JUDGMENT S.P. Khare, J. 1. This is defendant's second appeal under Section 100 C.P.C.. The substantial questions of law which were formulated at the time of admission of this appeal by the order dated 13-9-1995, are as under :-- (1) "Have the two Courts below erred in decreeing the claim of the plaintiff under Section 12 (1) (f) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 for the bonafide requirement of business of the husband of the plaintiff and her two sons, who were allegedly minor on the date of filing of the suit." (2) "Have the two Courts below erred in holding that the vendor, who sold the suit house to her, had valid title on the house in question". 2. There are concurrent findings of fact of the trial Court and the first appellate Court that the defendant was tenant of Mukund Das in the suit accommodation house No. 738 block No. 12, Wright Town (Narsinghdas Building), Jabalpur, at a monthly rent of Rs. 10/- since 1956. He was paying rent to Mukund Das. The plaintiff has purchased this house from Mukund Das by registered sale-deed dated 23-10-1973 (Ex. P-1) and the defendant became the tenant of the plaintiff. It has also been held that the suit accommodation had been let out to the defendant for non-residential purpose and the plaintiff bonafide requires this accommodation for the wholesale business of chemist which is being carried on by her sons in a rental shop and she has no other reasonably suitable non-residential accommodation of her own in her occupation for this purpose in the city. Thus the ground for eviction under Section 12 (1) (f) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act) was held to have been established and the suit for eviction has been decreed. The suit for eviction was filed on 6-2-1975 and since then more than twenty four years have passed. 3. The appellant is a senior Advocate and he himself has argued this appeal with the assistance of his junior. It is contended that under Section 12 (1) (f) of the Act there can be eviction for the requirement of "major sons" and in this case the sons of the plaintiff were minors on the date of the institution of the suit and therefore the suit could not be decreed. It is contended that under Section 12 (1) (f) of the Act there can be eviction for the requirement of "major sons" and in this case the sons of the plaintiff were minors on the date of the institution of the suit and therefore the suit could not be decreed. Appellant Shri R.P. Tiwari as D.W. 2 has admitted in cross-examination in para 38 that the plaintiff has two sons and they are above 18 years of age. This admission has been used by the trial Court in para 16 of the judgment for holding that the plaintiff's sons are major. Tarachand (P.W. 1) is husband of the plaintiff. He has deposed in para 5 that the age of his elder son is 20 years and the younger son is 18 years. In para 10 he has stated that the age of the elder son is 18 years and the younger son is 15 years. His deposition was recorded on 24-11-1977 and the evidence of the defendant was taken on 11-9-1980 in which he admitted that the sons of the plaintiff are major. Thus both the sons were major when the trial Court held by the judgment dated 29-8-1983 that the ground for eviction under Section 12 (1) (f) of the Act is established. That has been affirmed by the first appellate Court. Now both the sons are more than 35 years of age. The ground for eviction under Section 12 (1) (f) of the Act was pleaded by amendment in the plaint. In Chhotelal v. Akbar Ali AIR 1983 M.P. 50 , it has been held by a Full Bench of this Court that a ground for eviction which was not in existence at the time of filing of the suit, but came into existence during the pendency of the suit, can be made a ground for eviction by amendment of the plaint and a decree for eviction can be passed on such ground, if that ground is established by the plaintiff. 4. The Court can always take notice of subsequent events for the just decision of the case and mould the relief in the light of those events (Variety Emporium v. Mohd. Ibrahim AIR 1985 S.C. 207 ). 4. The Court can always take notice of subsequent events for the just decision of the case and mould the relief in the light of those events (Variety Emporium v. Mohd. Ibrahim AIR 1985 S.C. 207 ). As the landlord is required to show that the need subsists till the last decree, he can also show that his need has become more acute, Baba Kashinath v. Samast Lingyat 1994 Suppl (3) S.C.C. 698. As discussed above the sons of the plaintiff were major when the trial Court passed the eviction decree, it is apparent that the elder son is now about 40 years of age and the younger son has become 37 years of age. Therefore, the ground for eviction under Section 12 (1) (f) of the Act is fully established. The trial Court and the first appellate Court have concurrently upheld the plea of bonafide requirement in this case and that is not open to review in this second appeal except on the question of law which has been formulated on the point, whether the sons were major, when the suit was decreed. The question relating to the bonafide requirement does not give rise to any substantial question of law. (Ram Prasad v. Nandkumar AIR 1998 SC 2730 ). Concurrent findings of fact cannot be reversed in second appeal (Sheelchand v. Prakash Chand AIR 1998 SC 3063 ). The two Courts have not committed any error in decreeing the suit for eviction under Section 12 (1) (f) of the Act. The question No. 1 is answered in the negative. 5. So far as question No. 2 is concerned both the Courts have held that the defendant was tenant of Mukund Das in the suit accommodation and he has sold the same to the plaintiff by registered sale-deed and now he has become tenant of the plaintiff as per Section 109 of the Transfer of Property Act. The defendant was admittedly paying rent to Mukund Das and that is also evidence by the rent receipts Ex. D-3 and Ex. D-4. Therefore, the defendant cannot deny the title of Mukund Das and the concurrent finding of fact of the two Courts on this point is not liable to interference in this second appeal. It was also sought to be argued on behalf of the appellant that the sale-deed Ex. P-1 was not properly presented for registration before the Sub-Registrar. D-4. Therefore, the defendant cannot deny the title of Mukund Das and the concurrent finding of fact of the two Courts on this point is not liable to interference in this second appeal. It was also sought to be argued on behalf of the appellant that the sale-deed Ex. P-1 was not properly presented for registration before the Sub-Registrar. But that is not the subject matter of question No. 2. No question has been framed on the point of passing of title from Mukund Das to the plaintiff on the basis of registered sale-deed. The validity of sale-deed upheld by the two Courts is not covered by question No. 2. The question covers the dispute whether the vendor had valid title and that is answered in the affirmative as he was the landlord of the defendant. 6. This appeal is dismissed. 7. Before signing the judgment it has been pointed out by the appellant that the plaintiffs husband in his deposition in para 36 has admitted that the date of birth of his elder son is 27-11-1958 and the date of birth of his younger son is 28-10-1962 and therefore, they were minors on the date the suit was filed. As has been stated above the need of the sons was pleaded by an amendment on 6-10-1979. It has been further argued that the amendment in the plaint relates back to the date of the suit and therefore, if the sons were minors on the date of the institution of the original suit, it could not be decreed on the ground under Section 12(1)(f)of the Act. The view that has been taken by this Court is that the subsequent event can be taken into consideration by the trial Court and also by the appellate Court. On the date the decree was passed by the trial Court and also by the first appellate Court, the sons of the plaintiff were definitely major and therefore, the two Courts have rightly held that the ground for eviction under Section 12 (1) (f) of the Act is made out. If a subsequent event can be considered in favour of the tenant it should also be taken into account in favour of the landlord. To be literal is to see the skin and miss the soul. At the most the suit can be held to have been filed on the date both sons attained majority. If a subsequent event can be considered in favour of the tenant it should also be taken into account in favour of the landlord. To be literal is to see the skin and miss the soul. At the most the suit can be held to have been filed on the date both sons attained majority. Technicality should not triumph over substance. 8. It is also pointed out on the question No. 2 that earlier in Civil Revision No. 337 of 1977 this Court has held by order dated 7-5-1977 that the interrogatories could be delivered with regard to title of Mukund Das and, therefore, it must be considered whether Mukund Das was 'owner' of the house within the meaning of Section 12 (1) (f) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961. It is by now well settled that the landlord need not be absolute owner. If he is lessor or landlord and the tenant cannot deny his title in view of Section 116 of the Evidence Act the landlord or the lessor would be deemed to be owner within the meaning of Section 12 (1) (f) of the Act. In Dadanbai v. Arjundas (1995) 3 SCC 412 , the Supreme Court considered the meaning of 'owner' in Section 23-A (b) of the Act and held that a lessor whose title cannot be disputed by the lessee undoubtedly is owner at whose instance the proceedings for eviction were maintainable. The words used in Section 23-A (b) of the Act are the same as in Section 12 (1) (f) of the Act. The same view has been taken by the Supreme Court in Anar Devi v. Nathuram (1994) 4 SCC 250 and S.R. Sinha v. H. Banerjee. This Court took the same view in Asif Ali v. Rahandomal AIR 1986 M.P. 143 . As the defendant has been held to be tenant of Mukund Das on the basis of the material on record it is not necessary to trace the title of Mukund Das. Once the defendant is held to be tenant of Mukund Das he cannot question his title in view of the rule of estoppel in Section 116 of the Evidence Act. The plaintiff is transferee from Mukund Das on the basis of registered sale-deed. She would be 'owner' of the accommodation within the meaning of Section 12 (1) (f) of the Act. 9. This appeal is dismissed. The plaintiff is transferee from Mukund Das on the basis of registered sale-deed. She would be 'owner' of the accommodation within the meaning of Section 12 (1) (f) of the Act. 9. This appeal is dismissed. The appellant made an oral request for certificate of fitness under Article 134A of the Constitution of India for appeal to the Supreme Court. This appeal is being decided on the basis of law already settled by the Supreme Court. The case does not involve a substantial question of law of general importance which in the opinion of this Court needs to be decided by the Supreme Court. Therefore, this Court declines to grant such certificate.