JUDGMENT - S.S. PARKAR, J.:---The respondent-accused was convicted under section 184 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 for driving Matador at a speed in a manner which was dangerous to the public but was released after admonition under section 3 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. The State, being aggrieved by the release of the respondent after admonition, has preferred this appeal for enhancement of the sentence. 2. The brief fact, leading to the present appeal, are as follows :--- The respondent was employed as a temporary driver by the Telephone Department. On 15-7-1992 he was driving his employer's Matador No. MH-12/4006 on Pune-Bombay Road. He was taking Junior Engineer of the Department from Pune to Ghatkopar at about 7.30 a.m. in the morning. On the high way, after passing Vadgaon village, he was trying to overtake the truck and when he found another tempo coming from the front side in high speed, he had to immediately turn his vehicle on the left side which resulted in giving dash to the rear side of the truck. As a result of the said dash, the Matador suffered damage to the extent of Rs. 12,000/- as per the panchanama of the place of offence and the vehicle made on 15-7-1992. The Junior Engineer who was sitting in the tempo, left the place and proceeded to Bombay by different mode of transport. The respondent, therefore, went to the police station and gave the information to the police. His statement as above was recorded at the police station. The offence was registered under No. 97/92 by Vadgaon Mawal Police Station under section 184 of the Motor Vehicles Act and section 427 of Indian Penal Code. The respondent was prosecuted in the Court of J.M.F.C. Vadgaon Mawal, Dist. Pune in Criminal Case No. 1432 of 1992. 3. Thereafter the trial Court read out the above particulars of the offence to the respondent-accused. The respondent pleaded guilty. The learned J.M.F.C. accepted the plea of guilt as voluntary and convicted him under section 184 of Motor Vehicles Act but instead of sentencing him under the said provision, by his judgment and Order dated 16-7-1992 he directed the release of the respondent-accused on admonition under section 3 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. Hence, the present appeal by the State for enhancement of the sentence of respondent-accused. 4. Mr. Hence, the present appeal by the State for enhancement of the sentence of respondent-accused. 4. Mr. Galeria, the learned A.P.P. appearing on behalf of the Appellant-State contended that under section 184 of the Motor Vehicles Act the first offence of dangerous driving is punishable with imprisonment for a term of six months or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees and the second offence committed within three years thereafter is attended with more severe punishment and, therefore, the respondent should have been awarded at least the sentence of fine, particularly when the Matador belonging to the Telephone Department was damaged. Secondly, Mr. Galeria contended that even when the respondent-accused was released after admonition under section 3 of the Probation of Offenders Act he should have been directed to pay some compensation for the loss caused to the vehicle. 5. Under section 3 of the Probation of Offenders Act any person found guilty of having committed, inter alia, any offence punishable with imprisonment for not more than two years, or with fine, or with both, under Indian Penal Code, or any other law, and no previous conviction is proved against him, it is expedient to release him after due admonition having regard to the circumstances of the case. In the facts of the case I do not think that the discretion that is vested in the trial Court was exercised either illegally or arbitrarily and, therefore, the same does not call for interference. 6. So far as the first contention of Mr. Galeria is concerned, I see no legal flaw in releasing the respondent-accused after admonition under section 3 of the Probation of Offenders Act. It is not the case of the Appellant-State that the provisions of Probation of Offenders Act are not applicable to the cases under the Motor Vehicles Act and particularly the offence under section 184 of the said Act. It would not be expedient for this Court to interfere with the order of sentence passed in the exercise of the discretion by the trial Court whereby instead of sentencing the respondent-accused to either substantive sentence or fine he had been released after admonition. It would not be expedient for this Court to interfere with the order of sentence passed in the exercise of the discretion by the trial Court whereby instead of sentencing the respondent-accused to either substantive sentence or fine he had been released after admonition. The learned J.M.F.C. in his order has observed that the respondent was working temporarily in the Telephone Exchange, Pune and he was likely to be confirmed in his service in Telepone Department in near future and, therefore, leniency was shown to him by releasing him after admonition. It was further observed that there was nothing on record to show that the respondent accused was previously convicted and that any sentence, even of fine, if awarded to him, would have affected him adversely in his service. The apprehension of Mr. Galeria that in case second offence is committed by the accused the punishment for second offence cannot be imposed due to the release of the accused on admonition for first offence is misplaced as this offence will be considered as previous conviction in case further similar offence is committed by this accused. It may be stated here that the accused has been released after admonition under section 3 of the Probation of Offenders Act after his conviction under section 184 of the Motor Vehicles Act in this case. 7. So far as the second contention of Mr. Galeria is concerned, I find substance in it. The learned J.M.F.C. could have and should have, in the facts of the case, passed order under section 5 of the Probation of Offenders Act, directing the respondent-accused to pay reasonable compensation for the loss caused to the Telephone Exchange by the commission of the offence by respondent-accused, as it appears that due to the rash and negligent driving by the respondent-accused, the telephone department had suffered some losses. 8. Mr. Hardikar, the learned Advocate appearing for the respondent-accused, however, contended that power under section 5 of the said Act cannot be exercised by this Court in its appellate jurisdiction. 8. Mr. Hardikar, the learned Advocate appearing for the respondent-accused, however, contended that power under section 5 of the said Act cannot be exercised by this Court in its appellate jurisdiction. According to him, the order for compensation under section 5 could have been passed only by the trial Court while passing the order under section 3 of the Probation of Offenders Act and not by this Court in its appellate jurisdiction, as according to him appeal is not a continuation of the trial and that section 5 of the said Act requires the order of compensation to be made "at the same time" when the order of release after admonition was passed by the trial Court. 9. The said contention of Mr. Hardikar cannot be accepted as it is well settled that appeal is a continuation of the trial and the Appellate Court can exercise all the powers which the trial Court has. This Court in its appellate power is not barred from exercising power under section 5 of the Probation of Offenders Act while confirming the order of the trial Court releasing the accused after admonition. Though this Court has got power or jurisdiction in this appeal to pass further order for payment of compensation against the accused under section 5 of the said Act while confirming the order of release after admonition passed under section 3 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, I am reluctant to do so at this stage after a lapse of so much period, particularly when the employers of the respondent-accused had not moved in the matter for compensation and even the memo of appeal filed by the State does not make any claim in that behalf. It is only at the time of argument that Mr. Galeria made this submission, and in my view rightly, after he realised that I was not inclined to set aside the order of release after admonition passed by the trial Court under section 3 of the Probation of Offenders Act. Moreover the amount ordered to be paid as a compensation under section 5 of the Act of 1958 has to be taken into account before any order for damages can be passed in any Civil Proceedings that may be adopted against the accused and, therefore, I do not think it would be expedient to exercise power under section 5 of the Act at this stage. 10. In the circumstances, the impugned order dated 16-7-1992 passed by the learned J.M.F.C., Vadgaon Mawal in Criminal Case No. 1432 of 1992 is confirmed and the appeal is dismissed. Appeal dismissed. -----