the Vice- Chairman being one of the officers of the Authority could not have entertained the petition for ejectment filed by the Secretary of the Authority because a person cannot be a judge of his own cause. According to him, Section 3 provides that the Vice-Chairman is to be one of the members of the Authority and, as such, the provisions of sub-sections (2) and (4) empower the Vice-Chairman to act as a judge of his own cause. Learned counsel thus submitted that these two provisions violate the guarantee of equality and reasonableness of procedure as provided under Article 14 of the Constitution. 6. In our view, the contention of Mr. Kanth has no substance. From a bare perusal of different provisions of the Act it is clear that the same is self contained Act and notwithstanding anything inconsistent with another law, the provisions of rule and regulation made thereunder shall have effect. 6. In our view, the contention of Mr. Kanth has no substance. From a bare perusal of different provisions of the Act it is clear that the same is self contained Act and notwithstanding anything inconsistent with another law, the provisions of rule and regulation made thereunder shall have effect. Moreover, in view of Section 85 (2) (4) (Ng) the Chairman or another designated officer is empowered to act as civil court for the purposes laid down in Chapter IX of the Act. Similarly, there is a provision of appeal against the order passed by the Vice-Chairman or such designated officer, which is reflected in section 89 of the Act. It is well settled principle that a persona designata is being appointed by the legislature itself. In our view, the learned Sinigle Judge has correctly interpreted the provisions laid down in the Act and also the provisions as laid down in different Central and States Act in which a persona designata has been appointed by the legislature itself. The constitutional validity of sub-sections (2) and (4) of Section 85 of the Act was not entertained by the learned Single Judge also on the ground that the appellant did not make the State of Bihar a party-respondent in the writ application. Though Mr. Kanth has orally submitted that a prayer was made before the learned Single Judge for adding the State of Bihar as Respondent in the writ application and the same was not allowed by the writ court but there is no factual statement in the memo of appeal which can suggest that such a prayer was made and was negatived by the learned Single Judge. In absence of any such averment we are not inclined to agree with Mr. Kanth that such prayer was made but was rejected by the learned Single Judge. 7. The second contention of Mr. Kanth that since the lease was not terminated as required under Section 106 of the T.P. Act, the appellant cannot be evicted by virtue of the impugned order, in our considered opinion, is also devoid of merit. The reliance of Mr. Kanth on the decision reported in AIR 1984 SC 143 (Satish Chand Makhan and others vs. Govardhan Das Byas and others) and Pat. The reliance of Mr. Kanth on the decision reported in AIR 1984 SC 143 (Satish Chand Makhan and others vs. Govardhan Das Byas and others) and Pat. L.R. 1999 SC 58 (Rajendra Pratap Singh vs. Rameshwar Prasad) is misplaced inasmuch as the submission tends to completely overlook the fact that the Act is a selt contained Act and in view of Section 76 the provision of this Act and the rules and regulation made thereunder shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent with any other law. In such circumstances, the requirement of any notice under Section 106 of the T.P. Act is not required for eviction of the appellant from the land in question. 8. The learned counsel for the appellant having felt difficulty in (sicto ?) wriggle out from this position of law alternatively contends that even before exercising his power under Section 85 of the Act the Authority was required to issue notice to the appellant directing him to vacate the land as contemplated under section 82 of the Act. In this regard we may point out that in the plaint itself, which is annexure-5 to the writ application, specific averment is that the appellant was called upon by the Authority to hand over the said land with materials and also to deposit all outstanding dues of the Authority. On several requests it is stated, the appellant neither vacated the said piece of land nor delivered the vacant position to the Authority. This fact was also noticed by the Vice-chairman in his impugned order dated 25.4.1988. Before him, specific stand was taken by the appellant that no notice of termination of the lease was given under Section 106 of the T.P. Act. The Vice-Chairman found that there were at least three letters which clearly indicate that the notice of termination was given to the appellant. 9. No other submission was made to challenge the order passed by the learned Single Judge but at the end Mr. Kanth submitted that the appellant is ready and willing to vacate the land provided the Authority settles the amount, which is required to be paid by him. Learned counsel for the Respondent- Authority has urged that the appellant is required to pay more than three crores rupees to the Authority for such illegal occupation for a long period. In this appeal we are not required to decide this matter. 10. Learned counsel for the Respondent- Authority has urged that the appellant is required to pay more than three crores rupees to the Authority for such illegal occupation for a long period. In this appeal we are not required to decide this matter. 10. Having given our anxious consideration to the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the view that no ground has been made out by the appellant for interference with the order of the learned Single Judge. We find no merit in this appeal. It is, accordingly, dismissed. 11. The interim order dated 2.7.1999 is vacated and the appellant is directed to hand over the vacant possession within ten days from to-day, failing which the Authority-Respondent will be at liberty to take police help for his eviction. So far the determination of the amount of damages in terms of Section 82 (2) of the Act is concerned, direction of the learned Single Judge is reaffirmed.